A decade of light and shadow: Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s by Bajraj, Reynaldo F. et al.
A Decade of Light 
and Shadow
Latin America and the Caribbean 
in the 1990s
José Antonio Ocampo 
Juan Martin 
Editors
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC)
Santiago, Chile, July 2003 

A decade of light and shadow. Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s 

Libros de la CEPAL
The final version of this book was coordinated by José Antonio Ocampo, Executive 
Secretary of ECLAC and Juan Martin, former Director of the ECLAC office in Buenos 
Aires, with the collaboration of Reynaldo Bajraj, Deputy Executive Secretary. 
Individual chapters were written with the collaboration of Gabriel Aghón, Hugo 
Altomonte, Alicia Bárcena, Alfredo Calcagno, Beatriz David, Hubert Escaith, Ricardo 
Ffrench-Davis, Len Ishmael, Ricardo Jordan, Jorge Katz, Michael Mortimore, Edgar 
Ortegón, Ernesto Ottone, Juan Carlos Ramírez, Osvaldo Rosales, Pedro Sáinz, 
Fernando Sánchez-Albavera, Miguel Solanes, Ian Thomson, Andras Uthoff, Vivianne 
Ventura-Dias and Miguel Villa. Many staff members also assisted with contributions 
and comments, among them Eduardo Chaparro, Jaime Contador, José Durán, Myriam 
Echeverría, Ernesto Espíndola, Rolando Franco, José Javier Gómez-García, Johannes 
Heirman, Gunther Held, Jan Hoffman, André Hofman, Martín Hopenhayn, Keiji 
Inoue, Felipe Jiménez, Mikio Kuwayama, Arturo León, Juan Carlos Lerda, Luis Lira, 
Ricardo Martner, Sandra Manuelito, César Morales, Guillermo Mundt, Georgina 
Ortiz, Marcelo Ortúzar, María Ángela Parra, Wilson Peres, Nieves Rico, Iván Silva-
Lira, Giovanni Stumpo, Raquel Szalachman, Pedro Tejo, Daniel Titelman, Alejandro 
Vargas and Jürgen Weller. 
Cover design: Andrés Hannach 
United Nations Publication 
ISBN: 92-1-121401-7 
LC/G.2205-P 
Sales No. E.03.II.G.79 
Copyright © United Nations, July 2003. All rights reserved 
Printed in United Nations, Santiago, Chile 
Applications for the right to reproduce this work are welcomed and should be sent to the Secretary  
of the Publications Board, United Nations Headquarters, New York, N.Y. 10017, United States. 
Member States and the governmental institutions may reproduce this work without prior authorization, 
but are requested to mention the source and inform the United Nations of such reproduction. 
76





I. The global and regional context ......................................................... 27 
 1.  Loss of world economic dynamism and rising inequality .. 29 
 2. Trends towards greater internationalization in the new 
  world context ............................................................................. 36 
 3. Policies and agents of internationalization ............................ 42 
 4. Globalization of values ............................................................. 47 
 5. Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean.................. 51 
 6. Latin America and the Caribbean in a global context .......... 54 
II. Connections between the internal and external environments...... 59 
 1. International integration policies ............................................ 60 
 2. Changes in external trade and regional heterogeneity ........ 71 
 3. Size and composition of capital flows .................................... 83 
 4. International labour migration ................................................ 95 
III. Macroeconomic performance ............................................................. 99 
 1. Macroeconomic policy.............................................................. 99  
 2. Insufficient recovery of growth, investment and  
  productivity...............................................................................110
 3. Inflation......................................................................................120
 4. Financial crises..........................................................................122
ECLAC 6
IV. Structure and performance of goods-producing sectors................129
 1. Trends by broad sectors of economic activity ......................130
 2. The agriculture and forestry sector........................................138
 3. The mining sector .....................................................................151
 4. The industrial sector ................................................................158
V. Infrastructure service sectors .............................................................175
 1. Telecommunications ................................................................176
 2. Energy reforms .........................................................................180
 3. Drinking water and sanitation services.................................195
 4. Transport ...................................................................................203
VI. The social sectors .................................................................................215
 1. The region-wide demographic transition and the 
  failure to take advantage of the demographic bonus..........217
 2. Employment: low growth, the shift to services and the  
  increase in informal employment ..........................................223
 3. The persistence of poverty and inequality............................231
 4. Gender equity ...........................................................................243
 5. Public spending and reforms in the social sectors...............249
VII. Creating opportunities for sustainable development.....................261
 1. The international environmental context of the 1990s ........262
 2. Institutional progress in relation to environmental 
  management..............................................................................264
 3. Other actors ...............................................................................274
 4. Environmental policy instruments ........................................279
 5. Environmental developments in the region .........................284
VIII. Economic and social performance in the Caribbean.......................293
 1. Trade and foreign direct investment .....................................294
 2. Macroeconomic performance and reforms...........................302
 3. Production profile ....................................................................310
 4. Changes in the social structure...............................................313
 5. The environment and sustainable development..................318
IX. The restructuring of national territories ...........................................321
 1. Population distribution and geographical mobility ............322
 2. The politics and financing of decentralization .....................330
 3. Territorial heterogeneity..........................................................336
Bibliography ....................................................................................................341
A decade of light and shadow. Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s  7
Tables, figures and boxes 
Tables 
Table I.1 Annual growth rates, selected periods................................ 29 
Table I.2 World income inequality, 1988 and 1993 ............................ 33 
Table I.3 Trends in world income inequality, 1975-1995................... 34 
Table I.4 Real long-term interest rates in selected OECD 
  countries .................................................................................. 43 
Table I.5 Latin America: opinion polls ................................................ 53 
Table I.6 Levels of economic reform and rates of change ................. 56 
Table II.1 Tariff structure of the countries of the Latin American 
  Integration Association (LAIA), 1988, 1996 and 1999........ 62 
Table II.2 Latin America and the Caribbean: real effective 
  exchange rate indices for imports, 1991-1999 ..................... 65 
Table II.3 Growth in world merchandise trade, by volume 
  and value, 1990-1999 .............................................................. 72 
Table II.4 Export and import coefficients for Latin America, 
  1980-1981, 1989-1990, 1997-1998, and 1999.......................... 74 
Table II.5 Goods and services trade in Latin America and 
  the Caribbean, 1980-1999 ....................................................... 75 
Table II.6 Latin America and the Caribbean: terms of trade for 
  goods FOB/FOB, 1980, 1985 and 1990-1999 ....................... 76 
Table II.7 Composition of Latin American and Caribbean 
  exports, 1988 and 1998 ........................................................... 80 
Table II.8 Latin America and the Caribbean: exports, in total 
  and by subregional integration scheme............................... 82 
Table II.9 Latin America: sources of external financing ..................... 86 
Table II.10 Latin America and the Caribbean investment 
  strategies of the subsidiaries of transnational 
  corporations in the1990s ........................................................ 94 
Table II.11 Latin America: immigrant population by general 
  region of origin. National population censuses of 
  1970, 1980 and 1990 ................................................................ 95 
Table II.12 United States: immigrant population of Latin  
  American and Caribbean origin. National
  population censuses of 1970, 1980 and 1990 ....................... 97 
Table III.1 Latin America and the Caribbean: exchange-rate 
  regimes, 1999..........................................................................108
ECLAC 8
Table III.2 Latin America and the Caribbean: real effective 
  exchange rate for imports, 1990-1999..................................109
Table III.3 Latin America and the Caribbean: total and  
  per capita GDP.......................................................................111
Table III.4 Latin America and the Caribbean: growth differentials 
   between highest and lowest per capita income 
  countries,1980-1999 ...............................................................114
Table III.5 Latin America and the Caribbean: gross fixed 
  investment, 1971-1999 ...........................................................116
Table III.6 Latin America and the Caribbean:  total factor, labour  
  and capital productivity in selected periods,  
  1950-2000.................................................................................117
Table III.7 Latin America and the Caribbean: consumer price 
  index, December to December.............................................121
Table III.8 Latin America and the Caribbean: banking  
  problems in the 1990s............................................................125
Table IV.1 Latin America: output shares and growth rates at 
  constant 1995 prices, by sector or industry ........................132
Table IV.2 Latin America and the Caribbean (selected subregions 
  and countries): output shares and growth rates at 
  constant 1995 prices, by sector or industry ........................134
Table IV.3 Latin America and the Caribbean: the 500 largest 
  companies, 1990-1992, 1994-1996 and 1998-2000...............137
Table IV.4 Latin America and the Caribbean (19 countries):  
  growth in agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing........142
Table IV.5 Latin America and the Caribbean: agricultural  
  output growth........................................................................143
Table IV.6 Latin America and the Caribbean: structure and  
  growth performance of forestry exports ............................144
Table IV.7 Real price indices for selected commodities ......................145
Table IV.8 Latin America and the Caribbean (23 countries): 
  ranking by agricultural and non-agricultural labour 
  productivity............................................................................147
Table IV.9 Latin America and the Caribbean (16 countries):  
  indices of land concentration, 1969-1997............................149
Table IV.10 Latin America: ore and metal production..........................155
Table IV.11 Latin America: world export share of main metals, by 
  volume and value ..................................................................156
Table IV.12 Real price indices for the main metals ................................157
Table IV.13 Latin America (5 countries): changes in the structure of 
  industrial production ............................................................161
Table IV.14 Labour productivity gap between the region and  
  the United States, 1970-1999.................................................162
A decade of light and shadow. Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s  9
Table IV.15 Output, employment and labour productivity  
  growth in manufacturing .....................................................164
Table IV.16 Latin America and the Caribbean: competitive  
  analysis of nations (CAN) matrix, 1980-1996.....................166
Table IV.17 Latin America and the Caribbean: manufacturers 
  ranking among the 500 largest companies, 2000...............168
Table IV.18 Latin America and the Caribbean (15 countries):  
  share of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)  
  in total manufacturing employment and output ..............170
Table IV.19 Latin America (11 countries): industrial production 
  structure of small and medium-sized enterprises 
  (SMEs) .....................................................................................172
Table IV.20 Latin America (10 countries): output, employment  
  and productivity growth in small and medium-sized 
  enterprises (SMEs).................................................................173
Table V.1 Productivity in the telecommunications industry ............178
Table V.2 Latin America: economic coordination in the  
  electricity industry.................................................................183
Table V.3 Contracting arrangements in the oil and gas sector .........190
Table V.4 Coordination methods in downstream segments 
  of the natural gas industry ...................................................192
Table V.5 Latin America and the Caribbean: access to drinking 
  water and sanitation services...............................................198
Table V.6 Latin America and the Caribbean: private-sector 
  participation in water and sanitation services and 
  allocation of responsibilities.................................................202
Table V.7 Indices of changes in transport services consumption 
  and real prices, selected countries, 1990-1999....................214
Table VI.1 Latin America and the Caribbean: population  
  indicators by stage in the demographic transition............220
Table VI.2 Latin America and the Caribbean: age structure 
  indicators, by stages in the demographic transition.........221
Table VI.3 The demographic bonus: population growth by 
  age group................................................................................222
Table VI.4 Latin America (12 countries): percentage of women of 
   active age who are employed, by household income 
   level, urban areas, 1990 and 1997 ........................................224
Table VI.5 Latin America (17 countries): job creation by 
  employment category, 1990s................................................226
Table VI.6 Latin America (15 countries): job creation by  
  branch of activity, 1990s .......................................................227
Table VI.7 Latin America: poverty and indigence, 1980-1999............232
ECLAC 10
Table VI.8 Latin America: unemployment, employment  
  density and contribution of transfers to income 
  in households close to the poverty line, 1990s...................236
Table VI.9 Latin America and the Caribbean (17 countries):  
  earnings differentials in urban areas, 1990-1999 ...............241
Table VI.10 Latin America and the Caribbean (17 countries): ratio 
  of social spending to GDP over time, by sector.................250
Table VII.1 Topics included in the work programme of the World 
  Trade Organization (WTO) committee on trade and  
  environment ...........................................................................265
Table VII.2 Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): 
  environmental regulations and institutions ......................270
Table VII.3 Organizations represented on the business council 
   for sustainable development - Latin America 
  (CEDSAL) ...............................................................................276
Table VII.4 Latin America and the Caribbean: environmental 
  certification in the business sector.......................................278
Table VII.5 Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): 
  use of economic instruments for environmental 
  purposes..................................................................................284
Table VII.6 Latin America and the Caribbean: state of  
  conservation of land eco-regions.........................................286
Table VII.7 Latin America and the Caribbean: annual renewable 
  water resources per capita in countries where water 
  is scarcest, 1998 ......................................................................290
Table VIII.1 CARICOM: value and distribution of exports,  
  by main destinations, and of imports, by main sources...297 
Table VIII.2 CARICOM: net inflows of foreign direct investment, 
  1980-1999.................................................................................301
Table VIII.3 CARICOM: macroeconomic situation of the countries....305 
Table VIII.4 CARICOM: investment, saving and current 
  account balances ....................................................................308
Table VIII.5 CARICOM: structure of national economies .....................311
Table VIII.6 Selected Caribbean countries: population aged 60 
  and over, 1950-2000 ...............................................................315
Table VIII.7 Selected Caribbean countries: estimated  
  poverty levels .........................................................................317
Table VIII.8 Caribbean island states: annual rate of deforestation,  
  1990-1995.................................................................................318
Table IX.1 Latin America: 52 cities with 1,000,000 or more  
  inhabitants, 1950-2000...........................................................325
A decade of light and shadow. Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s  11
Table IX.2 Latin America: cities with 5,000,000 or more 
  inhabitants, 1950-2000...........................................................325
Figures 
Figure I.1 GDP growth in the main OECD countries, 1990-2000....... 30 
Figure I.2 GDP growth in the main developing and transition 
  regions, 1990-1999................................................................... 32 
Figure I.3 World export and output growth 1950-1999 ...................... 37 
Figure I.4 Foreign direct investment, by destination,1986-1999 ........ 37 
Figure I.5 International bond issues, by nationality of debtor ........... 38 
Figure I.6 Financial derivatives: annual transactions and 
  year-end balances ................................................................... 39 
Figure I.7 Ratification of human rights conventions ........................... 47 
Figure I.8 Reform indices, 1970-2000 ..................................................... 55 
Figure II.1 Trade and GDP growth in Latin America and 
  the Caribbean, 1990-1999 ....................................................... 73 
Figure II.2 Latin America: trade and the current account as a  
  proportion of GDP.................................................................. 74 
Figure II.3 Diversification of exports from Latin America,  
  between 1988 and 1998 .......................................................... 79 
Figure II.4 Latin America and the Caribbean: net capital 
  inflows and resource transfers.............................................. 84 
Figure II.5 Latin America and the Caribbean: external financing 
   and total GDP.......................................................................... 85 
Figure II.6 LAIA countries: net FDI inflows, by type, 1990-1999 ........ 88 
Figure II.7 FDI flows to Latin America and the Caribbean, 
  by main sources, 1990-2000 ................................................... 90 
Figure III.1 Latin America and the Caribbean: fiscal position of 
  central governments, 1980-1999 ..........................................101
Figure III.2 Latin America and the Caribbean: monetary indicators, 
   1970-1999.................................................................................105
Figure III.3 Latin America and the Caribbean: real interest rate on 
  deposits, 1985-1999................................................................106
Figure III.4 Latin America and the Caribbean: average real exchange 
   rate, 1979-1999........................................................................108
Figure III.5 Latin America and the Caribbean: GDP growth and net 
   resource transfer, 1991-1999 .................................................112
Figure III.6 Latin America: average GDP growth, 1945-1980  
  and 1990-1999.........................................................................113
Figure III.7 Latin America and the Caribbean: fixed capital 
  investment as a percentage of GDP, 1970-1998 .................115
ECLAC 12
Figure III.8 Latin America and the Caribbean: saving-investment 
  ratio, 1990-1999 ......................................................................118
Figure III.9 Latin America and the Caribbean: trade balance  
  and economic growth, 1951-1998 ........................................119
Figure III.10 Latin America: external debt and debt-export ratio, 
  1980-1999.................................................................................120
Figure III.11 Latin America and the Caribbean: median inflation, 
  1980-1999.................................................................................122
Figure IV.1 Worldwide exploration budgets, 1999................................154
Figure IV.2 Latin America: industrial output and GDP growth..........160
Figure V.1 Specific energy consumption per unit of output...............181
Figure V.2 Movement of containers .......................................................211
Figure VI.1 Latin America: per capita GDP growth and  
  unemployment, 1990s ...........................................................225
Figure VI.2 Informal economic activity and per capita GDP ......growth, 
1990s ........................................................................................225
Figure VI.3a Latin America: GDP and manufacturing employment ....228 
Figure VI.3b Latin America: GDP and employment in commerce 
  and services ............................................................................228
Figure VI.4a Latin America and the Caribbean (14 countries): real 
  average wages, 1988-2000.....................................................230
Figure VI.4b Latin America and the Caribbean (18 countries): real 
  minimum wage, 1988-2000...................................................230
Figure VI.5 Latin America (17 countries): urban poverty and  
  indigence.................................................................................233
Figure VI.6 Poverty and real gross national income per capita,
  1990-1999.................................................................................234
Figure VI.7 Poverty indicators, 1990s......................................................237
Figure VI.8 Latin America (13 countries): changes in income 
  distribution, 1990-1999..........................................................239
Figure VI.9 Latin America: average income in poverty line
  multiples and proportion of the economically 
   active population working in the informal sector, 
   by occupational category......................................................243
Figure VI.10 Latin America (17 countries): social spending,  
  1990-1991/1998-1999.............................................................251
Figure VI.11 Per capita GDP and social spending...................................252
Figure VII.1 Latin America and the Caribbean: percentage 
  of national land area classified as protected in 
  1990 and 2000 .........................................................................287
A decade of light and shadow. Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s  13
Figure VII.2 Latin America and the Caribbean: loss of natural 
  forest per annum in the periods 1980-1990 and 
  1990-1995.................................................................................288
Figure VII.3 Latin America and the Caribbean and developed 
  countries: industrial emissions of organic pollutants, 
  1998 and 1980 .........................................................................291
Figure VIII.1  CARICOM: crude birth and death rates and total  
  fertility rate, 1950-2000..........................................................314
Figure VIII.2 The Caribbean: male and female enrolment rates ............316
Figure IX.1 Latin America: average annual growth rates of  
  the total, urban and rural populations, 1970-2000 ............323
Figure IX.2 Latin America: total, urban and rural populations, 
  1970-2000.................................................................................328
Figure IX.3 The political aspect: directly elected mayors, a good  
  indicator of decentralization ................................................332
Figure IX.4 Local government spending in Latin American 
  countries .................................................................................333
Figure IX.5 Index of regional disparities ................................................338
Boxes 
Box IX.1 Innovation and progres with decentralization: some 
  success stories ........................................................................335

A decade of light and shadow. Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s  15
Foreword 
The 1990s were unquestionably a time of transition and reorientation 
in several aspects of Latin America and the Caribbean’s economic, social and 
political development. As in any period with these characteristics, the effects 
of long-standing processes mingled and interacted with incipient change. 
When the decade ended, ECLAC wished to contribute to the evaluation of 
the main events that marked the consolidation of reform in the region, 
recognizing of course that the speed of progress varied from country to 
country and from sector to sector. 
This publication offers an analysis of the international situation and 
the connections between this and the region; of new approaches to 
macroeconomic management, and the effects of these; of the development of 
production activities, both in the industrial, mining, agricultural and forestry 
sectors and in services; of developments in the social sectors, including trends 
in employment, poverty and income distribution, gender equity, the 
demographic transition, public social spending and social sector reforms; of 
the creation of sustainable development potential and territorial 
restructuring; and of economic and social developments in the English-
speaking countries of the Caribbean. 
As the title indicates, the picture is one of light and shadow, progress, 
stagnation and reverses: a chiaroscuro that not only gives a more realistic 
idea of the events of the period, but provides the basis for a more subtle 
appreciation of the main issues that are emerging on the regional horizon. 
José Antonio Ocampo 
Executive Secretary, ECLAC
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Introduction 
The most salient feature of the international situation in the 1990s 
was undoubtedly the consolidation of the globalization process. The 
heightening of United States supremacy, progress in creating a European 
bloc capable of playing a visibly assertive role on the world stage, rapid 
economic growth in China and India and headlong change in the former 
socialist countries were key aspects of this process. These changes were 
accompanied by the gradual construction of global markets. Although it 
was in the financial markets that the greatest integration took place, trade 
and investment flows expanded as well, and there was increasing 
diffusion of technological innovations originating chiefly in the developed 
countries. This process is still far from complete in goods and services 
markets, however, and labour mobility generally continues to be 
restricted. Meanwhile, greater interaction among sovereign States was not 
confined exclusively to economic issues. The 1990s also saw the gradual 
spread of ideas and values relating to human rights, political democracy, 
social development, gender equity, respect for ethnic and cultural 
diversity and environmental sustainability. Although undeniable 
progress has been made in all these fields, effective, concrete measures are 
only just beginning to be applied. 
An understanding of international developments in these different 
areas is essential if the changes seen over the decade in the countries of 
Latin America and the Caribbean are to be placed in perspective. 
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Politically, although certain countries still evince great and, in some cases, 
growing weaknesses, the main development was the spread of 
democratic government and the opening up of new channels for the 
exercise of citizenship. In the economic sphere there were profound 
reforms, centering on increasingly open trade, liberalization of domestic 
financial markets and external capital flows and a leading role for private 
enterprise in the production of goods and, increasingly, in the provision 
of public services and social benefits. 
These changes, of course, took place in a region whose countries 
vary in size, structure and development level and in their institutional 
characteristics, so that while their economic behaviour in the 1990s 
showed common patterns, there was considerable diversity as well. Thus, 
the substance of policy varied from one country to another in matters as 
important as the scope of privatization and the rules applying to capital 
movements, and there were wide variations in the approaches taken to 
economic restructuring. Within a general framework of liberalization, the 
countries’ production structures differed in their orientation and in the 
way they connected to the international economy. Broadly speaking, three 
specialization patterns can be differentiated in the region. In Mexico and 
some Central American and Caribbean countries, trade with the United 
States exercised a greater influence, and this was reflected in the export 
dynamism of manufactures incorporating a large component of imported 
inputs. In the countries concerned, this process was accompanied to a 
greater or lesser degree by a proliferation of productive linkages with the 
rest of the industrial system, and a rise in the volume of traditional or 
newly diversifying exports. In South America, by contrast, the influence 
of the United States economy on the goods and services trade pattern was 
less marked. Here, increased activity in foreign trade-oriented sectors 
involved natural-resource intensive goods and a more diversified set of 
exports within subregional integration schemes. Some countries also 
exported some labour-intensive manufactures and some quite 
technology-intensive products outside the area. A third pattern, which is 
characteristic of some Caribbean countries and Panama, is based on 
exports of services (primarily tourism, but including financial and 
transport services as well). 
When developments in the region during the 1990s are reviewed, it 
needs to be borne in mind that not only did national situations differ, but 
perceptions did not remain constant over the period either. The dominant 
view of events shifted as the decade wore on. In the early years, there was 
a quite widespread feeling of euphoria in most of the countries. Changes 
in the terms of access to international credit markets (lower interest rates 
and renewed capital flows into the region), the restructuring of several 
countries’ external debt under the Brady Plan, lower inflation and 
A decade of light and shadow. Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s  19
economic recovery (with some exceptions in the early years, particularly
Brazil before 1992) contributed to a perception that the 1990s were going 
to differ greatly from the “lost decade”, which had been dominated by the 
debt crisis and the consequences of the severe adjustment and 
stabilization programmes adopted. This initial success, however, 
produced at least two undesirable results. Firstly, it nourished simplistic 
views of extraordinarily complex problems of institutional transformation 
requiring sustained, coordinated effort. Secondly, eagerness to expand the 
role of the market gave rise to an attitude that discouraged collective 
action of any kind, and this went so far as to affect even areas where there 
was a recognized need for the public sector to renew and enhance its role, 
including traditional government functions and social policy. 
The events of late 1994 in Mexico, and the consequences of these for 
the other countries in the region, showed how vulnerable these economies 
were and at the same time called into question the simplistic view that 
reform would automatically lead to improved economic performance. 
Even before this, however, the need to attend to areas that reform had 
neglected, and to correct some of its unwanted effects, had already begun 
to be pointed out. The events referred to created a stronger and more 
widespread perception of this need. Nonetheless, while Mexico was 
obviously affected by the 1994 crisis, and Argentina was as well, the rest 
of the region escaped relatively unscathed. The limited extent of the crisis 
meant that while doubts were raised about the real soundness of the 
prevailing economic ideas, the effects on economic management in the 
vast majority of the countries were not great, and the incentive for change 
was reduced yet further by the strong recovery in economic growth in 
1996-1997. 
The crisis that began in certain Asian countries in 1997, and the 
financial problems subsequently suffered by other countries, had far more 
widespread and persistent effects in the region and consequently 
produced significant changes in the perceptions of economic agents, 
particularly in South America. The threats to social stability and the 
travails of democratic institutions in some countries, the climate of 
economic recession in 1998-1999 and the constraints experienced by a 
number of economies in their search for the path of sustained growth all 
help to account for this change. Towards the end of the 1990s, the feeling 
that generally prevailed was one of pessimism and bewilderment, in 
marked contrast to the early part of the decade. Out of this grew a 
perception that what was needed was a medium- and long-term vision 
capable of guiding efforts to build the future in the different countries and 
subregions of Latin America and the Caribbean and of helping to orient 
responses to different scenarios. 
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In Equity, Development and Citizenship (ECLAC, 2000a), ECLAC 
carefully considered how current approaches could be reoriented as part 
of a comprehensive vision of development. The analysis included in the 
present book, which lays more emphasis on the interpretation of recent 
history, also supplies information of value for this task. 
Chapter I looks at the main changes that took place in the 
international and regional economies. The global situation was one in 
which world economic dynamism was weaker than in previous decades, 
economic power became more concentrated and income distribution 
inequalities worsened, both among and within countries. The main 
achievements in the region were substantial trade growth and success in 
capitalizing on the greater availability of technological and financial 
resources resulting from higher foreign direct investment and a boom in 
various financial instruments. These positive changes, however, also 
brought weaknesses to the regional situation, partly because of the global 
dynamic, partly because of national policies. These weaknesses were 
reflected in trade and investment, but principally in the financial market. 
“Volatility” and “contagion” have been the terms most used to describe 
the main features of financial market behaviour. These characteristics, 
which led to frequent currency and financial crises, gave rise to a number 
of initiatives to reform the international financial system, an unfinished 
and still urgent task. In the region, the main events were economic reform 
and the advance of democratization. On the economic front, there was 
significant convergence in the orientation of economic reforms. The need 
to build on what had already been achieved, however, gave rise to a 
growing conviction that there were no easy, one-off solutions to be had. 
Perhaps the common feature was a conception of public life that 
transcended the sphere of the State as such, an approach that opens up 
opportunities for citizen participation and provides the basis for progress 
in resolving the crisis of national States and correcting both market and 
government failures. Again, the wide-ranging democratization process 
seen in the region was characterized by the acceptance of pluralism, 
increasing respect for civil and political rights and the election of 
authorities as the basis for the operation of the political system. These 
achievements, however, were not free of the shortcomings that are 
common to democratic systems the world over but that, for a number of 
reasons, particularly affect the region. Consequently, major efforts still 
need to be made to strengthen democracy by making the system more 
inclusive and by nurturing real citizenship. 
The connections between the region and the rest of the world are 
the subject of chapter II. The changes touched upon meant that growth in 
the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean came to depend heavily 
on the extent and quality of the region’s participation in the world 
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economy. The strategy of open regionalism made it possible to combine 
unilateral liberalization with negotiations in different forums to promote 
the liberalization of markets of concern to the region where old and new 
forms of protection still applied. Again, while net resource transfers into 
the region were positive in virtually every year of the decade, the 
volatility of capital flows varied from case to case. Foreign direct 
investment, for example, rose steadily. These large investment flows, 
most of which were from Europe (chiefly Spain) in the latter part of the 
decade, were driven by the different strategies pursued by transnational 
companies within the new global and regional context. Labour force 
mobility also increased, although it was subject to greater constraints. The 
main achievements in this area were export and foreign direct investment 
growth in a number of countries, renewed trade and investment growth 
within subregional integration schemes and the signing of numerous free 
trade agreements with other countries and regions. The main weaknesses 
were the region’s lack of export diversification, its low share of world 
trade, the numerous barriers that still hindered trade and the adverse 
effects of financial volatility on the dynamic of commercial transactions. 
The business restructuring that went on at the same time was 
characterized by the adoption of mainly defensive strategies by local 
companies, decreasing levels of internal linkage among the activities of 
transnational corporations and growth in profit remittances by such 
corporations. The most important of the tasks still ahead is to find ways of 
improving national and regional negotiating capabilities. Renewed public 
action of this kind, however, will have to contend with new challenges 
and constraints. Nationally, there is the need to produce effective 
development policies and regulations. Subregionally, there has to be 
greater macroeconomic coordination, and regulations will need to be 
harmonized in different economic, social and environmental fields. 
Internationally, developing countries should be seeking greater 
involvement in the design of global institutions and regulatory 
frameworks. 
Chapter III concentrates on analysing the macroeconomic 
management methods prevailing in the countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean, and the effects that these have had on economic 
performance. It also looks at how national financial systems reacted to the 
two crises that affected the region during the decade. The main 
achievements in this area included the taming of inflation and the 
correction of fiscal imbalances, two problems that had been endemic since 
the 1970s, while confidence in government management among domestic 
and external economic agents increased. Progress as regards economic 
growth, productivity and external vulnerability, however, was 
frustratingly slow. Although economic activity and investment levels 
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improved on the very poor performance seen during the “lost decade”, 
economic growth rates were only modest when compared with those of 
the three decades preceding the debt crisis. Recovery, furthermore, was 
not only weak but unstable, owing to the macroeconomic management 
styles adopted at a time of great volatility in the financial markets. 
Against this background, total factor productivity grew more slowly than 
was necessary to close the gap with the developed world to any 
significant degree. The trend of economic activity, furthermore, reflected a 
high degree of dependence on the vagaries of external financing. Other 
manifestations of this dependence were the greater sensitivity of the trade 
balance to economic activity levels and the tendency for domestic saving 
to be replaced by external saving. One important consequence of this was 
the frequency of domestic banking problems, which consumed enormous 
fiscal and quasi-fiscal resources in several countries. Accordingly, there is 
a need for regulation and prudential supervision to be strengthened 
further. Two other key requirements can be identified. The first is to 
adopt more active macroeconomic management procedures that use the 
instruments available more consistently and flexibly and take a 
preventive approach during the upswings of the economic cycle. The 
second is to implement a “liability policy” aimed at ensuring that an 
appropriate maturities profile is maintained with respect to both domestic 
and external public and private commitments. 
Chapter IV looks at changes in the structure and behaviour of 
goods-producing sectors. Owing to the impact of the economic reforms 
and the working through of longer-term processes, the relative 
composition, productivity, competitiveness and profitability of 
agriculture sector activities underwent major changes. At the same time, 
heterogeneity increased and new agents came to the fore within a context 
of profound change in sectoral competition conditions. In the case of 
mining, latent potential was strongly developed, although the degree of 
domestic processing applied to the products concerned fell in relative 
terms. In both sectors, progress was qualified by unfavourable 
movements in the international prices of many products and, in the case 
of agriculture, by market access restrictions in industrialized countries. 
Developments in manufacturing industry, meanwhile, were 
heterogeneous. In the South American countries, sectors producing 
tradable goods generally contracted and industrial output grew by less 
than total GDP, in marked contrast to the pattern seen over the three 
decades prior to 1980. As against this, in Mexico during the second half of 
the 1990s, and in a number of Central American and Caribbean countries, 
manufacturing branches maintained or increased their share of total 
output. The productivity gap with the developed world was not reduced 
systematically, and indeed grew wider in many countries and sectors. 
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Overall, the restructuring of these production sectors did not strengthen 
them sufficiently. The tasks still ahead include introducing more 
technology and know-how into all production chains while at the same 
time improving systemic competitiveness. 
The profound structural changes which affected service 
infrastructure sectors in the 1990s are analysed in chapter V. New 
providers came into the telecommunications, energy, sanitary services 
and transport sectors, most of them transnational corporations, along 
with a few large local conglomerates. The greatest changes were seen in 
energy and in telecommunications, the latter being a sector in which 
technological innovation was extremely rapid worldwide. In the water 
and sanitation sectors, there was a tendency for infrastructure and 
services to be franchised out, although the public sector continued to play 
an important role in the provision and, to an even greater extent, in the 
financing of services. Widespread as these tendencies were, services 
restructuring gave rise to a great variety of models that differed not only 
from one sector to another, but also from one country to another for the 
same sector. This diversity is explained by differences in the size and 
structure of markets, the real degree of competition that it was possible to 
introduce, the appearance of new products and services, the level of 
coverage and quality, and the environmental impact of different 
measures. Generally speaking, achievements included the extension and 
modernization of a variety of services, improved productivity both in 
these sectors and in the rest of the economy as a result of developments 
there, and the ability of some governments to attract substantial private 
investment, although in quite a number of cases this involved giving 
substantial profitability guarantees to the new agents. Particular mention 
should be made of the improvements achieved in the management of 
services, even where these were not privatized, as a result of clearer 
distinctions being drawn between the functions of sectoral development 
policy-making, regulation and services operation. The most common 
shortcomings were the absence or inadequacy of general rules to provide 
a framework for individual contracts, gaps in legal provisions and the 
deficiencies of regulatory bodies, which in some cases made the reforms 
rather unstable and resulted in returns being generated for certain sectors 
in ways that involved asset and revenue transfers. Continued progress 
with any aspect of service provision will involve dealing with the current 
regulatory deficit, something that largely entails strengthening 
institutions and improving information transparency. The rights and 
obligations of public- and private-sector service providers, governments 
and users also need to be better balanced. 
The social sectors, which are the subject of chapter VI, are the area 
where the greatest shortcomings can be perceived, and where most 
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remains to be done. Developments over the decade show how little the 
benefits of economic recovery and restructuring have spread through 
society, and reveal increasing heterogeneity. The most visible signs of this 
are the rise in open unemployment in several countries and the even more 
widespread decline in employment quality, which have prevented the 
region from making productive use of the “demographic bonus” resulting 
from relatively rapid growth in the working-age population and a decline 
in family dependency rates. On the social front, the most important 
achievement was the increase in public resources channeled into social 
spending, bringing this back up to the levels seen before the debt crisis. 
There were also improvements in the criteria and procedures for 
allocating social spending. Where criteria were concerned, the main 
improvement was in selectivity, as almost half of all social spending went 
to primary and secondary education, health and nutrition. Since demand 
for these services is disproportionately high in the lowest-income 
households, the result was greater progressivity. As regards allocation 
procedures, more decentralized systems were introduced and use began 
to be made of results-oriented management contracts and evaluation 
techniques based on indicators measuring the performance of public 
bodies. In a number of countries, private participation schemes were also 
developed for the provision of some social services. Although some 
progress was made with efficiency, private-sector suppliers generally 
concentrated on higher-income or lower-risk sectors, and this tended to 
undermine the principles of universality and solidarity. As regards 
poverty, there was a gradual decline from the high levels inherited from 
the 1980s, although this tailed off after the last crisis. The end result was 
that relative poverty levels were still higher at the end of the 1990s than in 
1980, and population growth and an increase in the size of poor 
households meant that the number of people in this situation grew. Poor 
households became more concentrated in urban areas, although in 
relative terms the highest levels of poverty, and particularly of indigence, 
were still to be found in rural areas. Income distribution continued to 
worsen as well, with some exceptions. Thus, economic recovery, lower 
inflation and higher public social spending were not enough to improve 
social equity. Progress was made with gender equity, however, although 
not to the extent that might have been wished. 
Chapter VII looks at progress in creating opportunities for 
sustainable development. The 1990s began with major changes in the 
international environmental agenda. The turning point was the “Earth 
Summit” (Rio de Janeiro, 1992), which laid the basis for a new world 
vision of sustainable development and for global conventions on 
emerging issues such as biological diversity and climate change. In the 
course of this process, awareness of the environmental aspects of 
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development, which had always been limited or even non-existent in the 
region, gradually percolated into the public and private spheres. As a 
result, institutions and government policies and strategies to promote 
sustainable development were created, and the issue began to feature in 
education, culture and the communications media. More recently, the 
subject has also been incorporated into subregional cooperation 
agreements and has influenced the practices of economic agents, 
particularly large firms. Despite these advances, many sectors continue to 
view the principles of environmental protection and sustainable 
development as a constraint on economic progress. As a result, and 
despite the achievements referred to, the ability of the public sector to 
check the increasing environmental damage being done to critical 
ecosystems and to control pollution has been limited. The bulk of the 
explicit environmental policies now applied are reactive in nature, as are 
the direct and indirect regulation instruments used in the region. 
Prevention and incentive policies to link improvements in environmental 
quality to industrial competitiveness have received much less attention. 
Again, environmental institutions are only just beginning to develop the 
capabilities they need to achieve the goals laid down in terms of effective 
trans-sectoral and subregional policies and to establish the countries’ 
international negotiating position. The consequences of these institutional 
shortcomings are particularly serious in cases where environmental 
damage is linked to national and subregional export structures and 
economic strategies. The most salient examples of this are provided by 
some new issues to which increasing attention is being paid in the 
international debate, such as biosecurity and the trade in genetically 
modified organisms, as the countries of the region are having to deal with 
transnational agents that are very well equipped to defend their interests. 
Chapter VIII contains an analysis of economic and social 
developments in the countries of the English-speaking Caribbean, a 
subregion that has special characteristics in a number of areas. The 
reforms initiated in the 1980s, the thrust of which was to make the 
subregion’s economies more open and to correct the external and internal 
imbalances inherited from previous decades, began to show results in the 
1990s in the form of economic recovery in a number of the larger 
countries and steady growth in the smaller States. At the same time, 
efforts to create a single market and economic area were intensified. The 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) welcomed new members, and its 
commercial and economic relationships were extended to some Latin 
American countries. In the social sphere, a continuing emphasis on equity 
was reflected in spending on education, health and poverty relief that 
generally exceeded the average for Latin America. Considerable progress 
was also made with gender equity. In another area, the adoption of the 
ECLAC 26
Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island 
Developing States focused the attention of policy makers on this issue. 
There are a number of weaknesses, however, that this progress has not 
been able to overcome. The economies of the subregion are undiversified, 
a large proportion of their exports is accounted for by a few products 
whose international market prices are very volatile, and trade preferences 
have been eroded. Furthermore, these countries’ land and sea ecosystems 
are often highly vulnerable to human action and to the natural disasters 
which frequently strike the subregion, and their small size and insularity 
increase the costs of doing business. The main challenge for the subregion 
in the coming years will be to adjust to the new liberalization conditions 
laid down by the Association Agreement with the European Union, 
which replaced the fourth Lomé Convention, and to the growing threats 
to its exclusive preferential access to the United States and Canadian 
markets. 
Chapter IX, lastly, looks at the restructuring of national territories. 
The region’s inhabitants settled new areas and moved between existing 
population centres, changing distribution patterns within countries. 
Economic activity went into crisis in some areas while in others it was 
vigorous, so that production was relocated on a large scale. As the 
countries in the region continued to urbanize rapidly, large cities showed 
their ability to adapt to the unfavourable socio-economic developments of 
the 1980s, but severe weaknesses remained. Thus, several of the region’s 
metropolitan areas became global cities, increasingly focused on the 
provision of services to companies and acting as business centres within 
the global economic system. The importance of medium-sized cities in 
supporting urban growth was also confirmed. The rural population 
remained very scattered, and this continued to limit its access to services, 
hinder interaction with the public sector and fuel emigration. Another 
noteworthy feature of the 1990s was the quickening pace of 
decentralization. In the political sphere, the number of unitary countries 
with directly elected local authorities increased. A very important 
endogenous change that accompanied this was the increase in the 
influence of social actors operating at a subnational level. In the economic 
sphere, the evidence shows that spending was decentralized most, while 
subnational tax collection and fiscal modernization proceeded more 
slowly. Decentralization as it now stands is also unsatisfactory and 
incomplete. The evidence available confirms both the need to strengthen 
the institutions and human resources that decentralization requires and 
the advisability of creating follow-up and evaluation systems to monitor 
this process.
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Chapter I 
The global and regional context 
The 1990s saw sweeping changes in international relations. The 
ending of the Cold War profoundly altered the climate of international 
affairs among sovereign nations, while the intensification and increased 
visibility of several localized conflicts gave rise to international tensions 
very different in nature to the kind of confrontation that had been the 
norm up until the end of the 1980s. 
While these trends had started to emerge in the 1970s, they 
strengthened significantly in the 1990s, owing particularly to the 
profound changes in the socialist world, which intensified after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall. The 1990s were marked by an increase in the military 
supremacy of the United States, by European attempts to create a bloc 
capable of playing a leading role in world politics and by the sudden 
transformation of the socialist countries. 
The current phase of globalization has economic and financial 
characteristics that, while new, are also part of a longer historical process. 
This process has set the stage for the world economy to become, over 
time, a single network of markets and production, rather than just an 
aggregate of national economies linked by trade, investment and financial 
flows. Thus, the economies of different States have undergone major 
changes that have alternately boosted and slowed economic activity in the 
developing countries. 
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Globalization is closely linked to the rapid spread of technological 
innovations, most of them generated in the developed countries. This 
phenomenon has penetrated almost all economic sectors, not only 
because of the abundance and diversity of innovations, but also because 
of the way these have been spread horizontally by activities that affect 
practically all production and service sectors. Changes in information and 
communications technologies are the prime example of this, as their very 
nature has made them at once a vehicle and a catalyst for the spread of 
innovations. Similarly, the impact of developments in metallurgy and 
biotechnology has been felt in some very large and, apparently, 
heterogeneous subsets of the production spectrum. 
The 1990s were also witness to the gradual spread of global ideas 
and values relating to the two facets of human rights —civil and political 
rights, on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights, on the 
other— and to social development, gender equity, respect for ethnic and 
cultural diversity and sustainable development. Much of the convergence 
of outlook achieved on these issues emerged at the global summits 
organized by the United Nations. 
It is within the framework created by these developments that 
events in Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s have to be 
understood. At the political level, democracy spread and new citizen 
participation structures emerged although these important achievements 
were not free from problems and shortcomings. Throughout much of the 
region’s economy, meanwhile, thorough-going reforms were introduced, 
the thrust of these being to free up trade and liberalize national financial 
markets and capital flows with the outside world. 
1. Loss of world economic dynamism and rising 
inequality 
(a) Economic dynamism 
In the 1990s, world economic growth was a mere 2.4%, the lowest 
rate recorded in any decade since the Second World War. To a very large 
extent, this average reflects the sluggish performance of the developed 
countries (2.2%), the sharp contraction in Eastern Europe (-3.6%) and slow 
growth in Africa (2.2%). On the other hand, Asia recorded strong growth 
rates (6.5%) and improvements were noted in Latin America and the 
Middle East, where annual growth rates were 3.2% and 3.3%, 
respectively, as shown in table I.1. 
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Table I.1 
ANNUAL GROWTH RATES, SELECTED PERIODS 














1950-1960 4.4 4.1 5.1 4.9 4.5 5.7 5.7 9.2 
1960-1973 5.1 5.0 5.5 5.5 5.0 5.2 7.7 6.7 
1973-1980 3.4 3.0 5.3 5.1 3.5 6.2 4.8 4.3 
1980-1990 3.1 3.1 3.7 1.4 2.5 6.8 1.5 2.6 




        
1950-1960 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.2 2.0 3.6 2.9 8.2 
1960-1973 3.1 4.1 3.0 3.3 2.5 2.9 4.8 5.5 
1973-1980 1.6 2.3 3.0 2.3 0.3 4.2 1.9 3.3 
1980-1990 1.4 2.0 1.6 -0.1 -0.1 4.9 -1.6 1.9 
1990-1999 0.8 1.8 2.6 1.3 -0.4 5.4 1.0 -3.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures taken from the following yearbooks: United Nations, World 
Economic and Social Survey, New York, and Demographic Yearbook, New York; United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Handbook of International Trade and Development 
Statistics, Geneva, and Trade and Development Report, Geneva; International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
International Financial Statistics Yearbook, Washington, D.C.; Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), 
Trends in Europe and North America: Statistical Yearbook of the ECE; and Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean,
Santiago, Chile. The developing countries do not include Eastern Europe. Regional aggregates are 
calculated in constant 1995 dollars. 
Among  the  developed  countries,  there was  a  marked  contrast 
—especially after 1992— in relative growth patterns between countries, 
in particular between the performance of the United States, on the one 
hand, and that of Europe and Japan, on the other (see figure I.1). The 
United States recorded 3.1% annual growth over the decade, with 
expansion accelerating in the second half, when annual rates were of the 
order of 4%. On the other hand, Japan, which had typically recorded 
high growth rates in the postwar era, averaged only 1.1% per year 
during the decade, with negative rates in 1998. Europe, with a rate of 
2.3%, was close to the world average, a sharp fall in the early years of 
the decade being followed by renewed growth from 1994 onward. 
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Figure I.1 
GDP GROWTH IN THE MAIN OECD COUNTRIES, 1990-2000 
(Percentages) 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Economic Outlook 
Database, 2001. 
The growth patterns of the developed countries were marked by 
major macroeconomic disequilibria. Even the United States, which 
combined the strongest relative growth with low unemployment (4.2% in 
1999) and successfully turned its chronic fiscal deficit into a surplus, had a 
large and growing trade deficit and, from 1998 onwards, low household 
savings rates as well. The legacy of Japan’s financial crisis was a seriously 
weakened banking sector, a private sector with a low propensity to spend, 
a lower investment rate, higher unemployment (up from 2.5% in 1985-
1995 to 4.6% in 1999) and rising public debt, as the public sector took it 
upon itself to sustain demand by running (fiscal) deficits year after year 
(3.4% of GDP in 1997, 6.0% in 1998 and 7.6% in 1999). 
The need for macroeconomic convergence to strengthen the 
European Union (EU) was the dominant theme in Western Europe. Under 
the Maastricht Treaty (1992), limits were set not only on budget deficits 
and public debt, but also on the amount by which the inflation rate in any 
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Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the Stability and Growth Pact was established 
as a medium-term macroeconomic policy convergence mechanism for 
countries wishing to enter the euro zone (European Monetary System). 
Within the same framework, progress began to be made in addressing the 
problem of unemployment, which averaged around 10% in the EU 
countries in the 1990s. In Luxembourg (1997), measures to coordinate EU 
employment policy guidelines with national plans of action were agreed 
upon. In Cardiff (1988), emphasis was placed on the need to standardize 
structural reforms in labour, product and capital markets against a 
background of sound fiscal policy, with a view to promoting European 
competitiveness and eliminating the remaining restrictions and 
regulations. Under the Employment Pact (Cologne, 1999), a biannual 
conference of ministers of economic affairs and labour was set up to 
examine growth and employment issues. 
Developing countries, including the transition economies of 
Eastern Europe, entered the 1990s with widely varying growth rates, as 
shown in figure I.2. The South-East Asian nations, together with China 
and India, displayed buoyant growth, the most notable case being China, 
whose output expanded by 150% between 1990 and 1999. As is well 
known, the severe crisis that struck four major South-East Asian countries 
in 1997 and 1998 seriously disrupted international financial markets.1
Latin America, the Middle East and Africa recorded moderate growth 
rates throughout the decade, while Eastern Europe contracted sharply 
(although there were marked differences between individual countries). 
Thus, with the exception of Asia, the per capita income gap between the 
developing world and the developed countries widened during 
this period. 
Another notable trend in the 1990s was the significant decline of 
inflation in different groups of countries, especially those of Latin 
America. In this region, inflation fell from an annual average of 670% in 
1990-1993 to a single-digit rate in 1999.2 Less spectacular, but also 
significant, was the fall in inflation rates in the industrialized countries 
from about 12%, 9% and 5% in Europe, the United States and Japan, 
respectively, in 1981 to approximately half those levels in the early 1990s 
and then, in 1998-1999, to between 1% and 2% in the United States and EU 
and to less than zero in Japan. This trend reached critical proportions 
during the recent international financial crisis, when falling nominal 
prices for manufactures and many raw materials prompted some pundits 
to warn against the risks of global deflation. 
1 By 1999, these countries, with the exception of Indonesia, had already made a strong 
come back. For an analysis of the Asian crisis, see ECLAC (1998a). 
2 This is a population-weighted average of national changes in the consumer price index.  
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Figure I.2 
GDP GROWTH IN THE MAIN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION REGIONS, 
1990-1999
(Percentages) 
Source: Estimates based on figures from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and United Nations, World Economic and Social Survey,
New York, for the period 1990-1998, and from ECLAC, LINK Project and World Economic and Social 
Survey, New York, for 1999. 
(b) Growing inequality 
Several analysts have pointed to the sharp disparities in world 
income distribution that existed in the early 1990s, when the Gini 
inequality index stood at over 0.63 (Chotikapanich, Valenzuela and Rao, 
1997; Bourguignon and Morrison, 2002; Milanovic, 1998; and UNDP, 
1999a). A recent study (Milanovic, 1999) also shows that, among a sample 
of 91 countries, these disparities increased by 0.006 points per year in the 
early part of the decade, or, to put it more clearly, the ratio between the 
average incomes of the highest-income 5% and the lowest-income 5% in 
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the world distribution rose from 78 to 1 (1988) to 114 to 1 (1993).4 The 
figures also show that, in 1993, a citizen whose income was the average 
for the lowest decile in the United States was better off than two thirds of 
the people in the world. 
As table I.2 shows, differences between countries accounted for 
88% of income disparities. The largest countries, situated at one or other 
extreme of the world income distribution, were the ones that contributed 
most to the increase in inequality, a configuration that has been described 
as “the twin peaks” (Quah, 1997). One of these extremes was represented 
by the rural and urban population of India and Indonesia and by the rural 
population of China, which accounted for 42% of world population but 
only 9% of world income. At the other extreme were France, Germany, 
Japan, United Kingdom and the United States, which had 13% of the 
world’s population but 45% of world income. Countries with large 
populations but medium income levels, such as Brazil, Mexico and 
Russia, or low incomes, such as Nigeria, also contributed, albeit to a lesser 
extent, to the disparity in world income distribution. 
Table I.2 
WORLD INCOME INEQUALITY, 1988 AND 1993 
(Distribution of population by per capita income)a
 Gini 1988b Gini 1993b
Inequality between countries 55.1 (88%)c 57.9 (88%) 
Inequality within countries 1.3 (2%) 1.3 (2%) 
Residual componentd  6.4 (10%)  6.8 (10%) 
Total inequality 62.8 66.0 
Number of countries 91 91 
Average per capita income 2 450 3 160 
Standard deviation 2 552 3 591 
Coefficient of variation 1.04 1.14 
Source: Branko Milanovic, “True World Income Distribution, 1988 and 1993”, Policy Research Working 
Paper, No. 2244, Washington, D.C., World Bank, 1999. 
a
 Calculated on a purchasing power parity basis. 
b Index values were multiplied by 100. 
c
 The figures in brackets represent the contribution to total inequality. 
d
 The residual component is the share of inequality that is due to the mix of persons from higher and lower 
per capita income countries, as certain individuals from lower per capita income countries have higher 
incomes than certain individuals from higher per capita income countries. 
This increase in polarization among regions was accompanied by 
rising inequality within countries (Cornia, 1999), as shown in table I.3. 
4 These figures are based on studies in which incomes are calculated on a purchasing 
power parity basis, inequalities are heightened considerably when current money values 
are used. 
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This confirms the persistence of a trend that has been evident in a wide 
range of countries over the last quarter of a century. 
Table I.3 
TRENDS IN WORLD INCOME INEQUALITY, 1975-1995 
(Percentages of countries in terms of population)







Industrialized countries 71.8 1.2 27.0 0.0 
Eastern Europe 98.1 0.0 0.0 1.9 
Former Soviet Union 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Latin America 83.8 0.0 11.4 14.0 
Southern Asia and Middle 
East 1.4 70.2 14.4 14.8 
East Asia 79.4 4.4 16.1 0.1 
Africa 31.6 11.9 7.7 48.8 
Worlda 56.6 22.1 15.6 5.7 
Source: Giovanni Andrea Cornia, “Liberalization, Globalization and Income Distribution”, Working Papers, 
No. 157, Helsinki, United Nations University (UNU)/ World Institute for Development Economics Research 
(WIDER), March 1999.  
a
 Sample of 77 countries accounting for 81.7% of world population and 95.0% of world GDP, incomes 
calculated on a  purchasing power parity basis. 
Thus, countries in which income distribution became more unequal 
in the period 1975-1995 accounted for 56.6% of the combined population 
of the 77 included in the survey. Only 15.6% lived in countries that 
showed declining levels of inequality, most of which were in Asia. The 
rest, 27.8%, were the inhabitants of countries where inequality levels 
remained stable or showed no discernible pattern over the period. 
In the case of the industrialized countries, this trend in income 
distribution was more marked, with 71.8% of the population living in 
countries where inequality was growing and 27.0% in countries where it 
was diminishing. According to various studies (Atkinson, 1996 and 1999 
and Cornia, 1999), worsening inequality was due to an increase in wage 
differentials, attributable mainly to the diminishing power of workers’ 
organizations, to the impact of trade liberalization and to technical 
progress, which raises the skill levels required of the workforce. Those 
countries where wages continued to be set centrally (Germany and Italy) 
and where a more significant role for workers’ organizations was 
combined with protection for minimum wages (France) managed to 
cushion the impact of these factors. By contrast, Australia, New Zealand, 
the United Kingdom and the United States, where wage negotiations are 
decentralized and labour markets are more flexible, recorded the sharpest 
increases in income inequality. 
The transition economies of the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe suffered the most severe deterioration in income distribution, 
with inequality rising in practically all the countries in these two groups. 
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Between 1987-1988 and 1993-1995, the Gini coefficient rose from 0.23 to 
0.47 for Ukraine, from 0.24 to 0.48 for Russia, from 0.23 to 0.37 for 
Lithuania, from 0.21 to 0.23 for Hungary and from 0.26 to 0.28 for Poland 
(Milanovic, 1998). In these cases, too, greater wage dispersion became the 
norm as certain professions began to command scarcity incomes and 
minimum wages fell. 
The developing regions show wider variations. Thus, in East Asia, 
inequality worsened overall, rising in countries that accounted for 79.4% 
of the region’s population; this trend largely reflects the growing 
differentiation between urban and coastal zones of China and the 
country’s rural areas. At the same time, however, East Asia had a higher 
percentage of people residing in countries in which inequiality is 
declining (16.1%) than any other developing region. Conversely, in 
Southern Asia and the Middle East, the majority of the population (70.2%) 
lived in countries where inequality rates remained stable or declined 
(14.4% of the population). In both cases, the disparities were due to 
differences between rural and urban locations or between coastal and 
inland regions and, increasingly, to wage differentials. The distinctive  
feature of Africa was the large number of countries —accounting for 
48.4% of the region’s population— in which no distribution trend could 
be identified. There again, growing income inequality (found in countries 
accounting for 31.6% of the region’s population) was largely the result of 
deepening divisions between rural and urban areas. 
The vast majority of Latin America’s population (83.8%) lives in 
countries where the inequality of income distribution increased in 1975-
1995, from levels that were already the world’s worst. Thus, the sharp 
deterioration which was a specific feature of Latin America during the 
1980s was not halted in the 1990s. Worsening distribution was associated 
with structural changes that led to asymmetry between the expansionary 
and contractionary phases of the economic cycle, which were not only 
pronounced in the last quarter of the twentieth century, but followed one 
another in quick succession. The income shares of lower-income sectors 
fell disproportionately during the recessionary phases, while the 
weighting of higher-income sectors increased by more than the average 
during upturns. The same holds true for the poor population; it has been 
estimated (Cornia, 1994) that poverty increased by 1.8% for each 
percentage point fall in output in the recessionary phases, while it 
diminished by only 0.6% for each percentage point of growth in 
the upturns.
This overall situation suggests that new factors strongly conducive 
to greater income inequality were at work, compounding traditional ones 
such as asset distribution and access to education. These new factors, 
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whose origins can be traced to globalization and certain national policy 
positions, were the decline in the share of total income accounted for by 
wage earnings and the concomitant rise of financial income and corporate 
profits, growing polarization of pay by skill levels, and the erosion of the 
State’s ability to redistribute income through taxes and transfers. 
However, the relative impact of one or other of these groups of factors, or 
of their individual components, varied from one region to another and 
even among countries within each region. 
2. Trends towards greater internationalization in the 
new world context
(a) Quantitative aspects of globalization 
Policies promoting the internationalization of societies and, in 
particular, of economies, triumphed in the 1990s. International trade grew 
by close to 7% per year, foreign direct investment (FDI) increased almost 
twenty-fold compared with the 1970s to top US$ 640 billion in 1999, and 
daily transactions on foreign-exchange markets, most of them purely 
financial in nature, had reached US$ 1.4 trillion by the end of the decade. 
One of the main manifestations of this trend was an increase in the 
ratio of international trade growth to output growth. Figure I.3 shows 
that, after slowing between 1973 and 1990, world trade, in constant 
values, returned to annual growth rates similar to those recorded in the 
first decades following the Second World War. This expansion coincided 
with a slowdown in world output growth, with the result that the ratio 
between the two variables in the 1990s, at almost 3:1, was the highest 
since the war. 
Figure I.4 shows the renewed strength of FDI. Reciprocal flows 
between industrialized countries continued to be the most substantial, 
and investment of this type was particularly strong within Western 
Europe. Nevertheless, the share of other regions, including Latin America, 
East and South-East Asia and, above all, China, also increased. Between 
1992 and 1999, China accounted for close to one third of all FDI flows to 
developing countries. The surprising upsurge in cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions led to these accounting for a very substantial proportion 
of FDI, up from 44% of the total in the period 1990-1992 to as much as 70% 
in 1999 (UNCTAD, 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2001). 
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Figure I.3 
WORLD EXPORT AND OUTPUT GROWTH, 1950-1999 
(Percentages and quotients) 
Source: Table I.1 and estimates based on IMF figures. 
Figure I.4 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, BY DESTINATION, 1986-1999 
(Billions of dollars) 
<<Insert figure 1.4>> 
<<Foreign direct investment, by destination>>
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report, 
1998: Transnational Corporations, Market Structure and Competition Policy (UNCTAD/WIR/1998), New 
York, 1998. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.98.II.D.5, World Investment Report, 1999: FDI and 
the Challenge of Development (UNCTAD/WIR/1999), New York, 1999. United Nations publication, Sales 
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Growth in international trade and foreign direct investment was 
matched by a similar expansion in international financial flows, one 
indicator of which was the growth in assets held by banks from the major 
industrialized countries in the rest of the world.5 Between June 1991 and 
December 1997 (that is, between the virtual end of the debt crisis and the 
start of the Asian crisis), these balances grew at a rate of 10% per year, 
from US$ 1.1 billion to US$ 1.9 billion. In 1998, total balances contracted 
by 7%, owing mainly to the fall experienced by the Asian countries (30%). 
This downward trend was maintained in 1999, although it was less sharp, 
with assets contracting by 1.4%. 
The sums involved in international bond issues were even larger, 
with balances climbing from US$ 1.8 trillion at the end of 1991 to US$ 5.1 
trillion in December 1999. Annual issues grew significantly in the second 
half of the decade, with emerging markets accounting for a slightly higher 
share, especially in 1996 and 1997, as can be seen in figure I.5. This share 
fell substantially in the last quarter of 1997 and again from mid-1998, to 
stand at only 3.0% in the second half of 1999. 
Figure I.5 
INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES, BY NATIONALITY OF DEBTOR 
(Billions of dollars) 
Source: Bank for International Settlements (BIS), International Banking and Financial Market 
Development, Basle, various issues. 
5 These are the positions that banks reporting to the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) have in countries outside the BIS zone (these are mainly developing countries and 
offshore financial centres). The figures are taken from BIS, The maturity and sectoral 
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Lastly, the value of outstanding derivatives (futures and options) 
grew by an average annual rate of 25% in the 1990s, topping US$ 13 
trillion in late 1999. Transactions in these instruments on organized 
markets recognized by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
swelled to almost US$ 400 trillion per year, as shown in figure 1.6. The 
collapse of major intermediaries resulting from the successive crises of 
1997 and 1998 severely affected this market, reducing net balances by 
US$ 2.7 trillion (or 17%) in the last quarter of 1998. This prompted doubts 
about the operations of certain financial agents who managed, with little 
capital, to acquire huge liabilities. These concerns led to a series of 
initiatives aimed at increasing regulation and supervision of such agents.6
Figure I.6 
FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ANNUAL TRANSACTIONS AND YEAR-END BALANCES 
(Billions of dollars) 
Source: Bank for International Settlements (BIS), International Banking and Financial Market 
Development, Basle, various issues. 
6 The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and, more recently, the Financial Stability 
Forum have analysed the risks that the activities of highly leveraged financial 
institutions represent for banks. The Committee has noted that banks did not have 
effective policies for administering their exposure towards such clients. In particular, 
assessments of the creditworthiness of such institutions were hampered by the limited 
availability of financial information; lending decisions were to some extent based on 
unsystematic estimates of risk and on the reputation and perceived risk management 
capabilities of the institutions in question. In the report, it was also pointed out that 
banks had no set of established criteria for making proper assessments of their exposure 












































Globalized financial capital seems to be increasingly disengaged 
from the real economy, despite the fact that its theoretical function is to 
finance it. Even on the most generous estimates, barely 8% of the US$ 1.3 
trillion to US$ 1.5 trillion that changes hands each day on the foreign-
exchange markets relates to commercial payments between countries or 
direct investments abroad (Chesnais, 1997). Financing provided to non-
financial agents creates the basis for an inverted pyramid of derivatives 
which inflate the assets and liabilities of intermediaries and give financial 
investors a whole range of options for employing their capital that bear no 
direct relationship to any real investment or commercial transaction. 
The speed with which international economic transactions 
expanded in the 1990s was in inverse proportion to the strength of their 
relationship with national output growth in the countries concerned. 
Thus, trade grew more rapidly than output, but more slowly than bank 
credits and much more slowly than international bond issues. The 
increase in outstanding derivative balances was much greater still, 
although it should be recalled that these do not relate only to international 
transactions. 
What all this makes clear is that the spread of globalization did not 
lead to greater economic growth in the 1990s. The impact of trade on 
growth weakened, and only when FDI was used for new investment did 
it have a positive and direct influence on the rate of expansion. 
Furthermore, this remarkable financial boom generated crisis situations 
without stimulating the economy to the extent expected. 
(b) Technological innovations, deregulation and concentration of 
economic power 
Globalization is a phenomenon that far transcends trade, FDI and 
financial flows. Indeed, its reach is spreading, something that was 
particularly noticeable in the 1990s. The increasing rapidity with which 
technological innovations are being generated and diffused is giving rise 
to profound changes in lifestyles, social organization and production 
activities. It is still too soon to evaluate the true scale of the effects on the 
economy, but there is no doubt that production functions and potential 
and the quantity and quality of goods and services have already changed 
significantly. Administrative innovations, introduced in conjunction with 
new machinery and equipment in markets of different sizes, have given 
rise to very different combinations of capital and labour. In the financial 
sector, in particular, the development of communications technologies 
has made real-time operations that transcend national frontiers a matter 
of routine. 
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The position of developing countries in this new international 
environment is multi-faceted, long determined by their access to new 
technologies, products and information of many kinds. Reference should 
be made, in particular, to the relationships between new types of financial 
linkage and modes of national development. Economic links between 
private banks and pension and investment funds in developed countries 
and the private sector in developing countries have, to a large extent, 
replaced the old government-to-government relationships. Official 
development assistance has dwindled so much that in recent years it has 
stood at barely a third of the international goal of 0.7% of GDP set for the 
industrialized countries. The bulk of lending by multilateral banks, which 
formerly supported the expansion of physical and productive 
infrastructure in developing countries, is now channelled towards the 
social sector, which has become the priority area for public-sector action 
in the region. 
At the same time, the developed countries, the international 
banking system and multilateral organizations have been advocating the 
establishment of new macroeconomic and institutional mechanisms to 
carry forward the liberalization of domestic markets and international 
economic relations. These deregulation measures have been adopted by a 
growing number of countries, especially since the early 1980s. The 
removal of barriers to movements of goods and capital, the increased 
business opportunities available to large corporate groups (for example, 
through privatizations and the elimination of restrictions on foreign 
investment) and the liberalization of national financial systems 
have made it possible for major economic agents to adopt global 
investment strategies. 
In this way, the organization of markets has been moving further 
and further away from the theoretical conditions of perfect competition 
which the positions taken in support of the new development style still 
implicitly uphold. In practice, there has been a striking tendency towards 
concentration in the corporate world, with countless cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions, alliances between transnational corporations and locally 
owned firms and the formation of multisectoral conglomerates.
Globalization is therefore by no means synonymous with greater 
homogeneity at the international level or within countries, although there 
is evidence that similar economic policy norms and technological 
standards are spreading and that similar consumption patterns are taking 
hold among affluent elements in each country. The possible implications 
of such changes for the concentration of economic power, and the 
likelihood that access to new goods and services will vary greatly across 
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countries and strata of the population, are now a cause of considerable 
concern. 
3. Policies and agents of internationalization 
An important aspect of globalization has been the increasing 
homogeneity of national policies. Domestic policies in every country are 
being determined to an ever greater extent by international standards 
designed to iron out differences in rules between national markets 
(Marinho, 1997 and Tussie, 1994). The World Trade Organization (WTO) 
standards, the proposals of the industrialized countries for a multilateral 
investment treaty and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) initiatives 
relating to capital account convertibility are all part of this tendency. One 
increasingly important point is that while the spread of globalization is 
being encouraged at the economic and financial levels, no international 
political institutions capable of regulating the system in any way have yet 
been created.7
(a) Monetary policies, interest rates and the preponderance of 
financial capital 
The leading role assigned to monetary policy at the macroeconomic 
level and the growing pressure for far-reaching financial liberalization in 
all countries are central features of the current globalization process. 
Changes in interest rate trends have played a key role in redistributing 
economic power, in strengthening certain agents and in altering the 
economic behaviour of most actors. 
The extreme mobility of financial capital and the monetary policies 
adopted in the early 1980s shifted bargaining power from borrowers to 
lenders and pushed up real long-term interest rates significantly over the 
decade, as table I.4 shows for the case of the developed countries. In the 
1990s, these rates did drop back to below their 1980s lends in the United 
States and Japan, but they are still far higher than they were before 
the 1970s. 
7 According to the former Brazilian President, F.H. Cardoso, this is a problem that 
governments must work together to address, primarily by establishing an international 
order based on rules acceptable to all and underpinned by institutions capable of 
ensuring that these rules are enforced (Cardoso, 1995). On the relevant financial aspects, 
see Ocampo (1999). 
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Table I.4 
REAL LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES IN SELECTED OECD COUNTRIES 
(Percentages) 
 1961-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 
United States -0.81 -0.33 8.18 5.88 
Japan ... 1.95 3.62 1.49 
United Kingdom 2.37 2.17 4.58 5.12 
European Community of 11a ... 0.22 4.31 4.95 
Source: Estimates based on OECD figures. 
a Countries of the European Union, excluding the United Kingdom, Denmark, Greece and Sweden. 
Another factor that contributed enormously to this tendency was 
increased financial deregulation, which included decontrol of the interest 
rates paid to savers and new opportunities to invest outside of the 
banking system. As a result, banks lost their privileged position as 
savings deposit-takers and were forced to raise their interest rates to curb 
the movement towards disintermediation.8 Such trends, combined with 
the elimination of some of the old demarcation lines in the financial 
system, tended to favour direct financing (through placements of stocks 
and bonds, which in turn provide the basis for numerous financial 
derivatives) at the expense of bank loans. Banks’ profit margins came 
under pressure as the cost of their funding increased and clients turned 
away from them to seek direct financing in the market, leading some of 
them to become involved in higher-yield, higher-risk operations. 
While commercial banks saw their influence diminish, that of 
pension funds, insurance companies and investment funds increased. In 
1990, institutional investors from 21 countries of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) managed financial 
assets of US$ 13.4 trillion, the equivalent of 83% of these countries’ 
total GDP. By the middle of the decade, these assets had climbed to 
US$ 23.1 trillion, which was more than the consolidated output of this 
group of countries.9
8  “Disintermediation” refers to the process whereby, as a result of competition from other 
investment options, a particular financial institution sees resources it used to attract 
diverted to other intermediaries that are able to offer higher yields, or directly to the 
final borrower. In the early 1980s, for example, this trend had repercussions on United 
States savings and loan associations whose interest rates were regulated and whose 
deposits declined when the market interest rate increased. 
9 Estimates based on figures from OECD, Institutional investors – Statistical Yearbook, 1997.
The main types of investors vary from one country to another, as do their preferred 
investments. In countries with funded pension systems, such as the United Kingdom 
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Volatility and contagion —which characteristically arise when the 
expectations of market agents are either euphoric or depressed— were 
features of this rapid process of financial development. These features, 
together with the failure of regulatory and prudential supervisory 
systems to keep pace with changes in the financial markets (particularly 
during periods of rapid liberalization), were responsible for the rapidity 
with which national banking crises succeeded one another (IMF, 1998), 
often in conjunction with foreign-exchange crises (in both developed and 
developing countries, but particularly the latter) and volatility in the 
exchange rates of the major currencies. These increasing difficulties in 
international finance gave rise to a number of initiatives for reforming the 
international financial system (Ocampo, 1999). 
Even as it globalized, the financial market remained highly 
segmented in a number of respects. It provided access to credit at 
relatively low rates to specific borrowers, basically the governments of 
industrialized countries and transnational corporations, set higher rates 
for large public or private emerging-market borrowers and denied credit 
to whole segments of developing countries and to small and medium-
sized enterprises. This differential treatment tended to intensify in periods 
of crisis, when investors’ “flight to safety” was reflected in 
disproportionately large rises in the interest rates charged to developing 
countries and to smaller firms in developed countries. As regards the 
customers for credit, households continued to be major borrowers during 
the period, generally at very high interest rates. 
In several developing countries, the shift in relative prices in favour 
of investment income restricted capital investment and growth in output. 
Faced with crisis situations, governments were forced to intervene, 
thereby incurring high fiscal and quasi-fiscal costs, and to apply for IMF 
assistance (see chapter 3). 
In short, the 1990s were witness to a higher concentration of 
economic power in the hands of financial creditors, at the expense of 
governments themselves.10 Nevertheless, the recent crises in various 
emerging countries in East Asia, Russia and Latin America may mark a 
and the United States, pension funds are the largest investors. In others, such as France, 
Germany and Japan, insurance companies account for the highest percentage, followed 
by investment funds. Again, in the English-speaking countries, shares generally make 
up a large proportion of these investors’ portfolios, accounting for well over 50% in 
Australia and the United Kingdom and for a large and growing portion in Canada and 
the United States; in the latter country they made up 36% of the total in 1995, whole 
bonds accounted for 40%. Conversely, bonds and loans predominate in continental 
Europe (France, Germany, Italy, etc.) and in Japan. 
10 The dominance of creditors in financial markets and of employers in the labour market 
are characteristics of our time. See Fitoussi (1996). 
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turning point in this predominance of investment income. For the first 
time, furthermore, the willingness of governments and IMF to spend 
considerable sums on financial rescue operations is being criticized in 
international forums and developed countries, and there are persistent 
calls for creditors to play a more active role in solving crises. 
(b) The dominant role played by transnational corporations 
The influence of transnational corporations also increased in the 
1990s. Transcending national boundaries, with the ability to accumulate 
and deploy capital on a global scale, transnationals are the main architects 
and beneficiaries of globalization. In fact, it is estimated that internal 
transfers among the parent subsidiary and associated companies of 
transnational conglomerates account for one third of all trade in non-
factor goods and services. Clearly, these transactions and the prices at 
which they take place do not always reflect market forces, but are valued 
at transfer prices. Since exports by subsidiaries of transnationals to non-
affiliated firms account for another third, it may be concluded that two 
thirds of world trade in non-factor goods and services falls, in one way or 
another, within the scope of the international production systems of 
transnational corporations (UNCTAD, 1995). 
Traditionally, transnational corporations tended to form networks 
between the parent company, subsidiaries and associates. In the 1980s, 
this was supplemented by a series of linkages based on financial 
movements of intangibles (patents, royalties, technical assistance, models, 
licences and franchises) which expanded the presence of transnational 
capital in the different regions of the world, while reducing direct 
investment risk. In recent years, transnational operations in the 
production sphere have begun to follow a new pattern. In some cases, 
parent companies have bought out their local partners, gaining direct 
control of the companies concerned. Many large firms have formed 
strategic alliances among themselves or carried out merger and hostile or 
friendly acquisition operations involving other companies in their sector. 
This has given rise to huge oligopolistic conglomerates, with firms and 
banks from different countries regrouping to compete at the 
supranational level. This is one of the reasons why some of the leading 
companies in the developing countries are now operating with greater 
administrative and productive efficiency and with higher rates of return 
than formerly, while forging stronger linkages with the global economy. 
ECLAC 46
(c) Regional integration 
At the same time, integration movements progressed in the 1990s, 
particularly in Asia, Europe and the Americas. These processes have a 
similar tendency to other aspects of globalization, being geared towards 
the removal of barriers to trade between given countries. Nevertheless, 
their logic and basic thrust are different, insofar as integration reflects the 
political will of countries to create a common framework whose scope 
goes beyond just trade, or even economic matters. Within this framework, 
guidelines or limits can be set for economic agents, and there is the 
potential for the bargaining power of member countries to be combined to 
produce a greater effect on the world stage. 
The ASEAN, Free-Trade Area, an integration agreement forming an 
integral part of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), has 
been in operation since 1992 and seeks to achieve completely free trade 
among its members by 2003 by deepening and expanding mutual tariff 
preferences. Equally important has been the expansion of Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), an organization that encompasses both 
industrialized and developing countries. In the case of Europe, 
integration has expanded to more countries and has deepened since the 
adoption of the euro in 1999.11
In the 1990s, Mexico joined the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), which also includes Canada and the United States. 
Of similar importance were initiatives to strengthen the region’s trade and 
investment links with other integration areas and countries in the world. 
The European Union has been the preferred choice of Latin American 
governments for the establishment of free trade agreements. Mexico 
recently entered into an agreement of this kind, and both MERCOSUR 
and Chile have made progress in the same direction. Asia is another area 
of growing interest to Latin American governments, the preferred 
approach being for Latin American countries to join APEC. Mexico was 
admitted in 1993, while Chile and Peru have participated as full members 
since 1997 and 1998, respectively. Reference should also be made to the 
interest expressed recently by some Asian countries in strengthening 
bilateral ties with Latin American ones, as demonstrated by the opening 
of negotiations for the establishment of a free trade agreement between 
the Republic of Korea and Chile. 
11 Among other consequences, the adoption of a single currency will put an end to the 
financial speculation which, by repeatedly targeting one currency or another in the 
European Monetary System, has influenced monetary policy in the member States and 
jeopardized their reserves. 
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Also worthy of note is the progress towards subregional integration 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. The consolidation of MERCOSUR 
has enhanced trade within the bloc and offers both local and foreign 
investors a wider market. The late 1980s saw the revival of the Andean 
Group (later superseded by the Andean Community), the Central 
American Common Market (CACM) and the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM). MERCOSUR also signed trade agreements with Chile and 
Bolivia and is negotiating similar pacts with the Andean Community. 
Reacting to these dynamic subregional integration processes, the United 
States put forward its proposal for a Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA) for the year 2005, which is being debated throughout the 
continent (see chapter 2). 
4. Globalization of values 
While the interest of the international community was engaged 
primarily by economic matters (in particular trade and finance) in the 
1990s, other issues that found their way on to the multilateral agenda 
revealed a trend towards globalization of certain basic values. This was 
attested to by the increasing number of governments signing up to human 
rights conventions during the decade, as shown in figure I.7. Further 
evidence of this trend is the growing importance being attached to United 
Nations world summits. 
Figure I.7 
RATIFICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS 
(Total countries) 
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With respect to the environment, the concept of sustainable 
development was elaborated and then gradually tied in with a number of 
other economic and social issues. The United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (dubbed the Earth Summit), held in 1992 
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, established the framework for a new 
international environmental order. That meeting culminated in the 
adoption of two legally binding treaties: the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity. The Non-legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles 
for a Global Consensus on Management, Conservation and Sustainable 
Development of All Types of Forests was also approved on that occasion. 
Agreement was likewise reached on a programme of action (Agenda 21) 
to guide the transition towards a sustainable form of development, with 
guidelines for the economic and social spheres. This programme included 
the notion of common but differentiated responsibilities, the “polluter 
pays” concept and the precautionary principle, according to which lack of 
absolute scientific certainty must not be used as grounds for deferring the 
adoption of corrective measures when there is a danger of grave or 
irreversible damage to the environment. Another key element is that 
environmental demands are generally linked to economic considerations 
and interests. Although there are currently enormous obstacles to the 
inclusion of environmental issues in trade negotiations, there can be no 
doubt that a negotiated convergence of national environmental policies 
will be crucial to the future of international trade (see chapter 7).
The International Conference on Population and Development was 
held in Cairo, Egypt, in 1994 to provide the ground rules for long-term 
national and international population and development policies. The 
Programme of Action set out a new strategy which stressed the 
importance of meeting the individual needs of men and women rather 
than attempting to achieve demographic goals. At the heart of the 
Programme was the recognition that steps to check population growth, 
eliminate gender inequalities, reduce poverty, achieve economic progress 
and protect the environment are mutually reinforcing. Goals were 
identified in three related spheres: firstly, to provide universal family-
planning services as part of a broader approach to reproductive health 
and procreation rights, while at the same time reducing infant, child and 
maternal mortality rates; secondly, to mainstream population issues in all 
policies and programmes for achieving sustainable development; and, 
lastly, to empower women and girl children and increase the options 
available to them by providing broader access to education, health 
services and employment opportunities.
The World Summit for Social Development, held in 1995 in 
Copenhagen, Denmark, marked a milestone, with governments throwing 
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their support behind policies to promote a framework for social 
development and justice. In particular, they strongly committed 
themselves to the goals of eradicating poverty, boosting productive 
employment and reducing unemployment, while striving to ensure that 
national policies and public budgets were directed towards meeting the 
basic needs of all and promoting social integration by fostering stable, 
secure and just societies. The Commission for Social Development, which 
comes under the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, has 
primary responsibility for following up and scrutinizing implementation 
of the agreements reached at the World Summit. It has adapted its 
mandate and agenda with a view to achieving an integrated approach to 
social development, on the basis of a multi-year programme running up 
to the year 2000.
The Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing, China, in 
1995, approved a Declaration enshrining the international community’s 
commitment to the advancement of women and to the mainstreaming of 
gender considerations in all policies and programmes at the national, 
regional and international levels. The Platform for Action established 
goals and set deadlines for concrete measures in areas such as health, 
education, decision-making and legal reform, with the ultimate aim of 
eliminating all forms of discrimination against women in public and 
private life. Many governments are now formulating plans for the 
implementation of the Platform for Action; national planning is expected 
to be broad-based, participatory and comprehensive and to include 
proposals for allocating or reallocating resources so that implementation 
can take place.
The United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II), 
held in Istanbul, Turkey, was the last in a series of global meetings which 
have shaped the world development programme for the coming years. 
Held in 1996, the Conference adopted a plan of action, the Habitat 
Agenda, that provides an effective instrument for the creation —in the 
specific context of urban planning— of human settlements that are 
sustainable in terms of the environment, human rights, social 
development, women and population. The Conference discussed ways in 
which local authorities, non-governmental organizations and other social 
groups could assist in achieving these aims, emphasizing the sharing of 
information and best practice as a way of finding solutions to human 
settlement problems based on initiatives and innovative modes of 
thinking originating from local governments and community-based 
organizations.
In the 1990s, other important issues were the subject of 
intergovernmental discussions resulting in plans of action. The World 
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Summit for Children was held in 1990 at United Nations Headquarters in 
New York, the highlight of this event being the joint signing of the World 
Declaration on the Survival, Protection and Development of Children and 
a plan of action establishing a detailed set of human development goals 
for children for the year 2000. These goals included cutting infant and 
maternal mortality rates, reducing child malnutrition and illiteracy and 
achieving clearly-defined increases in levels of access to basic health and 
family planning services, education, drinking water and sanitation. 
At the World Conference on Human Rights, held in Vienna, 
Austria, in 1993, representatives from 171 countries unanimously adopted 
the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, which outlines a 
common plan for strengthening respect for human rights and stresses the 
vitally important links between development, democracy and the 
promotion of human rights. Although a number of delegations were 
sensitive to the issue of national sovereignty, it was agreed that, in view of 
the intentions and principles of the United Nations Charter, the 
promotion and protection of all human rights was a legitimate concern of 
the international community.
The Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small 
Island Developing States, held in Bridgetown, Barbados, in 1994, adopted 
the Barbados Declaration and Programme of Action, which set forth 
development principles and strategies for such States. The main proposals 
were for the creation of national and regional funds to finance emergency 
aid and insurance against natural disasters, the establishment of regional 
research and training centres specializing in environmentally sound 
technologies, the organization of a technical assistance programme and 
the construction of an information network covering various aspects of 
sustainable development in small island States. Other meaningful 
initiatives include the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction, 
held in Yokohama, Japan, in 1994, the United Nations Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held in Cairo, 
Egypt, in 1995, and the World Food Summit, held in Rome, Italy, in 1996 
(United Nations, 1997).
Taken as a whole, the outcomes of these conferences provide a 
sound conceptual framework for moving towards globalization of values 
on the basis of a sustainable, humanized approach that respects human 
rights, gender and ethnic and cultural diversity and addresses the most 
pressing social issues.
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5. Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean 
The far-reaching political changes that occurred in the world in the 
late 1980s led to almost universal recognition for the claims of democracy 
as a political system. Acceptance of pluralism and the alternation of 
power, the separation of powers within the State, full respect for human 
rights, the election of authorities as the basis for legitimacy and the 
principle of majority rule, subject to respect for the rights of the minority, 
came to be the norm in political discourse and began to be applied on a 
fairly general basis. 
In Latin America and the Caribbean, this acceptance coincided with 
a democratization process that began in the 1980s and was consolidated in 
the 1990s. The number of democratic Governments that emerged as a 
result was unprecedented in the region’s history; it is enough to recall that 
there were just five democratic Governments in the region in 1930, seven 
in 1948, and a mere three in 1976 (UNDP, 1994).
Although this process was stimulated and reinforced by changes 
occurring globally, it was essentially the product of the region’s own 
development. At its core were the lessons drawn by the societies of the 
region about the grave consequences that ensued when they were left 
without mechanisms capable of solving social and political conflicts in an 
orderly way. In several cases, these conflicts built up to a point where 
they degenerated into confrontations that shattered the political system 
and led, in some instances, to the entrenchment of military dictatorships 
and, in others, to civil war and systematic violence.
Partly as a result of these painful experiences, the thinking of 
political, social and economic actors matured profoundly, and the 
resultant shift in the political and cultural climate made it possible to 
reach a basic consensus about the need to regulate conflicts through 
negotiation and compromise and to forestall conflicts and the logic of 
war. All of this resulted in a reassessment of democratic rules, institutions 
and procedures.
While democratic consolidation was not without its vicissitudes, 
the region also demonstrated its capacity to recover from profound 
institutional crises, such as those that occurred in Brazil in 1992, 
Guatemala in 1993, Ecuador in 1998, Paraguay in 1999 and Ecuador again 
in 2000. Ultimately, these conflicts were all settled peacefully through the 
application of institutional mechanisms and with broad support from civil 
society.
Significant progress was also made towards ending civil wars in 
the region. The 1989 peace agreements in Nicaragua were succeeded by 
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those in El Salvador and Guatemala in the 1990s, each of them being 
followed by democratic reconstruction efforts supported by the 
international community. In Colombia, where the violence had been 
dragging on for many years, a complex peace negotiation process was set 
in train, although these efforts continue to be plagued by major setbacks 
and difficulties. 
Several long-standing border conflicts, including those between 
Argentina and Chile and between Chile and Peru, were resolved during 
this period, while others, which had actually led to armed confrontations 
in the past, as in the case of Ecuador and Peru in 1997, ended with the 
signing of agreements. 
More generally, a series of major reforms were undertaken in the 
1990s to strengthen democratic institutions. These included constitutional 
reforms, changes in the administration of justice and modernization of the 
public sector aimed at improving the transparency of governance and 
public service. Efforts have also been made to improve electoral systems, 
modernize parliaments and generate local autonomy. 
Nevertheless, efforts to build democracy in the region still come up 
against serious weaknesses that reflect both problems common to 
democratic systems worldwide and the historical limits of the region’s 
own development and its heavy legacy of institutional discontinuity. 
Indeed, the political systems of a number of the region’s countries have 
deteriorated significantly in recent times, exacerbating the above-
mentioned democratic weaknesses. 
The changes under way face all democratic institutions everywhere 
with a number of issues concerning the way they function in societies 
where information and image play a fundamental role. These issues affect 
political parties, parliaments, the relationship between electors and 
representatives and the very meaning of politics. Voting seems to be on 
the decline in modern democracies and elections seem to be becoming 
less important in determining the policies that will be followed by the 
authorities elected.  
The above-mentioned tendencies have serious implications for the 
way representative democracy operates, since governments’ actions are 
increasingly influenced by opinion polls. These legitimize, influence and 
change the way the governing body operates, relegating the traditional 
institutions of representative democracy, such as voting the parliamentary 
system and political parties to a position of secondary importance.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, these problems have been 
exacerbated by inequality and social exclusion. Despite the efforts made 
in the 1990s to reduce poverty and indigence levels in the region, and the 
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qualified progress achieved in this respect, unacceptable levels of 
exclusion persist, as do highly uneven patterns of household income 
distribution (ECLAC, 2000a). These failings call into question the 
sustainability of the development process and are detrimental to the 
thorough exercise of democracy and citizenship in the region. Moreover, 
phenomena such as pervasive corruption and the criminal economy 
generated by drug trafficking are becoming increasingly widespread and 
are having very harmful effects on the way the political system operates. 
These factors help to explain the results of surveys used to assess 
people’s perceptions of democracy in the region. While the majority 
express support for this system, opinions about the way it operates and 
the extent to which it has been effective in responding to the demands of 
the population are predominantly negative (Latino Barómetro, 2000) (see 
table I.5). This dissatisfaction may be questionable, but it has a basis in the 
mismatch, as people perceive it, between the costs and benefits of the 
development process: the costs are undeniable and can be measured, 
while the probable benefits (and they cannot be guaranteed) are widely 
diffused. 
Table I.5 
LATIN AMERICA: OPINION POLLS 
(Percentages of affirmative responses) 
I prefer 
democracy to 
any other form of 
government 
I am quite satisfied 
or very satisfied 
with the way 
democracy works 
I believe that the 
economic situation 
in my country will 
be better in twelve 
months' time 
I believe that my 
economic position 
and that of my 
family will be 
better in twelve 
months' time 
 1996 1999 1996 1999 1996 1999 1996 1999 
Argentina 71 71 34 46 18 39 20 40 
Bolivia 64 62 25 22 18 14 30 29 
Brazil 50 39 20 18 36 34 50 53 
Chile 54 57 27 35 26 45 34 46 
Colombia 60 50 16 27 20 20 45 39 
Costa Rica 80 83 51 61 10 18 12 31 
Ecuador 52 54 34 23 27 17 27 24 
El Salvador 56 63 26 27 10 13 15 19 
Guatemala 51 45 16 35 5 29 18 38 
Honduras 42 64 20 44 3 28 7 43 
Mexico 53 45 11 37 14 26 20 37 
Nicaragua 59 64 23 16 29 20 32 29 
Panama 75 62 28 47 15 35 24 43 
Paraguay 59 48 22 12 21 25 34 34 
Peru 63 64 28 24 30 29 34 36 
Uruguay 80 84 52 69 15 25 19 28 
Venezuela 62 61 30 55 12 57 24 62 
Source: Latino Barómetro, “Informes de prensa de las encuestas realizadas en 1999 y 2000”, Santiago, 
Chile, 2000. 
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The characteristics of the 1980s crisis, the profound instability that 
it generated, the realization that hyperinflation was highly regressive in 
its effects  and the harsh experience of dictatorial government all meant 
that people in the region were willing to give their new governments a 
long “honeymoon” period in which to make changes in development 
models and rebuild democratic life. However, this honeymoon period 
seems to be coming to an end. Indeed, there are increasingly widespread 
demands for initiatives, but these encounter a weakened public authority 
that is apparently incapable of protecting citizens and coming to the 
assistance of those in need. Certainly, the strength of these tendencies and 
the way in which they manifest themselves vary with the particular 
situation in each country, but certain features are common to them all. 
6. Latin America and the Caribbean in a global context 
In the 1990s, the region underwent far-reaching economic and 
social changes determined by shifts in the external context. Economic 
reforms were initiated in the 1970s in the Southern Cone of Latin America 
(Argentina, Chile and Uruguay) and, to a lesser extent, in other countries 
as well. In the first few years after the debt crisis, between 1982 and 1985, 
many reforms were suspended and, in some cases, reversed by temporary 
restrictions on capital account liberalization, tariff increases and the use of 
para-tariff instruments, and government intervention in or nationalization 
of insolvent private-sector banks. From 1985 onwards, economic reforms 
spread practically throughout the region. Measures to liberalize trade and 
domestic financial markets were the first to be applied widely. While 
from 1990 onwards there was also increasing liberalization of external 
capital flows. Consequently, towards the mid-1990s, there was significant 
convergence among countries in these three areas of reform, which raised 
the averages for the relevant regional indices.12 These indices tended to 
level off in the closing years of the decade in most countries, with no 
12 The figure shows the regional averages of the reform indices in five policy areas: trade 
reform, domestic financial liberalization, capital account liberalization, privatization and 
the tax system. The indices were standardized (between 0 and 1), with a value close to 1 
indicating a high level of reform on the basis of relative values. Some characteristics of 
the procedure adopted should be highlighted. Firstly, the indices measure the intensity 
of the reforms undertaken in each country against the standard of the economy where 
the most thorough-going reforms were made in each policy area. As a result, if no 
country introduced significant reforms in a given area, a high index value may give a 
false impression of the absolute level of reform. Secondly, the indices measure the 
degree of liberalization in each policy area. Nevertheless, a high index value does not 
necessarily indicate a better policy regime, since the optimum value of the index is not 
known. Despite these shortcomings, the indices do provide an overview of which areas 
have been reformed most, and when. For definitions of the reform indices and details of 
the standardization procedures followed, see Morley, Machado and Pettinato, 1999. 
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major reversal during the turbulent macroeconomic events that started in 
1998 (see figure I.8). 
Figure I.8 
REFORM INDICES, 1970-2000 
Source: ECLAC. 
On the other hand, there has been less convergence in two other 
areas of reform: the tax system and privatization. In the case of the tax 
system, this may be partly due to the conflict between the objectives of 
neutrality and equity, but differences between countries in the relative 
size of the public sector may also be responsible. With respect to 
privatization, the situation varies between countries; while some have 
privatized almost all of their State-owned enterprises (Argentina and 
Peru), in others the State has retained a role in key sectors such as 
hydrocarbons and mining (Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela) or 
public services (Costa Rica and Uruguay). There is also a third group, to 
which many of the region’s countries belong, in which the State has 
always had a very limited role in business. 
Examination of the scope and depth of the reform process in 
different countries reveals an interesting pattern of convergence among 
national trends over time. This pattern is illustrated in table I.6, where 
countries are classified according to their level of reform in 1985 and the 
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Table I.6 
LEVELS OF ECONOMIC REFORM AND RATES OF CHANGE 
Level of reforms in 1985 Rate of 
change, 




















Source: Samuel Morley, Roberto Machado and Stefano Pettinato, “Indexes of Structural Reform in Latin 
America”, Reformas económicas series, No. 12 (LC/L.1166), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 1999.
It transpires that the countries whose economic reform indices were 
low in 1985 were the ones that introduced major changes in the following 
decade, giving rise to the above-mentioned regional convergence. The 
exceptions are Argentina, which intensified its reforms even further in the 
1990s, and, at the other extreme, Venezuela, which still has the lowest 
indices in the region.
The reforms helped to correct fiscal disequilibria and to combat 
inflation, both of which had been endemic problems since the 1970s. In 
addition, definite progress was made in increasing export growth, 
attracting FDI flows, strengthening economic integration within the 
region and concluding trade agreements with other countries and regions 
of the world (see chapter 2).
Where economic growth, industrial modernization and 
productivity are concerned, however, progress was frustratingly slow. 
Although growth rates in the 1990s were above the very low values seen 
in the 1980s, they were modest compared with those of earlier decades. 
As well as being inadequate, this recovery in economic growth was 
unstable because of the styles of macroeconomic management prevailing 
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at a time when international financial markets were highly volatile (see 
chapter 3). 
In the area of production, the predominant effects tended to be the 
“destructive” ones that affect sectors and firms when they lack the 
capacity to adjust to a new framework of economic incentives, as opposed 
to the “creative” effects that arise when change results in improved 
competitiveness and new forms of participation in the production 
process. As a result, structural heterogeneity increased and total factor 
productivity grew at a slower rate than was needed to close the gap with 
the developed world to any significant degree (see chapter 4).
On the social front, public spending increased to what were 
actually historically unprecedented levels. The percentage of poor people 
declined, although not enough to reverse the increase recorded in the 
previous decade or to attenuate the inequity of income distribution. Major 
efforts were made to restructure social services and improve the 
efficiency, transparency and effectiveness of spending, although in many 
cases not enough weight was given to the principles of universality and 
solidarity which should govern social policies (see chapter 6).
Given the need to build on what has already been achieved, there is 
a growing conviction that there can be no universal solutions to these 
issues. The region’s recent development reveals a diversity of responses. 
Perhaps the element common to most of them is an idea of the public 
sphere which transcends the State as such to encompass the full range of 
activities organized in pursuit of objectives of collective interest, thereby 
opening up areas for citizen participation, pointing the way towards the 
solution of a still partially unresolved crisis affecting national states and 
correcting market, as well as government, failures.
Nevertheless, this revival of public action is coming up against new 
determinants and challenges. The current international framework, the 
leading agents, their ways of interacting with one another and the new 
distribution of economic power have had a significant impact on Latin 
America and the Caribbean. There were definite changes in the roles and 
relative weight of the different agents in the late 1990s, as compared with 
the 1980s. The countries of the region started to position themselves to 
meet this challenge towards the end of the decade. They have responded 
nationally (through regulations and development policies), regionally 
(through integration and harmonization of tax and environmental rules) 
and internationally (through joint action with other governments and 
institutions in order to secure greater control of international financial 
flows) (United Nations, 1999a). 
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Chapter II 
Connections between the internal and external 
environments 
A variety of analysts agree that the far-reaching process of change 
in technology, institutions and orientation experienced by the 
international economy over the 1990s, which has come to be known as 
globalization, is part of a long-term trend towards the gradual formation 
of global markets. This process is still very far from complete, however, as 
neither product nor —much less— labour markets can be described as 
global at this point. Only financial markets would appear to be coming 
close to meeting this description (IMF, 1997). 
Financial globalization is in turn causing instability which affects 
international trade and national production activities. In fact, financial 
instability has patently become the most striking and worrisome 
characteristic of the world economy in recent years. The decline in global 
economic growth observed in 1998, which had an adverse effect on trade, 
was the fourth such downturn in the past 25 years (IMF, 1998). 
In the area of production, the phenomenon known as the 
“dismemberment of the value chain” began to manifest itself with greater 
force in the 1990s. This process consists of the segmentation of the 
production of any given product into the various stages at which value is 
added and the distribution of these segments among various countries 
based on their differing factor endowments. These kinds of production 
activities, which are coordinated by large transnational corporations or 
conglomerates, heighten the interdependence of different countries' 
markets (Krugman, 1995). Hence, a close relationship exists among the 
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"dismemberment" of the value chain, the expansion of the volume of trade 
and finance that has been occurring in recent years and the greater role 
being played by transnational corporations. Similarly, some degree of 
labour mobility among countries, whether permanent or temporary, is 
beginning to appear. 
1. International integration policies 
Over the past decades, the countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean have been seeking a way to integrate themselves into an 
international economy that is both globalized and regionalized by 
introducing economic reforms aimed at greater openness and 
liberalization. As a result of these changes, the economic growth of the 
region's countries has come to depend on the degree, depth and quality of 
their integration into the world economy. Furthermore, the recent 
international financial crisis and the abrupt drop in commodity prices 
have served as eloquent testimony of the importance of expanding and 
diversifying exports in order to pave the way for an export-based 
development strategy capable of generating sustained growth. The crisis 
has drawn attention to the external vulnerability of most countries in the 
region, in both financial and production terms. 
In addition to dynamic external demand, in order to expand their 
exports, the countries of the region need to ensure secure access for their 
goods and services to the markets of both the industrialized countries and 
the other developing countries. The strategy of open regionalism adopted 
by the countries of the region makes it possible for them to combine 
unilateral liberalization with bilateral, subregional, regional, hemispheric 
and multilateral negotiations and thus to deal realistically with the 
difficulties of promoting the liberalization of markets that are important 
to them. 
(a) The liberalization of trading and foreign-exchange systems 
Latin American —and to a lesser extent Caribbean— governments 
drastically altered their trading and foreign-exchange systems, within the 
framework of the macroeconomic reforms introduced since the 1980s, 
when they lowered their average tariffs and reduced their dispersion 
(ECLAC, 1998b and IDB, 1996). The process of eliminating tariff barriers 
to imports was particularly intense between the late 1980s and early 
1990s. The signing and implementation of subregional and bilateral trade 
liberalization agreements also made it possible for the countries to 
continue to move the liberalization process forward during the 1990s. 
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As table II.1 shows, the average tariff level, without taking into 
account the effect of partial liberalization agreements, was reduced from 
about 45% in the mid-1980s to about 12% in 1999, with most maximum 
rates standing at around 30% to 35% and just a few at a higher level. Most 
of the administrative and non-tariff measures affecting imports were also 
eliminated, and the use of stepped tariffs was limited, so that more 
uniform tariff structures could be established. Thus, whereas in 1985 
around half of the value of Central America's imports and approximately 
one third of that of the South American countries were subject to some 
type of para-tariff restriction, by the end of 1994 the proportion had been 
reduced to less than 1% in 7 of the 11 LAIA member States, and was in no 
case higher than 5% (Garay and Estevadeordal, 1995). 
Governments’ concern with price stabilization programmes and the 
views of many government teams and international organizations 
concerning the virtues of rapid liberalization prevented due attention 
from being given to the problems experienced by domestic production 
structures in adjusting to the new conditions of competition. As a result, 
trade liberalization was not carried out as gradually as it should have 
been, and local companies suddenly found themselves facing competition 
from foreign products and companies in a context of high interest rates 
and of modest investment coefficients and economic growth. However, in 
various countries the effects of liberalization on import growth were only 
felt after a certain lag owing to the contraction of these economies in the 
early years of trade liberalization and the delays involved in establishing 
marketing channels for non-traditional imports.1
As a corollary to unilateral liberalization, when the Uruguay Round 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) —which 
subsequently became the World Trade Organization (WTO)— was 
concluded in 1994, the Latin American countries consolidated their entire 
tariff structure, albeit at levels much higher than those they actually 
apply. Further, in view of the commitments assumed within that 
framework, the countries of the region had to make changes in their 
export promotion systems and in other domestic policies, although some 
subsidy programmes had already been eliminated or substantially scaled 
down owing to fiscal restrictions and macroeconomic reforms. 
1 In Mexico, an overvalued rate initially limited the impact of imported goods on 
domestic production, whereas in Brazil imports began to increase in late 1993, although 








TARIFF STRUCTURE OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION ASSOCIATION (LAIA), 1988, 1996 AND 1999 
(Percentages) 
Most-favoured-nation (MFN) tariff 
Number of tariff 
items Tariff rate by country Percentage of tariff items Country Year 
Ad 




distribution Minimum Maximum 
 1988 11 933 385 0.0 83.5 29.9 --- 43.5 --- --- 
Argentina 1996 9 306 0 0.0 33.5 13.9 6.9 5.5 4.7 0.4 
 1999 9 350 0 0.0 33.0 13.5 6.6 5.0 1.8 0.4 
 1988 4 944 0 0.0 17.0 16.7 --- 17.0 --- --- 
Bolivia 1996 6 621 0 0.0 10.0 9.7 1.3 10.0 0.0 93.4 
 1999 6 679 0 0.0 10.0 9.7 1.3 10.0 0.0 93.5 
 1988 11 935 0 0.0 85.0 41.4 --- 40.0 --- --- 
Brazil 1996 9 328 0 0.0 52.0 14.6 7.5 5.0 1.6 0.2 
 1999 9 331 0 0.0 35.0 14.3 7.0 19.0 1.6 0.4 
 1988 2 577 0 0.0 23.0 15.1 --- 15.0 --- --- 
Chile 1996 5 864 0 0.0 11.0 11.0 0.7 11.0 0.4 99.6 
 1999 5 917 0 0.0 10.0 9.8 1.2 10.0 1.5 98.4 
 1988 5 302 12 5.1 218.0 44.2 --- 33.0 --- --- 
Colombia 1996 6 728 0 0.0 35.0 11.6 6.3 5.0 1.7 0.2 
 1999 6 786 0 0.0 35.0 11.6 6.3 5.0 2.2 0.2 
 1988 5 171 0 0.0 325.0 39.7 --- 10.0 --- --- 
Ecuador 1996 6 650 0 0.0 35.5 11.8 6.4 5.5 0.0 0.2 
 1999 6 705 0 0.0 99.0 11.5 7.8 5.0 2.6 0.3 
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Table II.1 (concluded) 
Most-favoured-nation (MFN) tariff 
Number of tariff 
items Tariff rate by country Percentage of tariff items Country Year 
Ad 




distribution Minimum Maximum 
Mexico 1996 11 335 0 0.0 260.0 13.2 13.2 10.0 15.0 0.0 
 1999 11 360 0 0.0 260.0 16.2 13.5 13.0 2.0 0.0 
 1988 3 579 0 0.0 70.0 19.3 --- 20.0 --- --- 
Paraguay 1996 9 219 0 0.0 30.0 9.5 6.5 2.0 6.1 0.0 
 1999 9 319 0 0.0 30.0 11.4 6.8 5.0 3.3 0.0 
 1988 5 389 0 0.0 109.0 69.0 --- 109.0 --- --- 
Peru 1996 6 869 0 12.0 25.0 13.5 3.5 12.0 84.2 4.4 
 1999 6 888 0 12.0 68.0 13.7 4.8 12.0 84.0 0.3 
 1988 7 691 0 0.0 45.0 27.0 --- 45.0 --- --- 
Uruguay 1996 10 465 0 0.0 24.0 12.2 7.2 5.0 4.4 1.4 
 1999 10 492 0 0.0 10.0 4.1 4.1 0.0 41.3 18.3 
 1988 6 095 876 0.0 160.0 41.7 --- 1.0 --- --- 
Venezuela 1996 6 641 0 0.0 35.0 12.0 6.1 5.0 0.5 0.2 
 1999 6 688 0 0.0 35.0 12.0 6.1 5.0 0.5 0.2 
Source: Inter-American Development Bank, LAIA Secretariat. 
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These trade reforms' hoped-for effects on economic growth did not 
materialize, however, despite the fact that the liberalization of imports 
reduced exporters' costs. The region's experience thus suggests that 
simply opening up an economy is not sufficient in itself to bring about 
high levels of export and production growth. Other deciding factors are 
the initial level and sustainability of the real exchange rate, the strength of 
investment, the availability of infrastructure, access to and diffusion of 
technology, long-term financing, the training of human resources, 
external promotion and the track record of exporters.2 In the 1980s, when 
the reforms were launched, aggregate demand was very depressed, and 
this naturally discouraged investment. Later, and particularly in 1991-
1994 and 1996-1997, there was a significant recovery in aggregate 
demand, but, in parallel, exchange rates were rising (see table II.2). As a 
result, imports grew by more than exports, and external vulnerability thus 
increased. This overall behaviour pattern, together with the inadequacies 
of mesoeconomic policies, prevented export growth from becoming a 
factor for economic growth. 
(b) Open regionalism 
Throughout the 1990s, the governments of Latin America and the 
Caribbean combined unilateral liberalization with active participation in 
multilateral negotiations in the framework of WTO and with bilateral, 
plurilateral and interregional free trade agreements. Liberalization of 
trade and of the regulatory framework for investment in their economies 
made it possible for imports and exports to expand. Thus, for the first 
time, the regional integration movement began to enjoy full acceptance 
from business circles in the region. Again, the United States showed 
support for free-trade agreements in the 1980s, when it began bilateral 
negotiations first with Israel and Canada and, subsequently, with Canada 
and Mexico to establish NAFTA. While NAFTA was being ratified by the 
legislative bodies of the three countries, the Government of the United 
States began to define its strategy for the rest of Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Its first step in this direction was the 1990 Enterprise for the 
Americas Initiative, which eventually led to the current negotiations for 
the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). 
2  The results tend to be long in coming and to entail high costs during the transition  
(ECLAC, 1998b). 
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Table II.2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE  
RATE INDICES FOR IMPORTS, 1991-1999 
(Indices: 1995=100) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Argentina   116.3 103.0  94.4  93.8  100.0  101.9  98.9  96.8  89.4 
Barbados  92.6  93.2  95.0  98.3  100.0  99.4  93.6  95.2  94.4 
Bolivia   83.8  87.3  92.7  97.7  100.0  93.4  91.1  87.4  87.2 
Brazil   108.5  117.3  112.6  113.6  100.0  94.2  93.2  97.6  147.1 
Chile   111.8  108.1  110.1  106.3  100.0  96.4  90.0  92.4  97.2 
Colombia   134.9  120.0  114.5  99.9  100.0  92.7  86.8  92.6  104.9 
Costa Rica   108.3  103.1  103.1  103.6  100.0  99.0  101.2  102.6  106.8 
Ecuador   114.8  116.0  103.4  98.1  100.0  100.4  96.2  94.7  131.2 
El Salvador   125.4  124.7  112.5  105.7  100.0  92.2  91.9  91.7  92.8 
Guatemala   110.0  109.0  110.2  104.6  100.0  95.2  90.4  91.5  104.8 
Haiti  116.3  117.5  141.3  113.4  100.0  85.0  73.0  67.0 63.4 
Honduras   98.1  92.9  103.9  115.4  100.0  101.6  96.2  88.1  85.3 
Jamaica  92.8  108.0  101.1  103.6  100.0  84.2  72.3  67.9  62.7 
Mexico   74.8  69.1  65.8  67.6  100.0  89.0  77.2  77.3  70.8 
Nicaragua   84.7  85.6  89.7  95.4  100.0  102.2  108.0  107.6  108.7 
Paraguay   96.5  102.0  106.4  100.5  100.0  95.7  94.0  103.5  101.8 
Peru  94.8  94.7  106.2  100.2  100.0  98.6  99.1  100.5  109.3 
Dominican 
Republic   104.5  108.8  106.5  103.0  100.0  93.5  95.7  103.9  112.2 
Trinidad and 
Tobago  75.3  76.5  89.9  97.0  100.0  98.7  99.6  93.8  88.0 
Uruguay   130.2  127.2  113.9  104.3  100.0  99.1  97.1  96.3  89.8 
Venezuela   130.6  124.4  121.3  126.4  100.0  119.2  92.6  76.3  68.3 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of International Monetary Fund (IMF) figures. 
a
 The average of the indices for the real (main official) exchange rate of each country's currency against 
the currencies of its main trading partners, weighted according to the relative magnitude of imports from 
these countries. The weightings are the average for 1992-1996. Consumer price indices were used in the 
calculations for each country. For information on the methodology and sources used, see ECLAC, 
Economic Survey of Latin America, 1981 (E/CEPAL/G.1248), Santiago, Chile, 1983. United Nations 
publication, Sales No. E.83.II.G.2.
In 1994, ECLAC launched the concept of "open regionalism" in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. This concept was used to describe the 
trend which existed at the end of the Uruguay Round, when the 
dynamism of subregional movements was combined with unilateral 
liberalization and the movement towards hemispheric integration.3 Open 
3  In 1994, a number of interrelated events underscored the new complexity of trade 
liberalization processes. In January, NAFTA began to function. In March, the Uruguay 
Round agreements were formally signed in Marrakesh by more than 120 members of the 
former GATT, which permitted this body's transformation into WTO in January 1995. In 
December, the Summit of the Americas took place in Miami with the participation of 
heads of State and government, and a schedule of meetings was drawn up with a view 
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regionalism was defined as the interdependency between preferential 
agreements and de facto integration in response to market signals 
resulting from a broad and generalized liberalization (ECLAC, 1994).4
The basic rationale for this strategy is that unilateral liberalization 
does not guarantee the openness of purchasing markets. In an 
international environment in which national regulations still 
predominate, governments have retained their powers to determine and 
negotiate the access of persons, goods, capital and technology to their 
territories, and while tariffs are low, there are also new restrictions such as 
technical barriers and antidumping measures.5 Thus, in an economy 
which is simultaneously undergoing profound globalization and 
regionalization processes, States are seeking to define market integration 
strategies which will allow them to achieve more secure access for their 
products to import markets. 
During the 1990s the Latin American and Caribbean integration 
process found a direction and demonstrated a dynamism that would have 
been difficult to predict in previous years. The agreements signed in 1986 
between Argentina and Brazil for the establishment of a preferential trade 
zone, which preceded the liberalization efforts mentioned above, marked 
the revival of integration. In 1991, with the accession of Paraguay and 
Uruguay, this bilateral agreement became the Treaty of Asunción, under 
which the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) was formed. In 
addition, in the late 1980s the Andean Group (which later became the 
Andean Community) had been reactivated, as had the Central American 
Common Market (CACM) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). 
These subregional integration schemes have succeeded in liberalizing 
most of the trade occurring within each group, have set up programmes 
to provide tax breaks for third parties and have adopted incomplete and 
to beginning the process of establishing FTAA. Further, the Seventh Meeting of the 
Common Market Council of Mercosur, held in Ouro Preto, also in December 1994, 
marked the completion of the process involved in setting up the MERCOSUR free trade 
area and the beginning of its existence as a partial customs union. The Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Council (APEC) also continued its plans for trade liberalization. 
4  The expression “open regionalism” was originally suggested in the late 1970s by the 
Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira, to define an open form of regional 
cooperation which would harmonize with the interests of the global community 
(Palacios, 1995). 
5  As noted by Sáez and Valdés (1999, p. 94) in relation to Chile: “Obviously, unilateral 
openness is not necessarily reflected in openness of the markets of Chile’s trading 
partners. For example, it does not necessarily have any effect on their customs practices 
or the way they adopt and administer technical barriers, nor does it eliminate the 
restrictive practices applied by countries through the adoption of anti-dumping 
measures. Through agreements, however, it is possible to achieve preferential, assured 
and predictable openness which facilitates the development of export projects.” 
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gradual common external tariffs, which allow them to function as 
imperfect customs unions. 
In late 1994, MERCOSUR was converted into a free trade area, with 
few exceptions, and the member countries undertook to establish a 
common external tariff, which should be fully operational by the year 
2006.6 The Andean countries, for their part, liberalized intra-group trade 
in 1992, although the common external tariff was fully adopted only by 
Colombia and Venezuela in that year, with Ecuador implementing it later, 
and only in a partial manner.7 Free trade in CACM has been in place since 
the mid-1990s although all the member countries still retain a large 
number of reciprocal safeguards.8 There is a commitment to achieving full 
application of the common external tariff by 2005, and it is hoped that the 
rapprochement between El Salvador and Guatemala will act as a catalyst 
for Central American integration (Tavares, 1999). 
The member States of CARICOM have also agreed to liberalize 
intra-group trade entirely by about the middle of the decade, while the 
plans for member countries' tariff structures to converge towards a 
common external tariff were supposed to be implemented by the end of 
1998. However, the CARICOM secretariat has noted that only 6 of the 14 
member countries completed the final stage of convergence within the 
specified time limit.9 The smaller countries are having difficulty in 
lowering their tariffs owing to the impact that such measures have on 
their tax revenue. As for the free movement of goods within CARICOM, 
seven countries require import licences in some cases and apply duties to 
"sensitive products", such as edible oils, rum and other alcoholic 
beverages, motor vehicles and fresh milk products. 
At the same time, there has been a proliferation of partial-scope 
agreements, almost all of them bilateral, which have been referred to as 
“new generation agreements”, as their goals with regard to liberalization 
of the trade in goods are quite demanding. These agreements also include 
commitments in complementary areas, such as the liberalization of 
6  Argentina and Brazil have until 2001 and Paraguay and Uruguay until 2006. 
7  Bolivia and Peru have maintained their respective national tariffs, while Ecuador is 
applying the common external tariff to about 60% of its tariff structure. 
8  The Guatemala Protocol of 1993 established the objective of achieving economic union 
through voluntary agreement reached by consensus among the relevant States. 
9  The CARICOM single market will be completed by implementing nine supplementary 
protocols which cover matters ranging from institutional aspects to competition rules. 
Protocols 1, 2 ,3 and 5, dealing with institutional aspects, rights of establishment, 
services provision and capital movements, industrial policy and agricultural policy, 
respectively, have been ratified. Protocol 4, which deals with trade liberalization and the 
establishment of a common external tariff, is being applied provisionally in 10 of the 
14 members of CARICOM.
ECLAC 68
services, ad hoc dispute settlement mechanisms, the promotion of mutual 
investments and undertakings relating to physical infrastructure. These 
accords were prompted by the new commitments and subjects covered by 
NAFTA, which form part of the bilateral and plurilateral treaties in which 
Mexico plays a pivotal role. Within LAIA, some 10 of these agreements 
have been signed, in addition to those concluded by Mexico with Costa 
Rica and Nicaragua and the large number entered into between members 
of LAIA, on the one hand, and countries in Central America and the 
Caribbean, on the other, which generally stipulate preferential treatment 
for the latter. 
It should be noted that the four existing imperfect customs unions 
in the region have the ultimate aim of establishing a common market. In 
addition to the liberalization of trade in goods and the establishment of a 
common external tariff, realizing this aim would involve facilitating 
capital movements, freeing up trade in services and allowing the free 
movement of persons. Only by adopting these complementary disciplines 
could the four subregional integration schemes fulfil their raison d'être and 
ensure their survival within a free trade zone that would liberalize trade 
throughout the western hemisphere, which is the goal being pursued by 
the FTAA initiative. The Ministerial Declaration of San José laid down an 
important principle in this respect: “The FTAA can co-exist with bilateral 
and sub-regional agreements, to the extent that the rights and obligations 
under these agreements are not covered or go beyond the rights and 
obligations of the FTAA.” 
However, this positive movement towards greater integration 
among the Latin American and Caribbean economies was not immune to 
the consequences of the international financial crisis, which were felt in 
the region in the closing years of the 1990s. Although the integration 
process was able to withstand the unfavourable external environment, in 
1999 intraregional trade in South America fell nearly 25%. This reduction 
demonstrates that intraregional trade links are still fragile and may be 
affected by a lack of financial liquidity. 
The effects of the international financial crisis on the region spurred 
debate on the advisability of coordinating certain key macroeconomic 
policies, including foreign-exchange and fiscal policies. The member 
countries of both MERCOSUR and the Andean Community have adopted 
agreements aimed at bringing about gradual convergence of 
macroeconomic policies. Nevertheless, while demands for coordination 
have clearly increased, the countries' actual ability to accept specific 
disciplines in these areas has diminished as their national policies have 
become less effective in protecting their economies from external shocks. 
Also, in a context of economic contraction, there are still questions as to 
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the feasibility of imposing regional and subregional commitments on 
economies whose intra-subregional trade linkages are still weak.10
(c) Market access: the Uruguay Round, contingency protection 
and other trade barriers 
If the export model adopted by the Latin American and Caribbean 
countries in the past 15 years within the context of investment and trade 
liberalization is to lead to economic growth, various macro-, meso- and 
microeconomic conditions will have to be met. One of the most important 
is secure and predictable access to export markets. The Uruguay Round 
agreements promoted greater transparency in national trade regulations 
and policies and extended the multilateral rules that had previously been 
limited to industrial goods to new sectors such as services, the protection 
of intellectual property and corporate rights and other areas previously 
excluded from the multilateral trading system, such as agriculture, textiles 
and wearing apparel. Nevertheless, despite the efforts made by the 
developing countries during the negotiations, the results in terms of the 
distribution of the costs and benefits of these agreements were very 
unequal. 
In the Uruguay Round, significant progress was made in 
negotiations to liberalize certain markets of interest to Latin America, 
agreement being reached both on traditional market-opening measures 
and on standards governing the use of domestic policy instruments. The 
latter included commitments to reduce tariffs on industrial products, to 
convert various non-tariff measures into tariffs, to reduce agricultural 
subsidies and to dismantle the quotas of the Multifibre Arrangement 
(MFA). Again, in a gradual fashion the Final Act of Marrakesh included 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the 1994 General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (antidumping), the Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade and the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. 
The developed countries undertook to reduce tariffs on industrial 
products by 40% in the Uruguay Round, which translates into a reduction 
in the weighted average tariff for trade from 6.3% before the Round to 
3.8% upon its conclusion (GATT, 1994).11 Subsequently, various 
10  This is the case with Brazil and the member countries of the Andean Community. 
11  At the end of 1990, the tariff structure of the main importers, such as Canada, the 
European Union, Japan and the United States, was as follows: (i) the import-weighted 
average tariff rate was between 3.5% (Japan) and 6.6% (European Union); (ii)  tariff-free 
lines varied between 11% (European Union) and 35% (Japan); and (iii) specific and 
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plurilateral agreements conceded additional reductions for 
pharmaceuticals, distilled alcohol and information technology products 
(Finger and Schuknecht, 1999). 
The achievement of low average tariffs does not mean that import 
duties have lost their significance, however. The developing countries are 
facing two kinds of problems: the effects of tariff peaks, which are defined 
by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) as tariffs higher than 12% ad valorem;12 and tariff escalation as 
the degree of product processing increases. The problem of tariff peaks is 
particularly serious in six sectors: (i) main agricultural food products and 
basic products, particularly meat, sugar, milk and milk products, cereals, 
tobacco products and cotton; (ii) fruit, legumes and vegetables, and fish; 
(iii) processed food (e.g., orange juice and peanut butter in the United 
States); (iv) textiles and wearing apparel; (v) footwear, leather and travel 
items; and (vi) automotive products, transport equipment and electronic 
products. Despite the rollback of maximum tariffs since the Uruguay 
Round, the remaining degree of tariff escalation may still result in high 
effective protection rates on manufactures of interest to the region, such as 
metal products, textiles and wearing apparel, and wood products. 
Although the Uruguay Round has regulated the implementation of 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures and the application of technical 
standards,13 the increasingly frequent practice of applying quality, 
environmental or labour requirements as conditions of market access 
raises questions as to the associated levels of protection. In particular, the 
divergence between compulsory and optional standards and the failure to 
designate inspecting agencies to carry out multilateral certification of 
technical standards leave countries a margin of discretion in applying 
such measures.14
In the 1990s, the application of contingency measures significantly 
affected some of the key exports of countries in the region, although after 
the Uruguay Round they were reduced somewhat.15 One particular case is 
compound tariffs still accounted for a substantial proportion of total tariffs (18% of the 
total in the case of the United States) (Laird, 1998). 
12 The definition adopted at the Uruguay Round applies the term to tariffs higher than 15% 
(GATT, 1994, p. 11). OECD works with a different variant of this concept, that of the 
"spike", which refers to a tariff that is more than triple the national average (Laird, 1998). 
13 The agreements concerned recognizes the role that these play in providing information 
and facilitating market transactions, and in responding to the growing public demand 
for products free of health or environmental hazards (UNCTAD, 1999). 
14 See the examples for Chile in Fisher (1997).
15 However, assessment of the antidumping measures applied by industrialized countries 
reveals that they have not taken into account the recommendation contained in the 
relevant agreement of the Uruguay Round, which encourages member States to seek 
constructive solutions, such as price undertakings, when complaints concern developing 
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the on-going application of antidumping duties and countervailing 
measures by the United States to imports of iron and steel from three 
countries in the region (ECLAC, 1999b). In the case of the textile sector as 
well, the use of special safeguards, antidumping provisions, rules of 
origin and other technical requirements raise barriers to exports from the 
region and limit the gains in access that it has begun to enjoy under the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. 
Contingency measures have also been adopted by developing 
countries. In the region, the cases of Mexico (countervailing measures) 
and Argentina and Brazil (antidumping duties) have been prominent, and 
Chile has recently had recourse to safeguards. Brazil and Chile also 
applied countervailing duties prior to the Uruguay Round. 
It is thus no surprise that a high proportion of the cases heard by 
the new Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of WTO have concerned these 
topics. Furthermore, there has been a notable increase in the number of 
cases submitted to this body; specifically, 169 complaints were referred to 
the DSB during the period from 1995, the year of its establishment, to 
April 1999, which is considerably more than the total number of cases 
dealt with during the almost half-century of the existence of GATT 
(Thorstensen, 1999). It should also be noted that the main complainants 
have been industrialized countries (over 70% of all cases), and in 
particular the United States. Industrialized countries have also been the 
subject of about 60% of the complaints. The United States, the European 
Union and Canada have been the requesting party in two thirds of the 
consultations referred to the system and, together with Japan, have been 
involved in half of the cases. Mexico and Brazil, the main user countries in 
the region, have been named in less than 5% of the consultations, but 
together with Argentina and Chile, were involved in 13% of the cases. 
2. Changes in external trade and regional 
heterogeneity 
(a) Overall results 
The different international economic strategies adopted by the 
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean within this general context 
have been instrumental in increasing the heterogeneity that the region 
already displayed in a number of areas, by diversifying its external trade 
characteristics. 
countries. On the contrary, in the vast majority of cases, tariff surcharges have been 
applied (Finger and Schuknecht, 1999). 
ECLAC 72
As table II.3 shows, in the 1990s the region had one of the world's 
highest growth rates for merchandise trade, in terms of both volume and 
value. Between 1990 and 1999, exports grew, on average, by 8.5% in 
volume and 7.9% in value each year. These rates were exceeded only by 
China and the six highest-performing Asian countries. However, Latin 
American import growth, at 11.1% by volume and 12.1% by value, was 
even higher, and far outstripped that of other regions and countries, with 
the exception of China, whose rate was close to that of Latin America. 
Table II.3 
GROWTH IN WORLD MERCHANDISE TRADE, BY VOLUME AND VALUE, 1990-1999 
(Average annual growth rates) 
Asia 









Exports          
Volume 6.4 8.5 6.8 5.8 4.1 7.2 2.5 12.3 … 
Value 5.8 7.9 6.8 4.5 5.3 8.9 2.9 8.5 14.4 
Imports          
Volume 6.3 11.1 8.3 5.5 3.5 6.7 4.6 7.6 … 
Value 5.9 12.1 8.3 3.8 6.9 5.6 2.9 6.2 13.3 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from World Trade Organization (WTO), Annual report 2000,
Geneva, 2000, tables II.2 and II.3, p. 10; Annual report, 1999; and International trade statistics, Geneva,
1999, tables I.2 and I.3, pp. 1 and 2.
Exports and imports both grew much more rapidly than gross 
domestic product (GDP), as shown in figure II.1. From 1990 to 1999, GDP 
increased by an estimated average of 3.2% a year, while exports increased 
by 8.5% and imports by an average of 11.1%.16 As will be argued later, the 
regional averages conceal a growing heterogeneity, as the exports of just 
one country, Mexico, account for about half of all the external sales of 
Latin America and the Caribbean; also, its performance over the decade 
was more dynamic than the average for the rest of the region. For 
example, from 1990 to 1999 Mexican exports grew at an average annual 
rate of 13.8%, while Latin American exports, excluding Mexico, grew by 
about 7%. 
16 In 1999, imports declined by a little over 4%, causing a slight reduction in the import 
coefficient for the first time. 
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Figure II.1 
TRADE AND GDP GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN,a
1990-1999
(Growth rates based on 1995 dollars) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a
 Includes 19 countries from the region: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
b
 In 1999, GDP grew by only 0.4%, which is why the increase is barely visible in the figure. 
As a result of this growth, the coefficient of regional exports to GDP 
reached 19.8% in 1999, which is much higher than the 12.1% recorded for 
1989-1990. The expansion of imports over the 1990s, meanwhile, meant 
that the average coefficient of regional imports to GDP showed a rapid 
upward trend, reaching 20.5% in 1998, which is more than double the 
value for 1989-1990 (see table II.4). These values contrast with those of the 
1980s, when imports as a share of regional GDP fluctuated around an 
average of 10%, owing to the countries' economic stabilization and 
adjustment programmes. The continuation of the 1997-1998 crisis into 
1999 interrupted this trend, with the import coefficient falling that year 
for the first time in the decade, to a level similar to that of the export 
coefficient (20.1%). 
The gap between export and import performance led to an 
accumulation of growing trade deficits which, added to interest payments 
and profit remittances, caused the balance-of-payments current account to 
deteriorate. This deficit increased gradually from the late 1980s to the 
mid-1990s rising from 0.2% of GDP in 1990 to 3.2% in 1994, the year of the 
Mexican financial crisis, then diminished over the following two years, 
only to grow again in 1997-1998, when it reached 4.3% of GDP, after 













EXPORT AND IMPORT COEFFICIENTS FOR LATIN AMERICA,  
1980-1981, 1989-1990, 1997-1998 AND 1999 
(Average values with respect to GDP, in 1995 dollars)
1980-1981 1989-1990 1997-1998 1999 
Country/ 
period Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Argentina 5.0  8.0  8.2  4.0  11.7  14.9    10.9   13.1 
Bolivia 15.1  20.4  18.7  24.4  20.6  31.4    19.0   27.2 
Brazil 5.0  4.6  7.1  3.7  8.4  11.0    8.0   9.4 
Chile 16.6  25.9  25.4  20.9  33.2  30.5    34.8   26.7 
Colombia 8.7  10.2  11.0  7.7  14.5  18.6    16.8   14.9 
Costa Rica 25.4  26.4  32.9  34.7  49.4  49.1    65.4   60.1 
Ecuador 17.4  37.8  23.5  25.4  29.6  28.2    31.6   16.6 
El Salvador 21.7  19.9  15.4  20.7  26.5  36.9    26.8   38.6 
Guatemala 26.1  24.5  19.1  17.7  21.9  28.8    21.4   28.2 
Haiti 9.5  13.0  9.7  11.0  14.4  31.1    17.0   38.1 
Honduras 56.7  57.0  48.2  45.0  43.3  44.8    39.9   52.1 
Mexico 9.0  16.6  15.1  16.9  31.3  32.0    35.5   36.3 
Nicaragua 29.5  53.1  25.3  43.9  41.8  69.9    37.3   78.2 
Panama 106.9  94.1  104.3  93.5  93.1  100.6    72.8   79.6 
Paraguay 11.3  17.1  22.7  23.5  29.1  44.8    20.3   30.2 
Peru 10.8  12.0  10.5  8.8  13.1  17.0    13.4   14.0 
Dominican 
Republic 17.4 32.1 18.8 25.0 54.0 62.4   55.4   67.0 
Uruguay 12.1  14.6  15.9  12.8  21.5  23.1    19.2   22.2 
Venezuela 19.9  29.4  26.4  18.0  32.6  26.0    42.0   25.3 
Latin America 8.7  12.1 12.1  9.9  18.4  20.5  19.8 20.1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Figure II.2 
LATIN AMERICA: TRADE AND THE CURRENT ACCOUNT AS 
 A PROPORTION OF GDP 
(Percentages)









1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Exports Imports Goods and services trade balance Current account
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It is also important to note the growing contribution made by the 
services account balance to the total trade deficit, owing to the fact that 
imports of commercial services grew much faster than exports.17 Thus, for 
example, in 1995 and 1996, after the Mexican crisis, the region accrued a 
surplus in its visible trade balance, but this was greatly exceeded by the 
deficit in the services balance. As table II.5 shows, the deficit in the 
services account from 1992 to 1999 accounted for three quarters of the 
total goods and services trade deficit.
Table II.5 
GOODS AND SERVICES TRADE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 
1980-1999
(Millions of current dollars) 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Trade in goods 
Exports  136 283 137 150 146 420 160 811 188 120 227 938 254 948 283 740 279 523 296 776
Imports 105 159 123 798 151 345 168 959 200 620 224 875 249 169 304 898 317 470 301 243
Balance of 
trade in goods 31 124 13 352 -4 925 -8 148 -12 500 3 062 5 780 -21 158 -37 947 -4 468
Trade in services 
Exports 25 114 26 794 29 460 31 349 35 139 36 838 40 769 40 902 44 903 38 883




-8 160 -9 292 -10 779 -13 154 -12 641 -11 787 -13 736 -16 424 -17 297 -17 657
Balance of 
trade in goods 
and services 






-35.5 -228.9 68.6 61.7 50.3 135.1 172.6 54.7 33.8 89.6
Source: ECLAC, International Trade and Development Finance Division, on the basis of official figures 
from 19 countries of the region: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
After the sudden across-the-board decline in the region's terms of 
trade during the 1980s, in the 1990s there was a very slight upward trend, 
although with some variation among groups of countries, as shown by 
table II.6. This virtually static situation in the 1990s, of course, prevented 
the sharp deterioration of the 1980s from being reversed. In 1999, the 
17  WTO defines commercial services as the sum of transport activities, journeys and other 
commercial services. Consequently, they do not include government services or income 
from paid employment and investment. 
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terms of trade of South America, excluding the oil-exporting countries, 
were still 36% lower than in 1985. 
(b) Export performance 
While growing more strongly in the aggregate, exports from the 
region fluctuated considerably over the 1990s, although there were 
significant differences among countries and subregions. The first striking 
fact is the change in the relative performance of the two largest exporters, 
Mexico and Brazil, whose high weightings mean that they have a very 
considerable impact on average indicator values for the region as a whole. 
In 1999, Mexico exported almost as much by value as the rest of the region 
put together, accounting for about 48% of the total, whereas in 1988 its 
share was less than 28% (the figures for both years include maquila
exports). In the late 1980s, by contrast, Brazil was the main exporter in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, accounting for 31% of regional exports. 
Since its exports had not doubled by the end of the 1990s, its share in the 
regional total was down to 17%. 
Table II.6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TERMS OF TRADE 












1980 158.4 236.4 165.0 92.2 156.1 193.3 
1985 123.2 165.2 126.2 77.8 121.5 157.6 
1990 96.0 109.3 98.0 76.1 96.1 106.8 
1991 96.9 105.6 98.1 83.9 96.9 97.7 
1992 93.7 102.8 96.1 90.1 95.6 92.9 
1993 93.5 105.8 96.7 93.4 96.4 91.9 
1994 97.9 105.2 99.7 98.9 99.8 101.0 
1995 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1996 101.9 104.7 103.0 93.7 102.3 108.6 















Source: ECLAC, International Trade and Development Finance Division, on the basis of figures provided 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national institutions. 
a
 Includes 19 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. 
b
 Includes Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela. 
c
 Includes Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
d
 Includes Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. 
e
 Includes all the countries of South America, plus Mexico. 
f
 Includes Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. 
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It is also worth noting that a number of countries have made 
significant progress in diversifying the range and quality of the products 
they export, while the trend towards greater concentration is not so 
homogeneous where destination markets are concerned. Mexico has been 
diversifying its output while concentrating on a few destinations, whereas 
Brazil has diversified its product range to a lesser extent than Mexico, but 
still considerably, and exports to a wider variety of destinations. Chile has 
been expanding the number of products exported while also increasing 
the number of markets. Colombia and Peru have followed a path similar 
to that of Chile, although to a lesser degree. Argentina does not show any 
significant change, while the other two members of MERCOSUR 
(Paraguay and Uruguay) display a pattern similar to that of Brazil, but 
with less product diversification and greater concentration as regards 
destinations, especially Paraguay. The main developments where Bolivia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela are concerned is the increase in the number of 
destination markets to which they export, with little change in the breadth 
of their product ranges. Lastly, the Central American countries, with the 
exception of Guatemala, have been diversifying both their products 
(especially Costa Rica and El Salvador) and their export markets, as figure 
II.3 shows. 
A second important feature of the decade was the increase in the 
share of manufactured products at the expense of commodities in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, as can be seen from table II.7. Between 1988 
and 1998, industrial goods increased their weighting from 63.9% to 76.2%, 
while that of commodities fell from 35.5% to 22.9%. Again, among 
industrial goods, the traditional ones (foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco, 
textiles and metals) increased their share slightly from 21.3% to 22.6%, 
with a decline in the case of the foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco group 
and an increase in the case of textiles and wearing apparel. Lastly, the 
share of goods classified as natural-resource-intensive with substantial 
economies of scale declined, whereas the share of durable goods and 
those classified as diffusers of technical progress expanded significantly. 
It should be noted, however, that the product mix, destination 
markets and fast growth of Mexican exports have had a significant impact 
on regional averages. Mexico chose to create closer ties with the United 
States, through NAFTA, in order to guarantee an inflow of investment 
and thus more stable access to the United States market. This decision 
increased the relative importance of the United States as a destination 
market for Mexican exports18 and led to significant changes in the 
composition of these. The share of commodities, particularly agricultural 
18  The weight of the United States as a Mexican export destination, which was already 
substantial in 1988 (66%), increased even further, reaching about 87% in 1998. 
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and energy commodities, dropped very considerably, the gainers being 
industrial goods, especially those classified as final-use durables and as 
diffusers of technical progress, which more than doubled their share of 
exports. During this process, the share of assembly activities in the total of 
Mexican exports grew from 33% in 1988 to 45% in 1998.19
In their export mix, the economies of Central America and the 
Dominican Republic show similar trends to those seen in the case 
of Mexico, although the relative growth of assembly activities, again 
oriented towards the United States market, has been much 
more pronounced. Thus, the traditional industries, particularly wearing 
apparel, have increased their share, as, have electronic products. The 
English-speaking Caribbean, in contrast, does not show any significant 
changes in its export mix during the 1990s (see table II.7). 
The export base of Brazil, the region's other large exporter was 
already highly diversified at the beginning of the decade, and became 
more so over the period, but export growth was slower. Brazilian exports 
grew at an average annual rate of only 3.2% over the 1990s, with the share 
of industrial goods classified as diffusers of technical progress and final-
use durables increasing. The remaining countries in South America also 
showed minor changes, with natural-resource intensive goods, traditional 
industrial goods and commodities (in particular agricultural 
commodities) accounting for almost 70% of the group’s exports. 
In short, Mexico and some Central American and Caribbean 
countries have managed to expand exports in dynamic sectors, primarily 
to the North American market, although assembly activities account for a 
large share. In contrast, the South American countries have also pursued 
export growth, but demand in the developed countries for the goods they 
export is rising only slowly, albeit they have succeeded in diversifying 
their destination markets. 
19  Assembly operations were exempt from import taxes on goods and components 
destined for re-export, up to 1 January 2001. However, few analysts expect these 
activities to stagnate as a result. 
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Figure II.3 
DIVERSIFICATION OF EXPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICA, 
BETWEEN 1988 AND 1998 
A. Number of destination countries 
B. Number of products 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Note: Figure A shows  the changes in the number of destination markets for 80% of each 
country's exports between 1988 and 1998. For example, in 1988 Brazil exported to more than 
25 destinations, while in 1998 it exported to only 21. This is interpreted as an increase in the 
concentration of export destinations. Figure B shows changes between 1988 and 1998 in the 
number of products making up 80% of each country's exports. In the case of Brazil, the 
figure shows that just over 70 products accounted for 80% of the country's exports by value 
in 1988, while in 1998 the number of products making up this percentage was about 130. All 
products are defined down to four digits of SITC Rev. 2. These diversification measurements 




























































COMPOSITION OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN EXPORTS,a  1988 AND 1998 
(Percentages) 
Goods categories Mexico b Brazil 
South America, 
except Brazil 
Central Americac English-speaking 
Caribbeand







 1988 1998 1988 1998 1988 1998 1988 1998 1988 1998e 1988 1998 1988 1998 1988 1998 
Commodities 42.9 10.0 18.8 19.6 44.0 40.4 63.8 41.7 27.8 28.2 35.5 22.9 20.2 15.5 33.4 38.8 
Agriculture 10.7 4.1 12.2 12.4 20.9 20.3 63.2 41.0 10.4 7.7 17.2 12.3 8.0 8.6 17.5 19.9 
Mining 2.8 0.4 6.5 7.2 5.2 4.2 0.1 0.2 3.6 9.8 4.9 3.0 3.9 1.5 6.0 7.0 
Energy 29.4 5.5 0.0 0.0 17.9 15.8 0.4 0.5 13.8 10.6 13.4 7.6 8.4 5.3 9.9 11.9 
Industrial goods 56.7 89.9 80.1 79.2 55.6 57.8 35.7 58.2 72.0 70.2 63.9 76.2 79.4 84.3 65.9 60.1 
Traditional 10.8 20.0 29.2 28.9 20.0 21.3 23.6 31.1 19.1 21.0 21.3 22.6 17.4 26.4 25.5 23.7 
Food, beverages and 
tobacco 3.9 2.3 16.6 16.3 11.8 12.3 12.3 13.0 10.7 11.8 11.8 8.7 6.5 12.1 15.1 14.4
Other traditional 




economies of scalef 20.6 8.3 31.5 24.1 33.1 27.6 6.9 8.9 50.4 47.3 29.5 18.1 40.7 28.2 31.3 26.7 
Final-use durablesg 10.2 24.0 8.7 10.7 0.8 5.1 0.2 1.1 0.3 0.1 5.4 14.2 8.7 15.4 3.9 3.2 
Diffusers of technical 
progressh 15.1 37.6 10.8 15.5 1.8 3.8 5.2 17.0 2.2 1.7 7.7 21.4 12.5 14.3 5.2 6.4 
Other goods 0.3 0.1 0.8 1.2 0.4 1.8 0.5 0.1 0.2 1.7 0.5 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.7 1.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. For a detailed description of the classification used, see ECLAC Panorama de la inserción internacional de América Latina y el Caribe, 
1996 (LC/G.1941), Santiago, Chile, December 1996, pp. 217-225; and Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy. 1998 Edition (LC/G.2038-P), Santiago, Chile, March 
1999, p. 172. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.99.II.G.3. 
a
 Includes the following 25 countries: Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
b
 Since 1992, Mexico has been listing maquila products as "Goods". Before that date, they were classified under "Trade in services". Therefore, the data for 1988 and for 1999 are not comparable. 
c Includes the following five countries: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. 
d
 Includes the following eight countries: Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.
e
 In the case of Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Paraguay and Suriname, where data for 1998 were lacking, 1997 figures were used. 
f
 Includes, among other industrial commodities, petrochemicals, paper, cement and basic metals. 
g
 Includes household electrical appliances and vehicles (and parts), as well as assembly operations. 
h
 Includes machinery, instruments and fine chemicals, as well as assembly of those products.
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The third significant feature was the progress made in intraregional 
trade, which recovered from a serious slump in the 1980s to expand 
rapidly in the following years —more rapidly, in fact, than exports to 
outside countries. By 1997, it accounted for more than a fifth of total 
exports from the region's countries, as can be seen in table II.8.20 Economic 
liberalization and the consolidation of integration processes brought 
home to the countries the advantages of proximity and enabled them to 
capitalize on the potential of the region's markets, especially as outlets for 
manufactures and services. Aggregate data show that there was genuine 
trade creation among the member countries of integration schemes and 
preferential agreements, while trade diversion was limited on account of 
the general lowering of tariffs. 
This process was particularly marked within the different 
subregional schemes, although two subperiods have to be distinguished. 
Between 1990 and 1997, the MERCOSUR group’s share in total exports 
grew from 8.9% to 24.8%, that of the Andean Community from 4.2% to 
12.1%, that of CACM from 16% to 20.1% and that of CARICOM from 
12.9% to 16.7%, in all cases within a context of sustained growth in overall 
exports. However, the recent crisis caused trade flows within the two 
South American groups to drop sharply from 1998 onwards, and 
especially in 1999, when trade dropped by 27.2% within the Andean 
Community and by 24.4% within MERCOSUR (see table II.8). 
The two trends referred to —diversification of export structures 
and growth in intraregional trade— are related, as intraregional exports 
include a particularly high proportion of manufactured goods (84.3%, as 
against 76.2% for total regional exports) (see table II.7). 
20  This proportion is significantly higher if Mexico is excluded, once, as already mentioned, 
its links with the other countries of the region are weak. 
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Table II.8 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXPORTS, IN TOTAL AND BY 
SUBREGIONAL INTEGRATION SCHEME 
(Millions of current dollars and percentages) 
 1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
LAIA        
Total exportsa 112 694 167 192 204 170 229 164 255 390 251 345 264 235 
Annual percentage growth   10.4 22.1 12.2 11.4 -1.6 5.1 
Exports to LAIA 12 302 28 168 35 552 38 449 45 484 43 231 34 391 
Annual percentage growth  23.0 26.2 8.2 18.3 -5.0 -20.4 
Percentage of exports 
within LAIA (2:1) 10.9 16.8 17.4 16.8 17.8 17.2 13.0 
Andean Community        
Total exports 31 751 33 706 39 134 44 375 46 609 38 896 43 211 
Annual percentage growth  1.5 16.1 13.4 5.0 -16.5 11.1 
Exports to the Andean 
Community 1 324 3 472 4 859 4 698 5 621 5 411 3 940 
Annual percentage growth   27.2 39.9 -3.3 19.7 -3.7 -27.2 
Percentage of exports 
within the Community (2:1) 4.2 10.3 12.4 10.6 12.1 13.9 9.1 
MERCOSUR        
Total exports 46 403 61 890 70 129 74 407 82 596 80 227 74 300 
Annual percentage growth  7.5 13.3 6.1 11.0 -2.9 -7.4 
Exports to MERCOSUR 4 127 12 048 14 451 17 115 20 478 20 027 15 133 
Annual percentage growth … 30.7 20.0 18.4 19.7 -2.2 -24.4 
Percentage of exports 




       
Total exports 3 907 5 496 6 777 7 332 9 275 11 077 11 633 
Annual percentage growth … 8.9 23.3 8.2 26.5 19.4 5.0 
Exports to CACM 624 1 228 1 451 1 553 1 863 2 242 2 333 
Annual percentage growth … 18.4 18.2 7.0 19.9 20.3 4.1 
Percentage of exports 
within CACM (2:1) 16.0 22.3 21.4 21.2 20.1 20.2 20.1 
CARICOMb        
Total exports 3 634 4 113 4 511 4 595 4 687 4 791 4 223 
Annual percentage growth … 3.1 9.7 1.9 2.0 2.2 -11.9 
Exports to CARICOM 469 521 690 775 785 … … 
Annual percentage growth  … 2.6 32.4 12.3 1.2 … … 
Percentages of exports 
within CARICOM (2:1) 12.9 12.7 15.3 16.9 16.7 … … 
Latin America and the 
Caribbeanc        
Total exports 120 572 177 336 216 031 241 648 269 996 267 213 280 091 
Annual percentage growth  … 10.1 21.8 11.9 11.7 -0.8 4.8 
Exports to Latin America 
and the Caribbean 16 802 35 065 42 740 46 562 54 756 51 674 42 624 
Annual percentage growth … 20.2 21.9 8.9 17.6 -5.6 -17.5 
Percentage of exports 
within the region/total (2:1) 13.9 19.8 19.8 19.3 20.3 19.3 15.2 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures from the different subregional groups: LAIA, the Andean 
Community, MERCOSUR and the Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration (SIECA). 
a
 From 1992 onwards, Mexico’s maquila exports are included in these figures. 
b
 Includes Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. 
c
 Includes LAIA, CACM, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Panama and Trinidad and Tobago. This is not 
exactly the same group of countries as was taken for table II.5, as different aggregations and 
methodologies were used. 
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3. Size and composition of capital flows 
(a) General trends 
In the 1990s, the region was shaken by two financial crises: one in 
1994-1995, known as the "tequila effect", which had a serious impact on 
Mexico and Argentina, and one which started in Asia in mid-1997 and 
later spread to Russia and Latin America. To see that these were not 
isolated events, it is sufficient to recall the debt crisis that scourged the 
region in the 1980s and then spread to other parts of the developing 
world. These recent events are in fact part of a long history of financial 
booms and busts, some of them confined to individual developing or 
industrialized countries, others international, which have disfigured the 
economic record of Latin America and the Caribbean (Ocampo, 1999). 
These events, then, reflect intrinsic features of financial market 
operations, which have not disappeared with the return in recent years of 
macroeconomic conditions characterized by subdued inflation and lower 
fiscal deficits. Volatility and contagion have been the terms most used to 
describe the two central features of financial market behaviour. The first 
denotes the market’s tendency to move in pronounced cycles of financial 
boom and panic, in which capital flows tend to grow and then contract by 
more than the economic fundamentals would warrant. The second term 
refers to the market’s inhability to distinguish adequately between the 
various types of the borrowers, and is applied to both the expansionary 
and contractionary stages of the economic cycle. In contractionary phases, 
the contagion of pessimism leads the markets to attach excessive 
importance to short-term negative information, while secondary markets 
become disorganized, leading to a general loss of liquidity. In 
expansionary phases, by contrast, the contagion of optimism leads many 
agents to underestimate the risks of channelling resources into economies 
or companies whose indicators, looked at objectively, are not entirely 
favourable. 
Figure II.4 confirms the volatility of capital flows to Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Thus, there was a significant recovery in capital 
inflows into the region in the 1990s, after a period of financial stringency 
lasting almost throughout the 1980s. In 1991-1999, annual capital inflows 
averaged 3% of GDP, in sharp contrast to the huge outflows of 2% or so of 
GDP seen in 1983-1990. Even more striking was the situation in 1976-1981, 
when average annual inflows reached an unprecedented 4% of GDP, a 
level achieved only in the most expansionary years of the 1990s. 
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Not all types of flows, however, behaved in similar ways over the 
period. The most volatile were bond issues, portfolio flows and net 
commercial bank credits; in contrast, foreign direct investment (FDI), and 
of course official and compensatory financing, were much less volatile, as 
figure II.5 shows. 
Because of the recovery in flows, the net transfer of resources21 to 
the region was positive in the 1990s (except in 1990 and 1999), equating to 
9% of regional goods and services exports. Once again, this situation was 
very different from that of the previous decade, when transfers out of the 
region fluctuated around 40% of exports, year after year, between 1982 
and 1989 (see figure II.4). 
Figure II.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET CAPITAL INFLOWS 
AND RESOURCE TRANSFERS 
(As a share of GDP, at current prices) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a
 Net inflow of autonomous capital (figures include errors and omissions). 
b
 Net transfer of resources is equal to net inflow of autonomous and non-autonomous capital (loans, IMF 
credit and special funding) minus the balance of the income account (profit and net interest). 
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A decade of light and shadow. Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s  85
Figure II.5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXTERNAL FINANCING 
AND TOTAL GDP 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures from the World Bank and IMF. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) was the largest capital inflow 
component, displacing bank credits, which had held first place in the 
composition of capital inflows in previous decades. At the beginning of 
the 1980s, FDI represented only 20% of capital inflows. This proportion 
gradually increased in the 1990s, to reach over three quarters of the total 
in 1996-1999. Thus, in the last years of the decade, FDI took on a vital role 
in the financing of the balance-of-payments current account deficit in over 
half the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
During the 1980s, and particularly in the 1990s, the main 
beneficiaries were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. In the 
closing years of the decade, though, the geographical distribution of FDI 
diversified to include countries such as Bolivia, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. It should be noted that FDI was 
the only counter-cyclical private flow; Mexico received inflows of US$ 20 
billion in 1994-1995 and Brazil had receipts of almost US$ 30 billion in 
1998, which alleviated the crisis in both cases. 
Again, from 1989 onward, the countries of the region gained 
extensive access to international bond markets, whose steady expansion 
was only interrupted by the after-effects of the Mexican financial crisis in 
1995, and of the Asian crisis in 1998 (see table II.9). The region had only 
been able to have very limited recourse to this source of financing since 




































to the larger countries (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico), which accounted 
for almost 90% of all bond placements, but it was also important as a 
source of financing for Chile, Colombia, Uruguay and Venezuela and, 
towards the end of the decade, for smaller countries such as Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Panama and Trinidad and Tobago. 
Table II.9 
LATIN AMERICA: SOURCES OF EXTERNAL FINANCING 
(Millions of dollars) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
A. Debta           
Officialb 6 825 3 425 1 205 2 656 -1 344 9 295 -8 315 -3 239 9 059 6 300 
Bonds 101 4 133 4 738 20 922 14 306 11 793 29 764 10 562 17 600 9 600 
Banks 2 731 1 275 4 302 201 6 212 15 068 16 200 29 646 -6 078 -15 747 
B. Investment           
Directa 6 758 11 065 12 506 10 359 23 706 24 878 39 329 55 620 60 974 77 543 
ADRc 98 3 891 3 964 6 022 4 704 962 3 661 5 441 164 761 
C. Compensa-
tory fundingd 24 539 13 727 8 207 6 309 5 223 30 752 -271 -4 215 8 818 43
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official World Bank, IMF and BIS figures. 
aNet flow. bIncludes bilateral and multilateral funding, with the exception of IMF. cAmerican Depositary 
Receipts. Figures only include new share issues. dIncludes IMF loans and credit access and special 
funding. At the beginning of the 1990s, special funding consisted mostly of overdue interest; in recent 
years, it has included resources from multilateral organizations other than IMF, and the governments of 
developed countries. 
In the first half of the 1990s, the average term of new issues in the 
region was about three to five years. In 1997, when placements were at 
their height, the average term increased to 15 years, a situation for which 
there is no recent precedent. Later, in 1998-1999, the average term fell to 
about 7 years. Spreads on new issues also reached a low in mid-1997, but 
increased substantially in August 1998, after the Russian moratorium. In 
that month, the annual cost of external financing on the secondary 
Eurobond market rose to 15%, before falling to 12% in 1999. Of the 
countries that were most active in the market, Chile and Uruguay 
obtained the most favourable bond placement conditions; Mexico, which 
previously belonged to the following group, now obtains favourable 
terms as well, while Colombia, which used to rank with the above, has 
seen a tendency for its terms to deteriorate; and Argentina, Brazil and 
Venezuela get the most onerous terms. 
Following a virtual cessation of bank lending (apart from supplier 
credit) after the Mexican moratorium in 1982, the net flow of commercial 
bank funds to the region remained very moderate until 1993, when it 
began to gather momentum, net funding of this type peaked in 1997 at 
around US$ 30 billion, but the balance turned negative in 1998, according 
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to BIS estimates. This type of finance was particularly important for some 
private-sector companies in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico 
and Venezuela. On average, bank borrowing conditions during the 
decade were worse than in the 1970s, especially in terms of repayment 
schedules. 
Stock market investment went mainly to Argentina, Brazil, Chile 
and Mexico. The highest levels were reached in 1992-1993, prior to the 
Mexican crisis, and in 1997, prior to the Asian crisis. This flow showed 
quite pro-cyclical behaviour, as did American Depositary Receipt (ADR) 
investments, with inflows of about US$ 5.5 billion in 1993-1994 and 
US$ 4.5 billion in 1996-1997. In contrast, the total was very low in the 
years of financial crisis, closely matching developments in stock markets, 
which experienced their worst falls after years of strong growth. 
Official financing behaved counter-cyclically —particularly in 1995 
and 1998— after the financial crises referred to. Breaking down the total, it 
transpires that inflows of bilateral resources were negative for the region 
in the latter years of the decade, in marked contrast to those from 
multilateral sources, which followed a rising trend, especially from 1995 
onward. During the periods of greatest volatility in the region over the 
1990s, IMF and other multilateral organizations supported the 
governments of some countries that had been particularly affected, 
especially Mexico (US$ 30 billion) in late 1994 and Brazil (US$ 9.4 billion) 
at the end of 199822 (see table II.9). 
(b) Foreign direct investment 
World FDI flows increased substantially during the 1990s, rising 
from an annual average of US$ 245 billion between 1991 and 1996 to over 
US$ 650 billion in 1998, and to US$ 830 billion in 1999. Transnational 
corporations thus continued to gain importance in most national 
economies, whether developed or developing. 
In the context of this general trend, growth in net FDI flows to Latin 
America and the Caribbean was very significant, as they increased from 
US$ 9 billion to US$ 86 billion between 1990 and 1999, according to 
ECLAC estimates. This extraordinary growth means that more than half 
of all FDI assets existing in 1999 had accumulated over the decade, a fact 
which suggests there is a need to reinterpret this phenomenon. Although 
a significant proportion of this FDI was used to purchase existing assets 
22  This was the amount of the first IMF payment. The agreement between IMF and the 
Government of Brazil pledged a total of US$ 41 billion in external financing from 
multilateral organizations and from the governments of developed countries (Sáinz and 
Calcagno, 1999). 
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(privatized State enterprises or local private-sector companies), in the 
latter part of the decade, when these flows increased significantly, about 
60% of all FDI was still being used to create new assets in the LAIA 
countries (see figure II.6). 
Figure II.6 
LAIA COUNTRIES: NET FDI INFLOWS, BY TYPE, 1990-1999 
(Millions of dollars) 
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, Division of 
Production, Productivity and Management, on the basis of information provided by IMF, KPMG Corporate 
Finance, 1999, and ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, "Informe mensual de fusiones 
y adquisiciones", April to November 1999. 
The share of FDI that went to purchase existing assets thus 
remained stable at around 40% of the total. It should be noted that the 
upsurge in mergers and acquisitions was due to the numerous operations 
carried out in the larger countries. In Mexico, the main mergers and 
acquisitions in telecommunications, financial services and retailing took 
place in 1995-1997. In Brazil they were more recent (1997 and 1998) while 
in Argentina and Chile the large sales of domestic private-sector 
enterprises took place in 1999. Of all mergers and majority acquisitions in 
the region, 70% were carried out as part of the Brazilian privatization 
process in the areas of telecommunications (sale of the Telebras system) 
and electrical power (especially the distribution segment). In the first half 
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acquisitions in Latin America owing to the purchase of Yacimientos 
Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF) by Repsol. Something similar occurred in Chile 
with the acquisition of Enersis and Endesa-Chile by Endesa-Spain. 
In the second half of the 1990s, subregions that had traditionally 
been less favoured by foreign investors became more significant with the 
total FDI share of the smaller economies of Central America, excluding 
financial centres, growing from 6.1% to 7.5% between 1997 and 1998.23 In 
the latter year, the subregion attained the record figure of US$ 5.8 billion, 
with a similar amount in 1999. Despite the growing attraction of the 
Central American and Caribbean countries, however, the four largest 
Latin American economies continued to attract most attention from  
transnational corporations. During the period 1995-1999, Brazil (32%), 
Mexico (17%), Argentina (15%) and Chile (8%) received, taken together, 
more than two thirds of the region's net FDI. 
Net FDI inflows are also becoming much more concentrated in 
terms of their main sources, as shown in figure II.7. In the last few years, 
approximately half of these inflows have come from the United States and 
half from Europe, with Japan confirming to have a small presence in the 
region. In 1998, the European share clearly exceeded that of the United 
States for the first time owing to large investments made by Spanish 
firms, chiefly in the form of mergers and acquisitions (ECLAC, 1999a 
and 2000b). 
The increase in FDI has come about because transnational 
corporations have rethought their strategies in response to the 
globalization process and the new regime of macroeconomic incentives. 
Some have decided to seek greater efficiency by integrating their regional 
subsidiaries more into globalized programmes and tailoring new 
investments to new national and subregional circumstances (in the cases 
of NAFTA and MERCOSUR) and to the requirements of the world 
market. Others, actuated by a desire to defend or increase their market 
share, rationalized or expanded their operations in the national or 
subregional markets where they have a presence. 
23  In this book, Panama is included in this subregion, as in recent years its pattern of 
foreign investment has been observed to be similar to that of the other countries there. 
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Figure II.7 
FDI FLOWS TO LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 
BY MAIN SOURCES, 1990-2000 












Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, Division of 
Production, Productivity and Management, on the basis of information provided by IMF, the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the central banks of each country. 
The first of these strategies has been more in evidence in the case of 
Mexico, mainly in the automotive, vehicle parts, computer, electronics 
and wearing apparel industries (ECLAC, 1999a and 2000b). This is 
because, in response to the so-called Asian challenge in the United States 
market, the three largest United States automotive companies (General 
Motors, Ford and Chrysler, before its acquisition by the German company 
Daimler-Benz) and some from other countries (Volkswagen and Nissan) 
have taken a variety of measures to improve production efficiency, 
including investments in Mexico to build new plants with state-of-the-art 
machinery and technology. In the same way, other foreign firms have 
taken advantage of NAFTA and the maquila programme to invest in 
Mexico with a view to exporting to the North American market, most of 
them being manufactures of electronic products such as televisions, 
computers and sound and telecommunications equipment and 
wearing apparel. 
As in Mexico, many United States companies have taken advantage 
of the availability of export processing zones (assembly activities), low 
wages and tariff preferences for exports to the United States to invest in or 
go into partnership with local businesses in the countries of the Caribbean 
Basin (Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala and 
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Honduras), in order to improve their competitiveness in the North 
American market. In the case of the Central American and Caribbean 
countries, most of these investments have been in the clothing industry 
and in the electrical and electronic equipment sector. 
With regard to the second strategy of rationalizing and 
modernizing in order to create, defend or increase market share in a 
country or subregion, Argentina and Brazil, and by extension 
MERCOSUR, offer excellent examples. Foreign companies with a 
presence in these markets have been obliged to rethink their long-term 
strategies to cope with the new patterns of competition resulting from 
growing economic openness there. In general, companies have sought to 
maintain and expand their presence by producing essentially for local 
markets, but on a scale sufficient to compete with imports. Major 
investments have thus been made in the automotive and food subsectors 
and in the chemical and machinery industries. In the case of the 
automotive industry in MERCOSUR, companies with a large presence 
(Fiat, Volkswagen, Ford and General Motors) are investing to defend 
market share and to respond to rising demand, especially for compact 
cars. A large number of firms are also looking to enter or return to the 
subregion —examples being Chrysler, Renault, Peugeot, BMW, Daimler 
Benz, Honda, Asia Motors and Hyundai— with a view to positioning 
themselves in new market niches. 
In addition to these two main strategies —openness towards 
outside markets and defence of national and subregional markets— new 
investment opportunities have opened up in sectors to which private 
enterprise in general, and foreign companies in particular, formerly had 
only limited access. This change has come about as a result of the 
deregulation of many public service and mining activities, and has led to 
a large influx of foreign companies in extractive industries (mining and 
hydrocarbons) and in services (mainly finance, energy and 
telecommunications). Thus, in addition to the two strategies described 
above, transnational corporations are pursuing a third, extraction of raw 
materials, and a fourth, the quest for access to local service markets. 
The third strategy has come into being because natural resource 
exploration, extraction and processing activities have been opened up to 
foreign capital. Chile was the first country to attract the interest of the 
largest transnational corporations after granting extensive guarantees 
and open access to mining resources. Subsequently, in the 1990s, 
other countries such as Argentina, Bolivia and Peru adopted similar 
policies, attracting substantial new investments in mining activities (see 
chapter IV). 
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Another very significant development in the past few years has 
been the gradual liberalization of the hydrocarbons subsector, which until 
a few years ago was under state control. This has led to international 
investors establishing a growing presence in activities relating to oil and 
natural gas and derivatives of these, including exploration, extraction, 
processing, distribution and marketing, as governments have auctioned 
off secondary reserves, allowed joint ventures to be set up in certain key 
activities and, in some cases, privatized the entire subsector. The most 
striking cases in the region are Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and 
Venezuela. In the last case, it is hoped that existing joint ventures between 
the State company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) and foreign investors 
will attract more than US$ 30 billion over the next 10 years, thus doubling 
Venezuela’s hydrocarbon output. 
The fourth strategy is to take advantage of far-reaching 
liberalization in service sectors to gain access to domestic markets in the 
region (see chapter V). This has meant that, in most of the countries, these 
activities have been accounting for a larger and larger proportion of FDI 
inflows. In fact, foreign investors, many of them new to the region, have 
been taking large and growing market shares in the finance, energy 
(electrical power generation and distribution and natural gas distribution) 
and telecommunications subsectors (ECLAC, 1999a). 
In the case of the financial subsector, the most noteworthy strategy 
is the one that has been adopted by certain Spanish banks, in particular 
Santander, which merged with Central Hispano (BCH) in 1999, and 
Bilbao Vizcaya (BBV), which recently merged with Argentaria in response 
to this move by the Santander group. Owing to an energetic acquisition 
strategy, these banks have achieved a strong presence in the region, 
particularly in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and 
Venezuela. Overall, these two Spanish banks, along with the HSBC Group 
and the Canadian Bank of Nova Scotia, seem to be poised to take a 
position of strong leadership in the region's financial subsector. 
As a result of the privatization of public enterprises, a new 
contingent of foreign investors have positioned themselves in the Latin 
American energy sector as well, the most prominent being Spanish firms 
(Endesa and Iberdrola) and a number of pioneering companies of United 
States origin (AES Corporation, Houston Industries Energy, Southern 
Electric, CEA, Dominium Energy and CMS Energy). Given the scale of the 
resources involved, consortia of foreign firms from different countries 
were created, and these acted in partnership with powerful local groups 
to take control of the privatized assets. Interests focused first on the 
privatizations in Argentina, and then on Brazil. A strong link also began 
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to be established between natural gas transportation and distribution 
megaprojects and electrical power generation in Brazil. 
Telecommunications firms have been among those most prized by 
foreign investors. Since the late 1980s, the main State fixed-line telephony 
companies of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela and, 
recently, Brazil, have passed into private hands; cellular telephony 
services have also been auctioned off in almost all the countries. In this 
new environment, the most active firms have been Telefónica of Spain in 
basic telephony (local and long-distance calls) and the United States 
company BellSouth in mobile telephony. The recent privatization of the 
Telebras system revealed the level of interest felt by foreign companies in 
this type of assets in the region, as the Brazilian government received 
more than twice as much revenue from the sell-off as it had 
initially expected. 
In short, by applying these four basic strategies (see table II.10), 
transnational corporations have helped the countries of Latin America 
and the Caribbean to integrate further into the international economy and 
to cope with the difficulties of internal change and the repercussions of 
the external upheavals that took place during the 1990s. Thus through 
new investment, some companies from a number of Latin American 
countries are beginning to be integrated into the global production 
systems of transnational corporations, at least in part. It should be noted, 
however, that a very large proportion of FDI has been used to purchase 
existing assets, and that profit remittances, which are the corollary of 
economic transnationalization, have begun to emerge as an increasingly 
significant item in the region's balance-of-payments current account. It 
should also be noted that there is still no sign in Latin America and the 
Caribbean of transnational corporations taking steps to seek out the kind 
of strategic components (research and development, for example) that are 
such a significant feature of the OECD countries and of certain branches 
of the electronics industry in some Asian economies, such as the Republic 
of Korea and Taiwan province of China. 
Trade liberalization and stable monetary conditions also helped 
prepare the way for an increase in intraregional investment which, 
although still modest in terms of volume —between 3% and 5% of total 
foreign investment into the region— is significant in view of its fast 
growth and of certain attributes which give it a particularly important 
role to play in integrating the region's production and trade systems. 
Stimulated initially by privatizations, this investment took off in the early 
1990s, having been virtually non-existent until then; investors 
subsequently concentrated on establishing a presence in subregional 
markets which were integrating through binding agreements, such as 
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MERCOSUR and the Andean Community. Investments of this type have 
been facilitated by the geographical proximity and cultural closeness of 
member countries and by the knowledge acquired by earlier privatization 
investors. They have targeted certain basic services (electricity generation 
and distribution in Argentina and Peru), the financial system (banking 
sector in Colombia and Venezuela) and the automotive and food-
processing industries (Argentina, Brazil and Chile), among others. 
Table II.10 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN INVESTMENT STRATEGIES OF THE 
SUBSIDIARIES OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN THE 1990s 
Sector 
Corporate 
strategy Primary Manufacturing Services 
Efficiency-
seeking 
 Strategy 1 
Automotive industry 
Mexico Electronics: Mexico 
and Caribbean Basin 






 Strategy 2 
Automotive industry: 
MERCOSUR 
Chemicals: Brazil  
Agro-industry: Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico 
Cement: Colombia, 
Dominican Republic and 
Venezuela 
Strategy 4 
Finance: Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru 
and Venezuela 
Telecommunications: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Peru 
Retail trade: Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile and Mexico 
Electrical power: Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia and 
Central America 
Gas distribution: Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile and Colombia 
















Absent from Latin America and the Caribbean 
Source: ECLAC, Foreign investment in Latin America and the Caribbean. 1999 Report (LC/G.2061-P), 
Santiago, Chile, February 2000. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.00.II.G.4. 
A decade of light and shadow. Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s  95
4. International labour migration  
In the 1990s, two dominant migratory patterns were established in 
the region: movements between countries and emigration out of the 
region. Both patterns involved workers of varying skill levels (ECLAC-
CELADE, 1999a). A third movement, immigration from overseas, has 
declined in volume over the past few decades, both because of mortality 
and emigration (return) among existing immigrants and because flows 
from Europe have shrunk, while immigrants from other regions, chiefly 
Asia, are few (table II.11). 
Table II.11 
LATIN AMERICA: IMMIGRANT POPULATION BY GENERAL REGION OF ORIGIN. 
NATIONAL POPULATION CENSUSES OF 1970, 1980 AND 1990a
Census dateb Annual growth rate 
Region of origin 1970 1980 1990 1970-1980
1980-
1990
A. Population (thousands)      
Rest of world (immigration from 
overseas) 3 873 3 411 2 350 -1.3 -3.7 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean (intraregional 
migration) 1 219 2 012 2 201 4.9 0.9 
Total 5 092 5 423 4 551 0.6 -1.7 
B. Percentages      
Rest of world (immigration from 
overseas) 23.9 37.1 48.4 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean (intraregional 
migration) 76.1 62.9 51.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0   
Source: Estimates prepared on the basis of the IMILA (Investigation of International Migration in Latin 
America) database of the Population Division - Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre 
(CELADE) of ECLAC. 
a
 The number of countries included is 16 for 1970, 14 for 1980 and 13 for 1990. 
b
 The dates are those of the national census rounds. 
The doubling of the number of intraregional migrants between 1970 
and 1990 is a clear demonstration of the first pattern, one of whose 
distinguishing features is the high concentration of migrant inflows in 
countries which have traditionally had more advantageous wage and 
employment conditions. Thus, around 1990, two thirds of all immigrants 
were in Argentina and Venezuela and a significant proportion of people 
born in other Central American countries were living in Costa Rica. In 
addition to the influence of structural factors, intraregional migration 
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shows the effects of temporary circumstances, both socio-political and 
economic, for example, the social upheaval in various Central American 
countries in the 1980s provoked mass emigration, whereas the restoration 
of peace in the second half of that decade created favourable conditions 
for return (ECLAC-CELADE, 1999b). Again, geographical proximity, 
cultural similarity and a shared history all facilitate migration within the 
region (Pellegrino, 1995). 
The momentum of this expansionary movement began to decrease 
in the 1980s. In the 1990s, Venezuela exercised far less of an attraction, 
whereas Argentina and Costa Rica re-emerged as favoured destinations in 
the early years of the decade. Furthermore, in what was perhaps the most 
striking phenomenon of the decade, new areas of attraction appeared, 
such as Chile and the Dominican Republic. 
In general, linkages of a fairly informal kind have tended to arise 
among labour markets, supported by the information resources and 
contacts provided by the social networks of migrants themselves. This has 
helped strengthen yet further the increasing interdependence among the 
nations of the region and is a factor of particular importance for their 
efforts towards economic and cultural integration. It should also be noted 
that intraregional migratory currents are not confined to the movements 
of workers, as a significant proportion of the people involved are family 
members who do not participate directly in economic activity 
(ECLAC, 1999c). 
Emigration out of the region has shown an even steadier growth 
trend than immigration, as is illustrated by the large number of Latin 
American and Caribbean immigrants recorded in United States censuses 
(see table II.12). In 1990, about 9 million people born in the region were 
present in the United States,24 and information provided by the current 
Population Survey of the United States shows that this number grew even 
further over the five-year period 1990-1995 (ECLAC-CELADE, 1999b). 
Although the absolute figures are highest for Mexicans, the impact of this 
phenomenon relative to the population of the countries of origin is even 
greater in the case of the Caribbean nations. Again, in the last few 
decades, the average annual rates of increase for migrants from Central 
America have been the highest (ECLAC-CELADE, 1999a). As in the case 
of the intraregional pattern, the destinations of extraregional flows have 
tended to diversify in recent years, extending to Canada, some European 
countries (especially Spain), Australia and Japan, although the figures are 
markedly lower than those for the United States. 
24  Half of all immigrants from the region came from Mexico, continuing a pattern of border 
migration which has deep historical roots, while a fifth were from the Caribbean 
countries. 
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Emigration from the region is a typical example of South-North 
migration originating in large disparities in development levels; its mass 
scale is explained by the feedback effect of migration networks acting as 
recruitment and facilitation mechanisms for further migration. A large, 
although not clearly determined proportion of the immigrants from the 
region living in the United States are undocumented, which puts them in 
a vulnerable situation. Nonetheless, immigrants of both sexes in the 
United States have high labour force participation rates and include a 
large number of people with skill levels that sometimes exceed the 
average for their countries of origin. 
Table II.12 
UNITED STATES: IMMIGRANT POPULATION OF LATIN AMERICAN  
AND CARIBBEAN ORIGIN. NATIONAL POPULATION CENSUSES OF 
 1970, 1980 AND 1990 
Census date Annual growth rate Region of origin 1970 1980 1990 1970-1980 1980-1990 
A. Population 
(thousands)      
South America 234 494 905 7.1 5.9 
Mesoamerica 874 2 530 5 396 9.7 7.2 
Caribbean and other 618 1 359 2 107 7.5 4.3 
Total 1 725 4 383 8 408 8.7 6.3 
B. Percentages      
South America 13.6 11.3 10.8   
Mesoamerica 50.6 57.7 64.2   
Caribbean and other 35.8 31.0 25.1   
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0   
Source: Estimates prepared on the basis of the IMILA (Investigation of International Migration in Latin 
America) database of the Population Division - Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre 
(CELADE) of ECLAC. 
Among the most important of the many repercussions of 
international migration are the role of monetary remittances sent by 
migrants to their countries of origin and the loss of qualified personnel for 
those countries. The role of remittances is subject to different 
interpretations regarding the size and regularity of flows, their use for 
consumption or investment, the ties of dependency they may create 
among recipients and the distorting effect they may have on income 
distribution in the receiving countries. It is certainly true, however, that 
these remittances make a significant contribution at the macroeconomic 
level; it is estimated that the funds remitted in 1998 by Salvadoran 
immigrants in the United States were equivalent to 16% of El Salvador’s 
GDP and to 60% of the value of that country’s exports (ECLAC, 1999a). 
Remittances are also a form of support that can be significant at the local 
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level, especially when they are used for services and housing 
infrastructure in the migrants’ communities of origin. 
Extraregional emigration by people with a high level of 
qualifications has been increasing, although evaluating the effects of this 
is a particularly complex task. Whilst emigration frequently benefits the 
individuals concerned, as it allows them to make use of their abilities and 
obtain higher incomes than in their communities of origin, it also means a 
loss of human resources which, apart from the high training costs 
involved, deprives their home countries of an important source of 
development potential. 
In the 1990s, consolidation of the migratory patterns described was 
accompanied by diversification, with circular and seasonal movements, 
business travel, transfers of personnel working for large transnational 
corporations and periods of residency abroad for study purposes all 
increasing. The increased frequency of such movements, which are 
continually renewed, is one effect of the growing interdependence of 
markets at the international level and also reflects the predominance of 
the cultural standards of the more developed countries, since access to 
information and to the lifestyles and consumption patterns of these 
countries has been spreading to the rest of the world. The duration and 
geographical range of these new forms of travel have been increased by 
technological progress in the areas of transport and communications. 
On the micro-social scale, social networks help to reduce the 
friction of geographical and cultural distance by making many obstacles 
to conventional migration easier to deal with. The result is a transitory 
form of migration which, although repeated, seems to prevent the links 
between individuals and their communities and countries of origin from 
being lost. This aspect seems to be particularly important in the case of 
highly-qualified human resources. Migration of this kind, however, 
also reduces the potential for generating surpluses to send as remittances 
and interrupts the continuity of such transfers. Also, frequently repeated 
movements may turn into permanent forms of migration when more 
rigid standards for entry or access to work are applied in the 
destination countries. 
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Chapter III 
Macroeconomic performance 
In the second half of the 1980s, macroeconomic policy had begun to 
be shaped almost exclusively by the requirements of stabilization plans, 
in a context that was dominated by strong external constraints which 
generated severe fiscal disequilibria and, in some cases, acute inflation. 
Consequently, consumption and investment shrank and per capita output 
declined over the decade. 
As the external situation began to change in the early 1990s, it 
became feasible to use macroeconomic policy to reduce inflation and 
reactivate the countries’ economies. Though the region was shaken by 
two crises in the second half of the 1990s, they were managed fairly 
successfully, which demonstrated a certain capacity for keeping major 
macroeconomic disturbances under control. These policies alone, 
however, were not sufficient to restore high growth rates or to free the 
region of its external vulnerability. 
1. Macroeconomic policy 
The main features of the early 1990s were increased inflows of 
external capital, the real appreciation of local currencies and reduced 
inflation. These factors paved the way for the consolidation of fiscal 
accounts, increased monetization and a change in the sources of money 
creation. As the fiscal deficit started to narrow in the late 1980s, domestic 
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credit to the public sector began to decline in importance as a component 
of the money supply, although the situation varied from one country to 
another. Since then, the expansion of the money supply has been 
generated mainly by the increase in external assets and by credit to the 
private sector.1
The stabilization packages that were put into effect in the 1990s 
involved some elements of deindexation. In some instances this was 
explicit, as in the cases of the Convertibility Plan in Argentina and the 
Real Plan in Brazil. In other countries, such as Colombia and Mexico, the 
authorities adopted incomes policies based on tripartite agreements 
between unions, employers and the State, but did not resort to 
widespread price or wage freezes. 
A favourable international context during most of the decade also 
facilitated the management of stabilization policies. The developed 
countries enjoyed low rates of inflation, while the availability of loan 
funds at the world level made it possible to finance the external deficits 
resulting from these policies, although they also added a degree of 
volatility. Beginning in 1991, considerable capital inflows to the region 
and decreasing international interest rates turned the net transfer of 
external resources positive for the first time since the sharp reversal of 
1982. This favourable context was also partly due to the new policy 
among developed countries and international financial agencies of 
promoting packages of rescue measures for countries in severe financial 
difficulties (Mexico in 1995 and Brazil in 1998 and 1999). 
Increased capital inflows and, in several countries, the use of the 
nominal exchange rate to anchor inflation brought about a real 
appreciation in the countries’ currencies, while the current-account deficit 
widened. This was one of the hallmarks of the 1990s and compounded the 
fragility of the regional macroeconomy.
As the authorities have concentrated —often exclusively— on 
achieving fiscal deficit and inflation targets, they have tended to 
underestimate the long-term costs of certain measures, particularly cuts in 
public investment and currency overvaluation. The use of a short-term 
perspective in the management of macroeconomic policy has also resulted 
in a procyclical bias. Phases of ready access to external resources have 
encouraged expansionary public- and private-sector spending policies of 
a type which tend to lead to recession when external conditions take a 
turn for the worse. In essence, the situation seen in earlier decades has 
1 The proportion of credit going to the public sector, which stood at 44% of all domestic 
credit in 1984 as a simple average of the countries of the region, began to decrease 
steadily from 1987 onward. 
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been repeated, with the difference that while boom and bust cycles used 
to be measured in decades (the high growth of the 1960s and 1970s, 
followed by the lost decade of the 1980s), they now occur within much 
shorter periods. There is reason to fear that external constraints will prove 
to be a much more limiting factor in the future, once the privatization 
trend that attracted unprecedented external resources and helped to 
finance imbalances in external accounts in the 1990s tails off. 
(a) Fiscal policy and public finances 
There can be no doubt that public finances in the region have 
become more balanced, and this is reflected in substantially smaller 
deficits and more careful deficit and debt management. In the 1980s, the 
adjustment essentially took the form of reduced spending. The need to 
place a high priority on the fiscal component of macroeconomic 
stabilization led to the deferral of other objectives of public finance. The 
most seriously neglected aspect of all was the distributive function of 
government. Cuts in public spending thus translated into major 
reductions in social spending by the public sector. 
In the 1990s, more emphasis was placed on revenue enhancement, 
allowing a return to higher levels of spending, as shown in figure III.1.2
Many governments were thus in a position to implement measures, 
particularly in the area of social expenditure, that reflected a growing 
awareness of the gravity of the situation, while maintaining moderate 
fiscal deficits (ECLAC, 1998c). 
Figure III.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FISCAL POSITION 
OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS, 1980-1999 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
2 Based on consolidated data from 19 Latin American countries. Refers to the overall 
























































Despite these major achievements, the region’s fiscal affairs 
continue to show evidence of some problems. Current public-sector 
saving gradually decreased during the second part of the decade as 
outlays rose and revenues stagnated. In fact, in 1998 and 1999 the region 
failed to achieve a primary surplus. Another problem is that deficit 
figures have been calculated using accounting procedures —such as the 
conventional cash basis (instead of accrual) and, on some occasions, the 
recording of income from privatization and international donations above 
the line— which have yielded more optimistic results than are really 
warranted.  
It would be unwise, moreover, to dismiss the possibility that 
further repercussions may be in store, in the form of unrevealed quasi-
fiscal costs, from the restructuring of financial systems that had to be 
undertaken by many countries hit by banking crises in the 1990s, 
including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay and 
Venezuela. This is part of the problem of fiscal opacity that arises when 
the State gives public or private agents explicit or implicit guarantees that 
they will be bailed out should the need arise. Such guarantees jeopardize 
the solidity of public finances in a non-transparent way and particularly 
affect central governments. Brazil and Colombia are two of the countries 
which have been facing situations of this sort as a consequence of the 
decentralization of fiscal affairs. 
Total revenue swelled during the first half of the decade, thanks to 
an increase in the tax burden and a higher level of economic activity, as 
well as non-recurrent revenues from privatizations. Tax reforms over the 
period helped to make the tax administration system more 
straightforward and efficient, and thus to reduce evasion in several 
countries. The region’s ministries of finance afforded a high priority to 
combatting evasion (of taxes, customs duties and social security 
contributions) and reducing opportunities for tax avoidance. 
From 1997 onward, however, non-recurring income from such 
sources as the sale of assets and the exports of State-owned firms began to 
decline. This situation was compounded in the late 1990s when the region 
was hit by two external shocks: the international financial crisis and 
falling commodity prices. Increases in interest rates, adopted to shield 
currencies from speculative attacks, raised the cost of short-term debt 
servicing and deepened the recessionary trend, which exacerbated the 
contraction of receipts. 
The region’s fiscal deficit increased from 1.1% of GDP in 1997 to 
2.4% in 1998. In 1999, lower revenue and increased public spending again 
widened the fiscal deficit, which reached its peak for the decade (3.2% of 
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GDP). Increased public-sector financing charges in Brazil in the wake of 
the devaluation of the real weighed particularly heavily in this result, 
owing to the scale of this expenditure. 
In consequence, the immediate future holds a series of fiscal 
challenges for the region. Infrastructure investments that have been 
postponed in the last two years, social needs, debt servicing and past or 
current financial bail-out costs are all exerting expansionary pressures on 
spending. Non-financial expenditure has tended to be reactive and 
procyclical, as has revenue, which has proved to be very sensitive to 
external disturbances. 
Given the acute cyclical vulnerability of the region’s economies, 
fiscal management may be able to increase the room for manoeuvre in 
macroeconomic policy through multi-year budget programming, 
especially in countries which have been able to place their fiscal affairs on 
a sound footing. If the authorities are successful in differentiating between 
structural and transitory results and in establishing equilibrium targets on 
the basis of the former, public finances should be in a position to provide 
an element of domestic stability and mechanisms to absorb external 
shocks. Saving non-recurrent income received during economic booms 
and then using it during periods of recession would help to attenuate 
fluctuations in domestic spending and reduce the volatility of both public- 
and private-sector financial balances. 
In fact, several of the region’s countries have taken major strides in 
this direction by creating sectoral stabilization funds, including the 
Copper Stabilization Fund and the Petroleum Fund in Chile, the National 
Coffee Fund and the Petroleum Stabilization Fund in Colombia and the 
Petroleum Fund in Venezuela. The main purpose of all these funds is to 
reduce the volatility of consumer prices or of the income received by 
public and private economic agents. A new “generation” of 
macroeconomic stabilization funds has emerged recently, including those 
of Argentina (Fiscal Responsibility Act, 1999) and Peru (Fiscal Prudence 
and Transparency Act, 1999), which are part of schemes to increase fiscal 
discipline and prevent financial crises. These new mechanisms are 
helping to engender a new culture of fiscal responsibility not only in 
central governments, but also a lower level of government, as, for 
example, in Colombia (Territorial Borrowing Act, 1996) and Brazil (Fiscal 
Responsibility Act, 2000). 
Clearly, the task of strengthening public finances, rationalizing 
their management and consolidating domestic tax bases will involve 
dealing with fundamental problems, something which may be aided by 
the establishment of a fiscal covenant that will serve as a basis, 
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together with sustainable public finances, for prioritizing the desired 
societal agenda. 
(b) Monetary policy 
In the 1990s, monetary policies were, in general, consistent with the 
objective of controlling inflation, unlike the situation in previous episodes 
when the two were not so well aligned. As inflation came under control, 
these economies remonetized and saw an expansion of domestic credit in 
real terms. As figure III.2 shows, the liquidity ratio (M2/GDP), which had 
increased by almost 10 percentage points during the period 1970-1982, 
remained stable during the following 10 years. From 1992 onward, an 
increase in the demand for money coincided with a decrease in the rate of 
inflation and the replenishment of real balances. This increase in liquidity 
occurred against the background of an upswing in output, high real 
interest rates and falling inflation. 
The composition of expansionary factors changed drastically in the 
period 1985-1995 and, then stabilized. Thanks to inflows of external 
capital to the region, a growing proportion of liquidity came to be backed 
by foreign exchange; the increase in external assets recorded on the 
consolidated balance-sheets of the countries’ banks (including their 
central banks) was one indication of this trend (see figure III.2). The 
decreasing percentage accounted for by domestic credit is attributable to 
the fact that the fiscal deficit narrowed rapidly in the early 1990s and was 
increasingly financed by bond issues. It should be noted that in several 
countries the central bank is not allowed to issue loans to the government 
and, in addition, the separation of fiscal and monetary affairs has been 
reinforced by the greater degree of autonomy granted to central banks. 
In this context of decreasing domestic credit, the remaining funds 
tended to shift from the public to the private sector, which accounted for 
85% of domestic credit balances by the mid-1990s. This was a reflection of 
growing financial liberalization, which encouraged the transfer of lending 
to private firms and, increasingly, to households through mortgage and 
consumer loans as financial assets increased.
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Figure III.2  
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: MONETARY INDICATORS,  
1970-1999a
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from official sources and IMF. 
a
 Simple average, NIR: net international reserves/M2 and credit to the private sector/total domestic credit. 
The monetary authorities took the approach of controlling the 
money supply indirectly, which was favourable to commercial banking. 
Reserve requirements and loan portfolio ceilings tended to be used less, 
while open market operations increased. Instead of controlling the 
commercial banks’ capacity to create money (supply), monetary policy 
used the real interest rate to influence the demand for money and the 
composition of portfolios. Interest rates tended to rise from the mid-1980s 









































































































interest rates trended upward throughout the period 1985-1995, and the 
median annual rate of return on savings (time deposits) rose above 5%, as 
shown in figure III.3. With banking spreads frequently higher than 
10 percentage points, the median lending rate was over 15% a year in 
real terms. 
Figure III.3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: REAL INTEREST  
RATE ON DEPOSITS, 1985-1999 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from official sources and IMF. 
Open market operations helped to sterilize the monetary effects of 
external capital inflows, which were attracted to the region partly by high 
interest rates. This sterilization was another factor in generating quasi-
fiscal deficits, however, owing to the difference between the financial 
yields of the domestic and international markets. Lastly, increasing 
volumes of government bonds in circulation made it possible to broaden 
the region’s emerging domestic financial markets since, with the 
exception of a few of these financial centres, public instruments accounted 
for a large proportion of securities transactions. 
Although some observers expected the development of the 
countries’ financial systems to act as a driver of growth in the context of 
the new direction of regional development,3 financial liberalization and 
the channelling of domestic credit to the private sector did not have the 
desired effects. Despite major efforts and achievements in some countries, 
the vulnerability of their economies was exacerbated by the expansion of 
financial activity under conditions of weak oversight and poor risk 
3  When the reforms began, there were expectations that the development of financial 
markets (which implies a high rate of financial saving) would favour long-term growth 
by increasing macroeconomic stability in the face of external or fiscal disturbances and 
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assessment. Firstly, domestic saving did not respond to the increase in 
real interest rates and, secondly, a major share of loans went to finance 
household spending and investment projects in non-tradable services 
sectors, which opened the way for a boom in construction.  
The liberalization of the financial sector and prudent 
macroeconomic policies have not succeeded in bringing interest rates 
close to international levels either. Rates continue to be very high, which 
is partly attributable to a negative perception of sovereign risk that is 
reflected in average spreads of around 700 basis points and a very wide 
range of variation (from 250 in Chile to over 1,000 in Ecuador). 
During the most recent crisis, domestic interest rates soared even 
higher as a result of a number of factors: foreign-exchange difficulties 
(Chile and Colombia), fiscal conditions (Brazil) or problems in the banks 
themselves, in cases where deposits were lost (Argentina). Market 
segmentation, which adversely affected small and medium-sized 
enterprises and other small borrowers, was also fairly widespread. In the 
best of cases —i.e., when they were able to take out loans— these agents 
were obliged to accept considerable surcharges. In turn, the high cost of 
domestic financing has been reflected in increased external borrowing by 
large firms and the banking sector, which has increased their exposure to 
currency risk and their resistance to exchange-rate adjustments. 
(c) Exchange-rate policy 
As in previous decades, during much of the 1990s the nominal 
exchange rate was a significant factor not only in controlling inflation, but 
also in rebuilding confidence. In fact, only a few countries —of which 
Mexico was one— adopted flexible exchange-rate regimes before the most 
recent crisis, the most widespread practice being a dirty float controlled 
by the monetary authorities. The exchange-rate turbulence which 
accompanied the crisis led several countries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia and, 
temporarily, Ecuador) to adopt a floating system, and this regime is now 
the most common (see table III.1). 
As a consequence of nominal exchange-rate control, national 
currencies tended to appreciate in real terms from the early 1990s until 
1998 (see figure III.4). This revaluation was reflected in higher imports 
and large current-account deficits financed by external capital, which 
again began to flow into the region. Contrary to optimistic prognoses 
early in the decade, overvaluation became the Achilles’ heel of 
stabilization strategies when external capital flows declined.  
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Table III.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXCHANGE-RATE REGIMES, 1999 
Fixed, semi-fixed or dollarized Crawling peg or currency band Floatinga
Argentina, El Salvador, 
Panama, Eastern Caribbean 
States 









Peru, Trinidad and 
Tobago
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Floating schemes usually involve a certain amount of central bank intervention (dirty float). 
b
 Ecuador announced a dollarization plan in early 2000. 
Figure III.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: AVERAGE REAL EXCHANGE RATE, 
1979-1999a
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from official sources and IMF.
a
 Based on a simple average of annual variations, 1990=100. A positive change indicates real 
depreciation of the local currency.
The balance-of-payments crises suffered by Mexico in late 1994 and 
Brazil in early 1999 are examples of this phenomenon. In both cases there 
was a sharp correction in the real exchange rate, with quarterly variations 
of as much as 53.5% in Mexico and 43.5% in Brazil. Drastic changes like 
these and the ones that occurred in the early 1990s, especially in 
Argentina and Peru, helped to create situations of marked exchange-rate 
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was 11.9% over the decade, being particularly high in Argentina (20.5%),4
Brazil (16.6%) and Mexico (13.7%), as shown in table III.2. 
Sharp fluctuations like these can be even more harmful to national 
economies than overvaluation, as the increased uncertainty complicates 
investment decisions.5
Table III.2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE  
FOR IMPORTS, 1990-1999 
 Average annual rise Coefficient of variation 
Latin America (average) -0.7 11.9 
Brazil 5.2 16.6 
Argentina -10.7 20.5 
Other Southern Cone countries -1.5 9.5 
Andean Community -1.3 11.8 
Mexico -1.8 13.7 
Central American Common Market 0.8 9.3 
Caribbean -0.3 13.1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from official sources and IMF. 
Although debate continues on the long-term implications of 
unbalanced trade, from a macroeconomic perspective the exchange-rate 
lag heightened the Latin American countries’ dependence on external 
financing and exacerbated the instability of their economies. The risk of 
inflation gave way to the risk of an external liquidity crisis. Control of 
fiscal deficits and monetary prudence proved insufficient to reduce the 
external deficit. Many of the structural reforms even had the effect of 
creating conditions that resulted in a widening of the gap. Greater 
availability of external capital was combined with lower rates of domestic 
—and particularly private-sector— saving, which was partially replaced 
by external saving. As the income elasticity of imports increased, with no 
offsetting rise in exports, the rate of output growth came to depend on 
how much external capital was available to finance the current deficit. 
This exacerbated the external dependency which has long been a feature 
of regional output growth. 
4  This ratio was so high in Argentina because of the situation early in the decade, before 
the convertibility legislation came into effect. 
5  If the economy is highly dollarized, liquidity crises may also occur in the financial sector. 
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2. Insufficient recovery of growth, investment and 
productivity 
(a) Economic growth 
Regional output grew at an average annual rate of 3.2% between 
1990 and 1999, which was a little more than two percentage points higher 
than the average for the 1980s, when the region was hit by the external 
debt crisis. The 1990s figure, however, was considerably lower than the 
annual average of over 5.5% recorded for the long period from 1950 to 
1980. Because of population growth in the region, per capita output 
increased at an annual rate of just 1.4% in the 1990s (see table III.3). 
At the beginning of the decade, the reverberations of the external 
debt crisis were still adversely affecting the region’s output. Stringent 
adjustment programmes continued to be applied in most of the countries 
in response to severe domestic and external disequilibria. As their 
stabilization plans began to yield results and the external situation 
improved, however, a number of countries began to record higher rates of 
expansion. 
The large fluctuations in the rate of regional output growth were 
mainly attributable to trends in external capital movements (see figure 
III.5). After the scarcity of the 1980s, renewed —and eventually 
abundant— capital flows kick-started the upturn by strengthening 
domestic demand. What attracted capital flows back, besides world 
market conditions, were the region’s superior rates of return and its 
stabilization and structural reform policies, particularly its economic 
liberalization and privatization programmes. The subsequent decrease in 
external capital flows led to substantial drops in consumption and 
investment and compounded the disequilibria in the external and fiscal 
accounts, as a result of which several countries slid into severe recession. 
In late 1994, a currency crisis broke out in Mexico, triggering a 
sharp contraction in the level of activity. The crisis spread to other 
countries of the region and was particularly severe in Argentina, which 
also lapsed into deep recession. Both countries were able to control the 
situation, however, thanks to the policies they adopted to correct 
macroeconomic disequilibria and to the support they received in the form 
of abundant international credit. 
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Table III.3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL AND PER CAPITA GDP 
(Percentages, on the basis of 1995 prices) 
Total GDP Per capita GDP 
Average annual growth rate Average annual growth rate 
1980sa 1990-1999 1980sa 1990-1999 
Total for Latin America and the 
Caribbeanb
1.0 3.2 -1.0 1.4 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
(except Brazil) 
--- 3.6 --- 1.7 
Argentina -0.7 4.7 -2.1 3.3 
Bolivia 0.2 3.9 -1.9 1.4 
Brazil 1.3 2.5 -0.7 1.0 
Chile 3.0 6.0 1.3 4.4 
Colombiac 3.7 2.5 1.6 0.5 
Costa Rica 2.2 4.1 -0.6 1.2 
Cubad 3.7 -2.1 2.8 -2.6 
Ecuador 1.7 1.9 -0.9 -0.2 
El Salvador -0.4 4.4 -1.4 2.3 
Guatemala 0.9 4.2 -1.6 1.5 
Haiti -0.5 -1.2 -2.4 -3.1 
Honduras 2.4 3.1 -0.8 0.2 
Mexico 1.8 3.1 -0.3 1.3 
Nicaragua -1.5 3.2 -3.9 0.3 
Panama 1.4 4.7 -0.7 2.8 
Paraguay 3.0 2.1 0.0 -0.6 
Peru -1.2 4.7 -3.3 2.9 
Dominican Republic 2.4 5.0 0.2 3.1 
Uruguay 0.0 3.2 -0.6 2.4 
Venezuela -0.7 1.9 -3.2 -0.3 
Subtotal for the Caribbeane 0.1 2.0 -0.9 1.1 
Antigua and Barbudaf 6.1 2.9 5.6 2.3 
Barbados 1.1 1.4 0.7 0.9 
Belizeg 4.5 3.5 1.9 0.8 
Dominicag 4.4 2.6 4.8 2.7 
Grenadag 4.9 2.9 4.7 2.6 
Guyana -2.9 6.6 -3.4 5.6 
Jamaica 2.2 0.4 1.1 -0.5 
Saint Kitts and Nevisg 5.8 4.3 7.0 4.6 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadinesg 6.5 3.2 5.5 2.3 
Saint Lucia 6.8 1.9 5.3 0.6 
Surinamef 0.5 1.4 -0.7 1.1 
Trinidad and Tobago -2.6 3.0 -3.9 2.3 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures expressed in constant 1995 dollars. 
a Calculated on the basis of constant 1990 prices. b Does not include Cuba. c Values for the period 1997-
1999 are ECLAC estimates based on provisional figures provided by the National Administrative 
Department of Statistics (DANE). d Calculated on a constant local currency basis. e Calculated on a factor 
cost basis. f Figures for 1990-1997. g Figures for 1991-1998. 
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Figure III.5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GDP GROWTH AND NET  
RESOURCE TRANSFER, 1991-1999 
 Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from official sources and IMF. 
Regional output increased rapidly again in 1996 and 1997, but the 
crisis in South-East Asia caused a new contraction to begin in 1998. The 
difficulties were compounded by the collapse suffered by Russia in the 
second half of the year, which led to a sharp reduction in external capital 
inflows and a fall in international commodity prices. The situation was 
further complicated by the devaluation of the Brazilian currency in early 
1999. As a result, regional output growth slowed markedly in 1998, and 
even more severely in 1999. The impact was felt in Brazil and the other 
MERCOSUR countries, in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, and 
in several countries of the Central American isthmus and the Caribbean.6
The combination of the 1980s crisis and the instability of the new 
pattern of recovery and expansion that emerged at the end of the decade 
meant that output growth by the end of the 1990s was well below 
potential. Regional output in 1999 was barely 54% of the figure it would 
have been if the growth trends seen before the debt crisis had been 
maintained. 
Economic performance also varied from one country to another 
during the 1990s (see table III.3). Only three countries (Chile, the 
Dominican Republic and Guyana) attained annual growth rates of more 
than 5%. Fifteen recorded rates of between 3% and 5%, while thirteen 
6  Several of the region’s countries have fallen victim to major natural disasters in recent 
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grew by less than 3% a year and two recorded negative growth (Cuba and 
Haiti). Cuba implemented far-reaching economic reforms in response to 
severe external disturbances early in the decade and was thus able to 
return to positive growth rates in 1994. If output growth is considered in 
per capita terms, the list of countries in which it was negative extends to 
take in Ecuador, Jamaica, Paraguay and Venezuela. Eleven countries saw 
growth rates increase by three or more percentage points over their 
respective averages for the 1980s. Argentina, Guyana, Peru and Trinidad 
and Tobago were particularly striking cases, as their growth rates 
outstripped the previous decade’s averages by more than five percentage 
points. However, twelve countries —all of them in the Caribbean, except 
for Colombia and Paraguay— recorded a poorer performance in the 1990s 
than in the previous decade. 
The balance-sheet for the decade in terms of growth is 
disappointing, as only a few countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and 
Uruguay) were able to improve on the growth rates they recorded before 
the debt crisis (see figure III.6).7 Examination of per capita output trends, 
however, reveals a more favourable picture, as three further countries 
bettered their pre-debt crisis figures (the Dominican Republic, El Salvador 
and Peru). 
Figure III.6 
LATIN AMERICA: AVERAGE GDP GROWTH, 1945-1980 AND 1990-1999 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 



































The differences in growth rates, far from leading to convergence in 
per capita income levels, actually caused intraregional disparities to 
increase, since the countries with the lowest per capita incomes grew 
at slower rates than those with the highest per capita incomes (see 
table III.4).  
Table III.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROWTH DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN  
HIGHEST AND LOWEST PER CAPITA INCOME COUNTRIES, 1980-1999
Annual rate of per capita 
GDP growthaCountries by level of income Per capita income in 1990a
1980s 1990-1999 
Five lowest per capita income 
countries 577.8 -2.5 0.9 
Ten lowest per capita income 
countries 993.1 -1.7 1.2 
Five highest per capita income 
countries 5 102.6 -1.2 2.0 
Ten highest per capita income 
countries 4 074.3 -1.0 1.9 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a
 Simple average. 
(b) Investment and productivity 
In the 1980s, the fixed investment ratio in the countries of the 
region fell sharply (see figure III.7). In earlier periods, output had 
expanded in response to a relatively high —and rising— level of public- 
and private-sector investment, which stood at between 23% and 26% of 
GDP in the second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s. From 1983 to 
1989 the fixed investment ratio did not rise above 21%, owing to 
worsening terms of trade and capital outflows. Even when the region 
began to see an upswing in the second half of the 1980s, there was no 
upturn in the investment ratio, largely because access to external 
financing was limited (ECLAC, 1990). 
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Figure III.7 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FIXED CAPITAL INVESTMENT 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP, 1970-1998 
(Constant 1995 prices) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
The improved external environment that set the scene for the 1990s 
upturn made for a recovery in investment from 1992 onward. Fixed 
investment grew at an annual rate of 4.9% between 1991 and 1999, from a 
relatively low starting point (see table III.5). This regional average was 
lower than historical rates, but this was mainly attributable to the weight 
of the Brazilian economy within the region, as the country’s investment 
grew at an average rate of only 1.7% over the period. Calculation of a 
simple average or median value reveals a more favourable investment 
trend in the 1990s than in previous periods, as these measures are less 
affected by developments in the larger countries. 
This increased investment effort, however, did not bring about a 
rise in labour productivity in the region, with the notable exceptions of 
Argentina and Chile. Analysis of a representative group of eight Latin 
American countries, the results of which are shown in table III.6, shows 
that labour productivity growth in the region remained below the levels 
seen in the high-growth period which began in the post-war years and 
ended in 1980. 
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Table III.5  
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT, 1971-1999 
(Average annual variation)a
Country 1970s 1980s 1990-1999 
Argentina 3.3 -7.6 10.9 
Bolivia 3.2 -0.1 10.7 
Brazil 10.2 -1.4 1.7 
Chile 1.8 4.6 17.8 
Colombia 5.2 1.6 1.5 
Costa Rica 8.4 2.1 5.4 
Ecuador 9.9 -3.7 -1.1 
El Salvador 4.0 0.3 8.4 
Guatemala 5.9 -2.6 9.9 
Haiti 11.8 -0.8 0.2 
Honduras 6.9 -0.8 9.0 
Mexico 8.3 -1.2 4.8 
Nicaragua 0.2 -1.5 13.6 
Panama 3.4 -7.9 20.5 
Paraguay 17.7 1.0 0.4 
Peru 7.3 -4.2 6.9 
Dominican Republic 11.0 1.1 11.7 
Uruguay 8.2 -7.6 8.0 
Venezuela 7.4 -6.2 1.7 
Latin America    
Weighted average 7.3 -2.4 4.9 
Simple average 7.1 -1.8 7.5 
Median 7.3 -1.2 8.0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.  
a
 Rates of variation calculated on a dollar basis at constant prices. 
In the same period, the region’s capital productivity improved, by 
contrast with the negative result recorded in the period running up to 
1980. This increase in capital productivity, however, was not enough to 
improve the overall efficiency with which productive resources were used 
in the region and thereby increase the rate of output growth. The growth 
rate of total factor productivity in the eight countries mentioned was on 
average slightly lower during the 1990s (1.6%) than in the period 1950-
1980 (2%). In addition, part of the growth recorded in the 1990s —around 
0.3%— came about because of the recovery in output after the deep 
recession of the 1980s. These growth rates were not enough for the region 
to catch up rapidly with the developed countries, where total factor 
productivity rose by 1.1% in the 1990s.8
8  By way of comparison, in the recently industrialized Asian countries total productivity 
grew by more than 3% a year during the 1990s. 
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Table III.6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL FACTOR, LABOUR AND CAPITAL 
PRODUCTIVITY IN SELECTED PERIODS, 1950-2000 
(Average annual rates of growth) 
Country Change in total factor productivity 
Change in labour 
productivity 
Change in capital 
productivity 
 1950-1980 1990-2000 1950-1980 1990-2000 1950-1980 1990-2000 
Argentina 1.5 3.2 2.5 3.6 -0.8 1.2 
Boliviaa 2.0 0.6 2.5 0.3 0.3 -0.5 
Brazil 2.6 0.4 3.9 0.9 -3.3 -1.0 
Chileb 2.0 3.4 3.5 4.8 -0.4 -1.0 
Colombia 2.4 0.9 2.8 1.5 0.6 -1.8 
Costa Rica 2.2 1.9 3.5 2.1 -0.6 0.3 
Mexico 1.8 0.8 3.8 0.5 -2.0 -1.0 
Peru 1.9 1.4 2.9 1.1 -0.4 1.0 
Average 2.0 1.6 3.2 1.8 -0.8 -0.2 
Source: A. Hofman, Crecimiento y productividad en América Latina. Una visión comparativa a largo plazo 
(LC/R.1947), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
December 1999. The updating to 2000 has been done by the author. 
a
 First period: 1950-1978 instead of 1950-1980. 
b
 First period: 1950-1970 instead of 1950-1980. 
(c) Saving-investment ratios and the external deficit 
Higher investment ratios during the 1990s were almost entirely due 
to the greater availability of external savings which, measured in constant 
prices, had grown by 1998 to the almost unprecedented level of 5% of 
GDP, a figure matched only in 1981. In 1998, such savings financed over 
20% of total investment, which stood at 23.7% of output. By comparison, 
external saving in 1990 represented only 0.1% of GDP, measured in 
constant 1995 dollars, and contributed only marginally to gross capital 
formation, which stood at just 18.5% of output that year (see figure III.8).9
However, in spite of the record levels of FDI that flowed into the region in 
1999, external savings in that year dropped to their 1996 level as a 
consequence of the financial distress that followed the Asian crisis. 
Gross domestic saving increased by barely one percentage point of 
GDP over the decade. This poor performance was partly due to the 
decline in public-sector saving. Although this improved in several 
countries in the first half of the period, it later deteriorated to end the 
decade at around 2%, which was the lowest level recorded since 1991. 
Private saving likewise failed to improve to any significant degree, 
owing to the channelling of domestic credit into consumption and to the 
9  Calculations of external saving at constant prices tend to produce different results from 
current-price calculations based on the current balance-of-payments deficit. 
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large-scale replacement of domestic saving by external saving as capital 
inflows increased.10
Figure III.8  
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SAVING-INVESTMENT RATIO, 1990-1999 
(Percentage of GDP, in constant 1995 dollars) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
This substitution of saving, and the increased investment effort 
needed to prevent the sustained growth trend from being reversed, 
caused the trade deficit to widen. As can be seen from figure III.9, the 
region’s external vulnerability was more marked in the 1990s than in 
earlier high-growth periods. In fact, whereas in the 1970s a trade gap of 
1% of output allowed growth of 5.5%, in the 1990s a similar trade deficit 
was accompanied by a considerably lower rate of growth (3.2%). This 
comparison is even starker if a simple average is taken for the countries of 
the region.
10  Half of the variation in external saving was matched by a corresponding variation in 
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Figure III.9 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TRADE BALANCE AND  
ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1951-1998 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
By contrast with what happened in the 1970s, the use of external 
resources to finance investment in the 1990s had not resulted by the end 
of the decade in external debt rising to unmanageable levels. Although 
the external debt of Latin America and the Caribbean almost doubled 
over the decade, increasing from US$ 435 billion to US$ 756 billion, debt 
serviceability indicators improved at the same time, being kept within 
reasonable limits by the good performance of the export sector. Thus, the 
ratio of total external debt to the value of goods and services exports 
decreased steadily from 1986 onward, after peaking at close to 400%. By 
the end of the 1990s, this ratio was about 220% (see figure III.10). 
In the future, however, investments in the region will generate an 
outflow of profit remittances. This situation is already beginning to arise 
since, while accrued external debt service interest as a proportion of total 
exports decreased from 22% to 16% over the decade, remitted or 




LATIN AMERICA: EXTERNAL DEBT AND DEBT-EXPORT RATIO,  
1980-1999
LATIN AMERICA: FACTOR SERVICES AS A PROPORTION 
OF GOODS AND SERVICES EXPORTS 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
3. Inflation 
The average inflation rate in the region showed a strong and steady 
decline in the 1990s, dropping from a high of over 1,000% in 1990 to just 
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region’s countries recording single-digit rates. This decrease was the 
result of a radical change in macroeconomic conditions which began in a 
few countries in the late 1980s, then gradually spread to the rest of Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Brazil implemented a successful stabilization 
programme in 1994, which brought about an immediate drop in the 
country’s rate of inflation and further accelerated the rapid fall in the 
regional indicator. This initiative played a vital part in bringing a long 
and traumatic period of inflation to an end, which was one of the most 
positive features of regional macroeconomic performance in the decade 
(see table III.7). 
Table III.7 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CONSUMER PRICE  
INDEX, DECEMBER TO DECEMBER  
(Average annual percentage variation) 
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Weighted average 16.7 21.8 42.8 273.6 104.6 
Simple average 10.4 8.9 27.2 109.6 25.9 
High-inflation countriesa 23.4 16.5 45.6 421.1 60.4 
Other countries 6.6 6.8 22.1 23.0 16.4 
Median 3.6 3.2 13.8 23.8 15.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a
 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua and Peru. 
The most notable feature of the process was the way in which the 
countries of the region converged from very different starting points; in 
the 1980s there were enormous disparities, and these carried over well 
into the 1990s. The debt crisis triggered hyperinflation in Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua and Peru, which caused the region’s average 
inflation rate to trend upwards. However, the median rate, which 
removes the bias imposed by the larger countries, shows inflation peaking 
at 40% in 1990 (see figure III.11), when the average rate was 1,371%. In 
consequence, the mean deviation from the average decreased from 3,500 
in 1988 to just 7 in 1999. 
Just as the magnitude of the inflationary process varied greatly 
from one country to another, the measures adopted in response to the 
problem were also very different, notwithstanding the convergence 
shown by the results. In countries which had an annual inflation rate of 
three or more digits, the preferred tools were the exchange-rate anchor, 
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fiscal adjustment and deindexation, which gave rapid results.11 In 
countries with lower rates of inflation, a wider range of policy tools were 
used and in general the decrease was slower and more gradual. 
Figure III.11 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: MEDIAN INFLATION, 1980-1999 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Consequently, inflation rates fell faster in countries which had been 
hit by hyperinflation. Bolivia was able to bring inflation under control 
before 1990, while Argentina, Brazil, Nicaragua and Peru did so during 
the first half of the 1990s, achieving very low rates by the second half of 
the decade. Inflation also decreased in most of the other countries, in 
several of them by a large amount. Panama and the small islands of the 
Caribbean maintained their usual low rates of inflation. Only two 
countries, Ecuador and Venezuela, have recorded annual rates of over 
30% in the last three years. While the situation has improved of late in 
Venezuela, in Ecuador inflation rose above 50% in 1999. These 
inflationary surges show that, notwithstanding the progress seen thus far, 
it is still difficult to keep inflation low and stable throughout the region. 
4. Financial crises 
In the last two decades, numerous episodes of insolvency have 
affected the banking systems of the countries in the region. Banking and 
currency crises associated with the debt problems that beleaguered Latin 
11 Even in these cases there were considerable differences in the policies employed: 
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America and the Caribbean in the 1980s were followed in the 1990s by 
financial problems in several countries, some of which still persist. 
The insolvency problems that beset the countries of the region 
reflected wider events at the international level. A recent IMF study 
shows that 133 of that organization’s 181 member countries experienced 
significant banking problems between 1980 and 1996, including 41 
banking crises in 35 countries (IMF, 1998). As a result, in the 1990s 
financial problems took on a global dimension that had not been seen 
since the depression of the 1930s. 
(a) Causes of recurring financial problems 
The widespread banking problems seen in the region in the last 
two decades were largely attributable to the implementation of financial 
liberalization policies in environments where the risks of portfolio losses 
were high. These environments were characterized by deficiencies in the 
application of prudential standards relating to bank solvency and 
liquidity, macroeconomic conditions that were prone to sharp 
adjustments and fluctuations, and structural weaknesses in national 
financial systems resulting from low domestic saving rates and immature 
markets. 
In the absence of measures to improve bank solvency through 
stronger regulation and prudential oversight, financial liberalization 
opened the way to strong lending growth and excessive risk exposure in 
the credit markets (Mishkin, 1996). Over the last two decades, financial 
liberalization and market opening have proved to be among the most 
reliable harbingers of currency crises, which have generally been 
preceded by large influxes of external capital, growing currency risk 
exposure and marked increases in the volatility of financial flows 
(Wyplosz, 1998). 
Weaknesses in regulation and prudential oversight may be due to 
failings in external regulations adopted by virtue of the legislation and 
standards that constitute the institutional framework within which banks 
operate, or to deficiencies in the internal rules of the banks themselves. 
Loopholes in external rules lower the quality of the lending process, open 
the way to the formation of financial services conglomerates of the kind 
seen in a number of the region’s countries, and increase the likelihood 
that financial crises will arise in certain circumstances. 
Closely related to these deficiencies in external regulations are the 
flaws seen in banks’ internal lending controls, i.e., in their self-regulation 
(Goodhart and others, 1998). These flaws are manifested, firstly, in poorly 
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delineated and risky lending procedures. Failure to carry out proper 
accounting of risks and losses has distorted profit and asset calculations. 
Secondly, the tight monetary policy of the last decade combined 
with high interest rates and economic recession to increase banks’ losses 
on their lending portfolios. The instability that is a characteristic feature of 
the region’s economies, taking the form of large fluctuations in their terms 
of trade, exchange rates and other variables, also played a part in 
lowering the quality of lending procedures, owing to frequent changes in 
risk and return levels (Hausmann and Gavin, 1995). 
As has been mentioned, the immaturity of national financial 
systems, which is the result of low domestic saving rates, meant that the 
countries’ ability to sterilize the monetary effects of external capital 
inflows was limited. Sharp declines in real exchange rates and the 
expansion of domestic spending resulted in current account deficits so 
large as to be almost unsustainable. The reversal of external capital flows 
triggered currency crises that led to steep currency depreciation, high 
interest rates and economic recessions which sharply altered the risk-
return ratio of production activities, inflicting considerable portfolio 
losses on banks and leading to banking and —once again— currency 
crises.
(b) Financial crises in Latin America and the Caribbean in the 
1990s
Thirteen of the region’s countries were exposed to difficult financial 
situations during the decade, and in five cases these situations ended in 
banking crises (see table III.8). These situations were largely attributable 
to weaknesses in regulation and oversight, unbalanced and unstable 
macroeconomic environments and liberalization of the balance-of-
payments capital account under unfavourable structural conditions. It is 
difficult to determine the relative importance of each of these factors in 
any particular crisis, however, as they often work in combination. 
The countries that suffered banking crises were Venezuela in 1994, 
Argentina, Mexico and Paraguay in 1995, and Ecuador in 1999. The 
banking problems of Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay and Venezuela dragged 
on for several years and their after-effects continue. Serious banking 
problems also emerged in Brazil and Colombia in 1994 and 1998, 
respectively. Several smaller countries (including Bolivia, Costa Rica, the 
Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti and Jamaica) also faced problems in 
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Table III.8 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: BANKING PROBLEMS IN THE 1990s 
Country Year of 
outbreak Extent of problems 
Losses or cost of rescue 
(as a percentage of 
GDP) 
Argentina 1995 Bank crash. 45 of 205 institutions closed or merged.  
Bolivia 1994 
Severe bank problems. Two banks holding 11% of total assets closed in 1994. Four of 15 
banks, with 30% of total assets, undergoing severe portfolio problems in 1995. Isolated 
problems of insolvency in 1999. 
Brazil 1994 
Severe bank problems. Of a total of  271 banks, 76 have been audited, placed under special 
conditions, merged or liquidated. Non-performing portfolio equal to 10% of real credit by the end 
of 1998. 
8%-11% 
Colombia 1998 Severe bank problems. Non-performing portfolio equal to 13% of deposits in 1999. 4%-5% 
Costa Rica 1994 Severe bank problems. A large State bank closed in late 1994. Non-performing portfolio (after deducting reserves) of State commercial banks exceeded capital in 1995. 
Ecuador 1995 
Bank crash in 1999, following major problems in 1995-1996. Eleven of 40 banks placed under 
government control between December 1998 and June 1999. Deposits frozen in March 1999. 
External audit of banks in April-July 1999. 
10%-15% 
Guyana 1993 Severe bank problems. Large public bank liquidated and merged. Portfolio castigated heavily by 
successor bank in 1993-1994. 7% 
Haiti 1994 Severe bank problems. The political situation triggered a run on deposits in 1994, and since that date, a perception of financial instability remains.  
Jamaica 1994 Severe bank problems. An investment banking group closed in 1994. Support for a medium-
sized bank in 1995. 
Mexico 1994 
Bank crash. The non-performing portfolio rose to 12% in December 1995. Six banks with 17% of 
total assets audited in 1995. Extensive sales of portfolios to a bank fund (FOBAPROA). Banks 
with portfolio problems in 1999. 
15-21% 
Dominican Republic 1992 
Severe bank problems. An estimated 5% or more of the total portfolio classed as non-
performing. Three minor banks liquidated and the third-largest private bank, with 7% of all 
assets, audited in 1996. 
Paraguay 1995 Bank crash. Banks with around 10% of all deposits audited in 1995. Six national banks audited 
and deposits restored in 1996-1998. 8% 
Venezuela 1994 Bank crash. 18 of 47 banks audited in 1994-1995. Symptoms of financial instability in banks in 1999. 17%-18% 
Source: C. Goodhart and others, Financial Regulation, London, Routledge, appendix to chapter I, 1998; G. Caprio and D. Klingebiel, “Bank Insolvency: Bad Luck, Bad 
Policy or Bad Banking?”, document presented at the Annual Conference on Development Economics of the World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1996; and Pedro Sáinz and 
Alfredo Calcagno, La economía brasileña ante el Plan Real y su crisis, Temas de coyuntura series, No. 4 (LC/L.1237-P), Santiago, Chile, 1999. United Nations 
publication, Sales No. S.99.II.G.13. 
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Argentina, Ecuador, Mexico and Paraguay recorded high capital 
inflows in the period 1992-1994, equivalent to 4.3%, 5.7%, 6.5% and 10.5% 
of output, respectively. As the monetary effects of these inflows were 
subject to only very limited sterilization, they generated a sharp rise in 
bank credit. The private sector credit to GDP ratio practically doubled 
between 1990-1991 and 1994-1995, increasing from 13% to 25% in 
Ecuador, from 17% to 30% in Mexico and from 13% to 22% in Paraguay 
(IMF, 1999). 
The case of Brazil, whose banking system began to show signs of 
substantial problems in both the private and public sectors from 1994 
onward, serves to demonstrate the benefits of preventive action. The 
Government’s early and timely intervention in the financial system, when 
it restructured both public- and private-sector banks, made it possible to 
limit the effects of the currency crisis and prevent it spilling over into the 
banking system, by contrast with what happened in the Asian countries 
in 1997-1998 (Sáinz and Calcagno, 1999). 
(c) The fiscal cost of rescue programmes 
Three types of agents may absorb the losses incurred when a 
financial crisis is resolved: (i) the owners of the banks, up to the total 
worth of their respective shareholdings, the residual value of which is 
usually nil given the volume of losses when bank intervention occurs; 
(ii) depositors, whose funds may lose part of their real value either as a 
consequence of the effects of banking regulations, high inflation that 
erodes the value of their deposits, or the existence of negative real interest 
rates; and (iii) the public sector, when the financial system is in danger of 
lapsing into systemic crisis.
The resolution of financial crises in the region has not generally 
resulted in large nominal losses for depositors. Explicit or implicit State 
guarantees on deposits have made the public authorities responsible for 
restitution. In consequence, the bulk of the losses and of the subsequent 
costs of restructuring and bailing out banks and debtors have ultimately 
fallen on the public sector. 
Public institutions may employ different types of programmes to 
enable banks and debtors to recover their ability to pay: emergency loans 
from the central bank, the purchase of non-performing and high-risk bank 
portfolios, loan rescheduling for debtors with payment problems, the 
provision of preferential exchange-rate facilities for debtors, and 
conversion of bank debt. Programmes such as these may generate losses 
for public institutions if the banks do not subsequently succeed in 
meeting their obligations or if the schemes involve subsidized interest or 
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exchange rates. Losses met by public institutions ultimately translate into 
fiscal or quasi-fiscal costs, depending on whether the agency that absorbs 
them is the government treasury or the central bank. 
The bank and debtor bail-out operations undertaken in the region 
in the 1990s generally involved a combination of several such 
programmes. The high fiscal or quasi-fiscal cost of dealing with the 
financial crises in the countries mentioned, which in a number of cases 
amounted to between 10% and 20% of national output, is indicative of the 
high rate of social profitability that can be achieved by policies designed 
to prevent such crises and by timely and effective restructuring measures. 
(d) Prevention and management of financial crises 
The wide range of factors which may cause banks and credit 
institutions to accumulate portfolio losses require different measures, the 
combination of which depends on the situation in each country. 
These measures include, firstly, strengthening banking regulation 
and prudential oversight by applying standards designed primarily to 
ensure: (i) strict conditions of entry to the banking industry; (ii) rigorous 
management and oversight of credit, currency and other types of risk; 
(iii) accurate measurement of potential losses and the creation of adequate 
reserves; (iv) capital requirements that are higher than the minimum 
recommended by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision; 
(v) matching of liquidity requirements to the term of liabilities, in both 
local and foreign currencies; (vi) complete transparency with respect 
both to risks and to assets and liabilities; (vii) establishment of clear 
conditions for timely intervention in banks or liquidation of failing 
institutions; (viii) oversight focused mainly on accurate risk assessment 
and timely provision of relevant information; and (ix) consolidated 
regulation and oversight of financial institutions that have affiliates or 
subsidiaries abroad. 
Secondly, rapid measures to restructure failing banks have proven 
to be very important as a way of containing the spread of portfolio losses. 
This is because delays give rise to a widespread perception that large-
scale bail-out measures are about to be taken, which leads banks to take 
on large portfolio risks.  
Thirdly, even when banks are already facing major insolvency 
problems, it is possible to limit the cost of bank and debtor bail-out and 
restructuring schemes by deploying measures which comply with the 
following principles: (i) shareholder assets should be drawn upon, if 
necessary in their entirety (when the losses exceed the capital of the credit 
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institution); (ii) debtors who have caused banking losses through 
questionable practices should be excluded from rescheduling 
programmes; (iii) public funds should be used to enable banks that are 
still operating, and likewise debtors, to recover their ability to pay as soon 
as possible (Rojas-Suárez and Weisbrod, 1995). 
Fourthly, it is important to strengthen capital formation processes 
by means of policies which promote national saving and the development 
of financial markets, and to implement monetary and external capital 
policies that are compatible with the current-account deficit level deemed 
sustainable in the medium and long term (Zahler, 1992). 
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Chapter IV 
Structure and performance of  
goods-producing sectors 
Most of the literature available on the economic performance of the 
region’s countries in the wake of external trade liberalization and the 
deregulation and privatization of production activities is of a 
macroeconomic cast. While this literature is valuable on its own terms, it 
does not identify or explain trends in specific production sectors or the 
behaviour of economic agents. Such an analysis would need to go beyond 
the impact of aggregate variables and consider mesoeconomic and 
microeconomic factors, including institutional and regulatory aspects. A 
strictly aggregate view cannot capture the heterogeneous nature of the 
different production sectors, agents and regions in each country. 
It is beginning to be realized that, for all the unquestionable 
achievements of economic reform, total factor productivity has 
demonstrated unexpectedly slow growth, and large segments of the 
region’s production structure have been left in deep disarray by market 
opening. There is a growing awareness that structural unemployment and 
informal jobs have increased substantially in most of the region’s countries. 
Today’s development paradigm appears to be associated with 
flawed markets and information asymmetries among production agents, 
which means that access to the long-term capital and technological know-
how needed to adapt to the new ground rules is distributed very 
unevenly. Responses to this situation have varied greatly in different 
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parts of the production chain, resulting in unacceptable levels of exclusion 
in the move to modernize production. 
Thus, as one segment of the production structure is modernized, 
new challenges arise and have to be dealt with if the full potential of the 
production base is to be tapped and weaknesses in its basic makeup 
compensated for. The system as a whole cannot become more competitive 
unless special efforts are made to improve technology, research and 
development, training, productivity, quality standards, environmental 
rules and infrastructure. Policies in all these areas need to provide for 
positive discrimination measures that will encourage struggling 
production units to improve their organization and performance. While 
an orderly macroeconomic environment is essential for this, it is now 
clear that the assumption that macroeconomic stability, liberalization and 
deregulation are all that is needed to meet these challenges 
underestimates the difficulties of modernizing production. It also ignores 
past experience in the industrialized world and in most emerging 
economies (Katz, 2000a). 
The conceptual crux of this chapter is the premise that structural 
transformation is shaped by the interaction of evolving economic, 
technological and institutional forces that constantly feed back into one 
another on the macroeconomic, mesoeconomic and microeconomic levels. 
Every sector is subject to the impact not only of macroeconomic variables 
(exchange rates, interest rates, the level of economic activity and 
aggregate expenditure, the dynamic of international trade) but also of 
microeconomic factors (taxes, tariffs, subsidies, relative prices) and 
mesoeconomic influences (sectoral policies, the morphology and 
behaviour of specific markets, forms of market regulation and the 
strategies and organization of different business groupings). This 
combination of forces helps to explain why individual reactions to the 
incentives at work differ in the way they do, and thus why certain sectors, 
regions and companies forge ahead while others languish. 
1.  Trends by broad sectors of economic activity 
(a)  Sectoral structure and dynamics 
In the last half century, the production structure in the countries of 
Latin America, by broad sectors, has developed along the same lines as it 
formerly did in countries that are now developed. The share of the 
primary sector in economic activity has declined, while that of 
manufacturing industry, after increasing up to a certain point, has 
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stagnated. The share of the service sectors in the region’s total output, 
meanwhile, has now increased to over half. 
Developments in the region have departed somewhat from the 
typical pattern of transformation. Change has come about at different rates, 
and both agriculture and mining have tended to stabilize at output levels 
higher than those typical of developed countries, while manufacturing has 
settled at lower levels. Thus, for example, agriculture in Latin America 
currently accounts for around 7.5 % of total output, more than double the 
figure for agriculture in the United States. The share of manufacturing 
industry rose from 1950 to 1980, but never exceeded 24% of total output, 
while in developed countries the figure is typically in excess of 30%. The 
service sector began its growth phase at an earlier stage in the developed 
countries and was different in quality, being heavily weighted towards 
high-productivity services. 
In the region, these developments have unfolded through a sequence 
of clearly identifiable stages. The first, which began at the end of the Second 
World War and lasted until 1973, was the industrialization stage. During 
the second, from 1973 to 1982, massive capital inflows allowed the earlier 
stage to continue, although at a slower pace, and some countries undertook 
macroeconomic and institutional reforms. The third stage was the crisis of 
the 1980s. The fourth was a time of moderate recovery in growth within a 
context of increasingly open trade, new price structures and domestic 
market liberalization. 
It was during the first two stages, from 1950 to 1982, that the largest 
falls were seen in the output shares of agriculture (from 12% to 7%) 
and mining (from 3% to 2%), while the share of manufacturing industry 
increased (from 18% to 23%), mainly during the earlier stage. Two sectors 
that held steady were construction (9%) and services (about 55%). The 
relative decline of primary production during this period was 
due to growth rates that were lower than the average for other sectors (see 
table IV.1). 
Developments in the recessionary stage that began in 1982 were 
dominated more by sectors whose dynamism fell sharply than by those that 
continued to grow at constant values. Growth fell across the board, but less 
drastically in agriculture and mining. Large parts of manufacturing and the 
construction sector, on the other hand, were hit hard by stagnating 
consumption and sharply falling investment and their share in total output 
fell by almost five percentage points, making them the worst affected 
sectors. The primary sectors recovered about one percentage point, while 
the service sectors posted the highest relative growth, increasing their share 
in the economy to nearly 60%. In both cases, however, this took place 
against a background of growth that was slow by 1950-1982 standards. 
Table IV.1 
LATIN AMERICA: OUTPUT SHARES AND GROWTH RATES AT CONSTANT 1995 PRICES, BY SECTOR OR INDUSTRY  
(Percentages and average annual rates) 
Output share Growth rate 






hunting and fishing 12.3 10.8 9.1 7.2 7.9 7.8 7.7 7.6 7.5 7.7 7.8 7.5 7.4 7.1 3.5 2.1 2.7
Mining and quarrying 3.0 3.6 3.3 2.1 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.8 3.1 4.1 2.7 4.8
Manufacturing 17.8 20.5 23.5 23.0 20.8 20.7 20.5 20.6 20.7 20.6 20.9 21.1 20.8 21.0 6.3 0.2 3.1
Electricity, gas, water 
and sanitation services 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.3 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.5 8.9 5.1 5.2
Construction 9.2 8.9 8.2 9.2 6.7 6.8 6.7 6.9 7.1 6.8 6.9 7.2 7.2 7.8 5.4 -1.9 3.9
Wholesale and retail 
trade, communications, 
hotels and restaurants 14.7 14.8 15.5 15.3 13.9 14.1 14.4 14.3 14.4 14.0 14.0 14.3 14.2 14.6 5.5 0.2 3.5
Transport, storage and 
communications 4.3 4.2 4.4 5.1 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.6 6.8 7.0 7.3 8.5 6.0 2.7 6.0
Financial, insurance,  
real estate and  
business services 15.7 15.2 14.3 15.3 16.7 16.8 16.8 16.7 17.2 17.2 16.6 16.4 16.6 16.3 5.3 2.1 1.9
Community, social and 
personal services 22.4 21.4 20.6 21.5 23.7 23.4 23.4 23.2 22.3 22.4 22.2 21.6 21.5 19.6 5.2 2.2 3.2
GDP a 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 5.2 1.8 3.5
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official figures. 
a
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On the whole, the output shares of the main sectors changed very 
little in the 1990s, although mining and, to a lesser degree, construction 
recovered, while transport and communications gained ground in the 
service sector. All branches except mining grew more slowly than in 1950-
1982, although the slowdown was fairly moderate in the case of transport 
and communications. 
All these figures, however, are skewed by the performance of the 
largest countries in Latin America —Brazil and Mexico— which also 
showed certain opposing tendencies that are masked by the aggregate 
figures. For this reason, it is worth looking separately at different subregions 
and, particularly, isolating the effects produced by these two countries, as in 
table IV.2. 
During the 1990s, the subregion that includes Central America, 
Panama, the Dominican Republic and Haiti saw the continuation of a 
trend that had begun in 1950, with agriculture declining significantly as a 
share of total output. Even so, this sector continues to account for a large 
portion of total GDP (16.6% in 1999), more than twice the average for 
Latin America. Other industries that gained in relative importance 
include construction, trade, hotels and restaurants and transport and 
communications, while the share of government and defence services fell 
off. These tendencies are consistent with the ending of war conditions in 
several countries of this group and with the rise of tourism in the 
Dominican Republic, which contributed to growth in construction and in 
trade, hotels and restaurants. 
In the Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and 
Uruguay), the GDP share of manufacturing fell again during the 1990s, so 
that by the end of the decade it accounted for four percentage points of 
output less than in 1980. This drop was particularly significant in Chile 
and Uruguay in the 1990s. Community, social and personal services 
declined most steeply in the subregion, especially in Argentina and Chile, 
owing mainly to falls in the share of government and social services. After 
hitting unprecedented lows in the 1980s, construction rebounded, while 
the share of financial and real estate services rose significantly. 
The Andean Community subregion showed little movement 
during the 1990s. Agriculture and manufacturing fell back substantially in 
Colombia and moderately in all the other countries, while mining grew 
somewhat. Construction recovered after declining in the 1980s, and 
services experienced minor fluctuations. Of special note in this group of 
countries was the high output share accounted for by the primary sectors. 
Agriculture was particularly important in Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador, 
while mining, including oil, accounted for a far higher output share than 
in Latin America as a whole. 
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Table IV.2  
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED SUBREGIONS AND COUNTRIES): 
OUTPUT SHARES AND GROWTH RATES AT CONSTANT  
1995 PRICES, BY SECTOR OR INDUSTRY 
(Percentages and average annual rates) 
 Output share Growth rate 







Central America a         
Agriculture, forestry,  
hunting and fishing 32.1 19.8 19.3 17.9 16.6 3.2 0.8 2.2
Mining and quarrying 1.7 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.1 4.3 -1.2 3.2
Manufacturing 12.0 16.4 15.3 15.1 15.5 5.9 0.4 3.8
Electricity, gas, water and 
sanitation services 0.3 1.6 2.2 2.1 2.4 10.4 4.3 4.7
Construction 2.8 4.7 3.9 4.6 5.9 6.7 -0.7 9.0
Trade, hotels and restaurants 19.6 20.8 18.7 19.8 19.7 5.1 0.0 4.8
Transport, storage and 
communications 3.1 6.4 7.2 7.6 8.6 7.5 2.2 6.2
Financial, insurance, real estate 
and business services 11.6 10.4 13.3 13.8 13.3 4.5 3.6 4.0
Community, social and personal 
services 16.8 18.3 18.9 18.1 16.8 5.1 1.4 2.6
GDP d 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 4.9 1.1 4.2
Southern Cone b
Agriculture, forestry, hunting and 
fishing 7.1 5.4 6.9 5.9 6.2 2.2 2.2 4.0
Mining and quarrying 1.6 2.4 3.1 3.0 4.0 4.7 2.2 8.2
Manufacturing 19.5 22.9 20.9 20.6 19.0 3.7 -1.2 4.7
Electricity, gas, water and 
sanitation services 0.4 1.4 1.9 2.1 2.4 7.2 2.8 8.2
Construction 8.2 8.4 5.0 6.6 6.6 3.2 -5.3 9.6
Trade, hotels and restaurants 15.4 16.1 14.1 14.8 14.2 3.3 -1.6 6.1
Transport, storage and 
communications 4.7 4.3 5.4 5.7 6.4 2.9 2.0 8.0
Financial, insurance, real estate 
and business services 16.1 16.1 16.4 17.9 19.7 3.2 -0.1 7.8
Community, social and personal 
services 27.0 22.9 26.2 23.3 21.7 2.6 1.1 2.9
GDP d 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 3.3 -0.5 5.7
Andean Community c
Agriculture, forestry, hunting and 
fishing 13.1 8.3 9.7 9.1 9.2 3.5 2.7 2.1
Mining and quarrying 13.7 6.3 7.3 7.4 7.9 2.4 2.6 5.0
Manufacturing 15.9 21.1 19.9 19.8 16.3 6.0 0.6 2.3
Electricity, gas, water and 
sanitation services 0.4 1.5 2.1 2.1 2.3 9.5 4.6 4.5
Construction 7.3 8.1 5.8 7.3 7.2 5.4 -2.1 6.2
Trade, hotels and restaurants 16.6 19.1 17.6 17.3 16.6 5.5 0.3 2.6
Transport, storage and 
communications 5.6 7.5 7.9 7.9 8.5 6.1 1.7 4.3
Financial, insurance, real estate 
and business services 11.2 11.5 12.8 13.1 14.5 5.1 2.2 4.5
(Continued) 
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Table IV.2 (concluded) 
 Output share Growth rate 







Community, social and personal 
services 16.2 16.6 16.9 15.9 16.1 5.1 1.3 2.7
GDP d 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 5.1 0.8 3.5
Brazil 
Agriculture, forestry, hunting and 
fishing 17.3 7.4 8.1 8.3 9.4 4.1 2.5 3.0
Mining and quarrying 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.8 1.0 9.7 6.8 3.8
Manufacturing 18.3 26.1 22.0 22.5 21.6 8.3 -0.2 2.0
Electricity, gas, water and 
sanitation services 0.8 1.4 2.2 2.4 2.8 9.1 6.0 5.1
Construction 16.6 12.4 9.4 8.9 9.1 6.0 -1.3 2.2
Trade, hotels and restaurants 9.0 8.4 7.6 7.9 8.2 6.8 0.5 2.9
Transport, storage and 
communications 1.3 2.4 3.7 4.3 5.3 9.2 6.0 6.5
Financial, insurance, real estate 
and business services 16.6 18.0 19.1 17.9 16.9 7.3 2.1 0.4
Community, social and personal 
services 19.8 23.4 27.1 27.0 25.8 7.7 3.0 1.5
GDP d 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 6.6 3.0 2.8
Mexico 
Agriculture, forestry, hunting and 
fishing 11.9 5.8 5.3 4.8 4.6 3.9 1.0 0.3
Mining and quarrying 1.2 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.5 7.3 2.8 2.4
Manufacturing 16.2 20.1 20.3 19.5 22.1 7.2 2.1 4.2
Electricity, gas, water and 
sanitation services 0.2 0.8 1.2 1.1 1.2 11.7 5.9 3.4
Construction 4.0 5.6 4.4 4.7 4.2 7.6 -0.5 2.3
Trade, hotels and restaurants  18.5 23.5 21.4 22.0 20.5 7.2 1.0 2.5
Transport, storage and 
communications 7.3 9.1 8.8 9.4 11.1 7.2 1.0 2.6
Financial, insurance, real estate 
and business services 18.6 13.0 16.0 18.6 16.2 7.2 1.7 5.4
Community, social and personal 
services 22.2 20.7 20.9 18.4 18.6 6.1 2.1 1.9
GDP d 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 6.3 2.8 3.1
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a
 Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, plus Dominican Republic, Haiti and 
Panama.  b Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay.  c Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. 
d Adjusted for banking services and import duties. 
In Brazil, the structure of the main sectors of economic activity 
remained very stable during the 1990s. The output shares of agriculture, 
manufacturing and construction stood unchanged throughout the decade, 
which means that manufacturing and construction failed to recover the 
ground they had lost in the 1980s. The overall share of services did not 
fall, but the composition of the sector changed somewhat as the weight of 
trade and of transport and communications increased. These shifting 
proportions reflect the impact of two forces: the Real Plan, which 
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triggered a recovery in private consumption, and new investments in 
telecommunications. The output of the financial system plunged, 
however, owing to a combination of falling inflation and changes in 
relative prices. 
Mexico is one of the few countries in the region where 
manufacturing significantly boosted its share of overall output. This 
greater vitality, which was seen mainly in the second half of the decade, 
can be attributed to the overwhelming impact of NAFTA, an expanding 
assembly industry, and the change in relative prices that followed 
devaluation in late 1994. Conversely, there was a fall in the share of trade 
and financial services, which had earlier been buoyed up by capital 
inflows and consumer credit growth. As in other countries, the transport 
and communications industry also increased its share. 
In the Southern Cone, all sectors expanded faster in the 1990s than 
in the previous four decades. In the other countries and subregions, 
however, the overall pattern was one of lower growth rates. The only 
exceptions were Central America, where growth was faster in 
construction and, to a lesser degree, in trade, hotels and restaurants, and 
the Andean Community, where growth in both mining and construction 
increased. 
(b) The shifting roles of different economic agents 
The restructuring of production in the different sectors has been led 
by three major categories of firms: subsidiaries of transnational 
corporations, large local conglomerates and locally owned small and 
medium-sized enterprises. During the recent structural adjustment 
process, these groups displayed large differences in terms of behaviour 
and of access to information and factor markets. As the principle of State 
subsidiarity came to be applied, and particularly as privatization 
advanced, the role of State-owned companies as suppliers of goods and 
services diminished greatly. The vacuum left behind by the retreating 
State was filled by large private companies, especially transnationals. 
To illustrate the overall situation, table IV.3 gives figures for the 
region’s 500 largest companies in the 1990s. The sectoral trends 
outlined above are clearly reflected in this group since, in terms of sales, 
the manufacturing sector still predominates, accounting for about 40% of 
the total. The greatest changes over the decade were in the sales of the 
primary sector, which slumped from 27.7% to 22% of the total, and in 
those of the services sector, which expanded from 30% to 37.6%, putting 
it almost on a par with manufacturing. This relative growth was 
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mainly driven by the privatization of a number of State-owned 
telecommunications and electricity firms (see chapter V). 
Table IV.3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: THE 500 LARGEST COMPANIES,  
1990-1992, 1994-1996 AND 1998-2000a
(Millions of dollars and percentages) 
 1990-1992 1994-1996 1998-2000 
1. Number of companies 500 500 500 
 Foreign 149 156 231 
 Local private-sector 264 280 231 
 State-owned 87 64 38 
2. Sales (millions of dollars) 361 009 601 794 686 776 
 Foreign 99 028 193 335 285 627 
 Local private-sector 142 250 246 700 259 784 
 State-owned 119 731 161 759 141 365 
Distribution by ownership (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  Foreign 27.4 32.1 41.6 
  Local private-sector 39.4 41.0 37.8 
  State-owned 33.2 26.9 20.6 
3. Sectors (millions of dollars) 361 009 601 794 686 776 
  Primary sectorb 100 058 143 540 150 812 
  Manufacturing 153 001 259 942 277 893 
  Services 107 950 196 313 258 072 
Distribution by sector (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  Primary sector 27.7 23.9 22.0 
  Manufacturing 42.4 43.2 40.4 
  Services 29.9 33.0 37.6 
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, Division of 
Production, Productivity and Management, on the basis of information supplied by the research 
department of América economía magazine for the periods 1990-1992 and 1994-1996, and information 
published in the magazines La nota, April 2000; Gestión, June 2000; Mercado, July 2000; América 
economía, 27 July 2000; Expansión, 19 July 2000; Gazeta mercantil, October 2000; Expansión, 25 July 
2001; Mercado, July 2001; América economía, 30 August 2001; and Gazeta mercantil, November 2001. 
a
 The figures are three-year averages. 
b
 Oil companies are included in the primary sector. 
As regards the different types of companies, the table shows that 
subsidiaries of transnational enterprises expanded their role, especially in 
the second half of the 1990s, when their numbers rose from 156 to 231, 
while the sales of these companies swelled from 27.4% of the total in 1990-
1992 to 41.6% in 1998-2000. Conversely, the number of State enterprises 
shrank from 87 in 1990-1992 to 38 in 1998-2000, and their share of total 
sales also declined sharply, from 33.2% to 20.6%. The number of locally 
owned private-sector companies remained stable at around 260, 
accounting for 40% of total sales. Clearly, one of the consequences of 
globalization and adjustment was that subsidiaries of transnational 
enterprises improved their position while State-owned companies lost 
ground, especially in the closing years of the decade. The increasing 
strength of transnationals is even more evident in the export figures, since 
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the external sales of their subsidiaries rose from 30.6% of the total for the 
200 largest exporters in 1995 to 43.7% in 2000. 
Locally owned small and medium-sized enterprises stand at the 
other end of the production scale. Here, the situation varies by sector and 
country. In general, large numbers of agricultural and mining businesses 
disappeared during the period under study, and in certain countries the 
same also occurred in manufacturing. The owners and employees of these 
businesses joined the ranks of informal workers, especially in the service 
sector in urban areas (see chapter VI). Events elsewhere in the world 
(especially East Asia) strongly suggest that in several of the region’s 
countries this business failure rate was higher than would have been 
expected in a normal process of structural adjustment to meet new 
conditions of competition. 
2. The agriculture and forestry sector 
(a) Ongoing transformations and the impact of the reforms 
As a result of the economic reforms introduced, agricultural 
activities underwent major changes in their structure, productivity, 
competitiveness and relative profitability. At the same time, the sector 
became even more heterogeneous. With competition conditions changing 
profoundly in the sector, new entrants came to the fore even as traditional 
enterprises withdrew. Economic liberalization, market deregulation and 
reform or abolition of public institutions in the agricultural sector all had 
their own specific effects on input and product prices, on the availability 
of services and resources and, most particularly, on the different types of 
producers (David and Morales, undated). 
In a number of cases, these effects merely hastened transformations 
that had already been taking shape for a decade or more. Examples 
include changes in the product and export mix and the repercussions of 
new technology, such as higher yields, decreases in the amount of land 
under cultivation, the allocation of larger areas to livestock and forestry 
and a general decline in employment levels. 
The changes that took place in the agricultural sector in the 1990s 
can be attributed largely to certain features of macroeconomic policy and 
market opening. For example, most local currencies appreciated steadily, 
and this combined with lower tariffs to bring down import prices both for 
machinery and inputs and for agricultural and agroindustrial goods, 
giving rise to what was often predatory competition. The result was that 
modern, well capitalized sectors introduced technical innovations and 
A decade of light and shadow. Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s  139
stepped up mechanization, developing more intensive agriculture. 
Meanwhile, small-scale producers were unable to increase the amount of 
land they had under cultivation, or even had to reduce it, as their sources 
of credit dried up and their output, consisting mostly of traditional crops, 
struggled to compete with imports. As occurred in other production 
sectors, the responses of different agents to economic signals and the 
institutional changes that affected them were highly asymmetrical. 
Decisions in Latin American agriculture are made by some 
3 million owners or employers and some 15 million own-account workers, 
over half of whom are poor (Dirven, 1997). In all the countries in the 
region, adults over 40 years of age, who are usually the ones making the 
decisions, are consistently found to have had less than six years of 
education. This is important because complex decisions have to be made 
about what to produce, what technology to use and what marketing 
approach to follow in a fast-changing world. Clearly, business skills are 
weak across a large segment of this production sector, especially by 
comparison with other producers and marketing firms that have access to 
a sophisticated network of technical and professional advisers to support 
them in their decision-making.1
At the same time, many of the institutions that used to support 
small and medium-sized producers have disappeared or are undergoing 
profound transformation. This is the case with public agricultural 
research institutions, which played a critical role in the past, but whose 
responsibilities have steadily been transferred to the private sector. 
Examples of these responsibilities include agricultural advisory functions 
and research and development work with seeds, agrochemicals and 
cultivation and production methods.2
The geographical distribution of production within each country 
has also changed over time, as dictated by the natural comparative 
advantages of individual regions. As a result, developed regions have 
become more starkly differentiated from those that have fallen behind. 
Levels of inequality, poverty and indigence remain unacceptably high in 
rural areas. Profound demographic changes (rural-urban migration, an 
1  OECD considers that the combination of skills called for in the agricultural sector, and 
sometimes in the specific region where the farm is located (the agronomic know-how 
and understanding of market operations needed to decide what to produce and what 
technology to use), requires at least as many qualifications as any other kind of business 
(cost accounting, investment analysis, financial planning). Contrary to what is often 
supposed, agriculture should therefore be regarded as a sector with high human capital 
requirements (OECD, 1994). 
2  Research and consultancy programmes for less commercial crops, which usually 
benefited smaller (and generally poorer) producers, have also been cut back or 
discontinued. 
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ageing rural population, declining birth and death rates) have been 
compounded by the high concentration of income and assets, especially 
land, which continues to be a distinctive feature of the region despite 
policies to counteract it. In some countries, concentration may have 
become even more acute during the 1990s. The most recent agricultural 
census figures in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, as well as other studies in 
Argentina, Bolivia and Mexico, reveal a decline in the number of 
small farms. 
A variety of other new challenges, associated with the 
biotechnology revolution, the millennium round of trade negotiations, 
long-term financing and job creation, have started to come to light in the 
sector. The effect of these developments on growth and equity will 
depend on the new regulatory framework that is put in place to fill the 
gap left by the reduction in the direct role of the State and of institutions 
equipped to generate public goods. Another highly visible feature of the 
restructuring that rural organization is now undergoing is the growing 
influence of large multinational agrochemical and seed producers. These 
producers of basic inputs are increasingly influential in determining the 
subcontracting  procedures and production practices (soil preparation, 
planting and harvesting) of many primary farmers. 
In the region, some of these processes have triggered equally 
significant changes in the structure of capital in the sector, as a result of 
significant expansion in foreign agrifood investments. Six of the 100 
largest transnational companies in Latin America (by consolidated sales) 
are in the tobacco and food industry.3 In Brazil, for example, the number 
of mergers and acquisitions was six times as high between 1992 and 1997 
as in previous years, and this process was led by the food, beverage and 
tobacco industries, which together accounted for 13% of the total. The 
most important factors underlying these developments include market 
saturation in developed countries, the growing power of distribution 
chains, the need to cut costs, an increased tendency for businesses to 
target regional markets, and the strategies used to enter these markets.4 In 
Chile, total agroindustrial investment rose from 9.5% of output in the 
1970s to 15.7% in 1995-1997. Official incentives for foreign investment 
were one of the key factors driving this increase. 
3 The largest is British American Tobacco, a tobacco company, followed by Unilever, 
Cargill, Parmalat, Dreyfus & Co. and Danone. 
4 The largest horizontal mergers involved Fiorlat, Teixeira, Alimba, Via Láctea, Lacesa, 
Sodilac, Cilpe, Ouro Preto Betânia and Batávia. The main vertical mergers involved 
Gogo, Mococa, Spam, Betânia and Batávia and the main concentric ones Supremo, Santa 
Helena and General Biscuits. In the case of conglomerate mergers, mention should be 
made of Bolls, Etti and Neugebauer (National Bank for Economic and Social 
Development, 1999). 
A decade of light and shadow. Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s  141
(b) The restructuring of production 
A shifting competitive environment, technological change in the 
sector and demand and price movements on the world market are all 
factors that help to explain the divergent trends seen in different 
agricultural activities, the overall decline in the amount of land under 
cultivation, and the asymmetrical appropriation of benefits. The situation 
differs from one country to another, depending on the share of 
agricultural products in total national output and the extent to which 
production is stimulated by domestic and external demand. As table IV.4 
shows, the annual average growth rate in the sector was 3.5% in the 1970s, 
2.1% in the 1980s and 2.6% in the 1990s. If these figures for agriculture are 
compared with overall output growth, it transpires that the sector is a 
relatively inert one. While the slowdown of the 1980s was less acute in 
agriculture than in other sectors, the recovery of the 1990s was also 
slower. In any case, in the 1990s, the agricultural sector —like the 
economy as a whole— did not return to the growth rates of the 1970s and 
earlier decades. Not only was growth slower overall, but annual growth 
rates were highly volatile. 
Naturally, this region-wide pattern masks great differences among 
countries. If the dividing line is taken to be an average rate of 3.5% as was 
seen in the 1970s, in the 1990s this was exceeded by just four countries. 
Only two of these, Chile and Costa Rica, had performed at a positive level 
in the 1970s. The other two (Nicaragua and Peru) moved from a situation 
of negative growth in the 1970s to one of high dynamism in the 1990s. In 
other words, agricultural sector activity in this subgroup increased during 
the reform stage. By contrast, twelve other countries moved in the 
opposite direction, becoming less vigorous than before: Bolivia, Brazil, 
Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, 
Paraguay, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela (Ocampo, 2000). 
The most dynamic activities in the 1990s were those linked to 
modern agroindustrial chains and external markets, especially in the case 
of small countries, and to both domestic and external markets in the case 
of larger countries. Another factor contributing to differences in national 
performance was the composition of sectoral production, as different 
areas did not behave alike. As table IV.5 shows, many of these structural 
changes in the sector have unfolded gradually over the long term, and 
thus predate market opening. 
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Table IV.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (19 COUNTRIES): GROWTH IN 
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, HUNTING AND FISHING 
(Average annual rates) 
 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 
Argentina 2.1 1.6 2.6 
Bolivia 4.1 1.9 3.0 
Brazil 4.7 2.5 3.0 
Chile 2.2 5.7 4.5 
Colombia 4.4 3.0 1.5 
Costa Rica 2.6 3.1 4.1 
Ecuador 3.0 4.2 1.4 
El Salvador 2.4 -1.4 1.4 
Guatemala 4.7 1.3 2.8 
Haiti 1.5 -0.2 -2.9 
Honduras 2.7 2.7 2.3 
Mexico 3.4 1.1 1.9 
Nicaragua -0.1 -0.7 5.1 
Panama 1.3 2.5 1.9 
Paraguay 6.7 4.0 1.7 
Peru -0.6 2.2 6.0 
Dominican Republic 3.4 0.4 0.4 
Uruguay 0.6 0.2 2.2 
Venezuela 2.9 2.0 1.1 
Latin America 3.5 2.1 2.6 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the Statistics and Economic Projections Division. 
The greatest progress in increasing and diversifying agricultural 
production and exports was made with oil crops, fruit and vegetables. 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Paraguay led the way with increased soya 
production, and Costa Rica, Guatemala and Honduras with African palm. 
Fruit and vegetable production increased most in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Costa Rica and Mexico. Cereals and sugar cane flourished until the first 
half of the 1980s, after which growth slowed, only to pick up again 
somewhat in the late 1990s. Root and tuber production has been generally 
stagnant over the last quarter of a century, and the same is true of coffee 
since the mid-1980s. Naturally, production trends were not identical in all 
countries for all products, and even some with similar characteristics 
displayed dissimilar patterns. 
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Table IV.5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT GROWTH 













Cereals 100 114 137 143 152 176 
Livestock 100 127 149 163 196 242 
Oil crops 100 189 262 336 398 501 
Roots and tubers 100 96 93 98 99 105 
Vegetables 100 120 140 164 182 211 
Fruit 100 116 135 156 181 202 
Green coffee 100 102 129 136 133 129 
Sugar cane 100 120 149 174 178 197 











Cereals 2.7 3.8 0.8 1.2 3.3 
Livestock 5.0 3.1 1.8 3.8 4.8 
Oil crops 12.0 4.7 3.7 0.9 2.7 
Roots and tubers -0.8 -0.5 1.0 0.1 1.3 
Vegetables 3.7 3.2 3.2 2.2 3.3 
Fruit 3.0 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.5 
Green coffee 0.3 4.8 1.1 -0.4 -0.7 
Sugar cane 3.7 4.5 3.1 0.5 2.3 
Source: ECLAC on the basis of data from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 
In a number of countries, livestock production grew at such a rate 
that it even outstripped the expansion of farm crops. Meanwhile, the 
greatest strides in forestry production were made in the countries of the 
Southern Cone and Mexico, owing to special incentives and natural 
comparative advantages. The expansion of this subsector was reflected in 
the region’s exports of forestry products. As can be seen in table IV.6, the 
subsector’s external sales in constant prices have multiplied more than 
seven fold over the past 30 years. Brazil, the main exporter, continued to 
account for about 50% of these exports throughout the period. The share 
of Chile began to increase in the early 1970s, and has ranged between 25% 
and 33% since the middle of that decade. Argentina and Mexico, which 
began in 1970 with a very small share of the region’s forestry exports, 
achieved the highest growth rates during this period, with Mexico 
eventually contributing 5.1% of the total and Argentina 4.2%. The rest of 
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the countries moved in the opposite direction; their share of regional 
forestry exports, although still significant, fell by three fourths from 1970 
to 1999. 
Table IV.6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: STRUCTURE AND GROWTH 
PERFORMANCE OF FORESTRY EXPORTS 
(Index multiples and percentages) 
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 
 Growth (index 1970=100) 
Argentina 100.0 150.3 263.5 786.7 2 483.3 3 701.2 3 238.9 
Brazil 100.0 72.9 198.9 219.5 296.0 619.7 746.4 
Chile 100.0 149.1 297.6 274.5 456.2 1 167.1 1 572.3 
Mexico 100.0 50.4 62.9 62.5 490.9 933.4 1 100.4 
All other countries 100.0 112.7 105.0 106.7 69.3 208.9 93.7 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 100.0 97.5 186.3 196.8 282.8 634.0 749.8 
 Structure (percentages) 
Argentina 0.7 1.1 1.0 2.9 6.3 4.2 4.2 
Brazil 50.3 37.6 53.6 56.0 52.6 49.1 54.1 
Chile 17.8 27.3 28.5 24.9 28.8 32.8 30.8 
Mexico 3.1 1.6 1.1 1.0 5.4 4.6 5.1 
All other countries 28.1 32.4 15.8 15.2 6.9 9.2 5.8 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 
Traditional commodities were also affected by low international 
prices, as table IV.7 shows. This resulted both from oversupply of many 
commodities, to which simultaneous liberalization by a number of 
developing countries contributed, and from distortions in international 
agricultural markets caused mainly by protectionism and subsidies in 
industrialized countries, which successive rounds of trade negotiations 
have done very little to correct (Ocampo and Perry, 1995). This 
downward movement in international prices, especially for cotton, sugar, 
coffee, wood pulp and wheat, was a blow to the region’s major exporting 
countries. The difficulties of some of them can be explained by their 
heavy reliance on these traditional products. In marked contrast, the 
external trade growth of the most successful countries was built on non-
traditional, higher-priced products for which demand was rising. 
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Table IV.7 
REAL PRICE INDICES FOR SELECTED COMMODITIES 
(1995=100)
Commodity 1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Cotton 90.2 77.6 73.8 59.2 59.6 78.7 100.0 85.4 78.2 71.9 53.4
Sugar 216.1 94.5 67.5 68.3 75.5 90.2 100.0 90.1 85.6 67.5 47.2
Bananas 85.3 118.3 128.7 107.8 100.4 99.9 100.0 107.5 112.1 108.6 97.8
Coffee 112.9 61.0 56.8 43.1 47.9 99.3 100.0 82.9 125.6 90.2 73.5
Beef 145.5 133.4 139.7 128.7 137.3 122.3 100.0 93.6 97.3 90.5 96.1
Maize 145.4 87.9 87.4 82.9 83.3 86.6 100.0 125.0 93.4 80.8 76.4
Wood pulp 62.8 95.5 70.0 66.0 49.7 64.9 100.0 67.3 65.3 48.3 46.0
Vegetable  
oil products a 116.8 94.9 92.8 93.2 98.4 98.3 100.0 119.7 122.1 92.7 76.5
Wheat 98.4 76.5 72.2 84.2 79.4 84.4 100.0 116.3 90.1 72.2 64.3
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  official figures. 
a
 Includes oilseeds, oil and meal. 
(c) Changes in labour productivity 
If rural and urban living standards are ever to become more equal, 
one essential requirement will be for agricultural and non-agricultural 
productivity levels to converge. Such convergence, however, may be the 
result either of positive factors (narrowing of the technology gap) or of 
negative ones (more informal employment in urban areas due to 
immigration from the countryside).5
Since the 1960s, labour productivity in the region has grown faster 
in the agricultural sector than in non-agricultural activities. Agricultural 
labour was only 19% as productive as non-agricultural labour in 1970, but 
the figure had risen to 47% by 2000. This progress, however, stemmed 
from both the positive and negative factors described above. Positive 
factors held sway in the 1970s, but a further narrowing of the productivity 
gap in the 1980s resulted from non-agricultural productivity declining in 
absolute terms, something that in turn reflected significant growth in the 
urban informal economy. 
In the 1990s, agricultural productivity grew substantially in several 
countries as technological innovations were adopted and input prices fell. 
These improvements took place in the most modern and best capitalized 
operations, which occupy the best land, and their effects were largely 
confined to the most dynamic products. This overall rise also reflected the 
5 This section is based on Ocampo (2000). 
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disappearance of many small farms, which normally had very low 
productivity.
If agricultural output per economically active person is taken as an 
indicator of labour productivity, productivity in the sector grew at an 
average annual rate of 2.4% from 1990 to 2000, to reach US$ 3,866 at 1990 
prices.6 Average labour productivity in the non-agricultural sectors of the 
region’s countries, while considerably higher (US$ 8,278 in 2000), grew at 
an annual rate of -0.02% during this period. In the great majority of cases, 
productivity grew faster on the agricultural sector than in the rest of the 
economy. 
In combination with changes in the composition of sectoral output 
and a relatively stable agricultural frontier, this increase in labour 
productivity led to employment falling in the sector. The expansion of 
livestock and forestry activities at the expense of more labour-intensive 
production reduced employment, while growth in horticulture and 
poultry rearing had the opposite effect. The figures available show that 
the net result was a decline in the demand for labour in rural areas. 
Table IV.8 ranks countries according to the relative labour 
productivity of their agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, by 
comparison with regional averages in 2000. Most of the countries 
followed a pattern that could be considered normal, with productivity 
figures that were clearly consistent for the entire economy: either 
agricultural and non-agricultural productivity figures were both above 
the respective regional averages, or both were below. Six countries 
exceeded the regional averages on both counts, while 12 fell short. In five 
countries, however, agricultural and non-agricultural productivity were 
on different sides of the respective averages. In three (Panama, Mexico 
and Trinidad and Tobago) non-agricultural productivity rose by more 
than the regional average but agricultural productivity by less, while in 
the other two countries (Guyana and Venezuela) the opposite occurred. 
6 These figures were calculated from official FAO data on the economically active 
population and ECLAC information on agricultural sector output. 
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Table IV.8 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (23 COUNTRIES): RANKING BY 
AGRICULTURAL AND NON-AGRICULTURAL LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
Non-agricultural productivity below regional 
average of US$ 8 278/EAP in 2000 
Non-agricultural productivity above regional 
average of US$ 8 278/EAP in 2000 
Annual productivity growth from 1990 to 
2000 and productivity in 2000 
Annual productivity growth from 1990 to 2000 
and productivity in 2000 
Agricultural Non- agricultural Agricultural Non- 
agricultural 
% US$ % US$ % US$ % US$
Guyana  10.2 4 946 2.5 1 142 Barbados  3.0 16 667 -0.7 12 663
Venezuela 2.0 4 846 -1.1 7 815 Argentina 2.8 9 311 1.8 18 978
Uruguay 2.4 7 842 1.8 13 832
Chile 4.1 5 340 3.5 14 436







EAP in 2000 Brazil 4.5 4 620 0.0 10 316
Colombia 1.4 3 658 -0.7 5 737 Panama 2.2 2 742 1.3 9 140
Dominican 
Republic 5.6 3 163 2.0 5 091 Mexico 1.3 2 274 -0.6 14 261
Paraguay -0.1 3 062 -1.9 4 661 Trinidad 
and Tobago 1.2 1 976 0.7 12 354
Nicaragua 5.0 2 221 -2.1 988     
Peru 4.0 1 914 0.2 8 132     
Guatemala 0.8 1 879 0.2 6 337     
El Salvador 0.1 1 684 0.4 5 046     
Ecuador 0.7 1 659 -2.4 4 304     
Jamaica  2.4 1 602 -1.4 4 603     
Honduras 1.3 1 129 -1.7 2 279     







EAP in 2000 
Haiti -3.8 377 -3.6 1 625     
Source: Annual cumulative growth rates, ECLAC, data from the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) for the economically active population (EAP). 
A look at changes from 1990 to 2000 shows that the greatest 
increases in productivity, both on and off the agricultural sector, were 
generally achieved by the very countries where productivity was already 
relatively high. As a result, the region shows a divergent pattern of labour 
productivity. In countries with higher productivity (Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay), changes in the relationship between the 
rural and urban economies were dominated by positive factors associated 
with genuine convergence in technology levels and living standards. The 
main exception, owing to peculiarities in their production structures, is 
Barbados. The opposite is true of lower-productivity countries, where 
convergence was largely due to a quite widespread decline in non-
agricultural labour productivity resulting from the spread of informal 
working in the cities (Colombia, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Nicaragua and Paraguay). 
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(d) The economic and social influence of land concentration 
Latin America and the Caribbean have a history of highly 
concentrated land ownership and tenure. By contrast with other regions 
of the world, this issue is still actively on the agenda in most of the 
countries, despite agrarian reform programmes undertaken in the 1960s 
and early 1970s. The fact is that the sectors affected by these programmes 
put up such strong resistance that they eventually succeeded in 
neutralizing and even reversing them. With the exceptions of Brazil, 
Colombia, Costa Rica and, more recently, Venezuela, there are currently 
no initiatives to redistribute land. In the 1990s, large expanses of land 
remained unproductive even as highly unequal structures of land 
distribution persisted, a situation that is incompatible with the objectives 
of equity and efficiency implicit in sustainable development. 
The indices of land concentration given in table IV.9 allow three 
groups of countries to be distinguished. In the first group, comprising 
Chile, Mexico and Paraguay, indices are above 0.9, reflecting very high 
levels of concentration. At between 0.8 and 0.9, the index values for 
Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Panama, Peru and 
Venezuela are also high. The third group comprises Colombia, the 
Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico and Uruguay, with index values 
of between 0.7 and 0.8, and Honduras, where the value has ranged from 
0.6 to 0.7. 
Concentration of land ownership is a matter of concern both to 
governments and to a variety of civil society organizations. In the 1990s, 
several countries in the region experienced intensified activity by social 
movements of landless farm labourers, in some cases culminating in farm 
takeovers. Governments have adopted a range of policies to tackle this 
problem. Some have emphasized market mechanisms to bring about 
changes in ownership and have implemented policies based on carrying 
out land surveys, updating existing ones, registering land and issuing 
titles. In other cases, including Brazil, agrarian reform policies have been 
combined with the acquisition of land on the market. 
It would be premature to evaluate the Brazilian financing 
programme for land purchases (known as the Cédula da Terra or land 
certification project) because it was implemented only recently. The 
interest rate on programme credits, however, is already being criticized 
for being incompatible with the goal of making agriculture profitable. 
Studies now under way confirm the need for supplementary investments 
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to provide access to the technology needed if the land acquired is to be 
farmed successfully.7
Table IV.9 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (16 COUNTRIES): INDICES OF LAND 
CONCENTRATION, 1969-1997 a
(Gini Index values) 
 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Argentina … 0.83 (1988) … 
Brazil 0.84 (1970) 0.85 (1985) 0.81 (1996) 
Chile 0.92 (1975) ... 0.92 (1997) 
Colombia 0.86 (1971) 0.79 (1988) 0.79 (1997) 
Costa Rica 0.81 (1973) 0.80 (1984) ... 
Ecuador  0.81 (1974) ... ... 
El Salvador 0.80 (1971) … ... 
Honduras  0.71 (1974) ... 0.66 (1993) 
Mexico 0.93 (1970) ... ... 
Panama 0.77 (1971) 0.83 (1980) 0.85 (1990) 
Paraguay ... 0.93 (1981) 0.93 (1991) 
Peru 0.88 (1972) … 0.86 (1994) 
Puerto Rico 0.76 (1970) 0.77 (1987) ... 
Dominican Republic 0.78 (1970) 0.73 (1981) ... 
Uruguay 0.81 (1970) 0.80 (1980) 0.76 (1990) 
Venezuela 0.90 (1970) 0.89 (1985) ... 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of agricultural census and surveys. 
a
 Calculated using the methodology developed in Beatriz David and others, “Demandas por políticas de 
desenvolvimiento rural no Brasil”, Encontro Nacional de Economía, Belém do Pará, December 1999. The 
index goes from 0 to 1; the higher the value, the greater the inequality. 
Colombia’s Law 160, enacted in 1994, created a subsidy for direct 
land purchases as a way of promoting access to land by campesino 
farmers (Ocampo and Perry, 1995 and Vargas, 2000). This law emphasizes 
direct land negotiations between landlords and campesinos. The initiative 
has failed to match up to expectations, however, largely because the 
availability of subsidies has pushed up land prices and, in some cases, 
fuelled speculation. This process coexisted with the more traditional 
approach of giving settlers land grants in outlying areas. 
In Costa Rica, the agrarian reform process begun in 1962 had a 
significant impact on the structure of land tenure and ownership. The first 
main thrust of reform was to settle large areas of land. This was followed 
by land acquisition and distribution, the issuing of titles and measures to 
7  See, in particular, Dias (2000) and Rodríguez (2000). 
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support the consolidation of campesino settlements. It is estimated that 
almost two million hectares, over one third of the nation’s land, were 
redistributed under these programmes. 
The Agrarian Reform in El Salvador, together with the Land 
Transfer Programme deriving from the Peace Agreements, brought about 
major changes in land allocation. From 1980 to 1995, these programmes 
were generously funded, although the results failed to live up to the 
original social and economic goals and objectives. The structure of tenure 
is now such that 75.1% of land is in the possession of landowners, 18.4% is 
rented and the remaining 6.5% is held on some other basis. The 
characteristics of the sector, the fragmentation of properties and the low 
level of agricultural technology have depressed farm income and 
profitability. Farmers frequently seek wage employment as rural 
labourers to supplement their income. The stubbornly low levels of 
technology employed can be attributed to the lack of training 
programmes and the dearth of resources for supplementary investments.8
In Mexico, the Constitutional Reform of 1991 made it legal to sell 
and trade in agrarian rights, practices that already existed informally. The 
reforms abolished the power of communities to dispose of land and water 
rights and legalized the sale, rental and share-cropping of communal 
lands (ejidos). The policy was implemented through the Procede 
programme (Programme for the Certification of Agrarian Rights and the 
Allocation of Titles to Urban Sites) set up in 1993. By 1999, over 60% of 
ejido land had been certified, although the certification rate varied 
considerably among regions and the transmission of succession rights is 
still very common. While the new agrarian laws did not spark massive 
land sales, indirect transactions such as rental arrangements were 
revitalized. Ejido farmers were thus able to make more flexible use of 
their assets. 
The experience of the 1990s has clearly revealed that there are 
major obstacles to a market-based system of land transactions, including 
imperfect credit markets and limitations on the fiscal resources that can be 
made available for subsidy programmes that sometimes cover up to 75% 
of the purchase price. This is compounded by the lack of an expeditious, 
functional and reliable land survey and registry system capable of 
providing users with the financial and legal information they need to 
participate in the market (Tejada and Peralta, 1999). 
8 Based on data from surveys conducted under the ECLAC FRG/97/S70 project “Policy 
options to promote the development of agricultural land markets with a view to 
facilitating land transfer to small farmers”. 
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It has also been shown, though, that the difficulties of using market 
operations as a mechanism for land allocation do not stem solely from the 
shortcomings of the financial system or the inadequacy of cadastral 
information. Land is fundamentally different from other assets in that it 
serves simultaneously as a store of value, a fixed asset and a factor of 
production. This is why the land market, as a general rule, is very 
imperfect and segmented and involves high transaction costs (Muñoz, 
1999). 
3.  The mining sector 
In the 1990s, the latent potential of the mining sector was 
developed at an exceptional pace. Alongside changes in oil and gas 
activities (see chapter V), most countries in the region undertook reforms 
aimed at bringing new deposits into production more quickly and thus 
boosting and diversifying exports in the mining sector. While these 
reforms generally confirmed the State in its inalienable and 
imprescriptible ownership of these resources, the implementation of a 
variety of programmes to stimulate private investment curtailed the 
State’s commercial role and reduced tax revenues from mining activities. 
The essential developments in the 1990s were the removal of barriers to 
the entry of private investment, the application of consistent policies 
regardless of the origin of capital or the scale of mining operations, and 
the privatization of a number of public companies in the sector.9
(a) Direction and substance of reforms 
Although reforms were not always adopted systematically or 
simultaneously by the countries, they usually entailed the following 
measures: increasing information and knowledge about mining potential; 
upgrading the technical capabilities of public institutions in the mining 
sector; strengthening the legal status of mining rights and modernizing 
the administration of these; and providing specific investment incentives, 
which meant that economic policy instruments ceased to be neutral. 
Reforms were based on the assumption that, given the 
technological progress made since the 1970s, technical advances needed 
to be introduced and disseminated if the mining industry were to 
develop, something that required more private investment, especially 
from abroad. Foreign companies were looking for opportunities to exploit 
competitive advantages, especially in the cases of copper and gold, the 
9 This section is based on Sánchez Albavera and others (1999). 
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two products that attracted the largest investments. Choices between 
investment opportunities in different regions were mainly determined by 
operating costs. Thus, economic policies helped to develop a sector in 
which international prices were an important consideration. Once mining 
rights had been placed on a sounder legal footing, the administration of 
these rights had been modernized and entry barriers had been removed, 
the orientation of macroeconomic reforms became a key factor in 
investment decisions. 
From this perspective, the reforms with the greatest impact were 
the ones that influenced costs, commercial and financial management and 
the distribution of profits. The main measures affecting costs were the 
reduction of tariff protection levels, the introduction of drawback 
mechanisms for taxes paid during the production process, the reduction 
or abolition of royalties, licence fees and other indirect taxes, and the 
abolition of specific taxes or discriminatory fees on the use of 
infrastructure (energy, ports, etc.). Reforms affecting commercial and 
financial management included the removal of trade and currency 
restrictions and the liberalization of capital movements. Where the 
distribution of profits was concerned, important reforms included cuts in 
corporate income tax, incentives for the reinvestment of profits, the 
removal of restrictions on profit remittances abroad and the signing of 
agreements on tax stability and investment guarantees. Together with the 
earlier measures, these reforms were not only appropriate to the global 
nature of foreign mining companies, but created a very favourable 
investment climate in the sector. 
Certainly, these reforms were not all brought in the same way, or 
with the same vigour or promptness. As a result, the greatest investment 
flows went to those countries that not only offered considerable 
competitive advantages but that had acted most quickly to give more 
favourable treatment to investment. Mining profits available for 
distribution are those that remain after minimum earning expectations are 
subtracted from the after-tax yield of a project. The country where the 
largest share of this difference goes to investors is Chile, which also 
reduces the tax burden during the first years of operation. Most of the 
countries have developed attractive regimes whose incentives compare 
favourably with those offered in other regions. Intraregional competition 
for investment also intensified in the 1990s. 
Another important development in the decade was that many 
countries in the region established solid environmental institutions and 
regulations, at a time when environmental issues were rapidly being 
internationalized (see chapter VII). Environmental conditions on 
financing for mining projects were steadily tightened up, and civil society 
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began to exert greater pressure in this regard. Companies have responded 
very energetically by implementing policies to ensure that their 
operations are conducted in harmony with the environment and local 
communities. As new investments incorporate more environmentally 
friendly technology, the greatest environmental liabilities tend to derive 
from older operations. 
(b) Outcome of the reforms 
Even though investment responded favourably to these reforms, 
the international competitiveness of the region’s mining sector remained 
weak. Too little was being done to incorporate added value into exports, 
and world markets remained unstable. Exploration in the region boomed 
during the 1990s, giving rise to vigorous but highly concentrated growth 
in mining investment. 
In 1990, the large mining companies allocated budgets of less than 
US$ 200 million annually for exploration in Latin America. The new 
conditions for mining investment, coupled with a number of 
developments affecting exploration spending in countries such as 
Australia, Canada and the United States from the 1980s onward, aroused 
interest in increasing such activities in the region.10 Exploration budgets in 
Latin America thus rose to US$ 544 million a year in 1994, after which 
they increased so rapidly that in 1997 they totalled US$ 1.17 billion. That 
year, the region managed to attract 29% of the world’s total exploration 
budget, estimated at US$ 4.03 billion.11 Figure IV.1 gives a graphic 
illustration of this trend and of the scale of exploration spending in the 
region by comparison with some industrialized countries. 
10 These factors include rising exploration costs in the United States and Canada owing to 
new environmental requirements in both countries, the withdrawal of tax incentives in 
Canada and the depletion of reserves in some mining zones. Australian companies 
boosted their foreign operations for similar reasons, but also because of promising new 
technological developments for copper and gold production and the high cost of gold 
mining operations in traditional areas, such as South Africa. 
11 Towards the end of the decade, however, exploration budgets were cut back 
considerably in response to steadily declining prices and the Asian crisis. The most 
recent figure available is for 1998, when only US$ 2.83 billion was allocated for 


























WORLDWIDE EXPLORATION BUDGETS, 1999 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the Metals Economics Group. 
There are no region-wide statistics to show the trend of actual 
investment in new projects. Although a sample of five countries yields a 
figure of some US$ 17.379 billion for investment in the period 1990-1997, 
these capital flows were narrowly concentrated as a result of massive 
copper investment in Chile, a country which attracted 51% of all the 
investment in the sample.12
The position of the region’s mining sector, however, is vulnerable 
in certain respects. The main threats include the decline in the share of 
international trade accounted for by mining products, a failure to focus 
sufficiently on adding value, structural changes in world consumption 
and the persistent decline of real prices. 
Output of more highly processed products has been particularly 
disappointing in terms of market share. While the region increased its 
share of total extraction for most minerals (mine products), it failed to 
show any significant improvement where goods with greater value added 
(refined products) were concerned, with the exception of copper (see table 
IV.10). The failure of the region to increase its share of world exports by 
value, which remained virtually unchanged at 12% throughout the 1990s, 
12 According to ECLAC figures based on official information from the governments, 
investment in the other countries of the sample broke down as follows: Brazil, 24%; 
Peru, 12%; Argentina, 10%; and Mexico, 3%. 
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was largely due to the high proportion of its output accounted for by 
goods incorporating little processing and to the decline in its contribution 
to world production of refined products.13
Table IV.10 
LATIN AMERICA: ORE AND METAL PRODUCTION 
(Average annual rates and percentages) 




Ore    
Bauxite 23 27 2.9 
Copper 25 44 10.5 
Tin 27 25 -1.3 
Nickel 7 15 11.2 
Lead 13 13 -0.2 
Zinc 17 21 3.3 
Refined metals    
Aluminium 9 9 1.8 
Copper 16 26 9.2 
Tin 23 15 -3.8 
Nickel 7 11 7.4 
Lead 8 7 0.2 
Zinc 7 7 2.7 
Source: World Bureau of Metal Statistics (WBMS), World Metal Statistics, various issues. 
The region’s share of world ore and concentrate exports increased 
in both volume and value, with the exceptions of ferronickel and zinc. In 
nearly every case, though, its share of refined metal exports fell off in 
terms of both volume and value, as table IV.11 shows. Copper was the 
exception, but even here the region’s share of ore and concentrate exports 
grew by more than its share of refined metal exports (Moussa, 1999). 
13 Latin America’s contribution to the worldwide total of ore and metal exports was 12.7% 
in 1990 and 11.8% in 1995 and 1997. At the same time, developed countries saw their 
share slip from 60% in 1990 to 58.4% in 1995 and 57.3% in 1997. The winners were other 




LATIN AMERICA: WORLD EXPORT SHARE OF MAIN METALS,  
BY VOLUME AND VALUE 
(Percentages) 
Volume Value 
1990 1999 1990 1999 
Bauxite 31.2 33.7 31.9 36.5 
Aluminium 14.1 8.9 12.9 8.9 
Copper ore and concentrate 19.6 43.9 19.1 40.3 
Refined copper 36.0 44.1 36.7 45.1 
Tin ore and concentrate 30.4 33.6 28.7 31.9 
Refined tin 23.0 9.4 22.5 9.5 
Ferronickel 39.2 27.1 43.0 38.2 
Refined nickel 4.3 2.0 4.3 1.9 
Lead ore and concentrate 20.3 19.5 21.5 29.6 
Refined lead 13.3 6.9 12.7 6.9 
Zinc ore and concentrate 26.1 24.6 24.2 24.5 
Zinc 10.1 7.2 9.8 7.3 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Handbook of World Mineral 
Trade Statistics, 1990-1995 (UNCTAD/ITCD/COM/2), New York, 1997. United Nations publication, Sales 
No. E.97.II.D.3; and Handbook of World Mineral Trade Statistics, 1995-2000 (UNCTAD/ITCD/COM/37), 
New York, 2002. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.02.II.D.1. 
World export performance was also unsatisfactory as regards semi-
manufactures of mining origin. From 1990 to 1997, the region’s share in 
total exports of aluminium semi-manufactures fell from 4.3% to 2.7% by 
volume, while its share of tin exports slipped from 4% to 1.5%. Copper 
exports held steady at around 3.7% of world export volume, and nickel 
was also stable. Only lead and zinc saw growth, moderate in the first case 
and very substantial in the second (from 3.9% to 20.2%). 
The destination of mining exports is mainly determined by 
consumption trends in developed countries. The structural changes 
displayed by world consumption in terms of metal use per unit of output 
continue to be a source of vulnerability. Nevertheless, the substitution 
effect that was a feature of the previous two decades seemed to be less 
significant in the 1990s.14 Indeed, world consumption grew slightly faster 
from 1990 to 1999 than in the 1980s, thanks in part to higher consumption 
in developing countries. Even so, the real prices of most mining products 
continued to slump (see table IV.12). 
14 Between 1990 and 1998, developed countries’ share in world consumption of metals 
such as copper and zinc did not fall significantly from its early 1980s level, while in the 
cases of aluminium, tin and nickel it increased. Furthermore, their consumption of most 
products grew faster in the 1990s than during the previous decade. 
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Table IV.12 
REAL PRICE INDICES FOR THE MAIN METALS a
(1990=100)
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Aluminium 100.0 77.7 71.7 65.3 81.7 92.4 80.6 90.2 79.6 80.2 
Copper  100.0 86.0 80.4 67.6 78.7 92.5 75.6 79.1 59.8 57.1 
Tin 100.0 87.7 91.7 77.8 79.5 83.5 86.7 83.7 85.4 83.6 
Nickel 100.0 90.0 74.1 56.2 64.9 77.9 74.2 72.2 50.2 65.5 
Lead 100.0 67.3 62.7 47.3 61.3 65.3 83.8 71.2 62.7 59.9 
Zinc 100.0 72.0 76.6 59.7 59.6 57.0 59.2 80.1 64.8 68.4 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Monthly Commodity Price 
Bulletin, New York, various volumes, various issues, and World Bank, Global Commodity Markets,
Washington, D.C., various issues. 
a
 Deflated by the World Bank Manufacturing Unit Value (MUV) index. 
These trends seriously affected small-scale formal mining 
operations, while traditional or informal miners were in danger of 
disappearing altogether. The operating conditions typical of both groups, 
especially the latter, pose a persistent and intractable problem. Their cost 
structure is usually uncompetitive, security of employment is minimal, 
and their practices are harmful to the environment. One of the most 
serious shortcomings of mining policies in the 1990s was the failure to 
take a firm stance on these problems. 
In conclusion, the region has abundant reserves of mineral 
resources on which to build dynamic economic growth, and much 
potential still remains unexplored. Resources, although concentrated in a 
small number of countries, are diverse. While this has encouraged 
considerable product specialization, it also offers great potential for 
complementarity, which could trigger greater intraregional trade as the 
countries become more developed. 
Strategies and policies to boost competitiveness should encourage 
wider incorporation of new technologies so that the reserves available can 
be brought into operation and costs can be cut. The aim should be to 
reconfigure world supply so that Latin America secures a larger share of 
international trade on the basis of competitive advantages that are 
sustainable over the long term. 
The new cycle of mining investments in the 1990s took things in this 
direction, responding not only to existing natural advantages but also to 
more effective economic policies in the area of natural resource production. 
Late in the decade, doubts began to arise as to whether the rate of growth that 
mining investment had seen in the 1990s was sustainable. Nevertheless, it is 
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estimated that worldwide investment in mining will total US$ 51 billion 
between 2000 and 2007, and the region could take 32% of this total.15
It should be noted, however, that some developing countries are 
approaching a level of industrial maturity such that their consumption 
patterns can soon be expected to resemble those of developed countries; 
consumption, in other words, will grow less quickly than in the more 
dynamic stages of industrialization. Thus, future developments in world 
markets will be influenced more by the market behaviour of countries such 
as China, which posted high consumption rates in the 1990s, and by faster 
industrial growth in other developing countries, including those of 
Latin America. 
4. The industrial sector 
(a) Industrial performance and restructuring 
The industrial sector has passed through several clearly defined 
stages over the past 50 years, with large shifts in growth trends. Following 
successful performance from 1950 to 1974 with average annual expansion 
rates of 6.8%, growth slowed to an average of 4.3% between 1974 and 
1980. The 1980s witnessed a collapse to 0.4% annual average growth. 
Although the industrial sector recovered strongly in the 1990s with 
average annual growth of 3.1%, it never regained the vigour of the years 
before the debt crisis, and even lagged GDP growth slightly, although 
with variations among subregions and countries. In South America, the 
industrial output trend was dominated by the negative impact of events 
in tradable goods-producing sectors; these contracted sharply, losing 
domestic market share and failing to expand exports significantly. In 
Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, where reforms were introduced early, the 
decline took place mainly in the late 1970s and 1980s and became 
entrenched in the 1990s. In other cases, including Brazil and Colombia, 
the downturn began in the 1980s and became more severe in the 1990s. In 
Brazil, in the countries of the Southern Cone (Argentina, Chile, Paraguay 
and Uruguay) and in the Andean Community (except Ecuador and Peru), 
industrial output grew considerably more slowly than GDP from 1990 
onward, reversing the trend that had prevailed from the post-war period 
until 1980. By contrast, a number of industrial subsectors in Mexico and in 
some Central American and Caribbean countries maintained or increased 
15 This estimate was taken from the Engineering and Mining Journal, which publishes an 
annual survey of investment forecasts for the following decade based on projects 
already under way and those that could be feasibly undertaken. 
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their share of total output thanks to robust manufacturing exports. As a 
result, industrial output grew faster than GDP in these countries (see 
figure IV.2). 
These contrasting trends in the overall performance of the 
countries’ industrial sectors were accompanied by major transformations 
in patterns of product specialization. Table IV.13 shows changes over time 
in the relative weight of different manufacturing branches in five Latin 
American countries. In all cases, the output of traditional labour-intensive 
subsectors, especially textiles and wearing apparel, fell in relative or even 
absolute terms. As markets rapidly opened up and national currencies 
appreciated, these subsectors found that they were unable to compete 
successfully with Asian companies, which undercut their prices at the 
lower end of the market, or with European ones, which dominated the 
top end of the market with superior design, finish, quality and product 
differentiation. Meanwhile, industries producing capital goods and 
industrial inputs ran into problems as the import content of the region’s 
industrial output increased. Although these tendencies were already 
present in some countries, they became more acute in the 1990s as rapid 
consumption growth was fuelled by rising real incomes, renewed credit 
and cheaper imports. By contrast, those parts of industry that were 
involved in the early stages of raw materials processing (agro-industry, 
cellulose and petrochemicals) consolidated their position following 
considerable growth in earlier decades, especially the 1980s, although 
Mexico was an exception to this trend. Similarly, the automotive industry 
in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, whose production levels were 
depressed after the crisis of the 1980s, succeeded in recovering, thanks 
mainly to the preferential treatment granted to it by the economic 
authorities in the form of special regimes (Benavente and others, 1996). 
In Mexico, as the automotive subsector flourished thanks to 
preferential treatment and access to the United States market, a variety of 
assembly activities both in final-use durable goods industries and in 
branches that diffuse technical progress (machinery, instruments, fine 
chemistry) also improved their position. Through their production 
linkages, these industries in turn injected new energy into other activities. 
This trend towards greater specialization has been spreading to some 
degree into other countries of Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador 
and Honduras) and the Caribbean (Dominican Republic), although the 
focus is much more narrowly on assembly activities, with less impact on 
the rest of the industrial structure. 
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Figure IV.2 
LATIN AMERICA: INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT AND GDP GROWTH 
(Average annual rates)
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Table IV.13 
LATIN AMERICA (5 COUNTRIES): CHANGES IN THE STRUCTURE OF 
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION a
(Percentages) 
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico 
1970 1990 1999 1970 1990 1999 1970 1990 1999 1970 1990 1998 1970 1990 1999
I. Metallurgical industry 
(excluding automotive) 15.6 14.3 13.4 18.8 22.9 22.2 15.9 10.8 11.9 10.7 9.6 9.7 13.3 12.3 15.2
II. Transport equipment 9.9 8.5 12.8 9.9 7.0 8.4 7.7 2.3 1.9 2.9 4.3 6.3 5.5 9.5 13.1
III and IV. Food products, beverages and tobacco, 
plus natural resource processing industries 36.2 46.7 43.6 35.8 39.6 43.7 41.7 54.5 56.2 45.7 51.1 55.0 46.8 46.8 44.5
V. Traditional industries (labour-intensive) 38.2 30.5 30.2 35.5 30.5 25.8 34.7 32.4 30.0 40.7 34.9 29.0 34.4 31.4 27.2
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a
 I  ISIC 381, 382, 383, 385; 
 II   ISIC 384; 
 III+IV   ISIC 311, 313, 314 plus ISIC 341, 351, 354, 355, 356, 371, 372; 
 V   ISIC 321, 322, 323, 324, 331, 332, 342, 352, 361, 362, 369, 390. 
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(b) Labour productivity gaps and current trends 
The different subsectors in which the countries of the region have 
particularly specialized were the ones that managed to maintain or even 
narrow the productivity gap with the United States. This is a creditable 
performance, given the speed with which labour productivity increased 
in nearly all areas of manufacturing industry in the United States during 
the 1990s (4.5% a year, on average). Table IV.14 shows the evolving 
productivity gap with the United States in different branches of industry 
from 1970 to 1999. Those in which the region is most clearly —albeit 
falteringly— approaching international productivity levels are the 
automotive industry and, to a lesser degree, natural resource processing 
industries. The automotive sector was less affected by trade liberalization 
than any other, as it has been sheltered by special regimes in most 
countries where it exists. Lastly, industries that process natural resources 
have been steadily narrowing the productivity gap with the United States 
since the 1980s (Katz, 2000b). 
Table IV.14 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GAP BETWEEN THE REGION a AND THE  
UNITED STATES, 1970-1999 
(Percentages of United States productivity) 

























Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures compiled in the Industrial Performance Analysis Program 
(PADI) database. 
a
 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. 
Again, if the period 1970-1999 is divided into two subperiods, 1970-
1990 and 1990-1999, and a coefficient of statistical association is calculated 
for the performance of each industrial subsector in both of them, the trend 
that emerges is clearly one of path dependency. In other words, those 
branches of manufacturing industry that tended to make better than 
average progress during the import substitution phase in narrowing the 
productivity gap that separated them from peer companies in the United 
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States likewise tended to perform better in the stage that followed 
economic opening and liberalization.16
Table IV.15 gives estimated growth rates for industrial output, 
employment and labour productivity in some Latin American countries 
and the United States.17 As these figures show, from 1970-1990 only three 
countries in the region —Argentina, Colombia and Mexico— achieved 
higher industrial labour productivity growth than the United States 
manufacturing sector, although in Brazil the rate was only slightly lower. 
These are the countries whose labour productivity gaps with the United 
States have shown a declining trend over the long term, although the 
distance in absolute terms is still great.18 The other countries considered  
—Chile, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Peru and Uruguay— have seen the gap 
widen over the long term. In the 1990s, labour productivity grew faster in 
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay than in the United States. 
These labour productivity gains in manufacturing industry were 
achieved at a time when imports were growing substantially, large 
numbers of small and medium-sized manufacturing companies were 
going out of business, industrial production was becoming increasingly 
specialized and a few companies, most of them subsidiaries of 
transnational firms, were expanding installed capacity and modernizing 
their technology. The relative weight of these factors varied from country 
to country. 
16 The cross-sectional estimates for each country, involving 27 observations down to three 
digits in the ISIC categorization in each case, show that the coefficients of association are 
statistically significant in all of them (Katz, 2000b). 
17  The database of the Industrial Performance Analysis Programme (PADI), compiled 
recently by ECLAC, was used to calculate indicators of labour productivity as measured 
by the aggregate value of output per person/year for the period 1970-1996, by country 
and industrial sector. With this information it is now possible, for the first time, to make 
comparisons between countries in the region and between these and developed 
countries. 
18 Absolute differences in labour productivity are still considerable. As a proportion of 
United States labour productivity, the values for this indicator in 1996 were: Argentina, 
0.67; Brazil, 0.37; Chile, 0.20 (1995); Colombia, 0.34; Costa Rica, 0.14 (1992); Jamaica, 0.13 
(1992); Mexico, 0.38 (1994); Peru, 0.15; and Uruguay, 0.22 (1995). These values were 




OUTPUT, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN  
MANUFACTURING 
(Average annual rates) 
 Industrial output Employment Labour productivity 
 1970-1990 1990-1999 1970-1990 1990-1999 1970-1990 1990-1999
Argentina a 0.1 5.2 -2.5 -2.2 2.6 7.6 
Brazil 4.3 0.8 2.8 -6.8 1.4 8.1 
Chile  1.9 4.1 1.0       0.8 b 0.8      4.2 b
Colombia a 4.5 1.9 1.9 -1.8 2.6 3.7 
Costa Rica 4.8 …      5.0 c --- -0.8 c --- 
Jamaica 0.5 … 1.8 --- -1.3 --- 
Mexico 4.1 3.6 1.1 0.2 3.0 3.4 
Peru d 0.7 5.1 3.1 2.0 -2.4 3.1 
Uruguay d 1.1 -1.5 -0.2 -8.6 -1.8 7.1 
United States a 1.5 4.2 3.0 -0.2 1.7 4.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a
 Data for the second period pertain to 1990-1998. 
b
 The employment and productivity data for the second period pertain to 1990-1998. 
c
 The employment and productivity data for the first period pertain to 1984-1990. 
d
 All data for the second period pertain to 1990-1996. 
In Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and, to a lesser extent, Colombia, 
productivity growth in the 1990s was accompanied by job losses in the 
sector and slower output growth. Indeed, in the first three countries, large-
scale destruction of industrial jobs was the corollary of the success they 
achieved in narrowing the productivity gap with the United States. By 
contrast, productivity in Chile and Peru rose at a time of growth in 
manufacturing employment and even faster expansion in industrial output. 
In the region as a whole, all the evidence shows that the business 
community is still most inclined to adopt a defensive posture in the face 
of macroeconomic conditions that are not yet well consolidated. Among 
the greatest weaknesses of the new pattern of industrial specialization are 
its composition and, particularly, its ability to create jobs, especially 
highly skilled, well paid ones. 
(c) Manufacturing exports and the dynamism of world trade 
One of the main features of globalization where manufactures are 
concerned is the increasing scale and intensity of international 
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competition. Manufactures are accounting for a greater and greater share 
of international trade in goods. Of the 239 product groups categorized at 
the three-digit level of the International Standard Industrial Classification 
of All Economic Activities (ISIC), in 1996 the 50 most dynamic accounted 
for around half of all imports in the countries of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), as against just 28% in 
1980. The greatest increases were achieved by the computer, other 
electrical machinery and electronic equipment, wearing apparel, chemical 
and pharmaceutical, automotive, and non-electrical machinery industries. 
These subsectors contain 34 of the 50 most dynamic export branches, and 
in 1996 they accounted for 40% of all OECD imports. The share of the 
other 16 groups of dynamic products, most of them manufactures as well, 
was about 12%. A common characteristic of these sectors is that they are 
not based on natural resources. Indeed, growth in international 
competition has been accompanied by a decline in the relative importance 
of natural resources and of manufactures based on them. 
Several Asian countries succeeded in increasing their share of 
OECD manufactured goods imports between 1980 and 1996, taking 8 of 
the top 10 positions (the other two were held by Mexico and Spain). These 
10 countries were the source of just over a quarter of all imports, and their 
success came from their ability to gain market share in the most dynamic 
product groups. They specialized in what are termed “rising stars” in the 
ECLAC Competitive Analysis of Nations (CAN) table, which accounted 
for around 80% of their exports. 
Table IV.16 shows the results of applying this methodology to those 
Latin American and Caribbean countries that have over 40% of the value 
of their goods exports to OECD countries in a single quadrant of the 
competitiveness matrix. The only countries that managed to specialize in 
“rising stars” were Mexico and three countries in the Caribbean Basin 
(five if Costa Rica and Guatemala are included, although in these cases 
“rising stars” were outweighed by “fading stars”). Most of Mexico’s (and 
subsequently Costa Rica’s) “rising stars” were in the automotive and 
electronics industries, while those of Central America and the Caribbean 
were mainly in the wearing apparel industry. The countries of South 
America generally specialized in “fading stars”, gaining market share in 
products for which import demand in OECD countries is not growing 
strongly, chiefly natural resources and natural resource-based 
manufactures. Countries that have built up market share in these natural 
resource processing sectors, as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia 
have done, now face slow-growing world demand. 
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Table IV.16 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS OF NATIONS (CAN) 
MATRIX, 1980-1996 a b
 Rising market share Falling market share 
Dynamic products Rising stars 
Dominican Republic (76.0%) 
Mexico (71.8%) 
Honduras (62.3%) 





















Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the Competitive Analysis of Nations (CAN) software. 
a
 Countries are placed in the quadrant whose categorization covers over 40% of the total value of their 
goods exports to the OECD. 
b
 The figures in brackets show what percentage of the country’s total exports to the OECD belongs to that 
quadrant.
c
 Even higher proportions of these countries’ exports to the OECD belong in the “falling stars” quadrant, 
however. 
Prices for the commodities these countries have been specializing in 
have been highly volatile, and the effects of this on external imbalances 
and the overall macroeconomic situation have been severe.19 When a 
current-account deficit at the limit of sustainability is combined with a 
production structure specializing in goods for which world demand is 
growing slowly and prices are highly volatile, the cumulative effect on the 
overall economic position may make frequent, severe macroeconomic 
adjustments unavoidable. 
19 The volatility of international raw material and commodity prices has been accompanied 
in recent years by significant falls in the prices of capital goods, and this has somewhat 
masked the a priori impact on the terms of trade. 
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(d) The heterogeneity of producer behaviour 
Globalization has increasingly altered the structure of the 
international market, the nature of those competing in it, technological 
demands and international regulations and standards affecting trade, 
investment and intellectual property rights. Manufacturing companies 
face a new competition situation that has changed the structure, quality 
and scale of their investments in Latin America and the Caribbean. At the 
same time, national policies have substantially altered the local business 
environment by giving investment incentives to national and 
international companies entering or already operating in the region. 
In response to this situation, the subsidiaries of transnational 
companies, both old and new, found they had to adopt a variety of 
strategies to redefine their position (see chapter II). Some sought to 
achieve greater efficiency, integrate their branch offices into globalized 
programmes, undertake new investments and increase their presence in 
the world market; others tried to create or defend market share in 
individual countries or subregions.20 By the closing years of the decade, 
they had established a substantially larger presence among the 239 
manufacturing firms featuring among the 500 largest companies in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Thus, subsidiaries of transnational 
companies accounted for 57.2% of all industrial sales and an even higher 
share of exports (68.9%). As table IV.17 shows, they were particularly 
prominent in the automotive industry (94.4% of the total) and knowledge-
intensive branches (73.2%), the very ones that showed the greatest 
productivity gains. 
Large locally owned companies also sought to adjust to the new 
world economic order, concentrating for the most part on metallurgical 
(80.0%) and labour-intensive industries (69.6%).21 The sweeping changes 
ushered in by this process affected the structuring of industrial companies 
and plants and the dynamic of the general strategies adopted by the 
economic groups making up these companies (Garrido and Peres, 1998).
20 Besides these changes, towards the end of the decade large transnational conglomerates 
took major steps towards horizontal integration involving primary, industrial and 
service activities. 
21 Another important development has been the virtual disappearance of State-owned 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: MANUFACTURERS RANKING AMONG  
THE 500 LARGEST COMPANIES, 2000 
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Percentages 
 Total 
Private Foreign State 
1. Number 239 41.4 57.3 1.3 
2.  Sales 334 826 36.6 57.2 6.2 
3.  Sales by industry     
 - Metallurgical 37 667 80.0 20.0 0.0 
 - Automotive 81 752 5.6 94.4 0.0 
 - Knowledge-intensive  74 763 26.8 73.2 0.0 
 - Natural resource  processing 51 074 35.9 59.2 4.9 
 - Labour-intensive  71 163 69.6 30.4 0.0 
4. Exports 98 925 31.1 68.9 0.3 
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies of the Division of 
Production, Productivity and Management, on the basis of information published in the specialized press 
in Latin America. 
The greatest changes made by industrial companies and plants have 
been in organizational, commercial and financial functions, while changes 
in production and technology have been relatively minor. Business 
organizations have tended to cut out levels of hierarchy and flatten their 
structure, reorganize their activities into business centres or units and 
professionalize their management. In some cases, this modernization 
process has coincided with the passing of control from one generation to 
another in family businesses. In these circumstances, marketing and 
financial engineering have continued to be the strongest management 
areas. 
Various alternative growth strategies are used by firms to conduct 
change in an orderly fashion. Three are usually distinguished: retreat, 
defence and offence. If the first is followed, the long-term result is that the 
company will cease operating or its original owners will lose control of it. 
More common than outright closure is the sale of the entire company or a 
majority holding to transnational investors. 
Strategies to defend domestic markets have taken several different 
forms, including preventive investment, especially in larger economies; 
importing finished goods for sale to take advantage of local distribution 
networks; focusing the business more thoroughly and determinedly on 
the customer, something that has been a particular feature of the food 
industry; creating industrial and financial groups if local laws so permit; 
and maximizing profits by securing tax, trade or sectoral benefits which, 
although their relative importance has decreased, are far from having 
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disappeared. Another defensive strategy adopted by some groups, 
requiring new, diversified investment, has been to shift from industrial 
activities into non-tradable services by taking advantage of privileged 
access to privatizations. Many groups taking this approach have drained 
funds from their member companies to finance privatization acquisitions 
or forays into newly deregulated markets, neglecting the investment 
needed to modernize their traditional activities in the process. 
Offensive strategies are more complex, but three types can be 
distinguished: (i) growth through greater specialization in the core 
business; examples are provided by certain groups that have focused on 
processing natural resources, and by others that were already highly 
specialized and did not need to become more so; (ii) growth with a 
moderate increase in diversification, a process that involves making 
individual companies less vertically integrated while increasing the 
vertical or horizontal integration of the group as a whole by participating 
in a small number of privatizations or carrying out mergers and 
acquisitions with other private-sector companies; the basic purpose of all 
such operations is to realize potential synergies; (iii) growth with extreme 
diversification, an offensive strategy that is largely pursued through 
participation in numerous privatizations; this strategy produces true 
conglomerates without any obvious productive, commercial or even 
financial synergies, and is often conducted with an investment portfolio 
approach. Conglomerates bring together dissimilar activities, and their 
recent rise has been based on links with international capital markets and 
the largest local banks and with the political decision makers in charge of 
privatization. 
In all cases, a wide range of factors have led to the choice of a 
particular strategy. Key considerations have been whether the subsector is 
competitive, and whether the company has achieved maturity through its 
own learning experiences and the operation of public sectoral 
development policies. An additional common element in the choice of 
strategic options has been the growing influence exercised by the external 
market, either because of the role played by exports and imports or 
because of the potential for receiving or placing international investment. 
Comparisons are difficult because of the nature of the statistics 
available on locally owned small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
Not only do national statistics cover different time periods, but the very 
definition of these enterprises varies from one country to another. The 
size categories into which the data are broken down are different from 
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case to case as well.22 Despite these limitations, table IV.18 illustrates several 
important points about the role of SMEs in manufacturing industry. 
Table IV.18 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (15 COUNTRIES): SHARE OF SMALL AND 
MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES (SMEs) IN TOTAL MANUFACTURING  
EMPLOYMENT AND OUTPUT 
(Percentages) 
Country, year and company sizea Employment Output 
Argentina, 1993 b c 44.6 35.9 
(6-100 employees)   
Bolivia,1994 c 26.1 17.6 
(5-15 and 15-49)   
Brazil, 1997 b 66.8 d 60.8 d
(20-99  and 100-499)   
Chile, 1996 52.7 37.1 
(10-49  and 50-199)   
Colombia, 1996 52.5 33.3 
(1-49 and 50-199)    
Costa Rica, 1997 b c 13.2 12.6 
(31-100)   
Ecuador, 1996 37.7 19.4 
(10-49 and 50-99)   
El Salvador, 1993 c 17.6 14.8 
(21-50 and 51-100)   
Mexico, 1993 44.6 e 31.1 
(16-100 and 101-250)   
Nicaragua, 1994 c 11.7 11.2 
(4-30)   
Paraguay, 1997 c 41.0 31.0 
(6-20 and 21-100)   
Peru, 1994 c 52.5 36.1 
(11-20 and 21-200)   
Trinidad and Tobago, 1996 c 57.0 22.6 
(6-100)   
Uruguay, 1995 57.9 39.7 
(5-99)   
Venezuela, 1995 39.5 13.8 
(5-20 and 21-100)   
Source: ECLAC, industrial SMEs database of the Industrial and Technological Development Unit. 
a
 Company size is defined on the basis of employment. When only one size range is given, it covers both 
small and medium-sized enterprises. When two ranges are given, the first is for small enterprises, and the 
second for medium-sized ones. 
b
 Output figures are for total sales. 
c
 Total manufacturing employment and value added figures include microenterprises. 
d
 Small enterprises (from 20 to 99 employees) contribute 29.5% of employment and 20.9% of output. 
e
 In 1998, according to preliminary data from that year’s census, the employment share of SMEs was 
39.9%. 
22 All these problems affect the tables in this section, so particular attention needs to be paid 
in each case to the notes provided, to the rows where the countries are named, which give 
the year to which the information relates, and to the size category or categories covered by 
this information. The notes are also important for identifying the countries whose data 
include microenterprises. This category falls outside the scope of the present study, but for 
some countries it was not possible to obtain breakdowns that excluded it. 
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In the first place, the figures show that SMEs are not marginal 
actors in the industrial structure, since they make a large contribution to 
employment. If the employment figures are relatively low in some cases, 
this is because of categorization problems. The figures for Nicaragua 
exclude medium-sized enterprises, and those for Costa Rica small ones. In 
the second place, contrary to what might be expected, SMEs are more 
heavily represented in the industrial structure of the larger countries, 
particularly as regards their share of value added or sales (Peres and 
Stumpo, 1999). Lastly, the fact that they account for a larger share of 
employment than of value added means that they have lower 
productivity, something that is discussed below. 
Table IV.19 shows the contribution made to total output by the 
industrial activities in which SMEs participate. In large countries with 
more diversified industrial structures (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico), 
SMEs are mainly to be found in the food, chemical and plastics industries 
and —a particular feature of the situation in these countries— the 
metallurgy and electrical and electronics industries. In medium-sized 
countries (Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela), the food and 
chemical industries predominate and, by contrast with the previous 
group, SMEs are not much represented in the metallurgy and electrical 
and electronics industries. In smaller countries (Costa Rica, Nicaragua 
and Uruguay), almost all SMEs are in the food industry. 
Leaving aside these differences, it transpires that SMEs in the 
different groups of countries have some new features in common. It is 
now clear, for example, that most SMEs are no longer to be found in the 
wearing apparel and footwear industries, but in the food, chemical and 
plastics industries. This concentration in the food industry suggests that 
these companies have specialized in labour-intensive subsectors that 
benefit from natural comparative advantages and have few economies of 
scale. As the low export figures brought to light by a number of national 
studies indicate, these SMEs activities are oriented heavily towards the 
domestic market. The same is true of the metallurgical and electrical and 
electronic goods produced by SMEs in the larger countries (Peres and 
Stumpo, 1999).23
23 The same studies, however, show evidence of incipient export activities among small 
businesses in Brazil, Columbia and Peru, and an increase in small business exports from 
Argentina.. 
Table IV.19 
LATIN AMERICA (11 COUNTRIES): INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION STRUCTURE OF SMALL AND  
























Food products 16.1 17.0 16.4 22.1 19.9 30.6a 20.0 19.1 32.2 25.9 30.6 
Beverages 5.8 1.7 4.7 2.1 4.0 - 4.2 2.1 16.5 2.3 6.1 
Tobacco 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Textiles 6.6 7.2 6.4 5.6 4.5 7.4 8.0 2.6 0.0 0.3 5.8 
Wearing apparel 3.7 2.7 4.6 4.4 5.5 2.9 2.0 5.5 1.2 7.1 5.7 
Leather 1.2 1.8 0.8 0.6 1.1 1.9  0.8 0.9 0.0 1.5 0.5 
Footwear 1.6 1.8 2.0 1.4 1.2 - 0.6 3.4 1.3 7.2 1.0 
Wood and wood products 2.0 1.5 1.5 11.2 1.5 2.2 1.3 1.7 0.3 4.0 1.0 
Furniture 2.2 2.6 2.7 1.7 1.2 - 0.9 3.1 2.5 8.2 1.3 
Paper 3.5 4.3 3.1 1.3 6.4 4.8 2.3 1.9 4.1 1.3 1.1 
Printed matter 4.7 2.5 5.3 4.5 2.6 3.0 5.3 5.8 0.8 5.5 4.8 
Chemical products 13.9 18.9 16.2 12.5 16.9 18.1 21.6 12.9 24.7 9.1 17.1 
Plastic products 5.3 4.7 5.3 5.1 7.4 6.8 5.8 6.8 0.0 1.3 4.6 
Construction supplies 3.7 4.2 6.6 5.3 5.8 4.4 3.9 6.5 2.5 8.7 3.6 
Iron and steel 2.5 - 2.3 4.1 2.2 1.7 4.2 6.3 0.0 0.7 2.4 
Metal products 7.1 9.4b 8.0 8.3 7.5 4.4 5.9 8.0 0.4 13.2 5.9 
Non-electrical machinery 6.7 7.0 4.3 4.2 3.5 0.9 3.3 4.9 0.2 0.4 2.0 
Electrical machinery and equipment 6.0 5.8 4.8 1.4 2.7 5.3 3.3 3.2 8.3 0.7 2.8 
Transport equipment 5.4 3.5 3.2 1.6 3.6 1.0 2.9 3.0 0.3 0.0 1.3 
Scientific instruments 1.1 1.3 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.1 1.4 0.8 0.2 0.0 1.0 
Other 1.0 1.7 1.2 2.1 1.8 4.4  2.2 1.4 4.3 2.7 1.4 
Source: ECLAC, industrial SME database of the Industrial  and Technological Development Unit. 
a
 Includes beverages. 
b
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Analysis of the production, employment and productivity 
performance of SMEs brings to light a number of other interesting facts. 
Firstly, production and employment growth rates differ considerably 
from one country to another, as table IV.20 shows. While Argentina, Chile 
(1990-1996) and Mexico display great vitality in terms of output growth, 
in other cases, such as that of Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela, 
growth rates are very low or negative. 
Table IV.20 
LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): OUTPUT, EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY 
GROWTH IN SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES (SMEs) 
(Percentage change) 
Country Output Employment Productivity 
Argentina,1984-1994 47.7 -24.4 95.3 
Brazil, 1986-1997 11.4 -14.2 29.8 
Chile, 1981-1990 -14.7 -7.4 -7.9 
Chile, 1990-1996 55.6 34.2 16.0 
Colombia, 1991-1996 16.2 11.2 4.5 
Costa Rica, 1990-1996 22.6 -20.7 36.5 
Ecuador, 1991-1996 8.7 -6.8 16.7 
Mexico, 1988-1994 48.6 17.1 32.0 
Peru, 1992-1994 16.8 8.2 7.9 
Uruguay, 1988-1995 2.5 -24.9 36.5 
Venezuela, 1990-1995 -5.2 -1.8 -4.1 
Source: ECLAC, industrial SME database of the Industrial and Technological Development Unit. 
In four countries —Argentina, Chile (1990-1996), Mexico and 
Uruguay— SMEs increased their share of total industrial production in the 
wake of the economic reforms, while in five others —Brazil, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador and Peru— SMEs increased their output but lost market share. 
Taken all together, then, businesses of this type display a complex mosaic of 
situations and performance that does not easily fit into a single interpretative 
framework. 
As was mentioned above, labour productivity is lower in these 
companies than in the industrial sector as a whole. Considering this, it is worth 
asking whether structural heterogeneity, as measured by the labour 
productivity gap between SMEs and large companies, has increased in recent 
years, or whether in fact it has diminished as economic liberalization and 
deregulation have brought greater competitive discipline. 
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Although no systematic region-wide evidence is available, the Chilean 
case points to interesting conclusions. The data were broken down for 
88 industrial branches and were then analysed to ascertain the extent to which 
the labour productivity gap between SMEs and large companies had narrowed 
between 1979 and 1995.24 To this end, the matrix of simple correlation 
coefficients was calculated for the labour productivity gap, the rate of gross 
output growth in the branch concerned, the increase in the capital base per 
person employed and changes in the ratio between skilled and unskilled 
employees, as an indicator of technical complexity in the subsector. 
The indices of correlation show a clear association between progress in 
narrowing the labour productivity gap and growth rates in the industry 
concerned. They also suggest that there is no statistically significant 
relationship with indicators of gross capital formation per employee or with a 
relative increase in the employment of skilled workers. In other words, if 
labour productivity in SMEs is compared with that of large companies, it 
transpires that those operating in faster-growing industrial sectors perform 
better. By contrast, the rate of investment per employee and greater use of 
skilled human resources appear to have no significant impact on comparative 
performance. 
This suggests that a critical factor in the relative performance of SMEs is 
the local and sectoral environment in which they are operating. In an area of 
production that is expanding rapidly, small and medium-sized companies find 
market niches in which they can operate successfully. In production areas that 
are slow-growing or stagnant, by contrast, there is less scope for this. Indeed, it 
is these subsectors that have accounted for the bulk of business failures over the 
past two decades. 
24 The analysis, which covered 24 branches of manufacturing industry, distinguished 
between small companies (10 to 50 workers) and medium-sized and large businesses 
(51 or more workers) (Katz, 2000b). 
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Chapter V 
Infrastructure service sectors 
Infrastructure services have been transformed by a structural 
upheaval encompassing telecommunications, energy, sanitary services 
and transport. New production agents from outside the region have made 
inroads in all these sectors, introducing technological packages that have 
brought rapid modernization of infrastructure and locally produced 
services as well as a radical transformation of production processes. While 
the public sector still maintains a strong presence in all these services, the 
relative weight of transnational agents has increased significantly and 
only a few large locally owned conglomerates have been able to 
incorporate themselves fully into this new group of suppliers. In several 
countries, some of the sectors concerned have come to be dominated by 
major transnational corporations, some of them publicly owned, from 
more developed countries. These changes have been particularly marked 
in the energy sector and, above all, the telecommunications sector, both of 
which were privatized relatively early and on quite a large scale. Where 
transport and water and sanitation services are concerned, on the other 
hand, the usual practice has been to contract out infrastructure provision 
and services management while retaining a major role for the public 
sector as an infrastructure investor and service supplier. 
Despite the strength of these trends, reforms in these areas have 
given rise to a range of models that vary not only from one sector to 
another, but also from one country to another for the same sector. This 
diversity is attributable to marked differences in the size and structure of 
ECLAC 176
markets, the real degree of competition that it is possible to introduce, 
pricing procedures, the coverage and quality of services and their 
environmental impact. 
1. Telecommunications 
Among infrastructure services, the telecommunications industry 
has shown an unparalleled rate of innovation which has pushed costs 
down significantly and eroded former economies of scale. These 
innovations have produced a constant increase in the variety of products 
and services, some of them more or less interchangeable, others 
complementary. As a result, the industry has shown a marked trend 
towards greater competition among services and suppliers; between 
fixed-line and mobile telephony, for example, and between cellular 
telephones and the personal communications service (PCS) system. 
However, there have also been trends towards integration and monopoly, 
as in the case of the new asymmetrical digital subscriber line (ADSL) 
technologies, which allow the capacity of old telephone lines to be 
expanded substantially. 
Other opposing effects have resulted from rapid technological 
innovation. On the one hand, large productivity gains have benefited both 
suppliers and users of many services. On the other, the rate of change has 
been so fast in some areas recently that it has acted as a deterrent to 
investors, owing to the speed with which certain products and services 
have become obsolete. One such area is long-distance telephony, as the 
prospect of massive competition from Internet telephony becomes 
imminent.
Telecommunications companies were the most highly prized by 
foreign investors in privatization processes. Since the late 1980s, the main 
State-owned telecommunications companies in the region have passed 
into private hands and cellular telephony licences have been auctioned off 
in almost all the countries (Melo, 1997). In this new environment, the most 
active transnationals have been Telefónica of Spain in fixed-line telephony 
(local and long-distance communications) and the United States firm 
BellSouth in mobile telephony. The recent privatization of the Telebras 
system in Brazil revealed how much interest there was among foreign 
companies in assets of this type in the region, since the Brazilian 
Government received more than twice as much from the sale as it 
originally anticipated. Something similar had happened earlier in Peru, 
although the amounts involved were smaller. 
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A trend already firmly established in the markets of the 
industrialized countries, that of growing integration between 
telecommunications systems and other communications media 
(terrestrial, cable and satellite television, Internet access and the press), is 
slowly beginning to emerge in the region. This trend is especially 
evident in Argentina, for example, where an unusual type of strategic 
alliance is being formed between Telefónica of Spain and Citicorp, a 
United States bank, with a view to controlling a substantial share of 
telecommunications services in this broader sense of the term. 
The countries of the region have followed very different strategies 
in their efforts to modernize the technology used in their 
telecommunications systems. At one end of the spectrum is Chile, where 
early deregulation and privatization of telecommunications generated a 
competitive climate, with a variety of new international actors entering 
the market with a view to positioning themselves in the region and 
capitalizing on the experience thus gained (Melo and Serra, 1998). At the 
other end are Costa Rica and Uruguay, whose approach to modernizing 
the sector was to maintain the State monopoly in basic telephony while 
gradually opening cellular telephony and value-added services up to 
newcomers.1 Between the two extremes lie Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, 
Peru and Venezuela, which also opted for privatization of services but 
which, unlike Chile, granted short market exclusivity periods 
(monopolies) to new operators in the sector. In the case of Colombia, a 
competitive system was established among publicly owned national and 
municipal enterprises working in partnership with private firms. These 
models clearly involve dissimilar market structures and competition 
regimes, and the performance of individual production agents has 
differed as a result. 
As in other fields of activity examined earlier, labour productivity2
throughout the region’s telecommunications sector grew strongly in the 
1990s by historical standards (Walter and Senén González, 1999). 
Although labour productivity increased in all the cases considered, there 
were differences between countries (see table V.1), and these suggest that 
there is a need to analyse each specific national situation in order to 
understand how the modernization process worked in the case of 
telecommunications and what impact this had on the well-being 
of society. 
1  In the case of Costa Rica, this strategy has recently been the subject of controversy. In 
Uruguay, the policy was adopted after a referendum in late 1992. 
2  This indicator may vary from one country to another, often because the definition of 




PRODUCTIVITY IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 
(Main lines per employee) 
Year United States Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Uruguay
1990 149 76 87 88 96 107 36 51 
1991 153 91 100 110 104 122 38 60 
1992 162 101 111 134 111 138 49 68 
1993 168 118 121 160 123 156 56 75 
1994 172 150 128 179 136 174 87 88 
1995 177 186 143 184 185 180 131 98 
1996 184 224 169 239 228 181 229 113 
1997 187 295 195 261 288 190 282 132 
1998 176 336 236 292 180 179 241 142 
1999 182 345 261 315 187 183 254 155 
Source: International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Yearbook of Statistics, 2001, Geneva, 2001. 
Although privatization of telecommunications services has not 
proved to be a precondition for technological modernization in the sector, 
in many cases it has been an effective factor in improving the internal 
efficiency of companies. In any event, what has shown itself to be a 
prerequisite for modernization is the break-up of the integrated 
monopolies inherited from earlier periods, so that competition can 
emerge in different areas and services. The entry of new actors into the 
market, and the competitive pressure that new technologies such as 
cellular telephony, satellite services and coaxial cable and fibre-optic 
networks are beginning to exert on traditional fixed-line telephony, are 
the forces which, in the final analysis, are modifying the structure and 
behaviour of the sector, irrespective of whether operators are public 
or private. 
This constantly changing and increasingly competitive industry 
also presents major challenges for sectoral regulation, in particular with 
respect to interconnections and to service addressing and portability. 
While there are similarities with other network-based infrastructure 
services (economies of scale and sunk investments), there are also 
distinctive features, such as the variety and continuous development of 
services and the use of the electromagnetic spectrum as a special and 
often indispensable resource. These characteristics and the fact that, in 
many countries, telecommunications services were the first to be 
privatized, have made the sector a veritable laboratory for the 
development of regulation in other areas of the economy. 
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The modernization of telecommunications is linked to a large 
number of other issues, in particular the systemic character and 
inseparability of technological, economic and institutional developments. 
The increased systemic maturity that the improvement of 
telecommunications entails undoubtedly affects activities upstream and 
downstream of the subsector itself. Companies’ suppliers and contractors 
are affected, and so are all users of their services. It is undeniable that an 
efficient, low-cost, high-coverage telecommunications system is an 
inseparable part of the mature institutional and economic structure that 
any society needs if it is to achieve systemic competitiveness. The recent 
introduction and gradual development of a world-class culture in 
telecommunications is thus a significant contribution to the long-term 
development of the region’s countries. 
Again, synergy between the telecommunications and information-
technology industries is a key factor in determining the impact that both 
of these will have on the countries’ social and economic development. 
Communications allow data to be accessed anywhere at any time, while 
the function of information technology is to organize them and make 
them available in whatever form users require. On the supply side, 
communications and information technology have been integrated not 
only in a technical sense at the production stage, but also in the marketing 
of products and even in the corporate administration of the businesses 
concerned. 
Lastly, attention should be drawn to the strong relationship 
between sectoral telecommunications policies and general policies to 
improve information provision and transparency in government and 
society. On the one hand, the development of information technology and 
telecommunications offers an undeniable opportunity to achieve wider 
participation and greater democratization. On the other, it poses a serious 
risk that these services may widen the social gap. Thus, to speak of those 
who have access to communications and information and those who do 
not is almost tantamount to distinguishing between full members of 
society and those at the margins, those who count in determining the 
destiny of their nations and those who do not.3
3  At the end of the decade, for example, the percentage of the total population with 
Internet access was 26.3% in the United States, 6.9% in the OECD countries other than 
the United States and 0.8% in Latin America and the Caribbean. In the other developing 
and transition regions, the percentages were all lower than those for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (UNDP, 1999a). 
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2.  Energy reforms 
The thrust of the energy reforms implemented in the 1990s was to 
intensify the use of market mechanisms and expand opportunities for 
private actors by removing barriers to entry, after several decades of 
dominance by State-owned monopolies in the sector. As in the case of 
telecommunications, a range of methods were used to achieve these aims. 
As a rule, the tendency was to introduce competition mechanisms, or 
regulatory mechanisms when competition was not feasible, and to 
promote private investment or privatization as appropriate. All of this 
was done amidst a general conviction that barriers to private capital entry 
were causing the region to be excluded from the benefits of technological 
progress. 
At the same time, the reforms sought to modify the role that the 
energy sector had been playing in macroeconomic management, with 
particular reference to the effectiveness of price controls and subsidies as 
a means of countering inflationary pressures, the fiscal management of 
energy revenue, the self-financing capacity of State-owned enterprises 
and changes in the composition and use of external financing. From this 
global perspective, reforms included features relating to price correction, 
restructuring and financial reorganization of State-owned enterprises. 
Taken together, these measures contributed enormously to the 
stabilization of the region’s economies, and energy reforms were 
undoubtedly influenced by the objective of achieving effective 
macroeconomic management, as well as by the interests of the energy 
sector itself (Sánchez Albavera and Altomonte, 1997).  
As regards sectoral policy, the objective was to find a sustainable 
approach to the harnessing and use of energy sources. Notwithstanding 
this general orientation and the slow growth recorded in per capita 
energy consumption, the region is far from showing adequate levels of 
efficiency in energy transformation and use. This is demonstrated by the 
stagnation in its energy-intensity (energy consumption per unit of 
output), which can be attributed to its failure to introduce energy-efficient 
technologies rapidly; by the obsolescence of its industrial plant; and by 
the high and inefficient fuel consumption of the vehicles used there, 
among other factors. Furthermore, carbon dioxide emissions per unit of 
output have risen, increasing environmental damage from energy use 
(see figure V.1). By the end of the decade, this evidence that energy 
efficiency reforms had not had the impact hoped for had placed the 
issue at the centre of initiatives to bring greater rationality to the use of 
natural resources. 
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Figure V.1 
SPECIFIC ENERGY CONSUMPTION PER UNIT OF OUTPUT 
Source: Own calculations based on data from ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Santiago, Chile, various issues, and Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE), Sistema 
de información económico-energética, Quito, July 2000.
The main differences in the reforms applied to energy industry 
subsectors were in the way competition mechanisms were introduced into 
the markets concerned. The tradability of petroleum, and to some extent 
of petroleum derivatives, facilitated the introduction of measures to 
enhance competition. It was just a matter of eliminating the legal barriers 
that artificially hindered new actors from entering these markets and the 
activities associated with them. Clearly, the higher the degree of 
concentration in a market, the less effective competition there is among 
existing and/or potential actors. The main differences between one 
country and another in the oil industry reforms they introduced stemmed 
from the scale of their reserves, the size of their domestic markets and the 
degree of development attained by the State-owned enterprises involved. 
Introducing competition conditions in the electricity and natural 
gas markets necessitated far more thorough-going structural adjustments. 
As a result, a wider variety of approaches were taken, especially as 
regards the degree of liberalization (limited or total) and the basic 
regulatory principles introduced. One noteworthy feature of these 







































chains, especially since reform. This interrelationship has arisen, on the 
one hand, because the use of natural gas in power generation stimulates 
effective competition in electricity markets and, on the other, because 
there is growing competition between the two sources in transport 
services (gas pipelines versus transmission lines). 
These interactions are especially important in the context of 
regional energy integration, considering the multiplicity of projects being 
proposed by State-owned and private corporations both from within the 
region and from other countries in the world. Strategic alliances among 
companies from every part of the energy sector are bound to take on 
greater importance in the post-reform period. Thus, for example, a strong 
link has started to develop between natural gas transportation and 
distribution mega-projects and electricity generation in Brazil. A United 
States company, Enron, has been especially active, having become heavily 
involved in every part of the energy supply chain from natural gas 
extraction, transportation and distribution to electricity generation, at 
both the national and subregional levels. 
(a) Reforms in the electricity industry  
The reforms introduced in the electricity industry were the most 
far-reaching and diverse in everything from market restructuring 
(generation, transmission and distribution) and the incorporation of new 
actors to the revitalization of capital markets, privatization and the 
establishment of regulatory agencies. Significant changes in the way the 
industry operated came with vertical disintegration and the limitation of 
public service activities to electricity transmission and distribution, which 
marked a major shift from the role that State monopolies had played in 
earlier decades. 
Prior to the 1990s, economic coordination of the industry rested 
with vertically integrated State monopolies which combined commercial 
and regulatory functions. The reforms shaped a new institutional system 
involving a prominent regulatory role for the State in public service 
activities, in the mechanisms used to coordinate generation and 
distribution operations (economic load dispatch centres) and in the 
expansion of services, which was guided by indicative plans drawn up by 
the competent authorities. Corporate efficiency, in this context, meant 
pricing based on long-term marginal cost (in the case of generation) and 
on maintenance costs and standardized replacement values plus a 
reasonable profit (for transmission). In the case of distribution, the 
benchmark was generally the performance of model companies in 
economically suitable concession areas, and distribution rates had a 
minimum level of profitability guaranteed by law. 
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Towards the end of the decade, the State retained its dominant role 
as a coordinating body in only a few countries. Total or partial 
deregulation of generation, combined with regulation of transmission and 
distribution, has been the usual approach in the region. Efforts are being 
made to foster competition in power generation and to regulate natural 
monopolies in transmission and distribution, opening up their networks 
to all. This dominant approach, which manifests itself in different ways 
according to the nature and size of national power markets, has shaped 
three reform styles, as outlined below. Table V.2 shows that the first two 
are the most common in the region. 
- Elimination of entry barriers throughout the power supply chain, 
with vertical disintegration of the industry and free access to 
transmission and distribution grids (full liberalization). 
- Elimination of entry barriers in some segments of the industry 
(partial liberalization), but with the State retaining a dominant role. 
- Maintenance of vertically integrated State monopolies, albeit 
subject to varying degrees of regulation. 
Table V.2 
LATIN AMERICA: ECONOMIC COORDINATION IN THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 
Size of the 
system 
Open access Single State purchaser Monopoly 










1 001-2 000 Guatemala 
Panama 
Costa Rica 
Trinidad and Tobago 





5 001-10 000 Chile  Paraguay 
10 001-20 000 Argentina 
Colombia 
> 20 000 Brazil 
Venezuela 
Mexico  
Source: Sánchez Albavera and Altomonte, “Las reformas energéticas en América Latina”, Medio 
ambiente y desarrollo series, No. 1, Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, April 1997.
Nevertheless, although the degree of progress differs, institutional 
reform is still incomplete and market action remains marginal. There 
would be greater diversity if ownership were linked to the scope for 
competition opened up by the reforms, as measured by the extent to 
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which strict vertical segmentation, more or less marked horizontal 
partition and real transparency in transactions are genuine features of the 
market. On the whole, the dominant tendency is to move away from 
centralized control. Even in Mexico, independent generators have the 
right —at least as far as the regulations are concerned— to enter the 
market, although in practice this partial liberalization has not yet 
amounted to much. As against this, both Cuba and Paraguay are expected 
to move their power-supply arrangements towards a single-buyer system 
at some time in the future (OLADE, 1999). 
It is highly probable that in several of the countries where the State 
now acts as the sole buyer, partial liberalization may be just an 
intermediate step towards a more significant role for the market and 
greater private-sector participation. Nevertheless, the prospects for 
opening up power generation to greater competition are severely limited 
by the absolute size of the markets concerned. The move from partial to 
total liberalization in the Central American countries can only take place 
if there is fuller integration of their power supply systems, including 
harmonization of regulatory frameworks (OLADE/ECLAC/GTZ, 2000). 
More than 15 years after the movement towards privatization in 
Latin America began, no exhaustive evaluation has yet been made of the 
results. One reason for this is that the process is still under way in several 
countries, while in others it has not yet begun; another is that a full and 
comprehensive evaluation requires consideration and quantification of 
short-, medium- and long-term effects. Despite this, a number of 
developments, some of them positive, some negative, can be identified 
with respect to production efficiency, pricing and regulatory practice 
(Altomonte, 1999). 
With respect to production efficiency, it should be pointed out that 
labour productivity (measured in terms of sales per worker) increased in 
both privatized and State enterprises. In Argentina, there were significant 
productivity rises at the three main privatized electricity companies: 73% 
at Empresa Distribuidora y Comercializadora Norte (Edenor), 83% at 
Empresa Distribuidora y Comercializadora Sur (Edesur) and 77% at 
Empresa Distribuidora La Plata (Edelap). In the first two cases this was 
due to cutbacks in staff, while in the third it was due to higher turnover. 
In Mexico, labour productivity in the two State-owned enterprises, 
Comisión Federal de Electricidad and Luz y Fuerza del Centro, improved 
by 40.8% and 137%, respectively, between 1988 and 1997. 
Another indicator of production efficiency is the percentage of 
distribution losses. Here, there is no conclusive evidence that structural 
reforms in the subsector have brought any substantial improvements in 
the short term. Major reductions have occurred in Chile (from 14% down 
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to 8% between 1990 and 1998) and in the three main distribution 
companies in Argentina (from over 20% in 1992 to less than 10% in 1998), 
which could indicate positive effects. At the same time, however, the 
performance of public- and private-sector companies in the Argentine 
provinces has shown no clear trend.4
Developments in pricing have varied according to the structure of 
the electricity industry. One situation, best exemplified by Argentina, is 
where competition in power generation was introduced along with 
network liberalization. Certain objectives established by Argentina’s Law 
24065 and Regulatory Decree 1398/92 have not been achieved, insofar as 
lower prices on the wholesale electricity market have not been passed on 
in full to captive users, and in some cases price changes have not only 
failed to reflect such savings adequately, but have been regressive as 
well.5 On the other hand, the distribution company in the province of 
Entre Ríos, which was sold to a private bidder in 1996, has passed on 
partial benefits to its users.6 In this case, while consumer rates have fallen 
by less than wholesale electricity prices, and the reduction has been 
regressive, at least low and medium users in the province have not been 
penalized by the pricing structure to the same extent as those in the 
metropolitan area. 
A different pattern of price changes is seen in systems, such as that 
of Mexico, where the single-buyer system predominates. In Mexico, the 
average residential rate has trended downwards; between 1985 and 1997 
4  On the one hand, a number of privatized corporations in the provinces still show major 
distribution losses, while others have made enormous efforts to eliminate non-technical 
losses, as in the cases of Empresa Distribuidora de Energía de Catamarca (Edecat) in the 
province of Catamarca (11%) and Empresa Jujeña de Sistemas Energéticos Dispersos 
(EJSED) in Jujuy (13.1%). On the other hand, some provincial public-sector enterprises 
display high percentage losses, including Chaco (17%), Córdoba (22%), Corrientes (20%), 
La Pampa (24%) and Santa Fe (20%), while in other provinces (Mendoza, Neuquén and 
Santa Cruz) public corporations record low percentage losses (Secretariat of Energy, 
Argentina, 1997).  
5  Although increased competition among generators in the wholesale market slashed the 
average spot price by 42% between 1992 and 1998, the benefits of this improved 
efficiency went to the more prosperous social sectors. In the Buenos Aires metropolitan 
area, rates were cut by between 18% and 20% in real terms for medium and high 
consumption users (over 300 kWh/month), while rates for low and medium-low 
consumption users (up to 150 kWh/month) went up by between 12% and 17%. 
6  Between 1996 and 1998, average contract and spot prices on the wholesale electricity 
market fell by 7% and 19.3%, respectively. This fall in wholesale prices was reflected in 
rate cuts of 2.7% for very light users (50 kWh/month), 7.4% for those using up to 
150 kWh/month and just over 6% for those using more than 300 kWh/month. 
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it fell by an average of 7.6% a year, although sharp fluctuations were seen 
in different subperiods.7
A third situation is where systems are formally open but effective 
competition is impossible. This is best exemplified by Bolivia 
(OLADE/ECLAC/GTZ, 2000), where the law provides for the existence 
of a wholesale electricity market made up of generating, transmission and 
distribution companies and unregulated consumers conducting electricity 
trading and transmission operations through the national interconnected 
system (SIN). However, the law has not yet entered fully into force. One 
notable point is that distributors in isolated systems charge more than 
those connected to the SIN.8
As regards regulatory practice, it is worth highlighting a number of 
problems linked to the degree of openness and organizational complexity 
of the electricity industry in each country.9 In countries with a federal 
structure, regulatory difficulties may arise as a result of conflicts between 
national and provincial laws (Argentina). Problems may also arise when 
institutional arrangements are inadequate or inappropriate, as became 
evident during the 1998-1999 energy crisis in Chile in relation to the 
constitution and management procedures of the Economic Load Dispatch 
Centre. In Bolivia, the difficulties have been due to certain conditions 
imposed by companies during the capitalization process, and to specific 
market failures. 
Secondly, vertical integration in the industry and the reintegration 
processes mentioned earlier have created difficulties because of their 
impact on actual competition, as opposed to the competition provided for 
in the countries’ respective regulatory frameworks. On the one hand, 
technical and functional concentration in the different energy production 
chains, and even in the sector as a whole, has generated some concern 
(Peru). On the other, it is beginning to look as though vertical and 
horizontal integration of the industry is an important factor in enabling 
foreign corporations to achieve the level of profitability they expect, 
especially in smaller markets. 
7  The rate declined by 14% a year between 1985 and 1989, rose by 22% a year between 
1990 and 1992, and then fell by 28% a year until 1997. 
8  In 1997, average prices were 92% higher in Trinidad (isolated system) than in La Paz 
(connected to the SIN), with a smaller difference for residential rates (75%) and a larger 
one for industrial rates (102%). It is worth noting that the La Paz market has traditionally 
been served by ENDE, a company which generates its own hydroelectric power and 
thus saves on transport costs between different business units, to the advantage of the 
end user. Distributors in isolated systems purchase energy from other producers. 
9  See Altomonte and Moguillansky (1999); Pistonesi (2000); Campodónico (2000); and 
OLADE/ECLAC/GTZ (2000). 
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Thirdly, there have proved to be serious deficiencies in the way 
competition operates in wholesale markets. In these markets, prices are 
set on the basis of the short-term marginal cost of the whole system plus 
an additional capacity charge. The latter allows some generating 
companies to appropriate hydroelectricity rents and/or quasi-rents 
arising from windfall profits since, in countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, 
Colombia, Guatemala and Peru, there is a significant amount of discretion 
involved in calculating the capacity charge. In Chile, capacity payments 
are based on assumptions relating to the risk of power failure and 
therefore provide no incentive to invest in stand-by capacity. This gave 
rise in 1998-1999 to the serious supply problems referred to above, for 
which generating companies did not accept responsibility, despite the 
surcharges they had collected over a long period. 
Fourthly, various problems have arisen with respect to the cost of 
access to transmission grids. In 1996, the Argentine Electricity Regulation 
Authority stated that the mechanisms established to determine how 
networks should be expanded and to distribute the resultant costs among 
the companies using them had serious failings which were causing 
resources to be allocated inefficiently. In the case of Chile, the 
transmission network of the Central Interconnected System belongs to the 
main generating company and the fees charged for use of it are 
unregulated. These characteristics clearly weaken the effectiveness of 
competition among generating companies. 
Fifthly, other problems derive from regulators’ imperfect 
understanding of distributors’ costs when production is efficient, a fact 
that makes it difficult to calculate their profitability accurately. In neither 
Argentina nor Chile have prices in the regulated segment of the market 
followed the marked downward trend in wholesale costs. Again, there 
have been problems with the interpretation of technical concepts included 
in regulatory provisions, and in many cases these have given rise to 
serious disputes. Such a dispute arose in Peru over the procedures for 
determining replacement as new value and distribution value-added, 
culminating in a legal battle in the Supreme Court. In Argentina, the crisis 
resulting from technical failures by the distribution company Edesur 
raised the issue of whether prior approval from the regulatory agency 
should be required for the investments of regulated corporations. 
Lastly, regulatory practice has found it quite hard to cope with the 
way prices in downstream segments of the industry vary depending on 
the time of day. In Argentina, seasonal prices are used when electricity is 
traded on the spot market, and there is a stabilization fund to match real-
time distribution prices with those that result from seasonal planning. In 
Colombia, by contrast, no compensatory mechanism is used, despite the 
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country’s limited ability to regulate supply using hydroelectric sources. 
The result is highly variable pricing in the spot market, with all the 
uncertainty this means for users. 
In short, these deficiencies show that there is a need to redouble 
institutional efforts and to make the operational improvements that are 
required if laws and regulations are to be complied with and the 
regulatory deficit in the subsector thereby remedied. 
(b) Reforms in the oil and gas industry  
Although the basis and justifications for reforms in the oil and 
natural gas sector are in keeping with the general framework outlined 
above, there are significant differences between countries. These are 
mainly attributable to the volume of their oil and gas reserves, their 
market size and the State-owned corporations involved in the sector. 
Specific factors include falls in proven reserves and the rate of 
exploration, dependence on imported supplies, the incentives for 
deregulation and vertical disintegration, fiscal pressures that encourage 
asset sales and the perceived obsolescence of policies excluding private 
investors. 
The general rule has been to maintain a regulated system of 
contractual participation in upstream segments of the industry 
(exploration and extraction) complemented by deregulation of 
downstream segments (transportation, refining, storage, wholesale 
marketing and national distribution). 
In upstream segments, the main reform was the removal of the 
barriers to entry that existed in some countries in the region with large 
reserves or potential yields of either crude oil or gas. In both subsectors, 
the most common practice up until the end of the 1980s —except where 
major producers were involved— was for these operations to be 
subcontracted to third parties under the administration of the State 
enterprise. Brazil and Venezuela both dismantled their entry barriers in 
the 1990s, although contract procedures differed greatly between the two 
countries. In Brazil, licence contracts were awarded through a competitive 
bidding process, with a view to procuring the maximum revenue for the 
State. In Venezuela, the most important contracts with the private sector 
provided for a profit-sharing arrangement and went to the bidder that 
conceded the largest share to the contracting company, Petróleos de 
Venezuela (PDVSA). 
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As table V.3 shows, private investment in upstream operations in 
most countries of the region is based on operating, participation (at the 
contractor’s risk) or joint venture agreements, which have replaced the 
traditional concession regime. The common feature of these contracts is 
that the private investor assumes the prospecting risks. Once a deposit 
has been discovered, the contractor’s contribution (in money or in kind) 
and freedom to dispose of the oil or gas extracted vary from case to case. 
Contracts stipulate that the share to which the contractor is entitled must 
be sold, at international market prices, to supply the domestic market or 
to generate exportable surpluses, which will be managed by the State-
owned corporation. 
The main changes introduced recently relate to prospecting time 
limits, the obligation to drill wells and the remuneration of contract-
holders. This remuneration has tended to increase as an incentive to 
investors. Again, most countries have abolished foreign trade monopolies, 
the exceptions being Mexico and Venezuela. The trend has been for new 
agreements to take the form of licences under which contractors are free 
to sell their oil or gas on the domestic market or to export it. 
Contractual arrangements for the development of gas fields are 
similar to those mentioned above. The impact of the reforms carried out 
in this case has been on the scope for vertical disintegration and on the 
regulatory systems governing wholesale distribution. 
Some countries have introduced major institutional changes in the 
management of upstream segments by separating the commercial and 
contractual functions that State-owned corporations used to combine. 
Thus, Perupetro in Peru and the Agência Nacional do Petróleo in Brazil 
were established to take responsibility, among other things, for 
negotiating and signing contracts with private investors. In Argentina, 
until 1999, the Secretariat of Energy (part of the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Public Works and Services) dealt with matters of national 
importance, while all other issues had to be negotiated with the provincial 
governments. In most countries in the region with oil-producing 
potential, however, State-owned enterprises still retain responsibility for 
contractual functions. 
Almost all the countries in the region now allow private-sector 
participation in the downstream segments of the industry, the most 
significant development in this regard being the remarkable shift in 
Brazilian liberalization policy that resulted from the 1995 constitutional 
reform. As regards recent events in these segments of the industry, many 
of the region’s countries have seen major investments in retail 
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 Cuba Ecuador  Bolivia c, d
Suriname a
Trinidad and Tobago 
Guatemala b, c 
Obligation to form 
joint venture 
 Chile Colombia   
Profit-sharing and 
operating contracts 




Brazil (prior to 1998)
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Source: Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE), Resultados de la modernización y perspectivas de la integración energéticas en América Latina y el Caribe, 
Quito, November 1998. 
a Not free to dispose of crude. 
b
 Free to dispose of crude for cost recovery.  
c Free to dispose of crude for remuneration purposes. 
d
 Contractor completely free to dispose of crude. 
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Nevertheless, the refining segment is essentially oligopolistic in 
structure, while in transport and storage monopolies are the rule, owing 
to economies of scale. The feasibility of vertical disintegration has been 
determined by market size, since in practice this option has been viable 
only in larger markets. In the cases of transport and storage, which in 
most instances are natural monopolies, a system of open access is applied 
on the basis of companies’ installed capacity and the commitments they 
have entered into. 
Apart from the removal of barriers to entry and the widespread 
dismantling of State-owned monopolies, the most noteworthy feature of 
downstream activities has been the elimination of price controls 
and subsidies, although these still persist in a few countries. The main 
aim of the reforms has been to ensure that prices reflect international 
parities.10 Where importing countries have applied domestic price 
stabilization schemes, there have been two variants: in some cases, 
direct price controls or the reduction of operating margins, and in others 
(such as Chile, Colombia and Venezuela), the establishment of oil price 
stabilization funds. 
With respect to gas, new laws have been passed in Argentina, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico and, more recently, Venezuela. By and large, 
these provide for open, negotiated access to upstream activities, with 
wellhead prices being based on international reference rates. They also 
include provisions designed to foster competition and public regulation 
in the transportation and distribution segments —which are classed as 
public service activities— in view of their natural monopoly 
characteristics. The methods currently used to coordinate downstream 
segments are shown in table V.4. 
10  This has been a controversial issue. Producer countries where control is wielded 
predominantly by State-owned enterprises have not always adopted domestic prices 
that reflect the opportunity cost of exports (FOB at the port of embarkation). In the case 
of predominantly importing countries, domestic prices have tended to reflect import 
parities (CIF at the port of destination), while in the case of countries that both import 
and export the existence of a competitive system should help to bring domestic prices 
closer to export parities. 
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Table V.4 
COORDINATION METHODS IN DOWNSTREAM SEGMENTS OF  
THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY 
Open market (wholesale) and regulated market (retail) 



























Venezuela Colombia  
Mexico 
Peru Argentina 
Importer   Brazil Chile  
Source: Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE), Resultados de la modernización y perspectivas 
de la integración energéticas en América Latina y el Caribe, Quito, November 1998. 
In Argentina, a country with a mature market, the State monopoly 
has been dismantled, a system of free trade has been brought in and the 
industry has been totally privatized. This model also includes a 
disintegrated gas extraction, transportation and distribution chain, 
operating and distribution concessions and open access to gas pipelines, 
with only the transportation and distribution segments being subject to 
regulation. In Argentina and Colombia, the law does not permit vertical 
integration; in Bolivia and Mexico, it is only allowed in exceptional 
circumstances; and in Chile, the operator retains freedom of action.11
Price-setting in regulated segments is based on considerations 
relating to the economic efficiency and financial viability of operators. 
Regulated prices have to be calculated on the basis of a competition 
model in which the sensitive variables are operating costs, productivity 
increments and the distribution of efficiency gains between operators and 
users. Thus, the costs of inefficient management cannot be passed on to 
users and operators cannot appropriate profits deriving from restrictive 
practices. From the point of view of financial viability, the prices set must 
be high enough for operators to recoup their investments and their 
operating, maintenance, replacement and expansion costs, while still 
obtaining a reasonable rate of return. 
11  Doubts have been raised as to whether disintegration is a good way of developing the 
industry in countries where the market is still relatively new. The difficulties 
encountered in operating the Camisea gas fields in Peru illustrate the problems that can 
arise. 
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To achieve these aims, pricing mechanisms provide for price caps 
(Argentina and Mexico), regulation by rate of return (Bolivia) and systems 
of “supervised freedom” (where there is competition) and “regulated 
freedom” (where there is not). In the latter case, a combination of price 
caps and rate of return criteria may be used, as in Colombia. 
Liberalization of the gas industry has prompted a dynamic process 
of physical integration in the Southern Cone. Countries have formalized a 
number of agreements designed to create legal frameworks that facilitate 
gas trading, the aim being to create a mass market for gas consumption 
and to improve the environment by encouraging the building of 
electricity plants that operate with this relatively harmless fuel.12 In 
Central America, proposals for a gas link with Mexico are being studied. 
Similarly, Colombia and Venezuela are positioning themselves as major 
regional suppliers. 
(c) The corporate dynamic in the energy sector 
The reforms adopted in the energy sector have unleashed a strong 
corporate dynamic driven by the new actors that emerged from the 
privatization process and by a renewed flow of foreign investment. In 
some cases, privatization of the energy sector has also helped to boost 
regional stock exchanges both through the issuing of new instruments 
and through a considerable increase in transaction volumes. Unprivatized 
State enterprises, especially those in the oil industry, have also shown 
renewed vigour.  
There are no figures available on changes in the stock of FDI in the 
electricity industry. Undoubtedly, the purchase of State assets has played 
a greater part in increasing this than new investments. In the oil and gas 
industry, meanwhile, the cumulative investments of United States 
corporations in the countries of South America expanded by 63% between 
1993 and 1997, from US$ 4.2 billion to US$ 6.8 billion, or approximately 
10% of the regional total. This stock of foreign investment in the oil and 
gas industry will increase substantially if liberalization in Venezuela and 
Brazil attracts the investment expected and new gas projects come 
on stream. 
12  Two gas pipelines are in operation between Argentina and Chile (Gas Andes and 
Magallanes), while between Argentina and Bolivia supplies continue to flow through 
the old pipeline. A large pipeline is being constructed between Bolivia and Brazil, while 
Uruguay will soon be supplied from Argentina by a consortium that won the supply 
contract in a competitive tendering process. Agreement has now been reached between 
Argentina and Brazil on a connection to Uruguaiana and extension of the gas pipeline as 
far as Porto Alegre. 
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Statistics on privatization revenue in the sector are not available for 
the whole decade either, but in 1997, for example, total privatization 
revenue was in excess of US$ 24 billion, and 62% of this was accounted 
for by energy firms (US$ 14.5 billion for electricity and US$ 745 million 
for gas). 
Major foreign investors include Spanish firms (Endesa and 
Iberdrola), French ones (Electricité de France - EDF) and a number of 
pioneering companies from the United States (AES, Houston Industries 
Energy, Southern Electric, CEA, Dominium Energy and CMS Energy). 
Because of the scale of the resources involved, the buyers of privatized 
assets were consortia made up of foreign companies of different 
nationalities in partnership with powerful local groups. 
A new trend that emerged in the 1990s was the formation of 
strategic alliances among European companies and between these and 
firms in the region. In Argentina, European- and Latin American-owned 
firms have established joint ventures of various kinds with EDF, Endesa 
of Spain, British Gas and Repsol, with annual sales of some US$ 2.4 
billion. Corporations that are wholly European-owned have annual sales 
of some US$ 3.4 billion. Taken all together, these companies have annual 
turnover of some US$ 5.8 billion in petroleum, gas and electricity 
businesses.13 In Colombia, too, alliances have been forged between 
European and Latin American firms, as in the case of the operations 
initially participated in by Endesa of Spain and Endesa and Enersis of 
Chile, involving investment of over US$ 2 billion in 1997. In Brazil, Latin 
American and European capital has been combined in partnerships of 
different kinds, with major consequences for distribution activities and, to 
a lesser extent, electricity generation and gas distribution.14
In the electricity industry, where vertical disintegration was one of 
the objectives of the reforms, there are signs of a trend towards renewed 
corporate concentration; one of the most striking acquisition operations in 
the regional electricity market was the 1999 purchase of a majority 
shareholding in Endesa of Chile and Enersis by Endesa of Spain.15 The 
13  Another interesting feature of the dynamic process of European investment in Argentina 
is the level of merger and acquisition activity. In 1997, for example, mergers and 
acquisitions involving European firms accounted for oil and gas investments totalling 
US$ 1.2 billion.  
14  These partnerships originally involved firms such as Electricidade de Portugal, Endesa 
of Spain, Endesa of Chile, Enersis, Edegel of Peru, Iberdrola of Spain, Chilectra of Chile, 
Electricité de France, Gas de España and Pluspetrol of Argentina. The different 
companies formed made acquisitions worth US$ 6.7 billion between 1996 and 1998. 
15  The purchase of the interest in Enersis meant an investment of some US$ 1.2 billion, 
while the Endesa Chile operation cost another US$ 1.9 billion. Control of part of Enersis 
has given Endesa of Spain a stake in a holding company whose value is estimated at 
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same is occurring in the oil industry for reasons that have to do with 
market size. The takeover of the Argentine firm Yacimientos Petrolíferos 
Fiscales (YPF) by Repsol of Spain was another very significant event in 
the closing part of the decade. The Spanish company, which already had 
interests in oil refining in Peru and which operates in several countries in 
the region, sealed the purchase of 85% of YPF for some US$ 13 billion.16
By contrast with the electricity industry, where the share of State-
owned enterprises has shrunk considerably, in the oil industry the public 
sector has continued to invest and to develop new corporate strategies. 
This has not been the case, of course, in Argentina, Bolivia and 
Peru, which opted to privatize the industry. State-owned enterprises 
adopted three major new strategies in the 1990s. One of these was 
internationalization through strategic alliances, as in the case of Petróleos 
Mexicanos (Pemex), which bought 3% of Repsol of Spain and 50% of the 
Deer Park refinery in Texas (United States) from Shell. The second 
strategy was one of internationalization in upstream segments through 
operations abroad, as in the cases of Petróleo Brasileiro (Petrobras) and 
Enap. The third strategy was to conclude regional strategic alliances, such 
as the one between YPF (Argentina), Petrobras (Brazil) and PDVSA 
(Venezuela) and the one between YPF and Enap (Chile). These new 
strategies are in addition to the existing one of combining 
internationalization with vertical integration through the development of 
activities in downstream segments of the industry abroad, as in the case 
of PDVSA, which is involved in fuel refining and distribution in the 
United States market (CITGO Petroleum Co., Unocal and UNO-VEN). 
3.  Drinking water and sanitation services 
Governments have traditionally been heavily involved in the 
provision of drinking water and sanitation services, on the basis of 
institutional arrangements that differ little from one country to another. In 
most cases, these arrangements still entail a high level of government 
participation in both services supply and investment financing. 
As drinking water is biologically essential to life, its supply has a 
very high social value. On the other hand, the relatively static nature of 
the technology involved and the high capital requirements and rigidity of 
some US$ 5 billion. This operation has given Spanish capital the opportunity to establish 
a firm foothold in the Argentine, Brazilian, Colombian and Peruvian markets. 
16  This transaction gave Repsol control of 55% of Argentina’s oil reserves, 60% of its 
refining capacity, 47% of its natural gas output and 48% of its retail petrol market, 
besides the interests held by YPF elsewhere in Latin America and in other parts of the 
world, either directly or through the Maxus group, which YPF took over three years ago. 
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demand which characterize the industry mean that profit levels are 
relatively low and it takes a long time to recoup investments, which in 
consequence are greatly affected by uncertainty. If the population’s water 
needs are not met, the widespread social repercussions make them a 
highly sensitive political issue, which often means that short-term 
interests are given priority over the long-term issues which affect the 
supply and financing of services. 
Over the past few years, however, efforts have been made to find 
new institutional arrangements. The need to enlist private financial, 
technological and management resources has combined with the 
restrictions facing the public sector in these areas to place the issue on 
many governments’ agendas, especially in the case of the Latin American 
and Caribbean countries. Management models have been slow to change, 
however, partly because of the conditions of the industry itself, but also 
because of the need to formulate new ground rules that take into account 
the special features of these services and all the interests involved. In 
general terms, this is a public service industry that has natural monopoly 
characteristics and is run accordingly, and that has large externalities in 
the areas of public health and environmental pollution. 
Regulation has to reconcile development of the industry with 
appropriate levels of profitability for investors and the protection of 
consumer rights. With these aims in view, regulatory agencies have been 
set up with a mandate to apply the following basic principles: open 
access, obligatory service supply, efficiency and optimum quality, fair 
pricing, rational use of and respect for the environment, security and 
continuity of supply and service coverage. Within this framework of 
principles, the issues that are sensitive to regulation have to do with 
freedom of network access, the scope for vertical integration by operators, 
the appropriate level of profitability, the promotion of productivity and 
the transfer of private-sector efficiency gains to users. In some cases, 
social equity criteria have also been introduced; in Colombia, for example, 
this has been done through the Solidarity and Guarantee Fund. 
(a) Inadequacies of coverage 
The development of the region’s drinking water and sanitation 
networks was carried out from the 1940s to the 1980s, on the basis of a 
centralized public-sector management model. Priority was given to 
extending coverage during this period, even when that was at the expense 
of quality and the economic efficiency of the operating bodies. The crisis 
of the 1980s aggravated the situation, bringing further deterioration in the 
physical and institutional aspects of this management model. As a result, 
by the early 1990s the sector was suffering from underinvestment, poor-
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quality services and low levels of efficiency, suppliers were running 
financial and operating deficits, large percentages of consumption went 
unaccounted for and users had a poor payment culture. 
The precarious state of these services in Latin America and the 
Caribbean can be appreciated from the figures shown in table V.5. All the 
indicators vary widely among countries, which reflects the diversity of 
situations coexisting in the region. The low averages that result, however, 
also show how widespread the shortcomings are. Only six countries 
(Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala, Panama and Trinidad and Tobago) 
provided drinking water access to practically their entire urban 
populations in the mid-1990s. In three countries (Argentina, Paraguay 
and Venezuela), less than 80% of the urban population was covered. 
There was generally a much lower level of access to drinking water in 
rural areas, the exceptions being Costa Rica and, to a lesser degree, 
Trinidad and Tobago, which had coverage of over 85%. Apart from these 
two countries, only five others (Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, 
Panama and Venezuela) provided access to at least half of their rural 
population. Nor was the situation very encouraging with regard to access 
to basic sanitation systems, again with the notable exception of Costa 
Rica. The coverage of these services averaged around two thirds of each 
country’s population, except in Haiti, Paraguay and Peru, where coverage 
was less than 50%. Lastly, the percentages of sewage treated before being 
released into the environment were extremely low, with figures of 
between 5% and 10%, depending on the country (Foster, 1996). 
Estimates for the investment needed in the sector are thus very 
high. For the region as a whole, the World Bank estimated that sectoral 
investment of about US$ 12 billion a year would be needed over the 
period 1991-2000 to deal with the expansion and repairs that had become 
necessary after a decade of very low investment. As the investments made 
over the 1990s fell far short of those goals, huge amounts are still 
required. It was calculated in a recent paper (Global Water Partnership, 
2000) that in the South American countries alone, if current deficiencies 
were to be remedied by the year 2010, a total of US$ 60 billion would need 
to have been invested by then. To put this estimate in perspective, total 
installed capital in the region’s water and sanitation sector was calculated 
at US$ 60 billion in 1993 (World Bank, 1995). This means that over the 
next ten years, investment equivalent to the region’s total installed capital 
in the sector is required for South America alone. 
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Table V.5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ACCESS TO DRINKING WATER AND 
SANITATION SERVICES 
(Percentages)
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Uruguay 100 --- 100 --- 61 
Venezuela 88 79 65 79 59 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Washington, D.C., CD-ROM version, 1999, and 
ECLAC, The Equity Gap: Latin America, the Caribbean and the Social Summit (LC/G.1945/Rev.1-P), 
Santiago, Chile, December 1997. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.97.II.G.11. 
(b) Management models 
During the 1990s, a variety of initiatives were undertaken in different 
countries to modify the public management model for water and sanitation 
services. The traditional model in the region had at least three undesirable 
characteristics. Firstly, the allocation of institutional responsibilities failed to 
make the necessary distinctions between the functions of policy-making for 
sectoral development, regulation and oversight of services, and actual 
service supply. In the case of the larger countries, there were also serious 
problems of jurisdiction between the national authorities and local 
governments. Lastly, investments and operating and maintenance costs 
were financed alike from the general budget, without the necessary 
distinctions being drawn between short- and long-term costs; pricing 
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policies, furthermore, were such that only a small part of these costs was 
recovered. 
Efforts have been made in the region to resolve some of these 
problems, to differing degrees. Brazil and Mexico are seeking to rationalize 
the public service system through regional decentralization and 
concentration of municipal services, in order to take advantage of 
economies of scale in service supply17 and of the benefits resulting from 
vertical integration and horizontal disaggregation of supply units.18
Similarly, progress has been made in establishing federal regulatory 
authorities with better defined functions and greater independence from 
policy-making bodies and operating companies. In Colombia, the emphasis 
has been on the creation of regionally-based joint ventures, the 
establishment of new pricing methodologies and novel combinations 
of cross-subsidies and solidarity funds (Fainboim and Rodríguez 
Restrepo, 2000). 
One of the most far-reaching and successful transformations began in 
Chile in the late 1980s. During the 1990s, a new management model was 
gradually constructed on the basis of the following: (i) separation of 
preceptive and supervisory functions (a central government responsibility), 
sectoral regulation (carried out by the Sanitation Services Superintendency) 
and service supply; (ii) the granting of franchises to 13 regional public-
sector enterprises organized as limited liability companies within a legal 
framework which treated public- and private-sector suppliers equally; (iii) a 
pricing system designed to reward companies for efficiency improvements 
and to give consumers clear signals about the value of services; and (iv) the 
implementation of a system of subsidies for lower-income users, financed 
out of the national budget. In the first half of the decade, investment in the 
sector quadrupled and there were great improvements in service quality 
and coverage, with the exception of sewage treatment (Corrales, 1996). In 
order to mobilize private-sector resources, particularly for sewage 
treatment, majority shareholdings in the regional companies of Santiago 
(EMOS) and Valparaíso (Esval) were sold to private investors in 1999, 
17  Some Latin American case studies show that the cost per cubic metre of water supplied 
falls enormously as the number of users increases, and that water services are only 
financially viable for operating units supplying larger towns of 40,000 to 50,000 
inhabitants (Yépez, 1990). Also, costs vary considerably with the size of systems. Thus, 
the cost of supplying groups of three people is US$ 1,600 in small systems and US$ 200 
in large systems. 
18  The recent tendency has been to favour integration of all the activities associated with 
service supply in order to reduce the high transaction costs involved. The local nature of 
the service, however, and the very close involvement of local governments have led to 
an excessive degree of horizontal disaggregation, resulting in “operational minimalism” 
(Lorraín, 1995) which hinders the consolidation of efficient operating structures, as 
occurred in Mexico City prior to reform (Casasús, 1994). 
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and similar processes are under way for other regional companies (Essel 
and Essal). 
A quite different approach was taken in Argentina, where the 
Government, with a view to generating market competition, staged an 
international auction as a result of which Aguas Argentinas, a private-
sector consortium led by Lyonnaise des Eaux-Dumez, won the franchise to 
run the Buenos Aires drinking water and sewage system. The franchise 
contract was renegotiated in 1997, a development which led to much 
criticism regarding the original auction conditions and the regulatory 
framework, which on a number of occasions had allowed the company to 
take advantage of the political authorities through opportunistic actions 
(Alcázar, Abdala and Shirley, 2000). The same model was later extended to 
various provincial companies, with regulatory frameworks being created 
on a case-by-case basis. This procedure turned the regulatory authorities 
concerned into bodies responsible for monitoring and overseeing the 
respective operating companies’ contracts and increased the risk that they 
would become captive (Corrales, 1998). 
In fact, this experience has demonstrated various features of 
the industry which make it difficult for the general interest to be served 
by private-sector participation. These include: (i) the low relative 
profitability of the sector;19 (ii) high levels of risk due to the social and 
political complexity of these services;20 (iii) difficulties in even simulating 
competition, owing to the international concentration of operators;21
(iv) serious imbalances in information access which hinder adequate 
regulation of services;22 and (v) the possible conflict between the objective of 
19  The amount of assets required to generate one unit of income per year is 10-12 in the 
water and sanitation industry, as compared to a figure of 3 for telecommunications, 3-4 
in the electricity sector and 7 for toll motorway franchises (Haarmeyer, 1994). 
20  In some places, such as Cochabamba in Bolivia, services have been affected by social 
conflicts over pricing issues and the use of water sources once they have been 
privatized. This situation has led some experts to suggest that, in addition to the risks 
traditionally associated with private investment, consideration needs to be given to the 
risk of social disturbances stemming from regulatory and contractual frameworks and 
business practices that lack general acceptance in the place where they are applied. 
21 No more than six international corporations have shown an interest in participating in 
the auctions which have been initiated in Latin America, and many of them are 
interrelated, so the same competitors crop up again and again (Corrales, 1998). 
22  Imbalances in access to information are one of the greatest obstacles to adequate 
regulation, and they are particularly acute in this sector. Thus, there has been 
speculation that profound regulatory changes will be needed in Chile if privatization is 
to be carried through successfully. Private-sector companies will have more incentive 
than public-sector ones to behave opportunistically and take advantage of the current 
weaknesses of the Sanitation Services Superintendency (Shirley, Xu and Zuluaga, 2000). 
As against this, it has been argued that these imbalances may obscure the benefits 
brought by the operating company (Sappington, 1994). 
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obtaining revenue for the public treasury and that of ensuring that services 
can be sustained on the basis of reasonable user prices.23
In view of these constraints, various methods of private 
participation have been tried in the region, as can be seen from table V.6. 
Experience shows that most investments are financed by price increases 
and that private operators limit the use of their own or borrowed funds to 
specific areas where there is high short-term profitability (Rivera, 1997). 
As a result, at the end of the decade there are still major challenges to 
be met if the financial resources needed to expand the quantity and 
enhance the quality of services are to be mobilized, and if the considerable 
regulatory deficit which is currently a feature of the sector is to be 
remedied.24 In mature regulatory systems with a tradition of private-sector 
provision of public services (France, the United Kingdom and the United 
States), it is accepted that retrospective legislation and decisions can be used 
to remedy regulatory gaps and deficiencies, as long as the principle of 
reasonable profit is respected. Improving the regulatory frameworks of the 
region’s countries is thus something that governments should attempt in 
the immediate future.25
23  The Court of Audit in France recently prohibited the awarding of contracts in the water 
industry on the basis of payments to the authority granting the franchise. The rationale 
for this measure is that such a procedure, although beneficial to the public finances, is 
detrimental to users since such payments will be recouped through higher charges 
(Court of Audit of France, 1997). 
24  For a review of these problems, see ECLAC (2000a, Chapter 12). 
25  In the Maruba case (99.694), the Supreme Court of Justice of Argentina ruled in 1998 that 
the State’s responsibility as franchiser does not come to an end when the franchise is 
granted, and that it therefore cannot be claimed that the State has surrendered its 
responsibility for overseeing pricing developments. 
Table V.6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PRIVATE-SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN WATER 
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and various provinces) 
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Chile (Santiago and 
Valparaíso) 
Source: Penelope J. Brooke Cowen, "The private sector and water sanitation. How to get started?", Public Policy for the Private Sector, No. 126, Washington, D.C.,  
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4.  Transport 
In the last 25 years there has been a marked transformation in the 
transport systems of many Latin American and Caribbean countries, with 
the most striking changes taking place in the 1990s. Although there have 
been substantial technological innovations, the most significant changes 
have taken place at the institutional level. These include, in particular, a 
marked decline in the role of the State as an operator of services and 
transport infrastructure, less protection for existing operating companies 
and the introduction of a new generation of economic regulation 
mechanisms to defend consumer interests and market competition. 
(a) Highway franchises 
The franchising of inter-city highways was a striking phenomenon 
of the 1990s, with major programmes being established in various 
countries of the region. Direct charging for the use of road infrastructure 
by means of a toll system, however, is only possible when there are 
relatively high traffic volumes. As a result, although private participation 
definitely contributes to the development of road infrastructure, public 
investment continues to be of primary importance in this subsector. 
The introduction of private-sector road infrastructure management 
through the franchising system altered the dynamic of the sector 
significantly. On the one hand, it brought a change in the function of the 
private sector, with the traditional role of public works contractor giving 
way to that of public service franchisee, while on the other hand it made 
large amounts of funding available for road investment. The process has 
not been free of problems, however, many of them deriving from the 
difficulty of quantifying the different types of risk associated with such 
works and allocating them among the agents concerned, and from the 
initial weaknesses of the legal frameworks and public regulatory 
institutions governing these activities. These shortcomings gave rise to 
large contingent liabilities in the public sector, and in a number of cases 
these had to be made effective. A review of events over the decade reveals 
a long institutional learning process during which the delimitation of 
agents’ responsibilities and the public transparency of the process were 
gradually improved. 
The road network in Argentina totals almost 500,000 km, of which 
38,800 form the national network, 181,000 the provincial network and 
280,000 the municipal network. At the beginning of the 1990s, almost half 
of the road network was in a poor state and only 25% offered good 
driving conditions. In the late 1980s, the national network was opened up 
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to private participation in different forms. Various franchise systems 
without tolls, financed from public funds,26 were established to maintain 
29,500 km of this network, while for the remaining 9,300 toll franchises 
were awarded. The network was divided into 20 road sections for 
franchising purposes, and the franchises, which were awarded in 1989-
1990 for a fixed period of 12 years, were based on an index-linked flat-rate 
toll of US$ 1.5/100 km, a levy being payable to the tax authorities in some 
sections. There were no minimum traffic assurances or State guarantees. 
The franchises were basically intended to cover repair and maintenance 
work, without any extension of road capacity. This system was modified 
in 1991, when the franchise period was extended by one year, the 
investment plans agreed by the companies were amended, the basic tariff 
was reduced to US$ 1/100 km without index-linking, the levy was 
dropped and a monthly State subsidy was established for each road 
section. This comprehensive renegotiation of the contracts generated 
private investment obligations of some US$ 2 billion over the franchise 
period, while the State committed itself to providing operating subsidies 
of US$ 925 million, at the same time waiving levy income of US$ 475 
million. Toll income during the franchise period was expected to total 
some US$ 3.6 billion. There were a number of further negotiating rounds, 
the latest being in 1998-1999, although no agreements have as yet been 
finalized. In accordance with current legislation, the basic principle 
underlying the inter-city franchises is that the risk is assumed by the 
private sector, without public guarantees. This principle has been only 
partially implemented in practice, however, as public subsidies have been 
paid each year since 1991 to compensate operators for the changes made 
when the tolls were adjusted (Delgado, 2000). 
Chile has almost 80,000 km of road, of which only 15% was in good 
condition in 1990, as the amount invested over the 1980s covered barely a 
third of maintenance needs. Road use, on the other hand, has been found 
by a number of studies to have doubled between 1984 and 1994. As a 
result, the shortfall in inter-city investment was estimated at US$ 4.25 
billion for the second half of the 1990s. In order to curb the deficit, public 
spending in this area was increased from US$ 300 million a year as of 1990 
to US$ 800 million by 1999 and, most importantly, private investment was 
invited through a road franchising programme. This programme 
managed to mobilize more than US$ 3 billion over the decade, taking into 
account both work completed and work in progress on approximately 
26  These systems are as follows: 2,210 km are maintained under public works franchise 
contracts with State support; 12,827 km are covered by repair and maintenance contracts 
(CreMa) financed by the World Bank and the Government, and 14,463 km come under 
different public works schemes managed by Vialidad Nacional and financed out of the 
public budget (Delgado, 1998). 
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2,500 km of roads. The programme opted for repair, maintenance and 
widening of existing roads rather than for new road construction. The 
main franchise was for the north-south route, the backbone of the road 
network, which was divided into eight sections for franchising purposes. 
Although each section is an independent project, the auction process was 
designed in such a way as to produce uniform tariffs: US$ 2/100 km for 
the highway sections and US$ 0.5 for branch roads less than 100 km long. 
In order to unify the tariffs, different franchise periods were used, State 
levies were charged for the use of existing infrastructure and public 
subsidies were provided for the less profitable sections. The Government 
guaranteed a minimum profit level for each project on the basis of cost 
analyses by the franchising authority. Usually, up to 70% of the amount 
invested plus operating and maintenance costs were guaranteed, and 
currency risk insurance was provided to facilitate external financing. This 
experiment in public/private partnership went through successive stages 
of refinement. Although some contracts were renegotiated, this was done 
transparently and in an environment of mutual confidence among all the 
actors involved (Rufián, 2000a). 
In Colombia, the outlook for the road network at the beginning of 
the 1990s was also rather discouraging. The average level of investment in 
the previous decade had been 0.8% of GDP, when the annual investment 
needed was estimated at between 2% and 3% of GDP. In 1992, a 
programme of road franchises was launched to complement the 
ambitious Plan Vial de Apertura or Road Liberalization Plan. In the first 
three years of the programme, 13 bidding rounds were held for road 
operating and maintenance franchises covering a total of 1,417 km of 
road, bringing in almost US$ 750 million. The haste with which the 
programme was launched and the franchises were awarded, however, 
meant that there was no time for proper studies on the expected level of 
demand and the investment needed. As a result, the National Institute of 
Roads had to offer government guarantees to minimize the risk to 
franchise-holders, and these turned into large fiscal payments as a result 
of construction cost overruns and lower than expected demand. Setting 
out from the National Development Plan 1994-1998, new principles were 
laid down with a view to making private participation in these works 
more structured and transparent and to clarifying and circumscribing 
State guarantees, by improving the regulatory and institutional 
framework.27 This naturally involved the renegotiation of contracts, with 
changes in project specifications and implementation schedules. The new 
27  Three laws of particular significance were enacted on the basis of the 1991 Constitution: 
the Statute on Public Contracting (Law 80/1993), the Law on Transport (Law 105/1993) 
and the Law on Borrowing (Law 185/1995). In addition, the Interministerial Committee 
on Private Participation in Infrastructure was created and began to function. 
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franchising programme brought in towards the end of the decade is based 
on the concept of road corridors linking the main centres of production 
and consumption with seaports on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. It 
involves a total of five projects encompassing 671 km of new construction, 
repairs to 1,900 km of existing roads and maintenance of 2,600 km. The 
project franchises will be awarded from 2000 onward (Rufián, 2000b). 
In Mexico, the Federal Government had exclusive responsibility for 
federal highways until 1987. As the public budget for developing 
highway infrastructure was limited, private-sector involvement in 
improving the road system began to be sought in 1988. Accordingly, new 
toll motorways were planned with a view to providing a new backbone 
for the road system. Between 1987 and 1994, the Federal Government 
granted 52 franchises for the construction and modernization of 5,316 km 
of high-specification roads. Of this total, 29 franchises went to the private 
sector (3,364 km), another 19 to state governments (1,538 km) and 4 to 
public-sector financial institutions (414 km). Different factors were taken 
into account in granting the franchises, but the main criterion was the 
time it would take to recoup the investments. Provision was made for the 
Federal Government to extend the term of concessions up to the 
maximum allowed by law (30 years) if the assumptions contained in the 
franchise agreements proved incorrect. When the programme came to be 
implemented, applying the initial conditions stipulated proved difficult in 
practice, and the economic crisis of late 1994 also caused problems. 
Among the first setbacks to arise were cost overruns averaging 42%, 
demand for road use that ran at only two thirds of the level forecast, and 
changes in the programme’s financial structure, which made short-term 
borrowing necessary. Thus, between 1993 and 1994, 10 of the original 
franchises had to be restructured for the first time. The 1994 crisis had 
devastating consequences for the programme, as its liabilities grew very 
rapidly in real terms. Some preliminary measures28 were eventually 
followed by the adoption of the Programa de Rescate Carretero (Road 
Recovery Programme), under which 23 of the franchises awarded, with a 
total investment value of US$ 11.2 billion, were terminated ahead of time. 
A total of US$ 7.6 billion was paid out in compensation, and the 
remainder was borne by the franchise-holders as a capital loss. As the 
property associated with the franchises was returned to the Federal 
Government and compensation had to be paid, a financial vehicle was 
created (a trust fund of the National Bank for Public Works and Services) 
so that revenue from the repossessed infrastructure could be used to meet 
the liabilities contracted. In addition to receiving this income, the trust 
28  In mid-1995, the road investment units programme was launched. This extended the 
franchise period to 30 years and rescheduled bank credits. 
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fund issued instruments of credit guaranteed by the Federal Government 
for US$ 3.6 billion, as well as entering into debt assignment arrangements 
with the banks and franchise-holders to the value of US$ 3.9 billion. This 
debt is contingent in nature for the Federal Government, contributions from 
the public budget being required only when the flows generated by the 
projects are insufficient to cover the payment obligations of the trust fund. 
It is estimated that the revenue from the motorways will be sufficient to 
cover operating and maintenance costs for the first few years, as well as the 
financial expenses deriving from repossession. An anticipated shortfall in 
2001 will be covered by public funds. The fiscal cost of the repossession 
programme was estimated in 1997 at US$ 2.4 billion (Corta Fernández, 
1999).29
Franchises were also granted for urban roads during this period, 
although on a lesser scale. In Argentina, work began in 1994 on four 
franchised motorways providing urban access to the city of Buenos Aires, 
with investments to date of US$ 1.5 billion. There are various conceptual 
differences between these franchises and those for inter-city roads, chiefly 
owing to the much higher daily traffic levels expected (Delgado, 2000). In 
Santiago, Chile, one large urban project has recently been franchised and 
another three are currently going through the franchising process. 
Altogether, these projects represent investment of more than US$ 1 billion 
(Rufián, 2000a). 
(b) Rail service franchises 
Traditionally, the countries have shown differing degrees of 
enthusiasm for private railway administration. In many cases in the region 
the railways began as private ventures, usually under government 
franchises. In the post-war period, however, most of them were 
nationalized, so that by 1990 there was only one privately-owned railway in 
public use in Latin America, and in the Caribbean there were none.30
29  This assessment was made for a time period of 50 years and was based on conservative 
assumptions: 3% growth in income, a real discount rate of 5.5% and minimal recovery in 
the first few months. This cost may be less if traffic responds favourably to the new 
pricing policy, with discounts of 17% for cars, 32% for buses and 35% to 40% for trucks. 
30  This one railway was operated by the Antofagasta (Chile) and Bolivia Railway Co. Ltd., 
whose shares were traded on the London stock market, and which was still strategically 
important because copper from Chuquicamata and much of Bolivia’s foreign trade were 
carried on it. 
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This situation changed dramatically during the 1990s, so that 
towards the end of the decade there were 24 private railway companies 
operating in the region, with 7 more planned for the immediate future. As 
against this, fiscal constraints mean that railways which are not privatized 
face the threat of being left far behind and even virtually abandoned, as 
seems to be happening with the national networks of a number of countries 
in the region (Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Paraguay and 
Trinidad and Tobago). 
The switch to private railway management has followed two main 
models. With the first, track management is separated from train operation, 
while with the second, infrastructure and services are franchised in their 
entirety. Colombia was a pioneer in applying the first model. In 1989, the 
Government handed responsibility for running trains on the network of the 
State railway company, Ferrovías, to a public-private joint venture, 
Sociedad Colombiana de Transporte Ferroviario, while retaining 
responsibility for infrastructure management. As the results were not good, 
the network was subsequently divided into an Atlantic section and a Pacific 
section, and these were franchised out in their entirety, with provision for 
operation by third parties if desired. Rail transport in Colombia, however, 
has still not revived, with the exception of the trains operated by the 
Drummond Mining Corporation (coal mining) in the north of the country 
and a steam train in Bogotá which is used for tourist services. 
Peru applied a variation of this model whereby the different lines 
were franchised to operating companies, which are also members of a 
consortium that manages the infrastructure. Another variant on the same 
model was applied in the centre/south region of Chile, where Ferrocarriles 
del Estado operates passenger trains and charges a private cargo company, 
Ferrocarril del Pacífico, for the right to use the main lines. The difference in 
this case is that some secondary branch lines have been fully franchised to 
the latter company. 
The second model, full franchising, is currently the most widespread 
in the region’s countries. Privatizations of this kind have taken place in 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia (at a later stage), Guatemala and 
Mexico (except in Tehuantepec and in the Valle de México). With this 
model, franchises to manage railway infrastructure and operate services are 
awarded for periods of between 30 and 50 years. As a variant, railways 
may be sold off, as happened in the northern region of Chile with the 
company Ferronor. 
Has railway privatization been successful? The answer is probably 
yes, although the achievements have been qualified (ECLAC, 1997a and 
2000c). In general, traffic volumes have increased (albeit with wide 
variations from one case to another), government subsidies have decreased 
A decade of light and shadow. Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s  209
and labour productivity indices have risen. Success has not been total, 
however, because of the characteristics of the transport sector, where the 
competition that the railways face from road hauliers and from buses must 
be regarded as unfair, chiefly because the latter two do not pay the true 
costs of the infrastructure they use. Again, private firms do not always 
comply fully with the agreements they sign with governments, something 
that has been an issue in Argentina and Chile. In most cases the authorities 
prefer to reopen negotiations with the incumbents rather than reallocating 
their franchises or taking back responsibility for operating trains. 
(c) Reforms in the urban transport system 
Reforms in this area were aimed at increasing the quantity and 
improving the quality of public transport in order to alleviate the traffic 
congestion caused by rapid growth in the ownership and use of private 
vehicles. Although this phenomenon did not start in the 1990s, the situation 
has certainly worsened recently, for various reasons. These include the 
reduction of import tariffs, infrastructure deficiencies and the slowness 
with which local and national authorities reacted to the sudden expansion 
in the number of vehicles. 
In several of the region’s countries, many middle-class and some 
working-class families were able to purchase a car for the first time, usually 
second-hand. Improved economic circumstances, lower tariffs and some 
tax cuts helped make this possible. In addition, the increase in family 
incomes led to rises in the quantity and quality of cars owned. In 
combination, these events contributed to a real explosion in the number 
of vehicles.31
In view of this situation, a number of countries began to deregulate 
public transport and privatize services. In the late 1980s, large segments of 
public urban transport services in some countries were operated by 
national or municipal governments. Ten years later, almost all bus services 
were operated by private companies. In the case of suburban and 
underground train operating functions, privatization began in Buenos Aires 
(Argentina) in the middle of the decade and in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) 
towards its close. In the first case, this brought quality improvements and 
rising demand for services. Although the experiment was successful from 
the social point of view, the service subsidies provided by the Government 
31  In Santiago, Chile, for example, the increase in the number of cars per family resulting 
from a 1% rise in family income is 0.0039 in Vitcura (a high-income commune), 0.0033 in 
Santiago (a middle-income commune) and 0.0017 in La Pintana (a low-income 
commune). See ECLAC (1997b). 
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remained at levels similar to those seen when the State was responsible for 
operating the trains.32
Where bus services are concerned, there is little left to privatize. At 
the beginning of the decade, the Empresa Nacional de Transportes Urbanos 
(Enatru), which provided services in four cities in Peru, transferred its 
assets to private companies, most of them created by its employees. In São 
Paulo (Brazil), the Companhia Municipal de Transportes Coletivos 
franchised all the services which it had been operating itself to private 
companies. Towards the end of the decade, the State-owned Ruta 1000 
withdrew from Mexico City and all non-electric public transport services 
returned to the private sector. In general, the privatization of urban public 
transport services was successful in terms of the technical efficiency and 
productivity of the resources used. 
Fares, however, increased. In the late 1980s, the cost of a journey in 
cities such as Buenos Aires, Lima, Mexico City and São Paulo was between 
US$ 0.07 and US$ 0.15; ten years later it had risen to between US$ 0.3 and 
US$ 0.6. State enterprises usually received subsidies which were intended 
to benefit lower-income groups, but were often used to mask their own 
inefficiency. In the late 1980s, for example, Ruta 100 was incapable of 
operating more than about 42% of the buses it owned (ECLAC, 1992). Fare 
rises were due to higher operating costs, the use of more appropriate but 
costlier vehicles, the extension of routes, stricter controls on drivers’ 
working conditions and a decline in the productivity of drivers and buses 
because of greater traffic congestion. 
The deregulation of public transport in Peru led to a substantial 
increase in the number of vehicles, from about 10,000 in 1989 to somewhere 
between 48,000 and 60,000 in 1999. Chile, which deregulated ten years 
earlier, went through a similar process. Although there were never more 
than 15,000 buses operating in Santiago, in 1990 the authorities decided to 
regulate transport in the city and put out a network of routes to competitive 
tender. As a result of this measure, the city’s buses were modernized, their 
number dropped to 9,000, and fares rose moderately. 
In Lima (Peru), an attempt was also made to regulate bus services, 
albeit not as completely as in Santiago. In medium-sized towns in Chile and 
Peru, however, deregulation was not followed by the introduction of new 
regulations, a fact which seems to imply that deregulation was more 
successful there. 
In the 1990s, inter-city passenger transport was also deregulated in 
some countries. The results were fairly good in Argentina, but in Peru, 
32 About US$ 1 million per day. See Jane’s Information Group Ltd. (1999). 
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owing to the lower level of business professionalism, they were not very 
encouraging, particularly with regard to safety. In a number of countries, 
especially Brazil, this activity is still heavily regulated. 
(d) Ports and maritime transport 
Until the 1980s, the region’s ports were typically managed by the 
public sector and their workers were employed directly by the port 
authority. In the early 1980s, cargo handling in Chilean ports began to be 
carried out by private companies that competed among themselves. The 
result was large efficiency improvements and reductions in the 
investment needed in machinery and equipment, but this was an 
exceptional case (Burkhalter, 1999 and ECLAC, 1998a). 
In the middle of the decade, large ports in Argentina and Panama 
were privatized, and productivity improved substantially as a result. The 
port of Buenos Aires (Argentina) thus managed to displace Santos 
(Brazil), which was then still run by the State, as the largest handler of 
containers in South America (see figure V.2). By the end of the decade, 
large ports in the Bahamas, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Jamaica and Mexico 
had been privatized, and the process was beginning in Peru. 
Figure V.2 
MOVEMENT OF CONTAINERS 
Source: Data up to and including 1996 provided by Martin Sgut, consultant. Data from 1997 to 
1999 from ECLAC, Maritime Profile of Latin America and the Caribbean (LC/W.001) 
(www.eclac.cl/transporte/perfil/indexe.html), 24 August 2000. 
Note: Santos includes Companhia Siderúrgica Paulista (Cosipa); Buenos Aires includes Exolgán. 
TEU: Twenty foot equivalent unit. 
Thousands of TEUs 
Santos 
Thousands of TEUs 
Buenos Aires 
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In the case of large ports, separate operating franchises are usually 
awarded for different terminals with a view to ensuring a reasonable level 
of competition, so that the cost reductions resulting from higher 
productivity will be passed on to importers and exporters. The actual 
infrastructure continues to belong to the State, although in some notable 
cases ports with privatized services compete with others built by private 
firms (Hoffmann, 1999). 
Within a period of barely ten years, Latin American ports have 
ceased to be a byword for inefficiency, and some have even become 
models of efficiency. This is particularly true of the port of Buenos Aires 
where, between 1991 and 1995, the cost per tonne of container imports 
dropped by 73%, average ship turnaround time was reduced by 40%, the 
amount of cargo handled rose by 50%, the number of container units 
increased by 80% and labour productivity grew by 275%. 
In the case of sea transportation by regular shipping lines, there 
was a continuing trend for local companies to be liquidated, merged with 
other firms or taken over by multinational corporations. This reduction in 
the number of Latin American companies was more than compensated 
for by the increase in the number of foreign ones active in the region, to 
the extent that the number of shipping lines operating in Latin America 
and the Caribbean increased slightly (ECLAC, 1998b). Regional shipping 
lines were used less, but there was a marked reduction in freight costs, 
helped by the increase in economic activity and the greater vigour of 
regional economic integration. Competition between shipping lines 
ensured that cost reductions resulted in reduced freight charges. 
In previous decades, the aim of governments had been to maximize 
the freight market share of domestic companies by reserving cargo for 
flag carriers of the exporting and importing countries. The events of the 
1990s show that the main objective of governments is now to reduce costs 
and improve efficiency. 
(e) Institutional aspects 
In the first experiments with reform in this sector, market 
deregulation and the privatization of State companies went ahead 
without sufficient attention being given to competitiveness, to the needs 
of less privileged social groups and to externalities. 
In the 1990s, by contrast, there was more emphasis on these areas. 
Even the privatization models used were designed with a view to 
preserving competition as, for example, in the case of the Peruvian 
railways. The model initially proposed would have obliged the mining 
companies to use the services of a single rail operator, or to send their 
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output to port in trucks. The model finally applied allows these 
companies to operate their own trains if they consider the freight charges 
of the railway company to be excessive. 
The creation of regulatory bodies to reinforce antimonopoly laws 
in the transport sector points in the same direction. One pioneering 
effort was the National Commission for Automotive Transport, set up in 
Argentina in 1993, which later became the National Commission in 
charge of Transport Regulation. Similar bodies were subsequently 
created in Bolivia, Guatemala, Peru and other countries. These bodies 
have managed, in some cases, to deal successfully with anticompetitive 
practices. In Bolivia, for example, the Empresa Ferroviaria Oriental 
lowered its freight charges for transporting soya at the insistence of the 
Transport Superintendency. 
Another area in which there were important institutional initiatives 
was the development of multimodal transport. Three international 
agreements were adopted on this subject between 1992 and 1994, the first 
in the Andean Community, a later one in MERCOSUR and the last among 
the ten countries participating in the Conference of South American 
Ministers of Transport, Communications and Public Works. The Western 
Hemisphere Transport Initiative, undertaken in the context of the Summit 
of the Americas, marks the beginning of a continent-wide approach to the 
development of intermodal systems. In response, business sectors have 
increased the range of integrated services available by introducing 
modern operations management systems and by investing heavily in port 
container terminals and inland freight transfer stations. 
Although no complete, comprehensive survey has yet been 
carried out, the figures in table V.7 show that in most countries the 
prices of transport services have decreased on the whole, while 
consumption of these services as a share of output has risen. These 
trends can no doubt be explained in part by factors such as technological 
changes and, in some cases, the reduction of subsidies. Productivity 
improvements, however, have also played their part in reducing the cost 
and increasing the consumption of this sector’s services, in all their 
variety and range. 
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Table V.7 
INDICES OF CHANGES IN TRANSPORT SERVICES CONSUMPTION AND 
REAL PRICES, SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1990-1999 
(Percentage change) 





Real change in 
market prices for 
transport services, 
1990-1999
Bolivia 46.1 73.2 -12.1 
Chile 64.9 82.9 -7.9 
Colombia a 34.3 39.1 19.2 
Costa Rica 35.7 77.4 -6.3 
Guyana 55.2 62.5 -5.2 
Mexico 22.8 41.6 4.9 
Peru 34.6 43.4 -19.7 
Uruguay a 35.1 88.2 -20.1 
Source: Own calculations, based on national figures published in ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 2001 Edition, Santiago, Chile. United Nations publication, Sales 
No. E.99.II.G.1. 
a
 From 1990 to 1998. 
Note: The percentage changes refers to the transport, storage and communications sector. 
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Chapter VI 
The social sectors 
Social development in the 1990s was characterized by consolidation 
of the demographic transition process, gradual population ageing, an 
inadequate level of employment creation, moderate reductions in poverty 
and increases in inequality in various countries, progress with regard to 
gender equity and a higher level of female participation in the labour 
market, a recovery in social investment, and implementation of important 
reforms to social policies and sectors. 
With regard to the population structure of the region, the 
demographic transition process continued, albeit with variations among 
countries and among the different social strata within them. Overall, the 
main features were an increase in the population of both the elderly and 
adults of working age, a decline in the fertility rate and a decrease in 
economic dependency rates, the two latter phenomena being reinforced 
by the increase in women’s labour force participation. These changes were 
accompanied by an increase in life expectancy and a reduction in the 
infant mortality rate. Faster growth in the working-age population and 
economically active population than in the total population represented a 
demographic “bonus” of which the region failed, however, to take 
advantage, mainly because of its poor job creation record, particularly 
where high-productivity employment is concerned. The implications of 
this growth pattern are very important for future social policies, in view 
of the changes they will bring in the demand for health and social security 
services, as well as in the type and amount of employment needed. 
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Renewed economic growth led to a rise in employment, but this 
was not sufficient to absorb the growing economically active population, 
so unemployment and informal employment increased in the region. The 
strength of this tendency differed between countries, but overall it was 
especially critical in the South American countries (with the exception of 
Chile). The labour market was favourable for those with a university 
education, whose salaries increased in relative terms. This was not 
conducive to a positive trend in income distribution, but rather helped to 
maintain the extremely high levels of economic inequality found in 
most countries. This bias also forestalled any significant reduction in 
poverty levels. 
Between 1990 and 1999, poverty fell to levels similar to those seen 
in the region in the early 1980s (35%), although population growth meant 
that the poor did not decrease in number. Economic growth was not 
strong enough to produce a more positive trend in the income levels of 
the poorest, educational requirements rose, and the general increase in 
social investment in the region had not led to greater equality of 
opportunity by the end of the period, owing to the time such investment 
takes to feed through. Systems to provide social protection at times of 
crisis and direct transfers to the poor are not yet widespread in the region. 
Although there was a reduction in poverty rates in both rural and urban 
areas, the absolute numbers living in poverty remained practically 
unchanged in the former, and increased in the latter. The progress made 
in controlling inflation, especially hyperinflation, was favourable to 
poverty reduction. The structure of the main factors determining poverty 
levels (education, employment, property ownership and household size) 
and their distribution did not change significantly, which means that the 
region has not yet escaped from the social patterns that perpetuate 
poverty across the generations. The recent crisis also interrupted the 
process of poverty reduction, especially in South America, so that the 
number of people living in poverty increased by approximately 
20 million. 
Significant progress was made in the region with regard to gender 
equity. Access to the education system and health services became more 
equal, and women’s labour force participation rose, while at the same 
time all the countries made significant progress with the institutions 
responsible for women’s policies and programmes and with legislation to 
protect women’s rights and to promote greater participation and 
recognition for them in social life. More still needs to be done, however, 
especially with regard to women living in poverty. 
Public social spending developed very positively over the decade, 
increasing by 2.7 percentage points of GDP, so that in many cases it 
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exceeded the levels seen at the beginning of the 1980s. Practically all the 
countries in the region made great efforts to raise the level of this 
expenditure as a percentage of output. While the situation varied among 
countries, this increase was generally driven both by the recovery of 
public revenue as a result of higher growth and by the priority given to 
social expenditure in the public budget. Spending growth in this area was 
particularly high in countries with medium per capita income levels. Also 
striking was the rise in the share of social expenditure going on education 
and health, areas which are vital for the development of human capital 
and for the prospects of achieving poverty reduction and equity goals. 
Lastly, the 1990s were marked by intense efforts to reform social 
policy and to reorganize the different sectors with which it is concerned. 
Reforms were particularly comprehensive and far-reaching in the health 
and pensions sectors, but they also encompassed education, housing and 
social welfare. In general, the changes aimed to improve the efficiency of 
public spending through the use of tools for establishing eligibility, 
demand subsidies, decentralization of public management, the 
introduction of competition and regulation mechanisms, the separation 
and delimitation of the different public administration functions (finance, 
management, provision, oversight) and the participation of private agents 
in the management and provision of services. Progress with regard to the 
coverage, quality and comprehensiveness of social protection has not yet 
been seen across the board, although increased expenditure and 
improved management in this area does seem to give grounds for 
positive expectations. 
1. The region-wide demographic transition and the 
failure to take advantage of the demographic bonus 
The demographic changes that occurred in the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries in the second half of the twentieth century —a 
reflection of the economic, social and cultural changes experienced by the 
region— manifested themselves in a transition1 to lower and lower levels
of fertility and mortality. This process continued over the 1990s, 
spreading to all countries. 
In the region as a whole, the average number of children per 
woman has declined from 3.4 to 2.7, life expectancy at birth has increased 
from 66 to 69, the infant mortality rate has decreased from 48 to 36 per 
thousand and the total population growth rate has dropped from 2% to 
1  The demographic transition is defined as a process in which the population shifts from 
high to low fertility and mortality rates. 
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1.6% (United Nations, 1999b). Although these trends are common to all 
the countries, demographic transition patterns have specific national 
features determined by when the process began, the speed of changes in 
biodemographic variables and the impact of socio-economic and cultural 
factors (see table VI.1). These specific features are reflected in different 
rates of population growth and in different configurations of the 
population age structure. Thus, in the five-year period 1995-2000, the 
fertility rate remained high in seven countries (with an average of 4 to 5 
children per woman), while in three countries the rate was below the 
population replacement level (2.1 children per woman); the rest had 
patterns similar to the regional average. 
If current assumptions concerning the future fertility rate in Latin 
America and the Caribbean prove accurate, it will be at or close to the 
replacement level in most countries by 2020-2025. Those countries that 
have high life expectancy at birth and low fertility rates, however, still 
have high annual average population growth rates compared to 
developed countries with similar population parameters.2
Although differences in fertility and mortality rates among groups 
of countries have combined with varying levels of international migration 
to create different population age profiles, one feature that is common to 
all the countries is the trend towards ageing. This is due to rising life 
expectancy (both at birth and after the age of 60) and, most of all, to a 
decline in the number of children. Over the decade, the results of this 
trend have been: relative stabilization of the number of births at an annual 
average of 11.6 million; declines in the growth rates of the population 
aged under 15 and of the working-age population (0.4% and 2.2%, 
respectively, compared to 1% and 2.5% in the 1980s); and an increase in 
the growth rate of the population aged 60 and over to 2.8% (up from 2.5% 
in the 1980s), a figure which was almost twice as high as the rate for the 
population as a whole (1.6%) and seven times as high as the rate for the 
population aged under 15. Although this trend towards population 
ageing occurred throughout the region, it was stronger in countries at the 
advanced transition state, where under-15s now account for less than 30% 
of the total population and over-60s for 13%, whereas in countries at the 
incipient and moderate transition stages, the younger age group 
represents over 40% of the population and the elderly account for no 
more than 7% (see table VI.2). The distinctive  feature of the 1990s was the 
2  This apparent paradox is the result of “demographic inertia”, a term which refers to the 
effect on population growth of the age distribution at the time when the sustained 
decline in the fertility rate begins. Thus, from a certain point onward, population growth 
is influenced not only by changes in fertility, mortality and migration rates, but also by 
the age structure of the population when the changes begin. 
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increase in the number of elderly people who were not working in 
relation to the number working, a trend which is expected to accelerate. 
Since health expenditure is much higher in old age, as is the income 
needed to live for more years after withdrawing from economic activity, 
this trend is a huge challenge to social security and welfare systems. 
Another important feature of regional population growth in the 
1990s was the persistence of inequalities in the sociodemographic 
behaviour of the different social strata. On average, the poorest groups in 
society had more children and a higher infant mortality rate than the 
groups that were not poor.3 The poorer strata are further from facing 
serious ageing problems, but it is among these that the highest proportion 
of people work in the informal sector and therefore do not contribute to 
social security, so that the only benefits they receive are from welfare 
schemes. There are also marked disparities by area of residence. The 
highest fertility and mortality rates are found in rural areas, where large 
proportions of the population are campesinos and ethnic groups living in 
what are clearly disadvantaged conditions. Of the 12 countries for which 
comparable information is available, the gap between the global fertility 
rates of urban and rural areas is smallest in Costa Rica, at 35%; in all other 
cases the disparity is more than 50% (ECLAC, 1998d). 
3  For example, the fertility rates of women without education are more than twice as high 
as those of women with secondary or higher education, the average number of children 
being 6.5 and 2.7, respectively, in Bolivia, 7.1 and 1.8 in Guatemala, 6.2 and 2.1 in 
Ecuador, 4.1 and 2.4 in Mexico and 5.0 and 1.5 in Brazil. Infant mortality rates likewise 
differ sharply between the two groups, the respective rates being 122 and 38 per 
thousand in Bolivia, 70 and 23 in Guatemala, 79 and 11 in Ecuador, 48 and 20 in Mexico 
and 93 and 28 in Brazil (ECLAC/CELADE, 1998b). 
Table VI.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: POPULATION INDICATORS BY STAGE IN THE  
DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION 
Stage in the demographic transition Time period and indicators Latin America and the Caribbean Incipienta Moderateb Fullc Advancedd
1990-1995      
Births per year (thousands) 
Total fertility rate (children per woman) 
Life expectancy at birth (years) 
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births) 
Population growth rate (percentage) 
Growth rate of WAPe (percentage) 




































1995-2000      
Births per year (thousands) 
Total fertility rate (children per woman) 
Life expectancy at birth (years) 
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births) 
Population growth rate (percentage) 
Growth rate of WAPe (percentage) 




































Source: ECLAC, Population Division - Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE), current population estimates and projections, and United Nations, 
World Population Prospects. The 1998 Revision. Volume I Comprehensive Tables (ST/ESA/SER.A/177), New York, 1999. United Nations publication, Sales No. 
E.99.XIII.9. 
a
 Includes Bolivia and Haiti. 
b
 Includes Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay. 
c
 Includes Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guyana, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Suriname and Venezuela. 
d
 Includes Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Chile, Cuba, French Antilles, Jamaica, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay. 
e
 Working-age population (15 to 59 years old). 
f








LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: AGE STRUCTURE INDICATORS, BY STAGES IN THE  DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION 
Stage in the demographic transition Years and indicators 
over the decade 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean Incipienta Moderateb Fullc Advancedd

































































DDI f  75.8  94.7  98.0  74.9  69.5

















































































































DDIf  65.8  85.2  87.1  62.8  68.6
Source: ECLAC, Population Division - Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE), current population estimates and projections, and United Nations, 
World Population Prospects. The 1998 Revision. Volume I Comprehensive Tables (ST/ESA/SER.A/177), New York, 1999. United Nations publication, Sales No. 
E.99.XIII.9. 
a
 Includes Bolivia and Haiti. 
b
 Includes Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay. 
c
 Includes Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guyana, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Suriname and Venezuela. 
d
 Includes Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Chile, Cuba, French Antilles, Jamaica, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay. 
e
 Economically active population aged 10 and over (Latin America only). 
f
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The decline in fertility, and, consequently, in the growth rate of the 
working-age population, which is consolidating the demographic 
transition process across the region, has led to a reduction in the economic 
dependency rate, a trend that is being reinforced by a higher level of 
female participation in economic activity. This offers the countries of the 
region a potential “bonus” in the form of an opportunity to increase their 
productive capacity, and thus improve the living conditions of current 
and future generations. The effect of the demographic bonus on actual 
growth in the labour supply depends on what proportion of people of 
working age, particularly women, participate in economic activity. In the 
1990s, the low level of job creation, and the extent to which new 
employment was concentrated in low-productivity occupations, partly 
accounted for the inadequate productivity growth seen. This situation 
was not only serious in itself, but represented a wasted opportunity. The 
region failed to capitalize on the advantages offered by the stage in the 
demographic transition it had then reached, in which the working-age 
population was growing more rapidly than the total population, albeit at 
decreasing rates, and dependency rates were falling. While population 
growth decreased from 2.7% a year over the period 1950-1980 to 1.7% a 
year in the 1990s, the growth rate of the economically active population 
remained at 2.6% (see table VI.3). The low number and informal nature of 
the jobs created meant that this demographic bonus was not taken 
advantage of. 
Table VI.3 
THE DEMOGRAPHIC BONUS: POPULATION GROWTH BY AGE GROUP 
Population group 1950-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2010 
Total population  2.67 2.01 1.67 1.39 
Working-age population 2.69 2.59 2.29 1.82 
Economically active population 2.60 2.80 2.60 2.20 
Dependent population 2.68 1.22 0.69 0.61 
Population aged under 15 2.58 1.06 0.34 0.11 
Population aged over 65 3.59 2.57 3.08 3.11 
Source: ECLAC, estimates of the Population Division - Latin American and Caribbean Demographic 
Centre (CELADE). 
There has also been a general decline in labour force participation 
among the population aged under 20, particularly men. This may be a 
positive sign, indicating that the expansion of education systems is 
offering young people the opportunity to stay at school longer 
(ECLAC/CELADE, 1999b). 
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Lastly, migration, undertaken in response to socio-economic 
factors, also affects the balance of population composition and labour 
force participation between urban and rural areas. From the beginning to 
the end of the decade, annual growth in the urban economically active 
population fell from 3.5% to rates close to 3%. Growth in the rural 
economically active population, meanwhile, was much slower on average 
(less than 1% a year). In both urban and rural areas, the decline in the 
growth rates of the economically active population would have been 
greater if there had not been an increase in female participation in 
economic activities outside the home, a phenomenon that parallels the 
decline in fertility rates. In fact, two simultaneous and long-standing 
processes were going on: ageing, and growth in the share of the working-
age population accounted for by women. These trends were more marked 
in urban areas than in rural ones (ECLAC/CELADE, 1999b). 
As was noted earlier, the growth of the working-age population 
slowed over the 1990s owing to the demographic trends described. The 
labour supply continued to increase more rapidly than the working-age 
population, however, since the global participation rate continued to rise 
by 0.2 percentage points per year, as it had done in the 1980s. Thus, in the 
region as a whole, the economically active population grew at an annual 
rate of 2.6%, which was slightly lower than the 2.8% seen in the previous 
decade. 
2.  Employment: low growth, the shift to services and 
the increase in informal employment 
Over the decade, insufficient jobs were created to absorb the 
increase in the working-age population. This led to an increase in open 
unemployment, to changes in the sectoral composition of employment 
and to a relative increase in informal employment. 
The main cause of the rise in the participation rate was the growing 
number of women entering the labour market. Between 1991 and 1999, 
the male participation rate remained stable at about 73%, while the female 
rate rose by 4 percentage points to over 41%. As opportunities for 
participating in the labour market are very unequal in different socio-
economic strata, however, the proportion of women working is 
substantially lower in poorer households than in richer ones (see table 
VI.4). Women from the lower-income strata wishing to enter the labour 
market have more disincentives: higher opportunity costs (childcare and 
housework), less benefits (lower wages) and greater restrictions 
(responsibility for the home). The facilities they need if they are to 
reconcile their roles in the home and the labour market (day-care centres, 
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kindergartens, schools and public safety) are rarely available, so women 
from these homes are poorly represented in the labour market, especially 
in formal employment. The lack of support service networks means that 
progress towards gender equity is retarded, the income gap between 
households from different social strata is not narrowed and large sectors 
of the population are excluded from the benefits of more modern social 
policies, as they end up outside social security systems and thus remain 
dependent on public social welfare schemes. 
Table VI.4 
LATIN AMERICA (12 COUNTRIES): PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN OF ACTIVE AGE WHO 
ARE EMPLOYED, BY HOUSEHOLD INCOME LEVEL,  
URBAN AREAS, 1990 AND 1997 
Quartile Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures from the countries. 
Between 1990 and 1999, the simple average of the employment rate 
in 12 countries also rose by almost 0.2 percentage points a year, although 
a low rate of job creation in Brazil meant that the weighted average was 
slightly lower. This level of relative employment growth meant that the 
number of people in work rose by an average of just over 2% annually, 
and thus by less than the economically active population. As a result, 
unemployment increased in the region as a whole, especially from the 
mid-1990s onward. This trend was largely contributed to by rising 
joblessness in Argentina and Mexico and subsequently, towards the end 
of the decade, in Brazil. 
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Average annual variation in per capita GDP
Over the decade, regional output grew more rapidly (3.2%) than 
the working-age population (2.5%), but net job creation (2.2%) was lower 
than this, so that the level of open unemployment rose. These overall 
averages mask large disparities across the region, the determining factor 
being the role of the informal sector in labour market adjustment (see 
figures VI.1 and VI.2). 
Figure VI.1 
LATIN AMERICA: PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH AND  
UNEMPLOYMENT, 1990s 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures from the countries. 
Figure VI.2 
INFORMAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH, 1990s 
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With regard to job creation by employment category, wage 
employment increased at a similar rate to total employment, although the 
weighted averages of the two rates were closer than the median averages 
(see table VI.5). The fact that the share of waged employment in the total 
did not increase illustrates the weakness of labour demand. Public-sector 
employment grew little, owing to privatization and restrictive fiscal 
policies, while waged employment in the private sector grew more 
rapidly in microenterprises than in the rest of the sector (ILO, 1999). 
Table VI.5 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): JOB CREATION BY EMPLOYMENT  
CATEGORY, 1990s 
(Cumulative annual growth) 
Sector (number of countries) Weighted average Median 
Wage earners   
- Total (17) 2.2 2.7 
- Private-sector (13) 2.2 3.2 
- Public sector (13) 0.7 0.6 
Own-account workers (17) 2.8 3.1 
Domestic service workers (13) 3.9 3.5 
Unpaid workers (15) 0.4 -1.9 
Other categories (17) 0.4 0.5 
Total (17) 2.2 3.4 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures from the countries. 
On average, 7 out of every 10 non-agricultural jobs were created in 
the informal sector. The number of own-account workers grew at higher 
rates than total employment, especially in urban areas. Thus, in the 1990s, 
the share of non-agricultural employment accounted for by these workers 
(excluding administrative, professional and technical workers) and by 
unpaid family members rose from 22.3% to 25%. In the same period, the 
share of microenterprises rose from 14.5% to 15.4% and that of domestic 
service workers from 5.3% to 6.3%, the end result being that the share of 
the informal sector4 in non-agricultural employment increased from 42.1% 
to 46.7%. 
4 The informal sector is deemed to include all own-account workers (excluding 
administrative, professional and technical workers), unpaid workers, domestic service 
workers and those working for businesses with less than 5 employees. 
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For all its heterogeneity, the information for 14 countries shows that 
informal urban employment was most likely to rise in countries which had 
lower levels of economic growth, and that the increases were largest in 
those countries (see figure VI.2). In Argentina, the share of the informal 
sector declined when the economy was growing at rates higher than 5.5%, 
while the labour market adjusted through higher open unemployment, 
which has not fallen below 13% since 1995. Judging by the regional pattern 
over the decade, per capita output growth rates of less than 3.5% a year are 
insufficient to reduce the level of informality observed. 
As policies came to favour more flexible labour markets, there was a 
move towards greater use of short-term contracts (temporary, seasonal, or 
part-time), the grounds on which contracts could be terminated were 
extended and redundancy payments were reduced (ILO, 1999). In 
particular, the proportion of wage earners working in temporary (non-
permanent) jobs increased significantly, so that by 1997 it stood at over 15% 
in six of the seven countries considered. At about the same time, large 
percentages of urban wage earners had no contracts at all; in 1996, this was 
the case with more than 30% of all wage earners in six of the seven 
countries analysed. Trends indicate that the proportion of wage earners 
without contracts increased in these countries during the 1990s, with the 
exception of Colombia, where it seems to have decreased by about seven 
percentage points between 1989 and 1996 (ECLAC, 2000a). 
In sectoral terms, the long-term decline in the proportion of 
employment accounted for by the primary sector continued, as did the 
upward trend in tertiary employment, while the rising tendency of secondary 
employment, which paused in the early 1980s only to resume towards the 
end of that decade, seems to have come to an end (see table VI.6). 
Table VI.6 
LATIN AMERICA (15 COUNTRIES): JOB CREATION BY BRANCH OF ACTIVITY, 1990s 
(Cumulative annual growth) 
Sector (number of countries) Weighted average Median 
Agriculture (13) -0.6 -1.2 
Manufacturing industry (17) 1.3 1.3 
Construction (17) 3.0 4.2 
Trade services, restaurants and hotels (17) 4.0 5.7 
Financial servicesa (15) 6.6 7.8 
Basic servicesb (17) 4.8 4.8 
Community, social and  
personal services (17) 2.9 2.8 
Total (17) 2.2 3.4 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures from the countries. 
a
 Includes insurance, business services and real estate. 
b
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This change was structural, since not only did manufacturing 
employment decline in general, but this trend was most pronounced in 
countries with higher per capita income levels. In fact, the positive 
relationship between manufacturing employment and per capita output 
was reversed, turning negative by the end of the decade, whereas the 
opposite happened with the employment share of trade and services (see 
figure VI.3). 
Figure VI.3a 
LATIN AMERICA: GDP AND MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT 
Figure VI.3b 
LATIN AMERICA: GDP AND EMPLOYMENT IN COMMERCE AND SERVICES 
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In the 1980s, both real and minimum wages fell substantially in 
most countries in the region. This trend was partially reversed in the 
1990s, when real wages in the formal sector increased across the region as 
a whole, the median rate being almost 20% higher in 1999 than at the end 
of the 1980s. The decline in wages seen in Brazil in the early 1990s and in 
Mexico in the middle of the decade, however, means that this increase in 
real wages was much less (5%) if the weighted average of rates is used. 
The situation with minimum wages was worse, as these declined sharply 
in the early 1990s, and even by the end of the decade the median 
minimum wage in the region was well below its 1989 level in real terms. 
On the other hand, the weighted average, which also experienced an 
initial decline, is moving back towards its late 1980s value (see 
figure VI.4). 
The differences in the way regional averages for employment, wage 
and productivity indicators behave (depending on whether the median or 
the weighted average is used) reveal the degree of heterogeneity existing 
across countries. This situation is compounded by heterogeneity within 
individual countries. Thus, if the behaviour of labour variables is 
considered (unemployment rate, creation of wage employment, average 
labour productivity and real average wages), the performance of the 
countries can be seen to have differed substantially. The main factor was 
economic growth, as high and sustained growth rates allowed some 
countries, such as Chile, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and 
Panama, to improve many or all of these variables. Others such as 
Ecuador, Jamaica, Paraguay and Venezuela, by contrast, achieved only 
modest economic growth over the decade, and this had a negative impact 
on labour market performance. In some cases, such as those of Bolivia and 
Honduras, employment increased significantly, but this was due more to 
the pressure of labour supply than to dynamic demand from companies, 
which meant that the new jobs were largely concentrated in the informal 
sector. Again, in the first half of the 1990s, some countries —Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia and Peru— introduced significant economic reforms 
which tended to reduce the labour intensity of economic growth and 
resulted in negative performance in this area (Weller, 2001).
To sum up, during the 1990s new job creation was weak and took 
place mainly in the informal sector. Real wages, although they increased 
slightly, only managed a slow and partial recovery from previous losses.
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Figure VI.4a 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (14 COUNTRIES): 
REAL AVERAGE WAGES,1988-2000 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures from the countries. 
Figure VI. 4b 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (18 COUNTRIES): 
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3.  The persistence of poverty and inequality 
With regard to poverty,5 there has been a gradual reduction of the 
high levels inherited from the “lost decade”, when the proportion of poor 
households in the region rose from 35% to 41% and the number of people 
living in poverty increased from 136 million to 200 million. In the first 
seven years of the decade, the number of poor households fell by five 
percentage points, to 36%, which is close to the 1980 level. Owing to 
demographic growth, however, and the larger size of poor households, by 
1997 the number of people living in poverty had increased to 204 million 
(see table VI.7). By 1999, even though the percentage of poor households 
was reduced a little further (35%), the number of people living in poverty 
increased to more than 211 million. It is now estimated that, in the 
following three years (2000-2002), 13 more million people became poor as 
the result of the crisis that began in the closing years of the decade. These 
figures show that the apparently favourable trend in poverty and 
indigence during the 1990s has to be treated with caution, as it was only 
in 1997 that the region managed to return to relative levels slightly higher 
than those of 1980. Even then there was no reduction in the absolute 
numbers living in poverty and indigence, and the situation grew worse 
again during the recent crisis. 
The distribution of the poor population has changed profoundly, 
and it is now more concentrated in cities. Whereas in 1980 there were 
fewer poor people in urban areas than in rural ones, the situation was 
reversed in 1990 owing to migration and the increase in poverty in the 
cities. By 1999, there were 75% more poor people in urban areas than in 
rural ones, and the increase in the number living in poverty during the 
1990s took place entirely in cities. This large increase helps to explain the 
decline in the quality of life seen in many of the region’s cities over the 
last 20 years. 
Indigence has followed a pattern that is only slightly different: 15% 
of households were indigent in 1980, a proportion which increased to 18% 
in 1990, before falling back to 14% in 1999; the number of people living 
in indigence rose from 62 million to 93 million during the 1980s, then fell  
to 90 million by 1999. There were 77% more indigent people in rural areas 
than  in urban  ones in  1980,  8%  more in  1990  and 1999. In  general terms, 
5 The references to poverty in this section are based on the poverty lines or income 
thresholds calculated by ECLAC for each country in the region. 
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the structure of indigence underwent significant changes over the 1990s, 
although the proportion of people living in indigence continued to be three 
times higher in rural areas than in urban ones (38% and 12%, respectively 
in 1999). 
Table VI.7 
LATIN AMERICA: POVERTY AND INDIGENCE,a 1980-1999
 Percentage of households 
 Poorb Indigentc
 Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural 
1980 35 25 54 15 9 28 
1990 41 35 58 18 12 34 
1994 38 32 56 16 11 34 
1997 36 30 54 15 10 30 
1999 35 30 54 14 9 31 
 Percentage of population 
 Poord Indigente
 Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural 
1980 41 30 60 19 11 33 
1990 48 41 65 23 15 40 
1994 46 39 65 21 14 41 
1997 44 37 63 19 12 38 
1999 44 37 64 19 12 38 
 Number (in millions) 
 Poorf Indigentg
 Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural 
1980 135.9 62.9 73.0 62.4 22.5 39.9 
1990 200.2 121.7 78.5 93.4 45.0 48.4 
1994 201.5 125.9 75.6 91.6 44.3 47.4 
1997 203.8 125.7 78.2 88.9 42.2 46.6 
1999 211.4 134.2 77.2 89.4 43.0 46.4 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
countries concerned. 
a
 Estimate for 19 countries in the region. 
b
 Percentage of households below the poverty line. Includes indigent households. 
c
 Percentage of households below the indigence line. 
d
 Percentage of population below the poverty line. Includes the indigent population. 
e
 Percentage of population below the indigence line. 
f
 People living in poor households. Includes the indigent population. 
g
 People living in indigent households. 
Trends in poverty and indigence were also heterogeneous in the 
region. In some countries (Brazil, Chile, Panama and Uruguay), both 
indices declined sharply between 1990 and 1999; in others (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru) they fell 
moderately; there were also some cases (Paraguay and Venezuela) in which 
they rose during this period. According to the most recent data, in Chile the 
downward trend in poverty has continued, albeit more slowly, while 
Mexico had a lower rate in 1998 than in 1989. It is very interesting to note 
that it was the countries with the lowest rates of poverty that made the 
steadiest progress over the decade, whereas in those with intermediate 
levels the results were extremely varied and those with high levels only 
made more modest progress. This demonstrates how the structure of 






















































poverty tends to perpetuate itself, and how difficult it is to deal with this 
problem (see figure VI.5). 
Figure VI.5 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): URBAN POVERTY AND INDIGENCE 
(Percentages) 
HIGH (over 40%) 
MEDIUM (20% to 40%) 
LOW (under 20%) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
countries concerned. 
a
 Includes the indigent population. 
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The underlying causes of these very large differences in national 
performance are highly varied. There is no doubt that economic growth 
played a very important role in determining poverty trends, as there is a 
clear relationship between growth patterns and changes in per capita 
income over the decade (see figure VI.6). The relationship between the 
two is not uniform however, as the same rate of economic growth may 
have very different effects, depending on its composition. A particularly 
important factor is the extent to which growth stimulates high-quality job 
creation, but other variables also have a significant effect on poverty 
(social services, transfers, inflation). Thus, for example, while annual per 
capita income growth was more than twice as high in Argentina as in 
Costa Rica during the period 1990-1999, the impact in terms of the annual 
percentage reduction of poverty was similar in both countries. Similarly, 
Brazil and Costa Rica had comparable levels of per capita economic 
growth, but poverty was reduced to a greater extent in Brazil. In more 
general terms, however, linear regression analysis of the behaviour of the 
two variables over the decade shows that poverty levels increase when 
per capita income growth is less than 1% a year in real terms, and that for 
each additional percentage point of growth poverty can be reduced by 
1.6 percentage points. Thus, if the rate of per capita output growth in the 
region stayed at the level of the past decade, it would take more than a 
quarter of a century to halve the current levels of poverty. 
Figure VI.6 
POVERTY AND REAL GROSS NATIONAL INCOME PER CAPITA, 1990-1999 
(Average annual percentage change) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official information supplied by the countries and special tabulations of 
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In Latin America and the Caribbean, there has been a rising trend 
in unemployment and informal employment, both of which tend to 
increase poverty and to have a discouraging effect on adults who wish to 
work but have no opportunity to do so. Although trends and outcomes 
varied greatly across the region as regards poverty and work 
opportunities among poor households and workers, some typical 
situations can be identified. In the first place, there was a general trend in 
the 1990s towards rising labour force participation among members of 
poor families, with the sole exceptions of Argentina and Paraguay. 
Secondly, in all countries where poverty increased, the level of 
unemployment among workers from poor households rose as well, 
although higher unemployment among such workers does not necessarily 
entail an increase in poverty. The final outcome will depend on the 
income that these households receive through social welfare mechanisms. 
Thus, in Brazil, Costa Rica and Uruguay, unemployment increased 
among poor workers, but poverty fell, owing to large increases in 
transfers of public funds to poor households. Thirdly, in all countries 
where the unemployment rate among the poor declined, there was also a 
decrease in poverty. In the 1990s, three countries Chile, Colombia and 
Panama achieved favourable situations, with falling poverty and 
unemployment and rising or stable labour force participation among the 
poor. Argentina is a special case: poverty fell moderately there, and the 
unemployment rate of poor households also declined, but the low labour 
force participation rate of these households the lowest of all the 
countries analysed (see table VI.8) gave rise to growing discouragement 
about the prospects of finding work. Thus, if poverty is to be reduced, not 
only is it essential to create employment for workers from poor 
households, but social welfare programmes and monetary transfers from 
the public sector to those households are also indispensable. 
Another development during the 1990s was that inflation was 
brought under control. Since high inflation affects those on lower incomes 
disproportionately, this had an extremely favourable impact on poverty. 
The most striking case is that of Brazil, where control of inflation 
combined with monetary transfer programmes to help bring about a 
12 percentage point reduction in poverty between 1990 and 1996; similar 
processes occurred, although to a lesser degree, in Argentina and Peru. 
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Table VI.8 
LATIN AMERICA: UNEMPLOYMENT, EMPLOYMENT DENSITY AND CONTRIBUTION 
OF TRANSFERS TO INCOME IN HOUSEHOLDS CLOSE TO THE  
POVERTY LINE, 1990s 
Households close to the poverty line 
Transfers as percentage of 
































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted to the 
countries concerned. 
a
 Ratio of employed persons to total household members. 
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Poverty structures are reinforced by various mechanisms that tend to 
perpetuate this condition. Among the poorer strata, not only do families 
tend to have more children, but these face serious limitations in terms of 
access to productive employment, health services, education and the 
benefits of economic progress in general. Child labour and teenage 
pregnancy are also prevalent problems that usually cut short the schooling 
of boys, girls and adolescents, affecting both their own personal 
development and the development prospects of their children. Hence, the 
children of poor parents run a higher risk of remaining poor when they are 
adults, since the obstacles to their finding appropriate employment and the 
risk that poverty will be transmitted across the generations are higher. 
Poverty as measured by the Human Poverty Index6 used by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 1997 and 1999a) is 
showing favourable trends, although the results produced by this method 
do not necessarily agree closely with income poverty trends, since it is less 
affected by immediate economic circumstances. The Human Poverty Index 
shows greater or lesser advances (or setbacks) than the income-based 
poverty index in the different countries (see figure VI.7), although only in 
exceptional cases do the two move in opposite directions. 
Figure VI.7 
POVERTY INDICATORS, 1990s 
Source: Income poverty: ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America, 1998 (LC/G.2050-P), Santiago, 
Chile, April 1999. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.99.II.G.4; Human Poverty Index (HPI): United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report, 1999, New York, 1999. 
6  This index is based on a set of indicators for living conditions and certain specific 
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With respect to income distribution, no significant progress was 
made in the region over the decade (see chapter I). Economic recovery, 
lower inflation and increased public social spending were not sufficient to 
produce any substantial improvement in this indicator. Of a sample of 13 
countries, only five, (Colombia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and 
Uruguay), showed progress in terms of income distribution; the last case 
is noteworthy because the improvements between 1989 and 1996 were 
achieved in a context of weak economic growth (see figure VI.8). In the 
remaining countries, income distribution remained unchanged or actually 
deteriorated in varying degrees (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Venezuela). Among the most striking 
cases were those of Brazil, where a deterioration in the pattern of 
distribution coincided with substantial progress in poverty alleviation; 
Chile, which displayed poor results, despite vigorous economic growth 
and a sharp increase in social spending during the period; and Argentina, 
where economic expansion was accompanied by a deterioration in 
income distribution. In Venezuela, the country with the worst economic 
performance, income concentration increased markedly. 
Regarding relative developments in urban and rural areas, it 
should be stressed that they rarely coincide. In Colombia, rural income 
inequalities were reduced more than in urban areas; in Brazil, there were 
no meaningful differences; and in Chile, the sharp deterioration of income 
distribution in rural areas recorded between 1987 and 1990 was followed 
by a substantial improvement in relation to urban areas. Rural income 
distribution deteriorated slightly in Costa Rica and Panama as compared 
to urban areas, while in Honduras and Mexico the trend moved in the 
opposite direction. Venezuela, lastly, showed a sharp deterioration in 
rural areas, with concentration increasing even more than it did in urban 
areas between 1990 and 1994. 
The causes of the persistent income concentration seen in the 1990s 
have been the subject of much debate, since they involve the whole 
complex mix of factors that determines how the benefits of economic 
growth are appropriated. Among the main factors in the region were, 
firstly, a poor record of job creation, due in part to inadequate economic 
growth and also to a production structure that was unfavourable to 
sectors making intensive use of direct labour; and, secondly, the persistent 
concentration of human capital, particularly in terms of education and 
assets. The poor distribution of income and opportunities also reflects 
major problems of social stratification and exclusion, which continue to be 
transmitted from one generation to the next, and which the current 
development model has no more been able to resolve than those which 
preceded it. 
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Figure VI.8 
LATIN AMERICA (13 COUNTRIES): CHANGES IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION,a
1990-1999
(Countries total) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
countries concerned. 
a
 Calculated by distributing households into per capita income deciles. The data are for whole-country, 
except in Argentina (Greater Buenos Aires) and Ecuador and Uruguay (urban areas). 
With respect to education, the gains made by the lower-income 
sectors have been too limited in quantity and quality to bring them up to 
the level of the higher-income strata. Among households in the six or 
seven lowest per capita income deciles, the average number of years spent 
in education by heads of household, and by the economically active 
members of households generally, tended to equalize in the 1990s, but at 
the same time the gap with the higher deciles widened. While the overall 
average is around eight years of education, the lowest decile has two 
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years less, whilst the highest decile exceeds this average by at least four 
years (12 years or over). 
Hence, despite efforts to raise the educational level of the new 
generations, which have resulted in young people receiving about three 
more years of schooling on average than their parents, there has not been 
any significant improvement in the distribution of educational capital or 
income. Owing to these asymmetries, and to declining returns on 
education in terms of job opportunities, only 47% of young people in 
urban areas and 28% of those living in rural areas have improved on the 
educational level of their parents to the extent that they have kept ahead 
of the increasing exigencies of the labour market and actually have access 
to better employment prospects than the previous generation (ECLAC, 
1998d). This finding is borne out by the results of a number of opinion 
polls, according to which only half of Latin America’s young people feel 
that they enjoy better opportunities than their parents. 
From the point of view of distribution, the favourable effects of 
raising workers’ average educational levels, which was achieved by 
widening not only the coverage of education systems but also access to 
secondary and university education, were counteracted by the widening 
of wage differentials between different skill levels. This combination of 
factors helped to perpetuate widespread, structural inequality in income 
distribution. 
The stable or unfavourable trend of distribution is closely linked to 
the inequality of earnings by education level, which clearly increased over 
the decade. Nevertheless, this effect was offset to some degree by other 
trends, such as the reduction of inflation, the narrowing of disparities 
within groups and the implementation of certain family income support 
policies.
Income differentials between workers with primary and secondary 
education tended to decrease in a number of countries, with positive 
effects on traditional income distribution indicators. However, this 
improvement was counteracted by the widening pay gap between higher-
skilled workers and lower-skilled ones, in particular between those with 
university education and those without. This was reflected in a very sharp 
and generalized increase in pay differentials between professional and 
technical workers and other workers, in both the formal and the informal 
sectors (see table VI.9). 
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Table VI.9
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (17 COUNTRIES): EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALSa
IN URBAN AREAS, 1990-1999 
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Argentina c 1990 211 211 139 93 155 161 
 1999 180 174 147 115 154 152 
Bolivia 1989 237 173 161 138 176 205 
 1999 205 208 191 203 171 154 
Brazil 1990 223 165 135 138 184 194 
 1999 234 171 168 163 163 175 
Chile 1990 217 200 167 136 159 183 
 1998 279 237 188 138 150 159 
Colombia 1991 221 … … … 150 148 
 1999 243 … … … 136 135 
Costa Rica 1990 218 209 146 164 145 152 

















Ecuador 1990 221 148 147 189 165 180 
 1999 175 153 184 204 162 141 
El Salvador 1995 250 155 161 180 164 139 
 1999 232 183 195 195 137 137 
Guatemala 1989 207 229 172 152 154 … 
 1998 265 216 175 209 190 161 
Honduras 1990 257 244 191 264 170 158 
 1999 152 155 201 170 160 135 
Mexico 1989 223 … … … 182 158 
 1998 235 247 164 125 181 179 
Nicaragua 1993 210 209 135 133 131 153 
 1998 248 274 170 186 161 149 
Panama 1991 234 285 168 255 115 132 
 1999 236 289 200 206 122 141 
Paraguay d 1990 189 211 153 125 183 174 
 1999 208 178 162 183 137 149 
Uruguay 1990 210 192 166 120 204 177 
 1999 241 169 181 178 154 172 
Venezuela 1990 186 140 162 111 155 140 
 1999e 230 200 166 128 131 135 
Simple  1990 219 198 157 157 161 165 
average f 1999 221 200 177 174 153 150 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the countries 
concerned. 
a
 Ratios between the average income of the higher-income category and the lower one, multiplied by 100. 
b
 Excludes domestic service. 
c
 Greater Buenos Aires. 
d
 Asunción metropolitan area. 
e This data refers to national total. 
f
 Excludes Colombia, Dominican Republic and Mexico. 
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The wage gap between workers in the formal sector of the economy 
and those in the informal sector also increased, albeit to a lesser degree 
and with wider differences between countries. Since, as already 
mentioned, it is in the informal sector that most new jobs were created, 
this contributed to the worsening distributional situation. The increase in 
this differential reflects both productivity factors and the lack of 
organization and bargaining power (with respect to wages and working 
conditions) of workers in this sector. 
Between 1990 and 1999, wage differentials between higher-skilled 
and lower-skilled workers widened more in the informal sector than in 
the formal sector. This was probably linked to technological change that 
raised the skill levels required of workers in the formal sector, thus 
creating a relative oversupply of unskilled labour. This supply seems to 
have been absorbed by the informal sector at lower wages. At the same 
time, there appears to have been a shift of skilled workers into informal or 
small-scale activities because of the streamlining of production and 
administrative procedures in large corporations and the restructuring of 
the public sector. 
Average pay levels as multiples of the poverty line for the different 
occupational categories are sensitive to the extent of informal working in 
urban areas. A number of very marked trends may be observed in this 
respect (see figure VI.9). Firstly, irrespective of the degree of informality, 
there are differences between wages in the different occupational 
categories. Secondly, as the degree of informality declines, average 
incomes increase for all occupational categories. Thirdly, when 
informality declines, wages for the more skilled categories, especially in 
the formal sector, are the first to improve, so it would seem that the 
formalization of labour involves a deterioration in income distribution.
Lastly, unemployment continued to have an adverse effect on the 
distribution outlook. Unemployment rates were much higher among 
lower-income groups than in the better-off strata; in fact, the 
unemployment rates of the poorest households were twice and in some 
cases three times the average, reflecting acute inequity. Hence, the 
benefits of growth, in terms of higher employment and wage levels, were 
concentrated among the more prosperous socio-economic strata (ECLAC, 
1999d). 
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Figure VI.9 
LATIN AMERICA: AVERAGE INCOME IN POVERTY LINE MULTIPLES AND 
PROPORTION OF THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION WORKING 
 IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR, BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORYa
Source: ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America, 1998 (LC/G.2050-P), Santiago, Chile, April 1999. 
United Nations publication, Sales No. E.99 II.G.4 (tables 4 and 6). 
a
 Regression analysis of pooled data from 17 countries, with 1 to 5 inputs between 1981 and 1997 (total of 
38 observations) for average income in each occupational category (as poverty line multiple) and 
proportion of the economically active population working in the informal sector. The informal sector 
includes non-professional, non-technical, private-sector employees in establishments employing up to 5 
people and non-professional, non-technical own-account workers and unpaid family members. 
4.  Gender equity 
A review of events in the 1990s as they affected women in Latin 
America and the Caribbean reveals progress, inconsistencies and 
ambiguities. In most countries, on the one hand, the structural changes 
that accompanied modernization created the conditions for a substantial 
influx of women into the labour market and for broader access to the 
different levels of education and to health and family planning services. 
These structural changes were brought about by a number of factors: 
firstly, the economic crisis of the 1980s, which forced women to seek paid 
work so that they could contribute to the family budget; secondly, the 
social movement set in train by women themselves and by international 
organizations, which created general acceptance of the idea of gender 
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violence, that had been regarded as belonging to the private sphere; lastly, 
the establishment of government agencies for the advancement of 
women, whose work in this area included mainstreaming concerns about 
gender equity in the public agenda. 
This very progress in opening up the different spheres of social life 
to women, however, has underscored the disparities between their 
situation and that of men. Major inequalities between men and women 
persist: in their participation in decision-making at all levels, in their 
ability to balance family life with activities in the public sphere, and in 
their scope for developing their own abilities and the autonomy that they 
need if they are to exercise their rights as citizens more fully. 
In the 1990s, progress with women’s education was consolidated as 
a result both of improvements in the general level of education and of an 
increase in the enrolment of girls as compared with boys. The superior 
performance of girls at the primary level was reflected in a greater 
number of years of schooling. Girls are thus reaching the middle and 
higher stages of education, with positive implications for their 
participation in the labour market. At the end of the 1990s, however, there 
were still significant shortcomings in the general educational level of 
older women (ECLAC, 1999d). 
While access to education has improved, some major quality 
problems remain unresolved, and this is having adverse effects on equity 
and on the creation of the values needed to underpin a less discriminatory 
society. Academic culture still tends to overrate male potential and to 
ignore or underrate female potential, a problem that is manifested in 
stereotyped educational material, a failure to pay sufficient attention to 
female students in the classroom, a lack of emphasis on science and 
technology and a narrowing of career opportunities. While educational 
policies and reforms in the sector have sought to correct this situation by 
various means, such as the creation of new study plans, stereotype-free 
textbooks and training programmes that equip teachers to promote an 
understanding of gender equity, a great deal still remains to be done. 
Better education for women has had positive effects on society as a 
whole, in particular by improving the educational environment of the 
home. It has also had a positive impact on health, has helped to reduce 
child mortality, and has raised the quality of human resources for 
development. It has not had an equally positive effect, however, on 
gender discrimination in the economic, social, cultural and political 
spheres. 
In the region, developments in the 1990s as regards female labour 
market participation and gender-based wage inequalities demonstrate 
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that the trends are in keeping with general patterns and the variations are 
produced by exceptional factors. The female labour force participation 
rate increased —especially among women aged 25 to 45 and married 
women— among all income strata in both urban and rural areas. The only 
exceptions were the Dominican Republic and El Salvador, where this 
indicator started to decline after having exceeded 50% of the female 
population in the early part of the decade (ECLAC, 1999d). In all cases, 
labour force participation rose by more among women from high-income 
households than among women from poor households. It is particularly 
interesting to note that, by contrast with what happened in the case of the 
economically active male population, there was a close relationship 
between women’s educational levels and their labour force participation 
rate. This rate now exceeds 70% among women with 13 or more years of 
schooling in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala 
and Panama. 
This massive entry by women into the workforce coincided with a 
shift towards service sector employment among the economically active 
female population, whose working conditions became more insecure, and 
towards vertical and horizontal segmentation of labour by gender. 
Women’s wage levels were substantially lower than those of men, and 
most women worked in the informal sector (Arriagada, 1997). This is a 
cause for particular concern in view of the fact that the region’s labour 
market generated few formal jobs in the 1990s, with the result that 
employment quality declined, and this situation was compounded by the 
growing wage differential between skilled and unskilled workers 
(ECLAC, 1997c). 
Women’s working conditions tend to be poorer than men’s, with a 
significant gender gap in pay for equivalent work at all levels of 
education, but especially at the upper end of the scale (ECLAC, 1999d). 
The retirement pensions paid to women perpetuate the pay 
discrimination that affects them during their working lives. This gap has 
tended to narrow, however, and equity has tended to increase, both in 
general and among the categories with professional qualifications, with a 
few exceptions (see table VI.9). 
With respect to health, the main advance in the region has been the 
growing recognition given to the importance of comprehensive health 
care and greater concern about health conditions for women in the 
workplace.7 Nevertheless, complications linked to pregnancy and 
7 There is not enough information available to permit of a thorough evaluation of the 
progress made with comprehensive health care for women. No doubt because of the 
region’s high population growth, the focus has been on reproduction and women’s 
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childbirth are still among the leading causes of death among women of 
child-bearing age. Considering that such deaths are for the most part 
preventable, and that the scientific knowledge and simple technologies 
needed to prevent them are available, this is further compelling evidence 
of inequity.8 Furthermore, whereas in some countries access to family 
planning may differ only slightly from one social stratum to another (with 
the poorest groups always faring worse), in others the disparities are 
enormous. For example, depending on the country, the proportion of 
women living in consensual unions who are unable to meet their family 
planning needs is four to ten times higher among those with a low level 
of education than among those with higher education (ECLAC-CELADE, 
1998a). 
As regards access to health sector benefits, and the quality of these, 
gender inequality, especially as it affects women of child-bearing age, 
female senior citizens and women who are not in paid employment or 
who work in the informal sector, is also manifested in problems of social 
security coverage. A significant percentage of women who devote most of 
their time to domestic duties have limited access to the social health care 
system. Again, social security schemes tend to reinforce the unequal 
distribution of child-raising costs between men and women and of 
benefits between those who work in the formal and informal sectors. 
As more women entered the labour market in the 1990s, and as 
social consensus and government policy came to reflect the new cultural 
norm of equal opportunities, there were signs of a less rigorous 
segregation of roles between the sexes. A rigid, gender-based division of 
labour which means that responsibility for housework is borne almost 
exclusively by women and a virtual absence of support networks for 
domestic tasks, including care for children and the sick, are still among 
the main obstacles preventing women from exercising their rights as 
citizens fully and equitably. The situation is compounded by a lack of 
social recognition for work in the home, which means that reproductive 
tasks are excluded from the spheres considered “important”, and by the 
ability to control their own fertility, while less progress has been made in areas such as 
nutrition, mental health, occupational health and sexual and domestic violence. 
8 Around 1990, the maternal mortality rate was less than 90 deaths per 100,000 live births 
in Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, 
Mexico, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela; between 115 and 
150 deaths per 100,000 live births in Belize, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Jamaica and Nicaragua; and over 220 in Bolivia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Paraguay 
and Peru (ECLAC, 1999b). 
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long working day of women who, in addition to participating in the 
labour market, have to attend to their domestic responsibilities.9
At the legal level, important institutional steps have been taken to 
bring national legislation into line with the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (an instrument ratified by 
all the countries in the region), and this has gradually led to the 
elimination of discriminatory expressions, to the incorporation of the 
principle of non-discrimination and to the enactment of laws that protect 
and guarantee the rights of women, including laws against domestic 
violence and sexual harassment (Binstock, 1998). However, there are still 
major difficulties in applying these standards, something that must be 
attributed to the legal system as a whole, since a wide gap can be seen to 
exist between equality under the law and de facto equality. 
Likewise, empowering women in Latin America and the Caribbean 
to participate more fully in decision-making on issues of public import 
has always been a formidable task, and it continued to be so in the 1990s, 
when steady but still very limited progress was made, especially in 
parliaments and at intermediate levels in agencies of the executive power. 
Of the three powers of the State, the legislature is the sphere in 
which women have made the most significant headway in all countries of 
the region. Nevertheless, there are still marked differences in the 
successes attained, with female representation ranging from 2.5% in the 
Paraguayan Chamber of Deputies (1998) to 27.6% in Cuba and in 
Argentina, where the Women’s Quota Law was passed in 1991. In the 
1990s, the region saw a sharp increase in female representation in the 
central executive. The judiciary, meanwhile, has remained practically 
closed to women, who are completely unrepresented in the supreme 
courts of justice of 8 of the 20 countries for which information is available; 
in the others, they are very much in a minority. 
The fact that women have a very limited active role in development 
policy decision-making helps to explain why they have such difficulty 
in having their problems and needs placed on the government policy-
making agenda, in securing State funding for the implementation 
9 The theoretical and methodological obstacles to including unpaid work in national 
output calculations need to be overcome. The fact that unpaid work is not included in 
systems of national accounts has a negative effect on perceptions of women’s 
productivity, even though they actually work longer hours than men in almost all 
countries (UNDP, 1995). Quantifying the economic contribution of women’s unpaid 
work in the home would be a step towards remedying the disjunction between the 
public (productive) sphere and the private (reproductive) sphere in social organization, 
considering the value inherent in care for the family and the household. 
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of policies to improve their situation and in exercising their rights as 
citizens fully. 
With respect to the institutional framework for policies promoting 
gender equity, the first government offices responsible for implementing 
policies and programmes for the advancement of women were created in 
1976, and further progress in this direction was gradually made during 
the 1980s. All the countries in the region have now set up offices with this 
mandate as part of the State structure. Whereas in the early 1990s the 
great majority of women’s bureaux were situated at intermediate and low 
levels of the State hierarchy and had very limited executive capabilities, 
they received a strong boost in the middle of the decade from the 
adoption of the Regional Programme of Action for the Women of Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 1995-2001 (ECLAC, 1995b) and the Platform 
for Action that came out of the Fourth World Conference on Women 
(Beijing, 1995), as a result of which 16 of these 33 bodies were elevated to 
intermediate and high levels of the State apparatus, their resources were 
increased and their legal mandates and operating and coordination 
capacities were strengthened. 
The development and strengthening of these institutions led to 
progress in the design and formulation of policies and programmes 
consistent with an integrated development focus and gender 
mainstreaming. Accordingly, moves to create government policy 
planning and follow-up instruments resulted in the creation of a broad 
range of sectoral, national and coordination mechanisms, shaping a 
network that integrates women’s programmes and polices at different 
levels.10
Nevertheless, these offices for women face major risks, such as lack 
of continuity in their technical teams, underfunding and the 
precariousness of their institutional position within the State apparatus. 
They have also faced difficulties in policy implementation, follow-up and 
evaluation, and their relationship with civil society organizations has not 
always been rewarding. Moreover, a number of challenges need to be 
overcome if gender policies are to be successfully adopted and 
implemented. These include ideological resistance to change, conceptual 
and methodological complexity, the multiplicity of social and political 
actors involved, conflicts of interest and institutional problems deriving 
from public administration itself. 
10  These mechanisms have played an important role in efforts to assess the position of 
women, improve gender-specific statistics, develop awareness campaigns and training 
programmes and implement programmes and projects for particularly vulnerable 
groups. 
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5.  Public spending and reforms in the social sectors 
(a) Public social spending: recovery and reallocation 
As revenues increased slightly, and as higher priority came to be 
given to meeting social needs, public social spending rose in almost all the 
countries. The effects of this progress on inequality, however, have been 
slow to emerge. For Latin America as a whole, it is estimated that public 
social spending has increased from 10.4% of GDP in 1990-1991 to 13.1% in 
1998-1999, with more significant increases in those countries whose per 
capita social spending was lower at the beginning of the 1990s. In a 
number of countries, the increases were particularly substantial: 7 
percentage points of GDP in Colombia, 6 points in Uruguay, 4.3 points in 
Paraguay and 3.5 points in Peru. In 1998-1999, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama and Uruguay had public social 
spending levels of between 15% and 23% of GDP, values very close to, 
and in some cases higher than, those of several developed countries (see 
table VI.10). 
Comparison of per capita social spending levels in the region 
between the beginning and end of the decade shows that public social 
spending has returned to pre-debt crisis levels. By the end of the decade, 
average per capita expenditure had increased to around US$ 460, a figure 
significantly higher than the US$ 330 (1997 dollars) recorded in 1990-1991, 
representing annual growth of 5.5% (see figure VI.10). Over the period 
1996-1999, however, this rate slowed to an annual average of 3.3%, little 
more than half the level of 6.4% attained in the period 1990-1995. 
In per capita terms, social spending in Colombia, Guatemala, 
Paraguay and Peru showed exceptional growth, nearly or more than 
doubling between 1990-1991 and 1998-1999, although starting from low 
initial values. In the Dominican Republic and Mexico it increased by 
around 50%, while in Bolivia, El Salvador and Uruguay it rose by more 
than 30%. In the other six countries where per capital social spending 
grew (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Panama), the 
increases ranged between 8% and 23%. It declined slightly in only two 
countries (Honduras and Venezuela). Where per capita social spending 
increased over the 1990s, this can be attributed, depending on the 
country, to higher economic growth (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Uruguay), the expansion of overall public spending (Costa Rica, the 
Dominican Republic and Paraguay), higher priority for social spending 
within the public expenditure budget (Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico and 
Peru) or a combination of these factors (Colombia, El Salvador and 
Panama) (ECLAC, 1999d). 
Table VI.10 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (17 COUNTRIES): RATIO OF SOCIAL 
SPENDING TO GDP OVER TIME, BY SECTOR 




























Argentina 17.7 20.5 3.3 4.7 4.0 4.6 8.3 8.7 2.1 2.5 
Bolivia b 12.4 16.1 5.3 6.0 3.1 3.3 1.4 3.9 2.5 3.0 
Brazil b 18.1 21.0 3.7 3.9 3.6 3.4 8.1 11.5 2.7 2.2 
Chile 13.0 16.0 2.6 3.9 2.1 2.8 7.0 7.5 1.4 1.8 
Colombia 8.0 15.0 3.2 4.7 1.2 4.1 3.0 5.2 0.6 1.0 
Costa Rica 15.7 16.8 3.8 4.4 5.0 4.9 4.9 5.9 2.1 1.8 
Dominican Republic 4.3 6.6 1.2 2.8 1.0 1.5 0.4 0.8 1.8 1.5 
El Salvador c 3.3 4.3 2.0 2.7 1.3 1.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Guatemala 3.4 6.2 1.6 2.3 0.9 1.3 0.8 0.9 0.1 1.7 
Honduras 7.9 7.4 4.3 4.1 2.6 2.0 0.1 0.0 0.9 1.3 
Mexicoa 6.5 9.1 2.6 3.8 3.0 2.1 0.3 2.3 0.7 0.9 
Nicaragua 10.8 12.7 5.0 5.7 4.6 4.5 0.0 0.0 1.3 2.5 
Panama 18.6 19.4 4.7 6.0 6.1 6.8 5.9 5.4 2.0 1.3 
Paraguay 3.1 7.4 1.2 3.7 0.3 1.1 1.2 2.6 0.4 0.1 
Peru 3.3 6.8 1.3 2.2 0.7 1.3 1.1 2.8 0.1 0.5 
Uruguay 16.8 22.8 2.5 3.3 2.9 2.8 11.2 16.3 0.3 0.5 
Venezuela 9.0 8.6 3.5 3.8 1.6 1.4 2.4 2.6 1.6 0.8 
           
Simple average d 10.4 13.1 2.9 3.9 2.6 2.9 3.6 4.8 1.2 1.4 
Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, social expenditure database. 
a
 The housing and social welfares figure includes food aid, social welfare and regional and urban development. 
b
 The starting figure is for 1995. 
c Estimate of consolidated social expenditure. The last figure is for 1998. 
d
 The starting figure is an average for 1994-1995. 
e
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Figure VI.10 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): SOCIAL SPENDING, 1990-1991/1998-1999 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information held in the database on social expenditure. 
In those countries where it was lower to begin with, social 
spending grew by an average of 10.7% a year, a rate twice as high as the 
average for countries with higher per capita public social spending. The 
differences between the countries’ income levels are so great, however, 
that large disparities still exist (see figure VI.11). 
Viewed as a whole, public social spending has the characteristics of 
a “higher good”, since the relative weight of social security increases as 
per capita income rises. Spending on human capital (education and 
health) as a percentage of output, rather than being linked to per capita 
income, reflects the priority that countries attach to it. In any event, 
there are large differences between the spending of individual countries 
and the average regional pattern. Given their income levels, Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Panama and Uruguay 
have high levels of social spending as a proportion of per capita GDP. 
By contrast, there is a large group of countries whose per capita 
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PER CAPITA GDP AND SOCIAL SPENDING 
Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, social expenditure database. 
The composition of extra public social spending between 1990-1991 
and 1998-1999 reveals clear shifts in priorities (see table VI.10). Thus, 48% 
of all extra spending went on education and health (37% and 11%, 
respectively), items where spending has relatively progressive effects (see 
below), and 45% on social security, whose implications for equity are less 
clear. The emphasis on the health and education sectors was more 
pronounced in countries with medium and low levels of relative 
spending, since in both cases 61% of the increase went to these areas. In 
countries with lower per capita incomes, the rise in spending on human 
capital was higher in relative terms, whereas extra spending on social 
security was more substantial on average in countries with higher per 
capita incomes, although there were wide variations among them. 
Between 1990-1991 and 1998-1999, spending on education increased 
from 2.9% to 3.9% of GDP, which represented growth of almost 35% in 
absolute terms. This substantial increase in public spending in the sector 
was largely geared towards supporting the efforts being made by a 
number of governments to narrow the gap between teachers’ salaries and 
those of other skilled workers in the public sector. Thus, in the 1990s 
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the country, this growth accounting for between 70% and 80% of the 
additional education spending.11
In the 1990s, on the whole, the public spending which had the most 
progressive effects, i.e., whose benefits went in the largest proportion to 
the lowest-income households, was that allocated to primary and 
secondary education and to health and nutrition. In relation to former 
decades, the main difference now is how progressive secondary education 
spending is, something that illustrates the high marginal progressiveness 
of any type of spending as the coverage of the services funded by it 
expands. Spending on social security and university education is the least 
progressive, a fact that reflects the still limited coverage of these services 
in the region. 
(b) The direction of reform 
In the 1990s, sweeping changes were made to the social protection 
and development systems of the region’s countries. The demands 
unleashed by the institutional and social decline of the preceding decade, 
the increasing acceptance of new approaches to public administration and 
the need to act more vigorously and forcefully in the social sphere led to 
reconsideration of basic tenets of administration and organization as these 
related to social development objectives. 
A large number of countries carried out reforms to social 
development, protection, security and welfare systems, the main areas 
affected being pensions, health, education, housing and social welfare. 
The objective of the changes introduced by these reforms was usually to 
overcome problems that reduced the efficiency and impact of public 
management and spending. Issues such as inadequate coverage, 
inequitable segmentation in subsystems,12 inflexible allocations and 
bureaucratic management and decision-making were seen as obstacles 
that made it very difficult and costly to expand social programmes. 
The basic objective of these reforms was to achieve greater 
efficiency and effectiveness in public administration and social spending 
and to solve problems of access and social coverage for a large proportion 
11 Large increases were seen in Paraguay, Bolivia, Chile and Brazil, where hourly pay rates 
rose each year by 9.5%, 7.8%, 7.8% and 4.0%, respectively. In Uruguay, Costa Rica and 
Ecuador, real increases were lower: 2.8%, 1.7% and 0.4% a year, respectively. 
12 Among the main obstacles to greater solidarity have been the partial and segmented 
coverage of traditional systems and the proliferation of special plans which benefit 
particular population groups. Most of these preferential plans (retirement and health 
protection schemes financed out of the general public budget, housing finance, special 
education services) are expensive, with a fiscal cost that is far above the average for the 
services provided to the population as a whole. 
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of the population. To this end, most of the reforms involved the 
introduction of systems of private participation in the provision and 
financing of social services, subject in some cases to the principle of 
equivalence between contributions paid and benefits received. Such 
mechanisms, while they enhance economic efficiency and financial 
transparency, particularly when considered in relation to the individual, 
are not entirely compatible with the objective of greater solidarity. By the 
same token, efforts were made to give users or beneficiaries greater 
autonomy by means of demand subsidies, often employed in conjunction 
with analytical and operational instruments used to select beneficiaries 
with a view to providing the poorest in society with priority access 
to services. 
As part of the same quest for greater efficiency and transparency in 
public action and benefits, the administrative and fiscal decentralization 
of public management was taken further, the aim in this case being to 
reduce leakage in public spending, achieve greater social control and 
bring beneficiaries closer to decision-making centres. Similarly, the 
institutional system was reorganized by separating out functions and 
responsibilities in financing, services provision and systems regulation. 
In addition, some reforms sought to restructure social services 
allocation and financing systems through the use of public spending 
quotas, local resources, specific sources and increases in contributions, all 
within a framework of rationalization combined with higher expenditure. 
In some cases, reforms sought to achieve greater social 
participation by establishing negotiation, coordination, oversight and 
collective consensus-seeking mechanisms, with the twofold aim of 
achieving greater citizen commitment to established programmes and 
constructing a modern, democratic civic culture through public dialogue 
and an informed approach to dealing with general and individual 
demands. 
(c) Important aspects of sectoral reform 
In the 1990s, particularly vigorous efforts were made to reform the 
social sectors in a number of the region’s countries; this subject has been 
covered in depth in another ECLAC document (2000a). Generally 
speaking, despite the common direction of reforms, the models and 
innovations adopted by the countries were far from homogeneous. 
Education system reforms have addressed issues of financing, 
organization, management, quality and integration with the public and 
social spheres. An early priority was to reconsider the role of central 
government with a view to reinforcing its work of strategic orientation, 
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general regulation and evaluation of the results of the system. Progress 
was also made in decentralizing administration of the system down to 
local governments and educational establishments, in some cases with 
active community involvement. In some countries, new participation 
mechanisms have been set up so that private agents can provide 
compulsory education for poor students, the supply of public education 
being supplemented by individual demand subsidies or payments to 
private establishments catering to the poor target population. Beneficiary 
selection systems and supplementary support programmes (such as 
supplementary nutrition schemes and programmes to provide teaching 
and student materials) have been instrumental in enabling the poorest to 
enter and remain in the school system, thus enhancing the solidarity of 
public spending in this sector. 
In order to build on educational gains, efforts and reforms have 
been geared towards developing evaluation mechanisms, redesigning 
curricula, supplying educational materials, extending school days, 
providing training for teachers, introducing computer science and 
improving infrastructure. As part of this effort, some reforms have sought 
to enhance the economic and cultural position of the teaching profession 
by changing the systems of teacher pay and recognition. 
Educational reforms have not gone far enough either in 
conception or implementation in integrating the activities and aims of 
the educational sector with other fundamental aspects of economic, social 
and cultural life. Hence, coordinating basic education with vocational 
training and research systems, and the latter with the needs of business 
and industry, remains an inescapable challenge. The region thus needs to 
set about developing a system of higher and vocational education with 
wider coverage, more diversity and greater economic impact, with close 
links to the system of scientific and technological research and innovation, 
and with the capacity to generate the new knowledge that 
competitiveness requires. 
The health system reforms carried out have generally helped 
increase membership of contributory systems by establishing family 
coverage and integrating numerous different protection schemes, the 
proliferation of which has been particularly great in the case of public-
sector workers. They have also changed benefit rules by introducing risk 
insurance mechanisms linking contributions to individual or group risk 
indicators. Compulsory contributions based on members’ income have 
been maintained. The different national reforms can be divided into three 
models, each with its own combination of public and private insurance 
and, consequently, with its own financial structure, access conditions 
and benefits. 
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The first model introduces private insurance with individual 
equivalence, competition in insurance provision and structural 
segmentation, an example of this approach being the reform carried out in 
Chile in 1981. With this model, the private contributory scheme makes no 
provision for solidarity within the system in the form of cross-subsidies; 
these are a feature of the public-sector insurance system, but within the 
private scheme they can only be provided out of the public budget 
(external to the system). The distinctive features of the second model are 
collective equivalence, universal insurance, competition among 
administrators of the single insurance plan chosen by subscribers and 
progressive integration of segmented structures. One example is the 1993 
reform in Colombia, where a single national fund and per capita 
premium13 brought in the element of solidarity. For poor and informal 
groups there is a single insurance system, subsidized by public funds and 
transfers from members of the contributory system. The third model, of 
which the reform carried out in Costa Rica in 1996 provides an example, 
works on the basis of collective equivalence and universal insurance, with 
a single fund and administration and an unvarying financial structure 
(compulsory tripartite contributions). In this case, the collection, funding 
and service buying and provision functions have been separated 
internally to create quasi-markets; in only a few cases are services 
provided privately. 
Eight countries in the region have reformed their pension systems. 
This has generally involved the creation of individual funding systems 
with savings accounts that allow benefits to be linked directly to the 
contributions of each subscriber. The savings go into pension funds 
managed by private administrators. Under this system, benefits (pension 
payments) in each individual case are based on the amount saved and the 
financial yields obtained during the contribution period. To improve 
financial balance, the reforms have introduced more demanding 
requirements as regards contribution amounts and periods and the 
minimum retirement age. The methods used to switch from one system to 
another and the overall structure of these systems are not the same in all 
cases, however, and may be divided into three models, whose common 
features are that the State administers the public components, provides 
top-up funding for those who do not succeed in accruing the capital 
needed for a minimum pension, and provides welfare pensions for the 
13 The capitation payment unit (or UPC) is the premium or sum received by the fund 
administrators. Its amount, which varies according to the subscriber’s age, sex and place 
of residence in such a way as to compensate for differences between individual risks, is 
not dependent on the amount paid by the individual subscriber. This is a set proportion 
of wages, of which two thirds is paid by the employer and one third by the employee. 
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indigent. The State is also responsible for regulating and supervising the 
private system. 
The first model (substitution) abolishes the existing public pension 
programme and replaces it completely with a new individual funding 
system; this is the chief characteristic of the pioneering reform introduced 
in Chile (1981), which was adapted and implemented by Bolivia (1997), 
Mexico (1997) and El Salvador (1998). With the second model (parallel or 
dual system), the public programme is not done away with, but loses its 
exclusivity and runs alongside an individual funding system, with 
contributors having a choice between the two; Peru (1993) and Colombia 
(1993) opted for this model. The third model (mixed) maintains a 
standardized, improved public programme which guarantees a basic 
universal pension, combined with a new individual funding regime, 
which provides a top-up pension. An approach of this kind was used for 
the reforms in Argentina (1994) and Uruguay (1996). 
As regards social housing, reforms were geared towards changing 
the traditional public role whereby the State took direct responsibility for 
the financing, construction and self-regulation of housing for the poor. 
Urban reform and demand subsidy schemes were introduced together 
with certain incentives needed to ensure that market mechanisms could 
operate in this segment, while credit subsidies tended to disappear. 
Although funding earmarked for this purpose increased roughly in line 
with total social spending, and annual housing production in some 
countries in the region exceeded growth in demand, the housing deficit 
did not diminish in the 1990s. The greatest impact was achieved by 
improving the coverage and quality of public services, particularly 
drinking water provision. 
With respect to social safety nets, which are designed to protect the 
poor during periods or situations of crisis, the 1990s saw the conversion of 
social emergency and investment funds into more permanent structures, 
although their lack of specificity has made them vulnerable to budget 
adjustments. Particular progress was made, however, in developing 
public agencies responsible for disaster prevention and mitigation, whose 
response and reaction capabilities are now stronger as a result. 
(d) Lessons for further reform 
Most of the reforms are relatively recent and are likely to take time 
to develop their full potential; nevertheless, important lessons can be 
learned, as long as it is recognized that there is still a long way to go. The 
reforms implemented hold out the promise of substantial efficiency gains 
in social services provision, as they have created the conditions for better 
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resource management in the public and private spheres, closer links 
between resource allocation and performance criteria and the creation of 
quasi-market mechanisms in public-sector structures. 
It has generally been recognized that coverage which in some 
social sectors is still insufficient in most of the countries needs to be 
expanded. The objective is to move towards universal systems that can 
protect poor households and those whose income comes from informal 
work. Consequently, it has been essential to create alternative 
mechanisms to ensure that paid employment is not a precondition for 
continuity of access to services and safety nets and that these are not 
suspended when earnings temporarily cease. 
Although fiscal requirements vary with financing structures, the 
degree of solidarity, income levels and the profile of risks and needs, 
reforms are unlikely to reduce pressure on public spending in absolute 
terms. This is because the need for protection is still growing in terms of 
both quantity and quality; because the sharp divide between public and 
private structures limits the financial solidarity of higher-income sectors; 
and because social services are becoming more expensive to provide as 
their complexity and the quality demanded of them increase. 
Moreover, it is undeniable that higher coverage and quality 
requirements, and recognition for the full range of social rights, which are 
especially important in the poorest countries, call for a further increase in 
resources. Thus, for example, the increased demand for social security 
(health care and pensions) resulting from the demographic and 
epidemiological transitions requires higher spending, as does the need to 
expand higher education. Hence, improving management in order to 
achieve greater efficiency gains is crucial. 
Subsidy and beneficiary selection policies have become more 
effective in achieving the aims of progressiveness and equity in access to 
social services, and are now perceived as more reliable and credible, 
although it has to be recognized that they have not always been 
commensurate with the scale of programmes and the level of supply, 
information and transparency required. 
The region’s labour market structure and per capita income levels 
have meant that the need to maintain and strengthen solidarity 
mechanisms in the systems used to finance social safety nets has been 
central. Efficiency gains have sometimes been achieved at the expense of 
solidarity. To avoid this, sources of funding need to be more clearly 
specified, particularly where combinations of general and specific taxes 
are involved. 
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In order to protect the population in times of crisis, the countries 
have had to develop mechanisms, plans and resources capable of being 
deployed rapidly in response to unforeseen circumstances. There is 
clearly a need for them to develop forecasting, response and saving 
mechanisms that enhance their ability to deal with such situations. 
Regulatory systems also need to be strengthened to ensure that 
private participation does not result in the exclusion of those who are on 
low incomes, work in the informal sector or have higher levels of risk. 
When the public-private mix is determined, each sector’s role in 
financing, provision and regulation must be clearly defined. Experience 
shows that a poor public-private mix has negative effects on equity and 
efficiency. Thus, for example, one result may be risk selection or “market 
skimming”, which has adverse effects on equity without reducing the 
effective demand for resources that the public sector has to meet. 
In general, all the reforms have revealed a clear need for thorough 
consideration of the design and implementation of regulatory and 
supervisory systems, particularly as regards competition practices and 
access, levels and degrees of protection, quality assurance, public 
information and conflict resolution. This is still a new area of 
development, and major efforts are required to strengthen real 
capabilities and the workings of institutions. 
As regards social housing, experience shows that policy in this area 
needs to be supplemented by a variety of measures: the design of 
incentives for the development of a competitive private-sector social 
housing industry which complies with appropriate quality standards 
(area, distribution, building materials and urban planning criteria); public 
policies to restrain urban land appreciation and speculation (the main 
factor pushing up housing costs in cities) and ensure that a minimum 
level of infrastructure and services is in place; the introduction of financial 
mechanisms that combine public subsidies, family savings and mortgage 
loans in an appropriate and expeditious manner; and incentives for self-
help home building and improvement, given the extent of the problem of 
substandard housing and the greater affordability of these approaches for 
beneficiaries. In the case of extremely poor households, subsidies 
covering the full cost of the housing unit might even be considered. 
Given the scale and diversity of the lessons and challenges 
emerging from the 1990s, continued reform will require a renewed, 
broadly based consensus embracing the great majority of economic, 
political and social actors in each country, so that basic agreement can be 
reached on the main elements in the social agenda. This consensus has not 
come easily in the countries of the region, but in the last few years 
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progress has been made, albeit slowly and falteringly.14 If citizens are 
committed to a new social development strategy, they are more likely to 
participate actively in solving problems and attaining objectives, and they 
will value their social services all the more as the fruit of their own efforts. 
14  The content and pace of reform depend on the social, political and economic 
characteristics of each country. By this is meant not only the levels of need and quality 
problems affecting them, which vary enormously from country to country in the region, 
but also their capabilities, stock of physical infrastructure and degree of commitment. 
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Chapter VII 
Creating opportunities for sustainable 
development 
The scope for creating new sustainable development opportunities 
is closely related to the way the environmental situation and agenda in 
Latin America and the Caribbean developed during the 1990s, and to the 
profound changes that the world’s population has experienced, 
particularly as a result of globalization. 
Growing international awareness of the environmental aspects of 
development has gradually made its influence felt in the region’s public 
policies, resulting in the establishment of institutions and the formulation 
of government strategies and policies for environmental protection 
nationally and locally, together with subregional and regional 
cooperation initiatives. Another result has been the steady emergence of 
mechanisms through which civil society can participate in addressing 
sustainable development issues. 
Despite the efforts that have been made, though, data on the state 
of the environment in Latin America and the Caribbean show that the 
damage has increased further in recent years. This compromises the 
future development of the region’s countries, whose economies largely 
depend on the sustainability of the productive capacity of ecosystems 
over the long term. 
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1. The international environmental context of the 
1990s
In the early 1990s, a combination of positive and negative 
developments in the regional and global situations weakened yet further 
the ability of current development styles then being applied to respond to 
new challenges. In addition to the long-standing problems of poverty and 
inequality, efforts to achieve sustainable growth now had to take account 
of ecological and environmental constraints and requirements in a 
complex context of economic globalization. 
Since the time of “Only One Earth” (United Nations Conference on 
the Human Environment, Stockholm, 1972), the concept of sustainable 
development has inexorably changed the perception of environmental 
problems. In Stockholm, the emphasis was on the technical aspects of 
pollution caused by rapid industrialization, population growth and 
accelerating urban expansion. This excessively technocratic approach 
assumed that pollution problems would be overcome by technological 
progress. The notion of sustainable development was popularized in 1987 
with the publication of “Our Common Future” (also known as the 
Brundtland Report), and given a further impetus by the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development held in 1992 (Rio 
Conference). 
The early 1990s, which were a time of profound change, also 
displayed encouraging signs of real movement in the international 
environmental agenda. The Rio Conference represented progress in many 
respects. The foundations of sustainable development were consolidated 
on the basis of a new approach to global environmental issues which, as 
the decade progressed, became increasingly interwoven with 
globalization, a process that until then had been confined to economics. 
The concept of sustainable development was put on the international 
agenda, not just where the treatment of environmental issues by the 
community of nations was concerned, but also in relation to other 
matters such as poverty, women, population and human settlements (see 
chapter 1). At the same time, new opportunities were created for 
participation by non-State actors, especially the scientific community and 
the private sector, and the role of non-governmental organizations and 
civil society was strengthened. The 184 heads of State and government 
who met in Rio de Janeiro recognized the global nature of environmental 
problems and their inseparability from  key development problems. For 
example, although the production and consumption of fossil fuels may 
have quite localized consequences, nobody can escape the effects of 
climate change. Accordingly, one of the key ideas for successfully 
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confronting international environmental issues that emerged on that 
occasion was the need to think globally and act locally. 
The Rio Conference consolidated an emerging international 
environmental regime, given substance by a new generation of global 
agreements and conventions and by a programme of action (Agenda 21) 
designed to guide the transition towards a sustainable development style. 
The main pillars of this new international regime include the so-called 
“precautionary principle”. This is a genuine revolution in legal and public 
policy terms, as for the first time it is recognized that when the 
environment is in danger of suffering irreversible damage or alteration, a 
lack of scientific certainty cannot be used to prevent corrective measures 
being adopted or justify failure to do so. It was also recognized that 
developed countries had a different order of responsibility from 
developing ones when it came to remedying negative global externalities 
resulting from the formers’ history of industrialization (the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities). It was thus agreed that the 
immediate steps to reverse environmental deterioration should be taken 
by the industrialized countries and be based on more equitable 
international cooperation.1 The principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities can be viewed as an international version of another 
principle known as “polluter pays”, which is widely incorporated into 
many countries’ environmental regulations, and which makes the agent 
causing the pollution legally responsible for indemnifying the damage 
caused. 
Despite this progress in the domain of international law and the 
major efforts made to negotiate and consolidate the multilateral 
environmental agenda, institutional and operational progress and results 
in terms of concrete policies to achieve sustainability continue to be very 
slow in coming. This is particularly true as regards the investment 
amounts needed to implement Agenda 21, estimated at US$ 600 billion a 
year. The magnitude of this figure shows that the transition of developing 
countries towards sustainable growth paths is a huge investment 
challenge. The international macroeconomic climate of the 1990s, 
however, prevented the necessary funds from being mobilized. 
1 In 1991, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) was created to help developing 
countries finance the additional costs they would face in addressing environmental 
problems of global scope (loss of biodiversity, climate change, depletion of the ozone 
layer and other issues related to international waters and desertification). By 1998 the 
financial contribution of GEF had totalled over US$ 2 billion, of which about US$ 400
million had gone to finance projects in Latin America and the Caribbean. The agencies 
operating this fund are the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP); most of its financing 
comes from developed countries. 
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Another issue that came to feature prominently on the international 
agenda was the potential for conflict between national environmental 
regulations and the multilateral free trade disciplines administered by the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). For example, environmental 
regulations adopted by countries (phytosanitary regulations, ecological 
labelling, technology standards and specific processes, among others) 
could act as non-tariff barriers and be manipulated for protectionist 
purposes. Environmental regulations in industrialized countries could 
conflict in various ways with those in force in developing countries. Table 
VII.1 sets out some of the aspects of the common trade and environment 
agenda that have been studied by WTO. 
2. Institutional progress in relation to environmental 
management
Growing awareness of the environmental aspects of development 
has gradually been informing the region’s public policies and economic 
and social practices, and has led to the creation of institutions and the 
implementation of government strategies and policies for environmental 
protection and the diffusion of sustainable development concepts in the 
education system, culture, the communications media, social demands 
and business practices. Despite this progress, many production sectors 
and not a few government economic policy makers continue to view the 
principles of environmental protection and sustainability as a hindrance 
to development. In addition, sustainable development has been regarded 
as being synonymous with environmental management, and thus of little 
relevance to existing economic and financial institutions. 
The adjustments made in the wake of the economic crisis that 
buffeted the region in the 1980s, compounded by frequent 
macroeconomic disturbances in the 1990s, had a negative effect on 
environmental institutions that had only recently been created and were 
not strong enough. The need to curb public spending restricted the scope 
for undertaking environmental impact studies and environmental audits, 
or for following up pre-investment studies that predicted major 
environmental consequences. In practice, the ability of the public sector to 
halt the worsening environmental deterioration of critical ecosystems and 
control pollution was seriously undermined. 
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Table VII.1 
TOPICS INCLUDED IN THE WORK PROGRAMME OF THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION (WTO) COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT 
Topic Observations 
1. Trade-related environmental 
measures (TREMs) 
The relationship between the rules of the multilateral 
trading system and trade-related environmental 
measures (TREMs), including those contained in 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). 
2.  Environmental measures with 
effects on trade 
The relationship between the rules of the multilateral 
free trade system and environmental policies and 
measures with significant effects on trade. 
3. Product surcharges, taxes 
and standards (including 
packaging and labelling)  
The relationship between the rules of the multilateral 
trading system and (i) surcharges and taxes for 
environmental purposes; (ii) environmental product 
requirements, including standards, technical 
regulations, packaging, labelling and recycling. 
4. Transparency of 
environmental measures 
Provisions in the free trade system relating to the 
transparency of trade measures used for 
environmental purposes and environmental 
measures and requirements with significant effects 
on trade. 
5. Dispute settlement 
The relationship between dispute settlement 
mechanisms in the multilateral trading system and 
those contained in multilateral environmental 
agreements. 
6. Access to markets and 
environmental benefits as a 
result of trade liberalization  
Analysis of the effects of environmental measures 
on access to markets, especially for developing 
countries, and to the environmental benefits of 
removing trade barriers. 
7.  Export of domestically 
prohibited goods (DPGs) 
Study of export trade in goods that cannot be traded 
in the producing country. 
8. Agreement on trade-related 
aspects of  intellectual 
property rights (TRIPs) 
Includes aspects relating to technology transfer, 
genetic and biotechnology resources, protection of 
traditional rights, plant patents and the control of 
environmentally hazardous technologies. 
9. Trade in services Study of the interaction between trade in  services 
and environmental protection. 
10. Relations with non-
governmental organizations 
Agreement on appropriate mechanisms for 
establishing a relationship with non-governmental 
organizations as set out in WTO article V and the 
documentation on transparency. 
Source: K.P. Ewing and R.G. Tarasofky, “The Trade and Environment Agenda. Survey of Major Issues 
and Proposal: from Marrakesh to Singapore”, Environmental Policy and Law Paper, No. 33, Gland, 
Switzerland, World Conservation Union (IUCN)/ International Council of Environmental Law (ICEL), 1997. 
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(a) Regional and subregional initiatives 
In response to the new international situation, the countries of the 
region established or strengthened a number of major regional and 
subregional cooperation processes and mechanisms. In some cases, 
existing schemes were extended to take in environmental issues, one 
example being the Amazon Cooperation Treaty, signed in 1978,  which  
provided the framework for  the 1989 Special Commission on the 
Environment of the Amazon Region. In other cases, supranational 
cooperation was built around the relationship between the environment 
and sustainable development. Lastly, an environmental dimension was 
built into the institutional structure of most trade and integration treaties, 
and in some cases into the obligations stemming from such treaties 
as well. 
In Central America and the Caribbean there are a number of 
subregional environmental cooperation initiatives. These include the 
Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island 
Developing States in the Caribbean, approved in Barbados in 1994, and 
the Alliance for Sustainable Development of Central America (Alides), 
which was set up in 1994, and whose aim is to strengthen integration 
among the countries of the Central American isthmus on common 
sustainable development foundations. The Central American Commission 
on Environment and Development (CACED), instituted in 1989, has 
gained in importance as the subregional forum for environment ministers 
or equivalent authorities. Under its auspices, a series of subregional 
agreements have been proposed on biodiversity, hazardous waste, forests 
and other issues, on which common positions have been adopted for the 
first time, the result being a portfolio of environmental projects and a 
successful financial strategy. One of the most interesting initiatives is the 
Mesoamerican Biological Corridor.2 Here, regional cooperation in pursuit 
of the environmental goal of conserving biodiversity has made it possible 
to integrate bio-regional planning3 into the process of reconstructing and 
2 Mesoamerica, also known as Middle America, is defined as the region encompassing the 
five southern states of Mexico, Belize and the six countries of the Central American 
isthmus (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama). The 
region contains great geological, geographical, climatic and biotic diversity, accounting 
for about 7% of the world’s total biodiversity. The Mesoamerican Biological Corridor 
programme was approved in 1997 at the nineteenth Summit Meeting of Central 
American Presidents, and it receives financial support from GEF. 
3 A bioregion is an area defined by the inter-relationship between ecological systems and 
human communities in a given territory. It represents the geographical and social space 
needed to ensure the reproduction of nature while allowing this natural wealth to be 
used in human activities aimed at improving the quality of life for present and future 
generations. 
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modernizing Central America and southern Mexico, while also 
strengthening other regional cooperation initiatives relating to energy and 
tourism.
There have also been activities aimed at implementing the 
agreements reached in Rio de Janeiro. These include the creation of the 
Forum of Ministers of the Environment of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, which is participated in by more than 30 ministers, heads of 
organizations and environmental commissions from the region. The 
Forum meets every two years to discuss specific regional problems and to 
exchange ideas on proposals to be presented in global forums and on 
regional cooperation agreements. The meetings held in Havana (1995), 
Buenos Aires (1996), Lima (1998) and Barbados (2000), together with the 
Conference on Environmental Management held in Washington in 1998, 
have helped consolidate the Forum as an effective mechanism for 
establishing regional positions. 
Negotiations in connection with the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol identified the 
need to strengthen regional positions and exchange information on 
proven energy efficiency measures that can help reduce carbon emissions. 
In addition, countries such as Brazil and Costa Rica played a leading role 
in designing and negotiating the clean development mechanism (CDM) 
proposed in the Kyoto Protocol, which represents the first step towards a 
global market in carbon emissions. 
A number of countries are preparing to play a full part in global 
negotiations. Thus, for example, several have completed their national 
reports on the climate change convention, including inventories of 
greenhouse gases and research into different ways of mitigating and 
adapting to this phenomenon. The national reports prepared by 
Argentina and Mexico are particularly noteworthy, as is the energy use 
experiment conducted in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil with the participation of 
several sectors. 
Although the region’s trade and integration agreements and 
treaties have historically contained few or no clauses on environmental 
protection, countries are facing growing pressure to incorporate 
environmental components into these agreements as they increasingly 
participate in international markets and forge links with trade blocs that 
make stringent demands in this respect. 
The explicit treatment given to environmental issues in the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and, to a lesser extent, in 
MERCOSUR and the Andean Community, are signs of an incipient 
change in direction. The way environmental conditions are incorporated 
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into these trade treaties is likely to be an important reference point for 
future negotiations. Given the need for compatibility, it is very likely that 
the countries will be forced to adopt more advanced regulations, and they 
may even benefit from the transnationalization of environmental issues 
and citizen pressure in this regard. 
Although the MERCOSUR treaty was signed during the year of 
preparations for the Earth Summit (Rio de Janeiro, 1992), it gave little 
consideration to environmental issues. In August 1994, an initial step was 
taken with the approval of basic environmental policy guidelines that 
proposed targets to be included in member States’ environmental policy 
and legislation. One year later, ministers agreed that a working subgroup 
on the environment should be set up with the task of formulating and 
proposing strategies and guidelines to guarantee environmental 
protection and integrity. In the Andean Community, whose history goes 
back to 1969, the issue was first embraced only as recently as 1998 with 
the creation of the Andean Committee of Environmental Authorities, 
whose mission is to advise and support the General Secretariat on 
environmental policy in the Community. 
The NAFTA agreement, signed by the Governments of the United 
States, Canada and Mexico, came into force on 1 January 1994. 
Subsequently, two side-agreements on cooperation were included, one 
dealing with labour issues and the other with the environment. The 
attention given to the latter was unprecedented in the history of trade 
treaties. Both the main text and this side-agreement contained explicit 
provisions on the environment for the first time ever, for which reason it 
has been considered the greenest trade treaty ever signed. As such, it 
represents a landmark and perhaps a turning point in the history of trade 
treaties. It is important to stress that neither the treaty itself nor the 
agreement impose their own environmental standards; rather, they give 
each country’s authorities the right to set the environmental protection 
levels they consider most appropriate and to promote environmental 
improvement insofar as this lies within their power. The Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation accompanying the Canada-Chile Free Trade 
Agreement, which came into effect in 1997, took a similar approach. 
This tendency to include environmental issues in trade agreements 
has met with strong resistance, however, in the negotiations to establish 
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) initiated at the first Summit 
of the Americas (Miami, 1994). Environmental issues have so far been 
excluded from these negotiations because of pressure from Latin 
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American countries,4 which fear environmental regulations might be used 
for protectionist purposes by the United States and Canada. Outside the 
sphere of trade negotiations, agreements on environmental issues were 
built into the Plan of Action for the Sustainable Development of the 
Americas, approved in Santa Cruz de la Sierra in 1996. 
(b) National environmental policies  
The Rio Conference gave a new impetus to two basic 
environmental management strategies. The first favours the formulation 
and execution of environmental policies in their own right, while the 
second aims to incorporate environmental policies into other public 
policies. Most of the countries adopted the first strategy and set up 
specialized environment ministries that take an integrated approach to 
the issues of environmental pollution, natural and water resource 
management and sustainable development. Some countries opted for the 
second strategy, however, and created intersectoral environment councils 
or commissions. Table VII.2 sets out the changes made to environment-
related regulatory and institutional frameworks in a number of the 
region’s countries between the 1980s and 1990s. 
The global conventions agreed in 1992 have also led to a number of 
important institutional changes, and to the establishment of innovative 
cooperation mechanisms. For example, most countries either have created 
or are in the process of creating specific bodies such as commissions, 
institutes and national programmes on biodiversity. In addition, a start 
has been made on conducting evaluations, such as national reports 
providing inventories of greenhouse gases, to fulfil the terms of the 
climate change convention. 
4 While reaffirming the commitment to establish the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA), the declaration issued at the Eleventh Summit of Heads of State and 
Government of the Rio Group (Asunción, 1997) states that “the relationship between 
trade and the environment (...) should be dealt with exclusively (...) by the Committee on 








LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS 
(Inter-decade comparison) 
1980s 1990s Country 
Highest authority and legal structure governing environmental issues Highest authority and legal structure governing environmental issues 
Office for Environmental Policy (secondary level in ministry); in the late 
1980s, Special Commission; low effectiveness 
Secretary of Natural Resources and Sustainable Development (State 
ministry);a Federal Environmental Council; specific agencies in each 
province Argentina 
 Sectoral laws, mainly concerning natural resources; specific regulations; 
few standards 
Some sectoral laws; deregulation laws with an environmental component; 
constitutional reform; few standards or environmental impact assessments 
Presidential Advisory Commission;  Under-Secretary of Renewable 
Natural Resources and Environment (in the Ministry of Campesino 
Affairs and Agriculture) 
Vice-ministry of Environment, Natural Resources and Forest Development 
(within the Ministry); Sustainable Development Council; decentralization Bolivia 
Some sectoral laws, very weakly applied; limited standards Parent law and complementary sectoral laws; adequate regulations and 
standards; sectoral environmental impact assessment 
Special Secretariat for the Environment (SEMA) (State ministry); 
National Council for the Environment (Conama), coordinating body; 
Brazilian Environment and Renewable Resources Institute (Ibama), 
executive body 
Ministry of the Environment, Water Resources and the Amazon Treaty 
Region; National Council for Natural Resources and Inter-Ministerial 
Commission for Sustainable Development 
Brazil 
National Environmental Policy Act; constitutional reform; general 
environmental impact assessment; majority of standards 
National Environmental Policy Act in force; new modernized sectoral laws; 
majority of standards and regulations 
Authority dispersed among sectors; National Energy Commission 
(Conade) exists as coordinating body, but the little action there is is 
weak 
National Environment Commission (Conama), collegiate coordinating  
body, chaired by Council of Ministers, decentralized agencies in each 
region 
Political constitution; water and mining codes; sanitary laws, some 
standards
Parent law; specific regulations; new sectoral laws; adequate standards; 
national system of environmental impact assessment 
Chile 
Renewable Natural Resources Code; sectoral laws with regulations, 
mostly relating to sanitation 
Natural Resources Code in force; constitutional reform; parent law and 
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Table VII.2 (concluded)
1980s 1990s Country Highest authority and legal structure governing environmental issues Highest authority and legal structure governing environmental issues 
Colombia Environmental authority dispersed among various institutions; National Institute for Renewable Natural Resources and the Environment (Inderena), 
coordinating body; incipient decentralization process 
Ministry of Environment; National Environment System (Sina) and 
National Council for the Environment; decentralization process 
Renewable Natural Resources Code; sectoral laws with regulations, mostly 
relating to sanitation 
Natural Resources Code in force; constitutional reform; parent law 
and new sectoral laws; adequate standards and regulations 
Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mines; Ministry of Health 
(dispersed authority). National Environment System (Sisnama) and National 
Environment Commission (Conama) 
Ministry of the Environment, Energy and Mines; Sustainable 
Development Council; decentralized environmental management 
Costa Rica 
Sectoral laws, emphasizing sanitary protection and limits on the exploitation 
of natural resources; few standards 
Constitutional reform; parent law; some new sectoral laws; improved 
standards and regulations; limited environmental impact assessment 
Sectoral dispersion: authority vested in two under-ministries (Natural 
Resources and Health); executive body at departmental level in ministries 
Specific under-ministry and executive-level body responsible for 
coordination among sectoral offices and local authorities 
Jamaica 
Old sectoral laws; few standards Parent law and other new sectoral legislation; system of 
environmental permits and licences; limited standards 
Ministry of Urban Development and Ecology (Sedue), at ministerial level, with 
an Under-Secretariat (or Vice-Ministry) of Ecology 
Secretariat of the Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries 
(ministerial level)b and National Council for Sustainable Development 
Mexico 
Federal environmental parent law, plus sectoral laws; constitutional reform; 
environmental impact assessment; minimum standards and regulations 
Reformed federal environmental parent law, modernized sectoral 
laws; majority of standards and minimum regulations 
Ministerial departments of health and agriculture; other sectoral offices; 
National Office for the Evaluation of Natural Resources (ONERN), at 
executive level 
National Environmental Council (Conam), limited coordinating body, 
chaired by the Council of Government Ministers; environmental 
responsibilities by area Peru 
Non-integrated sectoral laws; political constitution; sectoral regulations; few 
standards
Amended Natural Resources Code; deregulation laws with an 
environmental component; constitutional reform; minimum standards 
and environmental impact assessment 
Source: Guillermo Acuña, Marcos regulatorios e institucionales ambientales de América Latina y el Caribe en el contexto del proceso de reformas macroeconómicas: 
1980-1990 (LC/R.2023), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2000. 
a The Secretary remain with this structure until December, 1999. After that, the new administration downgraded the Secretary and went back to the institutional framework 
of the eighties. b This secretariat changed in 2000 when “Fisheries” was move to the Secretary of Agriculture. 
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Major progress has also been made with environmental legislation. 
General environmental laws have been enacted, and a range of technical 
standards and instruments have been brought into operation for planning 
(land-use management and environmental impact assessments), pollution 
control and environmental engineering, conservation of protected areas 
and ecological restoration. The purpose of most of these laws, regulations 
and standards has been to strengthen environmental policies of the 
command-and-control type. 
Macroeconomic and sectoral policy decisions also contain an 
implicit environmental component.5 There is no certainty as yet about the 
likely effects that the new approaches to economic management will have 
on the environment, although the relative weight of sectors that make use 
of natural resources has increased in many countries. If economic policies 
in the agriculture, energy and industrial and urban development sectors 
are considered jointly in this context, it transpires that there are significant 
contradictions in relation to the environment, which means there is a need 
for environmental policies and management tools to be reviewed and 
analysed in depth. Meanwhile, policies encouraging land take-up, which 
have been one of the leading causes of deforestation in some places, are 
being used less now than in the past. 
In most cases, decisions by economic agents that affect the 
environment are made in response not to signals from the environmental 
regulatory framework, but to measures taken by the economic authorities. 
Most explicit environmental policies in the region are reactive, and their 
purpose is to abate the adverse effects of production and consumption. 
Nearly all public-sector environmental bodies concentrate on solving 
urgent problems caused by the polluting effects of urban and industrial 
expansion, deforestation, soil erosion, the depletion of marine resources 
and contamination caused by mining activity (Gligo, 1997). 
Environmental policies of a preventive nature, whose main instruments 
are land-use management and environmental impact assessment, have 
received less attention. 
As will be seen later, analysis of the environmental situation shows 
that the countries of the region have not been able to call an effective halt 
to ecological deterioration and pollution, despite new constitutional and 
legislative frameworks and high-level institutional schemes. Although 
5 Macroeconomic policies with an implicit environmental component include trade and 
export development, fiscal and foreign investment policies. Interest rate management 
also has a major influence on the environment because of its influence on agents’ inter-
temporal preferences. Sectoral policies with a major environmental impact include those 
relating to industrial development, energy, agriculture and forestry, along with urban 
development, infrastructure and transport policies. 
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significant progress has been made with environmental legislation, actual 
enforcement and compliance are generally very unsatisfactory. The 
behaviour of the agents mainly responsible for environmental 
degradation has not changed as much as the legislation envisaged, and it 
is rare for fines actually to be levied for illegal conduct. Society perceives 
the existence of large enclaves of impunity, and this undermines the 
prestige of laws and standards as suitable tools of environmental 
management, while detracting from the credibility of the institutions 
responsible for oversight and management.6 Evaluation of different 
experiences reveals the key role played in environmental development by 
the consolidation of strong institutions capable of responding to economic 
and social policy challenges. Frequently, environmental authorities are 
obliged to negotiate with their economic counterparts from a position of 
patent weakness. 
Comparative analyses of environmental management have focused 
on executive agencies, with little being said about the role of the 
legislature and judiciary. Most of the countries have set up specialist 
environment commissions in parliament, thereby helping to promote 
legislative debate on these issues. Nonetheless, there is a need to review 
and strengthen the capabilities of legislatures so that they can respond 
better to citizen demands. It is also worth highlighting the increasing role 
of the judiciary in protecting diffuse rights, and in designing and 
implementing procedures to deal with environmental offences. This 
suggests that it would be advisable to consider what role could be played 
by ombudsmen and public prosecutor’s offices as mechanisms to promote 
environmental justice. 
(c) Local activities 
Environmental powers have been transferred to local governments 
as a result of decentralization, but in many countries there is a worrying 
absence of policies for urban areas (see chapter 9). Municipal 
governments have responsibilities that include implementing 
environmental controls, punishing infringements, responding to 
environmental emergencies and coordinating programmes and projects 
aimed at improving the environmental situation in their jurisdictions. The 
importance of the local level and of the change that has occurred in the 
6 In a survey on the implementation of environmental regulations conducted in 1998 by 
International Environmental Monitor and Environics International, a very high 
percentage of interviewees considered that environmental laws and regulations were 
currently not being enforced rigorously enough. This was the opinion of 87% of 
respondents in Argentina, 86% in Colombia, 78% in Venezuela, 74% in Chile, 71% in 
Mexico, 67% in Uruguay and 61% in Brazil. 
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pattern of development is recognized not only nationally but also in 
international agreements, such as Agenda 21. 
Although some local authorities have tried to see that 
environmental regulations are implemented in a concerted fashion, little 
has been achieved so far. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, 
the environment is not a priority on local government agendas. Secondly, 
medium- and long-term planning is needed if environmental 
development is to have a perceptible effect, and the length of government 
terms of office militates against this. Lastly, there is little horizontal 
coordination between municipal authorities. 
At the local level, urban environmental problems are particularly 
important. The occupation of hillsides, ravines, areas that have suffered 
desertification and riverbeds is one example. When extreme weather 
phenomena or other natural disasters occur, the extent of the 
incompatibility between the natural and built environments becomes 
manifest. 
Urban environmental problems are also related to efforts to meet 
basic needs in order to raise the quality of life of the population. In many 
of the region’s countries, the provision of sanitation infrastructure has 
improved compared to the deficits of the past and in relation to new 
demand (see chapter 5). Clearly, however, there are still many problems 
with the way new needs are met, the efficiency of suppliers, service costs, 
price structures and the environmental consequences of the methods 
used. Cities have made progress in remedying long-standing deficiencies 
in the scale, coverage and maintenance of infrastructure networks, but 
other urban problems such as congestion and pollution have worsened. 
The international community’s response to urban problems is 
contained in the Habitat Agenda, approved at the United Nations 
Conference on Human Settlements (Istanbul, 1996), which focuses on the 
sustainability of human settlements in an urbanizing world. It is also set 
forth in Agenda 21, particularly in chapter 7, which discusses the enabling 
approach. The Habitat Agenda encourages joint efforts by the public and 
private sectors and local communities to enhance the economic, social and 
environmental quality of living and working conditions in human 
settlements, particularly where the poor are concerned. 
3. Other actors 
Preparations for the Rio Conference stimulated domestic debate on 
the different issues connected with sustainable development as countries 
established their negotiating positions for Agenda 21, the conventions on 
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biological diversity and climate change and, subsequently, the United 
Nations Conference on Desertification (UNCOD). The keen interest 
shown by scientists and public, private and social organizations resulted 
in unprecedented levels of participation. Important institutions, such as 
national sustainable development councils, came into being. The structure 
of these opened up the decision-making process to the private and social 
sectors, and to citizen and academic organizations. 
(a) Production sector initiatives 
In recent years, large corporations and business groups have 
played a larger part in the debate on the emerging issues of sustainable 
development that has opened up nationally, regionally and worldwide. 
Global initiatives by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in the 
late 1980s, and by the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD) in the early 1990s, influenced the positions and 
actions of large corporations in Latin America and the Caribbean, which 
began to build environmental management policies into their business 
programmes. 
These corporations created the Business Council for the Sustainable 
Development of Latin America (CEDSAL), essentially in response to the 
Rio Conference and with the aim of organizing their participation in the 
environmental debate. This Latin American chapter of the global network, 
which was fully consolidated in 1997, currently represents over 300 
companies from the region and has spawned national and subnational 
councils in its turn (see table VII.3). The activities it participates in range 
from researching, analysing and solving sustainable development 
problems to promoting education and training in the business sector. At 
times it has taken a different position from the public sector on new 
regulations. Nonetheless, it can be said that the attitude of business has 
generally been positive, for not only did it organize itself to participate in 
the debate, but it has also embarked upon a major process of technical re-
fitting to improve its environmental performance. One example of this is 
its active participation in the creation of national clean production centres, 
which reconcile private-sector interests with those of public agencies 
responsible for science and technology development. 
Voluntary initiatives by the private sector to improve its 
environmental performance are gaining importance throughout the 
world. In the European Union, for example, voluntary agreements 
between private agents and regulatory bodies are the cornerstone of 
environmental management strategy. Private industry began to 
implement environmental policies in response to increasing consumer 
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demand for products that met high environmental standards and the 
growing ability of the public to discriminate on this basis. Because of this 
market development, achieving a reputation as an environmentally 
responsible business has become an asset of no less importance than other 
competitive advantages, particularly in the case of Latin American and 
Caribbean firms exporting to the United States and European Union 
markets. 
Table VII.3 
ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTED ON THE BUSINESS COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT - LATIN AMERICA (CEDSAL) 
Country 
Organization 
Argentina  Argentine Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(CEADS) 
Brazil  Brazilian Business Council for Sustainable Development (CEBDS) 
Costa Rica  Costa Rican Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(Cemcodes) 
 Latin American Corporation for the Promotion of Small Eco-
Efficient Enterprise (Propel) 
Colombia  Development Corporation (Codesarrollo) 
El Salvador  Salvadoran Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(Cedes) 
 Salvadoran Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(Cedes) 
Honduras  Honduran Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(Cehdeso) 
 Private-Sector Centre for Sustainable Development Studies 
(Cespedes) 
Mexico  Business Council for the Sustainable Development of the Gulf of 
Mexico (Cedes-GdeM) 
 World Environmental Management Initiative (Gemi) 
Peru  Peru 2021 
 Venezuelan Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(Cevedes) 
Venezuela  Business Leadership Programme for Sustainable Development 
(PLEDS) 
Source: Business Council for the Sustainable Development of Latin America, 2000. 
Another important factor has been the increasing determination of 
the communications media and organized civil society to draw attention 
to irresponsible environmental behaviour, in both public and private 
industry. As a result of this attitude, and of the increasing transparency of 
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information on environmental performance, image and incentives have 
come to be powerful factors in determining the behaviour of large local 
and transnational firms. This dynamic has not operated in the same way 
among small and medium-sized enterprises, which have a lower public 
profile, so regulatory pressure has been the only factor driving 
improvements in environmental performance among such enterprises. 
ISO 14000 certification is one of the mechanisms firms use to show 
that they are environmentally responsible. These standards govern the 
way companies’ management systems needs to be organized to deal with 
environmental issues and the impact generated by their operations, by 
eliminating processes that are potentially harmful to the environment. In 
many regions and industries such certification is expected to become a 
necessary condition for doing business. Information on Latin America 
and the Caribbean shows a very substantial increase in the number of 
certified firms, from 15 in 1996 to 311 in 1999. As table VII.4 shows, 
Argentina and Brazil have the largest number of certified businesses in 
the region.7
Another mechanism is environmental product certification. An 
example of this is provided by the Forest Stewardship Council, set up in 
1993 to promote sustainable forestry activity. Timber and other forestry 
products with this certification can display the registered trademark of 
the organization, thereby enabling consumers to satisfy themselves that 
the product they are buying comes from a forest managed in accordance 
with internationally agreed environmental and social principles and 
criteria. Table VII.4 also gives data on the certification of forests in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Another similar example is the Marine 
Stewardship Council, which was created in 1997 to promote the 
sustainable exploitation of marine resources. Participants in these councils 
include businesses, environmental and consumer organizations, labour 
unions and the scientific and academic communities. 
(b) Civil society involvement 
The democratization process has created greater scope 
for participation by civil society actors in the search for solutions to 
citizens’ environmental demands. The changes that have taken place 
mean that such demands can be expressed not just in terms of rights that 
deserve recognition, but as a joint effort by all societal actors, both 
7 This trend has increased in the early 2000s. By mid 2002 the number of firms certified 
was: Brazil (700), Mexico (266), Argentina (209), Colombia (41), Uruguay (29), Chile (17) 
and Peru (15). See ISO World 2002. The Number of ISO 14001/EMAS Registration of the 
World (http://www.ecology). 
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public and private, to find solutions to shared problems, even if their 
rationales differ. 
Table VII.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ENVIRONMENTAL CERTIFICATION IN THE 
BUSINESS SECTOR 
ISO 14001 (number of firms 
certified as of December 
1999)
Brazil (146), Argentina (81), Mexico (60), Colombia (7), 
Chile (5), Barbados (3), Costa Rica (3), Uruguay (2), 
Guatemala (1), Peru (1), Ecuador (1), Honduras (1), 
Venezuela (1) 
Forests certified by the 
Forest Stewardship Council 
(FSC) (land area in hectares 
as of March 2000) 
Brazil (665,558), Bolivia (660,133), Mexico (162,054), 
Guatemala (100,026), Belize (95,800), Costa Rica 
(40,153), Honduras (19,876), Panama (23) 
Source: ISO World, “The number of ISO14001/EMAS registration of the world” (http://www.ecology.or.jp/ 
isoworld/english/analy14k.htm), 2000, and Forest Stewardship Council, “Certified Forest List” 
(http://www.fscoax.org/html/5-3-3.html), 2000. 
In the public sector, increasing numbers of governments are 
implementing new forms of participation, both locally and nationally, to 
enable citizens to take part in environmental impact assessment 
procedures and to understand and participate in decision-making 
mechanisms, especially when the decisions concerned could affect their 
own communities. Political culture is a key factor in the implementation 
of environmental policies. At the local level, this culture is generally 
characterized by a virtual absence of citizen participation mechanisms 
and of instruments for coordinating the interests of all actors. The 
prevailing social covenant rests on tacit agreements that frequently fail to 
distribute sustainable development roles and responsibilities clearly 
among the different actors. 
The importance now being attached to civil society involvement in 
environmental issues is reflected in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), which gives considerable space to consultation and 
dispute settlement procedures. Any individual, social group or 
organization can approach the Secretariat to report non-compliance with 
environmental law by any of the three member countries. 
Lastly, the Forum of Ministers of the Environment of Latin America 
and the Caribbean has sought to increase civil society involvement further 
by recognizing the need to stimulate, facilitate and institutionalize citizen 
participation in regional, national and local environmental management 
and to achieve more explicit recognition of the rights and responsibilities 
of each sector of society. In order to encourage the growth of 
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environmentally responsible citizenship, strategies are also needed for 
attaining a fuller understanding of environmental issues at every level of 
education, complemented by training that targets all social sectors. 
4.  Environmental policy instruments 
A now traditional classification of environmental management 
tools draws a distinction between direct and indirect regulation.8 Direct 
regulation tools include land-use management policies, rules on 
conservation and resource use (energy efficiency, for example), 
environmental impact assessment and the licensing system that follows 
on from this. Indirect regulation tools can be subdivided into fiscal and 
financial instruments, rights of ownership and use, and tradable rights or 
quotas. Fiscal and financial instruments can be applied to reduce 
subsidies that lead to harmful environmental effects and reassign them to 
activities with a positive impact, to pay explicitly for ecological services, 
to levy charges for the right to use or exploit natural resources and make 
harmful activities more expensive, and to finance investment in 
environmentally friendly assets and services, research and the adoption of 
clean technologies. 
Within their various legal and institutional frameworks, all the 
region’s countries make use of direct regulation, but there is little 
information on the way laws, regulations and legal rulings are actually 
enforced in practice. Recent years have seen a significant increase in the 
number of legal provisions directly regulating a variety of issues, such as 
the conservation of biodiversity, the treatment of solid and hazardous 
wastes, the conservation of fish stocks, air and water quality and pesticide 
use, among other things. Some countries also have systems to apportion 
liability and compensation in the event of environmental damage. 
The preparation of environmental accounts, including periodic 
audits of the natural asset base and the production of statistics on the state 
8 The classification of environmental policy tools is a controversial issue. Much of the 
literature on the subject distinguishes between “economic incentive (or market)” 
instruments and “command-and-control” instruments, the latter normally including 
whatever is left out of the former group. Some authors reject this dichotomous approach 
and the use of the term “command and control” to describe all instruments not 
consisting of economic incentives, and accordingly propose a different classification 
(Russell and Powell, 1997). Again, the instruments traditionally included in the 
“command-and-control” group need to be analysed from an economic standpoint, since 
insofar as they affect agents’ decisions and behaviour, they generate environmental and 
financial costs and benefits which need to be taken into consideration. This argument 
has led to attempts to measure the cost-effectiveness ratio of specific instruments used, 
regardless of their characteristics (Giner de los Ríos, 1997). 
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of the environment generally, are necessary elements in any strategy. 
Nonetheless, most of the countries in the region are still far from having 
in place the information systems needed for decision-making, public 
policy evaluation, environmental monitoring and a constant supply of 
adequate information to citizens. Nor do they have indicators that can be 
used to track the state of the environment on a comparative basis 
(UNDP/UNEP/IDB, 1998). 
Although the curtailment of subsidies for public services over the 
last two decades has had positive environmental effects, these have been 
indirect and thus generally minor. Greater effects might be achieved if 
firms were encouraged to take a proactive approach, striving for 
continuous improvements in their environmental performance and 
investing to preserve environmental resources that they use as input 
sources or dumps for their production activities. For example, 
hydroelectric power companies could be encouraged to invest in water 
sources and thermoelectric ones in clean production. Some countries have 
successfully used reputation incentives to persuade firms to adopt this 
type of behaviour. For example, the environmental authority might use 
public communications media to publicize an objective environmental 
performance ranking of different regulated organizations, thereby 
encouraging them to work to improve their rating and thus protect their 
corporate image in the market. In addition, as happens in industrialized 
countries, private efforts need to be complemented by programmes 
fostering innovation and the adoption of cleaner production technologies, 
especially in segments with limited technical resources, such as SMEs. 
These programmes generally involve outreach activities, technological 
information, pilot demonstration projects, consultancy programmes and 
financial facilities specifically for investments in clean production 
technologies. Again, if a process of improvement in environmental 
performance is to be generated, technical standards need to be gradually 
tightened up with a view to enhancing energy efficiency and optimizing 
other environmental parameters. Collaboration mechanisms will also 
need to be created with the private sector so that incremental efficiency 
improvement targets and public or joint public-private investment in new 
technologies can be agreed upon. 
The creation of markets in environmental services is an instrument 
of great potential, but its use requires appropriate institutional support. 
Several countries have implemented initiatives of this type: in 1996, 
pioneering legislation in Costa Rica gave recognition to some of the 
environmental services provided by forests,9 and a mechanism was 
9 Law 7575 defines environmental services as those which “the forest and forestry 
plantations provide, which have a direct effect on environmental protection and 
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established for paying their owners for them. Other countries, such as 
Colombia and Guatemala, have experimented with charges for the use of 
water from river basins; these have to be paid by the downstream 
beneficiaries and the revenues are used to finance upstream conservation 
activities. This system creates a market for an environmental service 
(sustained provision of water in the river basin) whose stability and 
continuity are guaranteed by compensating landowners in the upper river 
basin for their opportunity costs, while preventing such areas from being 
turned over to other economic uses. 
Internationally,10 the first serious initiative to create markets for 
global environmental services came within the framework of the Kyoto 
Protocol (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), in 
the form of the “clean development mechanism” (CDM). This initiative 
aims to create the conditions for a market in tradable certificates 
representing net reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. This market 
would operate among the industrialized countries that have signed the 
convention and undertaken to cut their emissions, and developing 
countries, which are not subject to such commitments, but where projects 
to reduce global emissions can be implemented at lower cost. In the 
region, Brazil and Costa Rica have played a pioneering role in 
international negotiations to conceptualize this mechanism within the 
framework of the Convention. A number of countries (such as Colombia 
and Costa Rica) are also making institutional efforts to become active 
providers of internationally tradable certificates, trusting that this market 
will soon be consolidated. Although negotiations on the multilateral 
regulations of CDM have not yet concluded, these national efforts have 
already contributed to the development of a fledgling market in projects 
to achieve net reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in some of the 
region’s countries. Most of the initial demand for such projects has come 
from large multinational energy companies that have taken a strategic 
business decision to be at the forefront of progress in the international 
climate change agenda and to develop their capabilities in this 
new market. 
improvement”. They include the following: (i) protection of water for urban, rural or 
hydroelectric use; (ii) abatement of greenhouse gases; (iii) protection of biodiversity to 
conserve it and provide the basis for sustainable scientific and pharmaceutical use; (iv) 
protection of ecosystems, life forms and natural scenic beauty for tourist and scientific 
purposes. 
10 The region has significant comparative advantages in respect of carbon dioxide 
emissions, because the primary energy used for electricity generation is mainly derived 
from quite clean sources (water and natural gas account for 81%), and there are 
abundant forest resources. In addition, the region has one of the world’s lowest CO2
emission rates, estimated at 4.28% in 1990 by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) (IDB, 1998a). 
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The establishment of protected areas for biodiversity conservation 
is another very widely used land-use management tool in the region. 
Other examples include plans implemented in Chile to regulate economic 
development in the communes and the Costa Rican scheme to control 
coastal development. Several countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica and Peru) have environmental policy instruments 
of a preventive type, such as environmental impact assessment systems 
and environmental permits. With this system, certain investments (mainly 
infrastructure projects and production activities) require prior approval 
from the environmental authority, which can reject the project or make 
authorization conditional on particular requirements being met. 
In recent years, the need to promote effective environmental 
policies has led to a preference for the use of indirect or economic 
regulation. This trend has clearly been contributed to by the bad 
reputation acquired by direct regulation instruments, which have lost 
credibility because of a lack of effective control. The effectiveness of 
indirect regulations depends, however, on the efficiency with which 
markets function, and this in turn depends on the degree of institutional 
development attained. 
With regard to the first of these points, a study that analysed a 
number of cases covered by the World Bank in its 1992 World 
Development Report concluded that reforms to price systems were less 
effective in improving environmental conditions than technical change 
(Taylor, 1992). This means that cutting subsidies for energy, fertilizers and 
water use, as proposed in that report, would not produce a significant 
environmental response, although it might allow for significantly higher 
public investment in the environment as a result of fiscal savings. Again, 
considering that the efforts made to control emissions in response to price 
changes are relatively weak, quantitative controls might be more effective 
than sophisticated manipulation of the market, especially in the early 
stages of environmental regulation (Taylor, 1992). 
Russell and Powell (1997) believe that institutional capabilities are a 
key consideration when it comes to choosing a control instrument. These 
authors argue that setting up and administering an environmental 
management system based on economic incentive instruments will never 
be easier than applying a regulatory-type solution. Indeed, in most cases 
it will be considerably harder. The instruments chosen need to suit the 
level of institutional development in the country concerned, and countries 
that have less advanced government or market institutions should start 
by focusing on direct regulation instruments, such as rules specifying 
what technologies can be used. 
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Owing to a variety of shortcomings, the two types of instruments 
work best as complements rather than substitutes, as is shown by the 
practices of the countries that have achieved the greatest success with 
environmental regulation. The region has little experience in the use of 
these environmental management tools, so there is ample scope for 
testing them, especially in more institutionally developed countries. Proof 
of this are the innovative efforts of Costa Rica with forestry and 
conservation activities. The capabilities that the countries succeed in 
developing will become more important as international rules and 
mechanisms for joint implementation activities and the trading of 
emissions credits in the framework of the Convention on Climate Change 
consolidate. A recent seminar organized by ECLAC and UNDP analysed 
the lessons learnt from experiments with the use of economic instruments 
for environmental purposes in several of the region’s countries (see 
table VII.5). 
The lessons yielded by this study suggest that there is a need to 
design a model that incorporates the numerous incentives that act upon 
regulated agents, while also capturing the complexity of the 
interrelationships that characterize the pollution and environmental 
quality situation in a context like that of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
The role of regulators cannot be limited to the design, follow-up and 
oversight of optimal regulations and instruments which are very difficult 
to apply in practice. Greater emphasis should be given to their role as 
catalysts, in two areas at least. Firstly, they should be encouraging fiscal 
authorities and local governments to implement direct regulations and 
effective economic incentives. Secondly, they should be seeking to 
mobilize public opinion by providing objective, transparent information 
on the environmental performance of regulated agents. 
The complementary relationship that exists between traditional 
regulatory strategies and those based on economic incentives means that 
environmental authorities need to coordinate new mechanisms for public 
action, in particular to ensure that sectoral and environmental policies 
provide incentive structures that are consistent. Such coordination 
requires measures to build consensus, strengthen environmental 
authorities and win over both the communities affected by environmental 
management tools and public opinion in general. There is an ever greater 
need to provide the public with information on firms’ environmental 
performance indices, voluntary compliance programmes and other 
schemes that incorporate citizen participation and reputation-based 
incentives into environmental inspection processes. 
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Table VII.5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): USE OF  
ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PURPOSES
Country Instruments analysed with a view to implementation 
Caribbean 
subregion 
Returnable deposit system for mass consumption bottles (Barbados) 
Environmental tariff on imported durable goods (Barbados) 
Differentiated charges for solid waste collection (Barbados) 
Tax exemption for solar-powered water heaters (Barbados) 
User charges based on volume of water extracted (Jamaica) 
Tax incentives for the construction of rainwater storage tanks and imported 
equipment used to save water in hotels (Barbados) 
Brazil 
Financial compensation for oil drilling 
Charges for water rights 
Fees levied for industrial effluents 
Sales tax on merchandise and services (ICMS) and environmental criteria for 
transfer to municipalities 
Recognition and awards for improvements in environmental performance by 
industry (non-governmental initiative) 
Chile 
Compensation system for emissions of particulate matter in the Metropolitan 
Region 
Differentiated charges for solid household waste 
Transferable individual fishing quotas 
Ecological labelling relating to ozone and organic farming 
Colombia Punitive tax on water pollution applied at the river basin level by autonomous 
regional corporations (CAR) 
Guatemala 
Tradable water-use permits 
Certification schemes (organic agriculture and eco-tourism) 
Incentives (subsidies) for reforestation 
Financing for clean production projects at preferential rates 
National fund for environmental projects 
Flat rate charges for municipal water, energy, embellishment and solid waste 
collection services 
Mexico 
Zero tariff and accelerated depreciation for pollution control and prevention 
equipment 
Increase in motor fuel prices 
Charges for the use or exploitation of public goods: flora, fauna, recreational 
hunting 
Charges for discharge of industrial effluents 
Returnable deposit systems for used batteries, tyres and lubricants 
Concessionary financing and subsidies for forest planting and management 
projects in devastated forest areas 
Source: ECLAC-UNDP project “Aplicación de instrumentos de política económica para la gestión 
ambiental y el desarrollo sustentable en países seleccionados de América Latina y el Caribe”, 1999. 
5. Environmental developments in the region 
The large gaps in the data available make it difficult to assess 
environmental developments in Latin America and the Caribbean. This is 
due in part to the shortcomings of information systems in many countries, 
and to the nature of the indicators themselves. Some of these do not mean 
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much at the individual country level, as certain environmental problems 
(loss of biodiversity, global warming and depletion of the ozone layer) 
cross national borders. Others, by contrast (air pollution in cities and the 
contamination of bodies of water by industrial or domestic effluents), 
affect very specific places. In addition, the very measurement of a number 
of environmental situations (land degradation and loss of biodiversity, for 
example) is a matter of methodological controversy. These problems are 
compounded by the lack of reliable data, which makes it difficult to track 
the comparative evolution of environmental problems.  
Most of the information available indicates that the regional 
environment has continued to deteriorate in recent years. Everything 
seems to suggest that efforts to reverse adverse trends have only served to 
slow the advance of certain damaging processes, without actually 
producing a change of direction (Gligo, 1997). 
(a) Natural assets 
A significant part of what is produced by the region’s countries, 
and an even larger percentage of their exports, depends on their 
maintaining the capacity of different ecosystems to produce goods 
(including agricultural, forestry and fishing products, water for domestic 
use and irrigation and hydroelectric power) and provide services 
(recreation and landscapes, for example, which are the basis of the 
tourism industry). Nonetheless, 46% of land eco-regions in Latin America 
and the Caribbean are currently either in a critical state or endangered, 
and 31% are vulnerable (see table VII.6). 
Regarding biodiversity conservation, figure VII.1 shows that most 
of the region’s countries have expanded the areas they designate as 
protected zones. In analysing this widespread and undoubtedly positive 
effort, however, complementary aspects relating to the management of 
such areas need to be considered as well. Protecting biological wealth 
involves developing plans to manage protected areas, providing 
resources so that they can be implemented (e.g., patrolling) and 
strengthening enforcement capabilities to ensure the relevant laws are 
complied with. There are major differences between countries in this 
respect, stemming from their relative development levels and the 
effectiveness of their institutional systems.11 Again, the conservation of 
biodiversity is the task for which the international community has 
provided the greatest financial and technical support. 
11 In 1997, areas protected by field staff in Central American countries were as follows, in 
hectares: 309 in El Salvador, 2,053 in Costa Rica, 7,965 in Panama, 10,803 in Honduras, 
16,431 in Guatemala, 21,094 in Nicaragua and 35,764 in Belize (CCAD, 1998). 
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Table VII.6 
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Source: World Bank and World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 1995. 
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Figure VII.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL  
LAND AREA CLASSIFIED AS PROTECTED IN 1990 AND 2000  
Source: World Resources 1990-1991 and 2000-2001 (World Resources Institute). 
Because of the number of environmental services that forests 
provide, deforestation continues to be the main problem facing the region 
in this area. Deforestation is considered to be the main cause of 
biodiversity loss, owing to the large number of species that forests 
support. In addition, the loss of land caused by erosion is mainly due to 
the clearing of wooded areas, and since these also play a major role in 
regulating hydrological cycles and protecting water resources, tree-felling 
reduces the availability of water and is a key factor in aggravating the 
damage caused by certain natural disasters. Another important 
environmental service performed by forests is carbon fixing.12
12 There are three main sources of greenhouse gas emissions: (i) the burning of fossil fuels; 
(ii) industrial processes; and (iii) changes in land use (deforestation increases emissions 
while reforestation reduces them). The greatest contribution to total emissions in the 





























Figure VII.2 shows the rates at which natural forest was lost each 
year in the countries of the region during the periods 1980-1990 and 1990-
1995.13 In about half of all cases rates declined or held steady, while in the 
other half they rose. The causes of the decline in natural forest cover 
include conversion into farming or grazing land, the building of 
infrastructure, logging and use as firewood. The leading cause in the 
region is the expansion of the agricultural frontier, although there are 
differences between countries. 
Figure VII.2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: LOSS OF NATURAL FOREST PER  
ANNUM IN THE PERIODS 1980-1990 AND 1990-1995
Source: World Resources Institute (WRI), “World Resources 2000-2001. People and Ecosystems”. 
WRI.USA.
region as a whole (and worldwide) is made by the first of these sources. Nonetheless, the 
region is the largest contributor to world emissions from changes in land use (48.3%) 
(UNEP, 2000), and in several countries for which information is available (including 
Bolivia, Brazil and Peru), deforestation is the leading cause. 
13 In most countries the rates are not much different if all forests are considered (i.e. natural 
forest plus plantations). Chile, Cuba and Haiti are exceptions. 
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Accounting for changes in deforestation rates between the periods 
considered is a complex task. In recent years, a number of policy changes 
have helped to slow down deforestation. There has been less State 
support (infrastructure, subsidies and the provision of land titles) for 
expanding the agricultural frontier, while efforts have also been made to 
protect certain areas, as outlined above. On the other hand, economic 
reforms involving market opening and deregulation have led to a 
reallocation of resources on the basis of comparative advantages, and this 
has stimulated the production and export of raw materials and natural 
resource-intensive industrial goods.14 Furthermore, even without State 
intervention, rural communities are still being driven by poverty to settle 
new land. 
Other indicators relating to land degradation and the exploitation 
of marine resources are also negative. In the region, over 300 million 
hectares, i.e., 16% of the total land area, are currently subject to 
degradation (UNEP, 2000). In most cases the problem is soil erosion 
caused by deforestation, overgrazing and, to a lesser extent, chemical 
degradation. Fish production in South America grew by 45% between 
1986 and 1996 (FAO, 1999); over 80% of commercial fish stocks in the 
south-west Atlantic and 40% in the south-east Pacific are currently 
overexploited or exhausted. 
Measured by the amount of renewable water resources available to 
them annually, most of the countries in the region have abundant water.15
A country is considered to have a water shortage when the annual 
volume of renewable water per person is below 2000 m3, since this limit 
represents a severe constraint on economic development and 
environmental protection. Countries with water availability of less than 
1000 m3 per capita are in a situation of serious shortage, with major 
problems in drought years. According to this indicator, Haiti and Peru 
currently face the greatest problems in the region. The Dominican 
Republic and El Salvador may also join this group by 2025 if current rates 
of use are maintained, depending on their population growth rates (see 
table VII.7). 
14 For example, total timber output (for use by industry or as fuel) increased by 20% in 
Central America and the Caribbean and by 27% in South America between 1983-1985 
and 1993-1995. The increase was even greater in certain countries (103% in Chile, 92% in 
Bolivia, 74% in Venezuela and 45% in Peru). Soya production in South America 
expanded by 63% between 1989 and 1998 (FAO, 1999) and has been the main cause of 
new land settlement in northern Argentina, eastern Paraguay and central Brazil. 
15 Even when countries have abundant water, its geographical distribution may be uneven, 
as may its availability over time. This can produce shortages or surpluses (flooding) on a 
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Source: Population Action International and World Resources Institute (WRI), “World Resources 1998-99: 
A Guide to the Global Environment” (http://publisher.elpress.com), 1999. 
According to World Bank data, the region’s consumption of energy 
and electrical power increased at annual rates of 2.4% and 5.1%, 
respectively, between 1980 and 1996. During this period, the share of oil 
derivatives as a primary energy source in electrical power generation 
decreased significantly, while the importance of hydroelectric power 
increased. With low coal use and a rising share for natural gas, Latin 
America’s electricity subsector is the “cleanest” in the world in terms of 
global emissions of greenhouse gases (IDB, 1998a). 
The major changes experienced by the energy subsector as a result 
of the economic reforms undertaken in the region gave rise to increased 
competition and private-sector participation, leading to stronger growth 
and enhanced efficiency. Nonetheless, major challenges remain as regards 
social equity and the environment (Sánchez and Altomonte, 1997). In 
urban areas, the greatest energy use-related environmental problems are 
air pollution and the contribution to global warming. Both are the result 
of emissions by the transport subsector, which consumes 31% of the 
region’s energy and 55% of its oil, and is responsible for 36% of 
greenhouse gas emissions (IDB, 1998a). Energy-related environmental 
problems in rural areas stem from production and transport activities in 
the energy sector itself, and include in particular the environmental 
degradation caused by oil drilling in Amazonia and other fragile 
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ecosystems and disputes over a number of hydroelectric power 
generation initiatives and the laying of electricity cables and gas 
pipelines.16 In many rural areas, furthermore, the use of biomass as a 
cooking fuel not only puts pressure on forestry resources but causes 
pollution inside homes with harmful health effects, especially for women 
and children. 
As regards industrial production, manufacturing activities 
based on natural resources and those producing highly standardized 
intermediate industrial goods have succeeded in improving their relative  
performance in recent years. According to the World Bank classification 
(Low and Yeats, 1992), these belong to “environmentally sensitive” 
subsectors.  Figure  VII.3  illustrates   changes  in   industrial  emissions  of  
Figure VII.3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: INDUSTRIAL 
EMISSIONS OF ORGANIC POLLUTANTS, 1998 AND 1980 
Source: World Bank, 2002. Development Indicators. On-line Data Base. 
16 At the present time, many of the environmental disputes in the region relate to energy 
production (the Yaciretá dam between Argentina and Paraguay, and Ralco in Chile; oil 
drilling in U’wa territory in north-eastern Colombia and in the Department of Petén in 
Guatemala), processing (refinery in Bahía de Trujillo in Honduras) and transportation 
(electrical power lines in Gran Sabana, Venezuela, the San Miguel-Cuiaba gas pipeline 
between Bolivia and Brazil, and the extension of the oil pipeline in Ecuador). 
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organic pollutants in a number of countries between 1980 and 1996. Daily 
emissions per worker rose in nearly all cases, which suggests that the 
more polluting industrial segments increased their presence over the 
period.17
Urban population growth and economic expansion have intensified 
the problem of atmospheric pollution. Mexico City, São Paulo (Brazil) and 
Santiago (Chile), are among cities that suffer from severe air pollution, 
with serious effects on the health of citizens and the economy. Several 
studies show that the concentrations of particulate matter, sulphur 
dioxide, nitrogen and lead recorded in a number of cities in the region are 
correlated with increases in mortality and sickness rates caused by 
respiratory illness (WHO, 1999). 
The problem of urban waste has taken on particular importance in 
the management of cities, owing to its effects on the quality of life and 
productivity in densely populated areas. With urbanization and the new 
production and consumption patterns associated with economic growth, 
waste volumes have increased dramatically. According to calculations 
made by the Pan-American Health Organization, in 1995 the region 
generated 275,000 tons of solid urban waste a day, with all the 
administrative, logistical, financial and institutional problems that its 
collection and disposal entail, not only in large cities, but in smaller towns 
as well (Zepeda, 1995). As rapid urban expansion and high land costs 
make it difficult to find nearby sites for final waste disposal, some 
countries have set up transfer stations. Progress has been made with 
landfills, but these are largely confined to a handful of more developed 
cities, while medium-sized and smaller cities continue to use 
unsatisfactory methods of rubbish disposal, such as open dumps. 
Industrial waste also has a major impact on the environment in many 
cities in the region. 
17 Water pollution caused by organic matter is measured in terms of biochemical oxygen 
demand (BOD). With regard to the data shown in the figure, it should be borne in mind 
that water pollution depends on local conditions and that the figures are per worker, so 
in some cases total emissions were less in 1998 than in 1980. 
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Chapter VIII 
Economic and social performance in the 
Caribbean
During the 1990s, the Caribbean countries continued to make 
progress with the major economic and social reforms they had introduced 
in the 1980s. Broadly speaking, these reforms were designed to open 
up their economies in order to take advantage of the opportunities offered 
—and respond to the challenges posed— by increasing liberalization of 
the world economy. In addition, an intensified effort was made in the 
1990s to consolidate the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) single 
market and economic area. CARICOM now includes Suriname and Haiti, 
and its economic and trade relations extend to the Dominican Republic 
and other Latin American countries, most notably Venezuela and 
Colombia.
There were also macroeconomic reforms aimed at correcting 
internal and external imbalances inherited from previous decades. The 
period saw a resumption of economic growth in Trinidad and Tobago 
and in Guyana, countries whose economies had contracted in the 1980s. 
In other countries, such the members of the Organization of Eastern 
Caribbean States (OECS), economic growth continued without 
interruption, although at a slower pace. These economies’ structure and 
lack of diversification, however, mean that this progress is vulnerable to 
any sudden change, such as a natural disaster or a drop in the inflow of 
foreign exchange from exports of their main commodities, as is now 
happening in the case of banana exports from the OECS countries. 
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Despite progress in certain areas, the long-desired goal of economic 
diversification has yet to be achieved. 
During the decade, attention in the Caribbean continued to be 
focused primarily on social equity-related issues such as employment, 
access to health and education and poverty relief, particularly in countries 
that experienced slower growth or political instability. Efforts were also 
made to achieve greater gender equity in the subregion through the 
implementation of policies and programmes to improve the social and 
economic status of women. Migration and population growth continued 
to alter the demographic characteristics of the Caribbean. With regard to 
the environment, approval in 1994 of the Programme of Action for the 
Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States underscored 
the need to protect the subregion’s fragile environment within the context 
of sustainable development policies. 
1. Trade and foreign direct investment 
(a) Trade policies and preferences 
The Caribbean countries have been accorded preferential treatment 
in numerous agreements, including the Lomé Convention, the Caribbean 
Basin Initiative and the Programme for trade, investment and industrial 
cooperation between Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean 
(Caribcan). Under the provisions of the fourth Lomé Convention, the 
European Union gives all products from States in Africa, the Caribbean 
and the Pacific tax-free access to its market, and also gives preferential 
treatment to bananas, rum and sugar. The heads of State and government
of the European Union and the 77 States of Africa, the Caribbean and the 
Pacific recently signed a new accord, the Association Agreement, which 
replaces the fourth Lomé Convention (Cotonou, Benin, June 2000). The 
Agreement provides for a transition period (2000-2008) during which the 
current preferences will be maintained, to be followed by a liberalization 
period lasting at least 12 years during which new trade relations will be 
established in accordance with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. 
There is also provision for 23.4 billion euros of European development 
funds to finance various economic and social initiatives over the 
Agreement’s first seven years of operation. 
Under the Caribbean Basin Initiative, most commodity exports 
from the Caribbean countries enjoy tax-free access to the United States 
market. The exceptions are wearing apparel, footwear and petroleum. The 
Initiative also allows special United States customs treatment for products 
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manufactured in the subregion using components from that country. In 
addition, the United States applies tax-free import quotas to sugar from 
some of the Caribbean countries, including Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, 
Saint Kitts and Nevis and Trinidad and Tobago. Under Caribcan, Canada 
gives tax-free access to all Caribbean exports except textiles, wearing 
apparel, footwear, certain leather articles, lubricating oils and methanol. 
The preferences for sugar and banana exports have had a positive 
effect on the economies of the subregion because they have made it 
possible to maintain employment levels while increasing revenue and 
profits. Although this support has allowed the two industries to survive, 
however, efficiency and productivity do not seem to have improved, since 
these commodities are produced at high cost. At the same time, they have 
remained dependent on the subsidies provided under the preferential 
trading regimes. 
The concessions granted under Articles 806 and 807 of the United 
States Customs Code have served as a major stimulus for the creation of 
numerous export processing zones, especially in Jamaica, and for the 
development of some manufacturing industries in the subregion. Given 
that the success of these zones is essentially due to the concessions that 
have been granted, however, it is possible that this good performance 
may not be sustainable over the long term. In fact, there are already signs 
that Mexico’s favoured access to the United States market under NAFTA 
is cutting into the advantages hitherto enjoyed by Caribbean exports 
under the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the Customs Code provisions. 
During the 1990s, Caribbean trade policies were heavily influenced 
by implementation of the programme creating the CARICOM single 
market and economic area, and by the steps taken to forge ties between 
the Caribbean Community and other country groupings in the Caribbean 
subregion and Latin America. The CARICOM common external tariff, 
buttressed by numerous non-tariff barriers, played a strong protective 
role until the end of the 1980s. Tariffs were highly dispersed, with 16 
different rates ranging from 0% to 70%, although most of them (about 
96%) were no higher than 45%. In addition to tariffs, imports entering the 
CARICOM member countries were subject to a variety of regulations, 
including liability for charges such as stamp duty, customs surcharges 
and excise taxes, which were almost always higher than those applied to 
domestic products. 
In the 1990s, CARICOM trade regulations underwent numerous 
revisions. In 1991, the tariff structure was greatly simplified and rates were 
reduced to a range of 0% to 45%. In 1993, a major overhaul resulted in the 
adoption of four categories, with provision to reduce them progressively 
over a period of five years. Thus began the opening up of the Caribbean 
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economies. Once the CARICOM common external tariff is fully 
implemented, rates will range from 0% to 20%, except in the case of 
agricultural products, which will continue to be subject to a 40% tariff. 
There have been a number of obstacles to implementation of these reforms, 
however, and as a result they are not yet fully in force in all the countries. 
In 1997, CARICOM drew up a series of protocols to amend the 
Treaty of Chaguaramas under which the Community was originally 
created. Once applied, some of these protocols will help open the countries 
up further to trade and to investments from other members of the 
Community. Protocol II, the one whose implementation is furthest 
advanced, will enable citizens of the CARICOM member countries to 
establish businesses, provide services and move capital freely within the 
subregion. The greater integration of factor markets that will probably 
occur when this protocol is applied will help improve resource allocation in 
the Caribbean and will also strengthen the countries’ capacity to absorb 
external shocks and respond to them more effectively. Other protocols that 
have major implications for trade and investment are Protocol III, Industrial 
Policy; Protocol IV, Trade Policy; Protocol V, Agricultural Policy; Protocol 
VIII, Disputes Settlement; and Protocol IX, Rules of Competition. They can 
all be expected to strengthen the Community’s trade policy and have a 
positive influence on its foreign policies. 
In addition to its efforts to create a single market and economy, 
CARICOM has been implementing policies aimed at deepening integration 
with the rest of the Caribbean subregion and Latin America. Suriname 
became a fully fledged member in 1993, and in 1997 Haiti was accepted on 
a provisional basis, although in practice it is treated as a normal member. 
The Community has also signed free trade agreements with Colombia and 
Venezuela, and it is currently negotiating another one with the Dominican 
Republic. All the CARICOM countries except the Bahamas are WTO 
members and are participating in the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
negotiations. In view of their limited financial capacity and human 
resources, these Caribbean countries have established a subregional 
mechanism to coordinate their position in international negotiations. 
(b) Trade performance 
A combination of relative economic stability, renewed growth in the 
larger economies and freer circulation of goods in the CARICOM area 
contributed to a rise in the subregion’s exports in the 1990s. As table VIII.1 
shows, exports increased by 42% during the decade, averaging US$ 5.807 
billion over the three-year period 1997-1999. However, this is still slightly 
lower than the 1980 figure of US$ 5.927 billion. 
Table VIII.1 
CARICOM: VALUE AND DISTRIBUTION OF EXPORTS, BY MAIN DESTINATIONS, AND OF IMPORTS, BY MAIN SOURCES 
(Millions of dollars and percentages) 
Exports Imports 
1980 1990a 1997-1999a 1980b 1990a 1997-1999c
 Value Percent
age Value Percentage Value Percentage Value Percentage Value Percentage Value Percentage 
Total CARICOM 5 927 100.0 4 088 100.0 5 807 100.0 5 906 100.0 5 065 100.0 8 596 100 
Caribbean 
Community and 
Common Market  
566 9.5 503 12.3 1 019 17.5 520 8.8 466 9.2 874 10.2 
Caribbean   
Common Market 529 8.9 498 12.2 991 17.1 518 8.8 466 9.2 857 10.0 
   Bahamas 37 0.6 5 0.1 28 0.5 2 0.0 0 0.0 16 0.2 
Other Caribbean 
countries 496 8.4 317 7.8 463 8.0 315 5.3 177 3.5 249 2.9 
Canada 106 1.8 175 4.3 391 6.7 274 4.6 273 5.4 245 2.8 




113 1.9 116 2.8 247 4.2 328 5.6 569 11.2 776 9.0 
Central American 
Common Market 89 1.5 18 0.5 121 2.1 50 0.8 35 0.7 83 1.0 
European Union 977 16.5 841 20.6 1 239 21.3 934 15.8 783 15.5 1 289 15.0 
   United Kingdom 427 7.2 536 13.1 570 9.8 656 11.1 434 8.6 473 5.5 
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 1980 1990a 1997-1999a 1980b 1990a 1997-1999c




141 2.4 154 3.8 88 1.5 72 1.2 87 1.7 61 0.7 
Selected Asian 
countriesd 23 0.4 48 1.2 48 0.8 391 6.6 390 7.7 668 7.8 
   Japan 21 0.4 36 0.9 36 0.6 291 4.9 232 4.6 218 2.5 
   Others 2 0.0 12 0.3 12 0.2 100 1.7 158 3.1 162 1.9 
Rest of the 
world 529 8.9 253 6.2 288 5.0 1 381 23.4 198 3.9 415 4.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information provided by the CARICOM Secretariat and two country studies published by The Economist Intelligence Unit: “Trinidad and 
Tobago, Guyana and Suriname country report”, June 2000, and “Jamaica, Belize, Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)”, April 2000. 
a
 Except Antigua and Barbuda, for which data are not available. 
b
 Except Montserrat, for which data are not available. 
c
 Except Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, Montserrat and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, for which data are not available. 
d
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There was little change in export destinations during the 1990s 
compared with the previous decade, except that the percentage of 
external sales among member countries of the Community themselves 
rose from 12.3% to 17.5% of total exports between 1990 and 1997-1999, 
reflecting higher growth and trade liberalization within the Community. 
In 1997-1999, the proportion of exports traded among the CARICOM 
countries was about the same as the percentage of external sales going to 
the countries of the European Union and slightly more than half the 
percentage going to the United States, which continues to be the main 
importer of Caribbean goods.
In the 1990s, exports continued to be dominated by oil, bauxite and 
agricultural products, including sugar, bananas, cacao and coffee. 
Earnings from sugar and bauxite fell during the decade owing to 
declining prices for these products and, in the case of sugar, damage 
caused by a series of natural disasters. Earnings from sugar fell from 
US$ 4.443 billion in 1986 to one fourth of this amount in the 1990s. 
Something similar occurred with the income received by Jamaica and 
Guyana from the sale of bauxite, which fell from an average of 
US$ 227.2 million in the 1980s to US$ 146.2 million in the 1990s. By 
contrast, banana exports increased from an annual average of 
US$ 84.7 million in the 1980s to an average of US$ 156.9 million over the 
period 1990-1999.1
Manufactures accounted for a relatively low proportion of the 
Caribbean countries’ exports at the end of the 1980s, but their share rose 
steadily throughout the 1990s. The main products were household and 
electronic articles assembled in the subregion, wearing apparel, processed 
foods and petroleum derivatives. Exports from the manufacturing sector 
went primarily to the protected regional market and the United States, 
where they are given preferential treatment. Textiles and wearing 
apparel, however, have been losing ground in some of the countries, 
including Jamaica, since the adoption of NAFTA. 
The export of tourist services became an important source of 
foreign exchange for the Caribbean, accounting for a high proportion of 
foreign currency revenue in Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Jamaica, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. In all these 
countries except Jamaica, revenue from this source far exceeded earnings 
from goods exports. Moreover, construction, agriculture, manufacturing 
and craft production have all benefited from the growth of tourism in the 
islands. While the construction of hotels and apartments and the 
consumption of local food and manufactured products (furniture, soap, 
1  ECLAC, on the basis of data from the countries. 
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etc.) have had a positive effect on overall economic activity, the ties 
between tourism and the other sectors of the economy could be stronger 
than they are. In Barbados and Jamaica they are more closely linked than 
in the smaller OECS countries.2
At the end of the 1990s, Caribbean exports were still characterized 
by excessive concentration and by vulnerability to price fluctuations and 
changing trade policies in the main destination countries. The exports of 
Trinidad and Tobago continued to be dominated by oil and petrochemical 
products; those of the OECS countries and Belize by sugar and bananas; 
Guyana’s principal exports were still rice, sugar and bauxite; Barbados 
remained dependent on tourist services; and most of Jamaica’s export 
revenue continued to come from bauxite, tourism and assembly activities. 
In absolute terms, CARICOM imports rose almost twice as fast as 
exports in the 1990s, when they increased by approximately 70% to 
average almost US$ 8.6 billion a year over the period 1997-1999. Imports 
of products from other CARICOM countries rose by just over 1% to 
account for 10.2% of the total in 1997-1999. The origin of imports follows a 
pattern similar to that for exports: 45.8% of the products imported by 
CARICOM in 1997-1999 came from the United States and 15% from the 
European Union. Another trend of interest was the growing importance 
of imports from Asia, which rose from 6.6% of the total in 1980 to 7.7% in 
the 1990s. 
In many Caribbean countries, foreign direct investment (FDI) has 
had a growing impact on economic development and has swelled low 
levels of domestic savings. As table VIII.2 shows, the subregion’s FDI rose 
from US$ 667 million in 1990 to US$ 2.497 billion in 1998, but slipped to 
US$ 1,992 in 1999. During 1997-1998 most of this investment went to three 
countries (37.8% to Trinidad and Tobago, 23.4% to Bahamas and 12.1% to 
Jamaica). The oil industry was the main recipient, with transnational 
enterprises investing heavily in exploration, production and refining 
activities in Trinidad and Tobago.3 On a smaller scale, FDI also 
had an impact in the OECS countries, which received about 8% of the 
Caribbean total. 
2  Charles and Marshall (1999) give a detailed analysis of the links between tourism and 
agriculture in the Caribbean. 
3  In 1999, Amoco, in partnership with British Gas, Repsol, National Gas Company (NGC) 
and Cabot, built one of the continent’s largest liquid natural gas plants at a cost of 
US$ 1 billion (ECLAC, 2000b). 
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Table VIII.2 
CARICOM:  NET INFLOWS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, 1980-1999 
(Millions of dollars) 
 1980 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
CARICOM 317 667 870 1 034 2 074 2 497 1 992 
More 
developed 
countries  216 303 530 643 1 311 1 156 1 232 
 Barbados 3 11 12 22 18 32 17 
 Guyana 1 8 74 81 90 45 48 
  Jamaica 28 175 147 184 203 350 524 
Trinidad 
and Tobago 185 109 296 356 1 000 730 643 
Less
developed 
countries 53 214 211 167 221 226 328 
 Belize 0 17 21 17 12 12 47 
OECS 53 197 190 150 209 214 281 
 Antigua and 
 Barbuda 20 61 31 19 28 20 27 
 Dominica 0 13 54 18 21 20 18 
 Grenada 0 13 20 19 35 41 46 
 Montserrat 0 10 3 0 3 3 8 
 Saint Kitts 
 and Nevis 1 49 20 35 20 32 42 
 Saint Lucia 31 45 30 17 47 51 94 
 Saint 
 Vincent and 
 the 
 Grenadines 1 8 31 43 55 47 46 
Other
Caribbean 
countries 49 149 129 224 542 1 116 432 
 Anguilla 0 11 18 33 21 21 40 
 Aruba 0 131 -6 84 196 82 392 
 Bahamas 4 … 107 88 210 852 … 
 Netherlands 
 Antilles 35 8 10 11 103 151 … 
 Suriname 10 … … 7 12 10 … 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information provided by the International Monetary Fund and the Eastern 
Caribbean Central Bank. 
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2. Macroeconomic performance and reforms 
(a) Economic reforms 
In response to internal and external imbalances and to deteriorating 
economic and social conditions in the Caribbean, many of the subregion’s 
countries embarked on economic reforms in the 1990s. Guyana, Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago4 found it necessary to implement structural adjustment 
programmes to deal with the effects of the public-sector expansion policies 
they had applied in the 1970s and 1980s, which had led to rising budget and 
balance-of-payments deficits and burgeoning foreign debt. In general, the 
reforms sought to give greater recognition to the function of prices. An 
integral part of these programmes were foreign exchange policies under 
which currency controls were to be progressively lifted. After a series of 
devaluations, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago gave up the effort 
to defend their currencies and adopted a dirty float. National currencies were 
subjected to numerous pressures throughout the decade, and monetary 
authorities were obliged to curb borrowing and carry out open market 
operations to forestall further devaluations. 
The three countries mentioned, together with Barbados, whose 
economy contracted sharply at the beginning of the decade, also 
embarked on fiscal reforms aimed at reducing expenditure and increasing 
revenue. To accomplish the first objective, they initially reduced capital 
investment, but later they shifted their focus to freezing the salaries of 
public servants, cutting back staff numbers and reducing transfers to 
public enterprises, including service suppliers and providers. State 
enterprises were also privatized in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad 
and Tobago. 
These policies had the effect of reducing expenditure on wages and 
salaries as a proportion of total public spending. In Barbados, Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago, respectively, this expenditure fell from 42%, 40% 
and 41% of the total in 1983 to 41%, 36% and 39% in 1997. Meanwhile, 
social expenditure on health and education generally remained high in 
these countries. In Barbados, an average of half of all current government 
expenditure went to the social sector in the 1990s; expressed as a 
percentage of GDP, this represented a rise from 13% in the 1980s to 15% in 
4  Jamaica signed up to its first structural adjustment programme with the International 
Monetary Fund in 1977, while Trinidad and Tobago’s first programme dates back to 
1988.
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the 1990s. In Trinidad and Tobago, on the other hand, social spending has 
tended to contract in recent years.5
As regards public revenue, measures were taken to overhaul the 
taxation system (by broadening the tax base and applying new 
consumption taxes) and to make tax administration more efficient. The 
main feature of the tax reform was the replacement of sales and other 
specific taxes with value added tax (VAT). VAT at 15% was introduced in 
Trinidad and Tobago in 1990 and in Barbados in 1997. In 1991 Jamaica 
adopted a 10% general consumption tax, which replaced the eight indirect 
taxes that had been in effect until then. 
The economic reforms also included stricter monetary policies, 
specifically: reductions in public credit, the abolition of interest rate 
controls and the gradual elimination of interest rate subsidies. In the area 
of trade, as already mentioned, tariffs were modified and quantitative 
restrictions were lifted. Measures were also taken to promote exports, 
including the abolition of export licences, the simplification of procedures 
and the adoption of a system of rebates for exporters. The reforms also led 
to the introduction of policies to facilitate foreign direct investment in the 
countries, mainly through the use of tax incentives. 
The OECS countries largely managed to avoid the macroeconomic 
imbalances that had affected the other countries of the region since the 
1980s, thanks to the prudent policies that they applied throughout the 
decade and to favourable conditions for their export commodities, 
especially bananas and sugar, in the protected European market. There was 
growth in these countries in the 1990s, but it was lower than in the 1980s 
(when it was in excess of 5% a year). The OECS countries also succeeded in 
maintaining fixed exchange rates, thanks mainly to their relatively sound 
fiscal and balance-of-payments situation and to the decision of their 
common central bank, the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, to set up a 
conversion fund mechanism for monetary management. The Bank 
maintains a strict ratio between the money supply and currency reserves, 
and it rigorously enforces the financing limits for the budget deficit. 
The taxation system in the OECS countries continues to rely heavily 
on indirect taxes, especially those applied to international trade, which 
accounted for more than 50% of total revenue in most of the countries in 
the 1990s. Some member countries –Antigua and Barbuda and Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, among others– have no personal income tax. In view of the 
5  During 1990-1995, the average share of GDP represented by health spending was 4.1% in 
Barbados, 2.6% in Trinidad and Tobago and 3% in Jamaica. In Barbados, average 
spending on education increased to 7.2% of GDP, while in Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago the figures were 8.2% and 4.5% of GDP, respectively. See ECLAC/CDCC (1999). 
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trend toward increased liberalization of trade, the countries initiated a tax 
reform programme in the 1990s with the aim of reducing their reliance on 
revenue from taxes on international trade. 
(b) Macroeconomic performance 
The economic performance of the Caribbean countries over the 
decade was quite heterogeneous (see table VIII.3). Growth recovered in 
Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago and, to a lesser extent, in Suriname, 
whose economy had contracted in the 1980s. In Jamaica, growth 
continued to be very slow, and in the latter years it turned negative. The 
economy of Barbados slowed considerably, while Belize continued to 
expand. The OECS countries grew more slowly than in the 1980s, 
particularly Montserrat, whose economy contracted during the period. 
Growth was also negative in the Netherlands Antilles. Other than in 
Guyana, Jamaica and Suriname, budget deficits, inflation and foreign debt 
charges were generally moderate in the countries of the subregion. 
Guyana contracted severely in the 1980s as a result of lower bauxite 
prices, rising oil prices and the numerous distortions that affect the 
country’s economy. However, growth resumed in the 1990s; in fact, the 
country’s average growth rate of 4.8% for the period 1990-1999 was the 
highest in the entire subregion. This impressive turnaround can be 
attributed to the economic recovery programme implemented in the late 
1980s and to the low level of initial activity. Improved macroeconomic 
management and measures to enhance the workings of the market 
contributed to higher output, especially in the agricultural sector (sugar and 
rice). The budget deficit and inflation fell from 50% and 64%, respectively, 
in 1987 to 12.3% and 8.7% in 1999. Nevertheless, Guyana still has a heavy 
debt burden, a legacy of the external borrowing it undertook to finance 
expansionist policies in the 1970s. In 1999 the country’s foreign debt was 
almost double its GDP, and it still struggles to service it, even though part 
was written off under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Debt Initiative. 
After contracting for several years, mainly because of the sharp fall in 
oil prices and the macroeconomic imbalances that resulted from this, the 
economy of Trinidad and Tobago recovered in the 1990s, averaging growth 
of 2.4% between 1990 and 1999. In 1988, the country began to apply a strict 
and far-reaching adjustment programme that created the conditions for 
sharp reductions in the budget and balance-of-payments deficits and for the 
emergence of economic conditions that were more favourable to investment 
and production. The resumption of growth in the oil and gas sector, the 
recovery of manufacturing and the resultant boost to other sectors of the 
economy (construction, banking, insurance and real estate) were the main 
factors behind the renewed vigour of the national economy. 
Table VIII.3 












(percentage of GDP)  
1990sa
More developed countries  -0.2 2.2 5.3 … … -3.9 
Barbados 3.0 0.3 3.0 24.3 12.3a -2.2 
Guyana -1.4 4.8 8.7 199.1 11.0c -12.3 
Jamaica 0.8 1.4 6.0 59.3 15.5a -0.8 
Trinidad and Tobago -3.0 2.4 3.4 24.7a 13.1 -0.4 
Less developed countries  5.4 2.3 2.8 … … -2.8 
Belize 4.4 4.6 -1.2 58.5 14.3a -3.8 
OECS 5.5 2.0 2.4 … … -2.7 
Antigua and Barbuda 7.4 3.2 1.6 68.9 7.0c -2.4 
Dominica 5.5 2.6 1.5 45.8 10.0c -4.1 
Grenada 4.7 3.8 -0.8 32.7a 16.0c -3.6 
Montserrat 5.8 -5.6 5.0 89.9a … -1.8 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 5.2 4.0 0.4 47.0a 12.0c -3.5 
Saint Lucia 4.0 2.5 6.2 26.1a 16.0c -1.0 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 5.9 3.6 3.0 36.8a 20.0c -2.4 
Other Caribbean countries … … … … … … 
Anguilla … 4.7 1.5 11.3a … -0.5 
Aruba … 4.8 2.8 … … -0.8 
Bahamas 4.5 3.5d 6.0 8.1 15.0c -2.1 
Netherlands Antilles … -0.5 0.8 … 14.2b 10.4 
Suriname -3.1 0.7 98.8 … 10.0b … 
CARICOM 3.1 2.4 8.6 … … -2.0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of national data and the following studies: The Economist Intelligence Unit, “Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Suriname country report”, 
June 2000; The Economist Intelligence Unit, “Jamaica, Belize, Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)”, April 2000; and The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
“Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Netherlands Antilles, Aruba, Turks and Caicos Islands, Cayman Islands country reports”, June 2000. 
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Growth rates in Jamaica and Suriname averaged 1.4% and 0.7% a 
year, respectively, between 1990 and 1999. After recovering vigorously in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Jamaican economy began to slow, and 
in 1996 it went into recession. This was the result of a combination of 
macroeconomic imbalances stemming from an increase in public 
spending financed by the Central Bank, the cost of servicing a large debt 
and a drought that affected the agricultural sector. The budget deficit 
averaged 0.8% of GDP in the 1990s, with a rise in the middle of the decade 
that was partly due to the cost of restructuring the financial sector to 
shore up failing banks.6 Inflation slowed down considerably in the early 
1990s, and by 1999 was holding steady at 6%. The proportion of GDP 
represented by the country’s external debt fell from 137.7% in 1987 to 
59.3% in 1999, although it is still large and debt servicing remains a heavy 
burden. After shrinking in the early part of the decade, the economy of 
Suriname recovered in 1995 and began to grow again thanks to the 
implementation of a programme of economic reforms. The country’s 
political instability and heavy debt burden complicate macroeconomic 
management and may endanger its fragile recovery. 
The Barbados economy experienced a slowdown during the 
decade, growing by an average of just 0.3% in 1990-1999 as compared 
with 3% in the 1980s. The economy contracted sharply in 1990, 1991 and 
1992, when GDP fell by 3.1%, 4.1% and 6.2%, respectively. The main 
factors behind this contraction were the weakness of the world economy 
and a decline in the competitiveness of the country’s main exports 
(tourism and agricultural and manufactured products) because of rising 
production costs. Implementation of an economic stabilization 
programme in 1991, coupled with more favourable conditions abroad, set 
the stage for a resumption of growth in 1993. Barbados maintained a fixed 
exchange rate, chiefly through the use of income and price policies, with 
the objective of warding off constant downward pressure on its currency. 
Belize, meanwhile, achieved average annual growth of 4.6% during 1990-
1999 thanks to the expansion of export agriculture, fishery activities and 
tourism (especially eco-tourism). Together, these sectors have accounted 
for 34% of GDP and 66% of total exports since 1995. 
6  In 1995, seven of the country’s commercial banks experienced problems: National 
Commercial Bank, Mutual Security Bank, Citizens Bank, Workers Bank, Century 
National Bank, Island Victoria Bank and Trafalgar Commercial Bank. The first two 
banks merged, but the new institution continued to have problems, as a result of which 
the Government had to come to the rescue with a large funding package. Century 
National Bank was dissolved, and Citizens Bank, Workers Bank, Island Victoria Bank 
and Trafalgar Commercial Bank merged into a single entity called Union Bank of 
Jamaica. 
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Growth in the OECS countries was moderate in the 1990s, except in 
Montserrat, where it was negative. Growth averaged 2% in the period 
1990-1999, which was slightly less than in the 1980s. This slowdown in 
growth was due mainly to the damage inflicted on agriculture, physical 
infrastructure and tourism by natural disasters. For the most part, these 
countries managed to prevent their budget deficits from widening even 
during the slowdown of the 1990s. Prudent fiscal policy also helped to 
offset inflationary pressures. In Montserrat, economic activity fell off 
greatly after the 1995 volcanic eruption, which inflicted enormous 
damage on the country’s economic and social infrastructure and triggered 
a massive population exodus.7
In the Netherlands Antilles, growth slowed sharply in the second 
half of the decade. This was mainly due to the contractionary fiscal and 
monetary policies adopted to curtail growing budget and balance-of-
payments deficits. Lower aggregate demand caused unemployment to 
rise from 12.8% in 1994 to 14.2% in 1997. 
Unemployment remained high in the Caribbean throughout the 
decade. In 1999, the rate was 10% or higher in all the countries of the 
subregion except Antigua and Barbuda. These high rates may be due to 
the growth performance of the 1990s, which was erratic and moderate at 
best, and to labour market rigidities. The incidence of unemployment 
varies from one group to another and tends to be higher among women 
and the young. Despite their high unemployment rates, the Caribbean 
countries continued to suffer from a shortage of highly skilled workers for 
technical and administrative jobs (IDB, 1998b). 
(c) Saving, investment and the current account 
As table VIII.4 shows, the way the components of the saving and 
investment account developed, and the overall outcome, were far from 
uniform in the CARICOM countries. The average investment ratio rose 
from 23% to 30.8% in Jamaica, while in Guyana it increased by two thirds, 
from 27.1% in the 1980s to 43.5% in the 1990s. In Barbados and Trinidad 
and Tobago, by contrast, it fell by approximately four and five percentage 
points, respectively, in the 1990s. In the OECS countries the average 
remained high (33.4% in 1981-1989 and 37.1% in 1990-1999). 
7  Many of those who stayed in the country had to move into refugee camps, and the 
tourism sector, one of the country’s main engines of economic growth, was virtually 
wiped out. In 1999, the islanders began to gradually regain confidence, and the 
Government, in cooperation with the United Kingdom, made progress with 
reconstruction. It is estimated that by August 1998, 14% of the emigrants had returned to 
the country and the population had reached 4,008 (Greene, 1999). 
ECLAC 308
Table VIII.4 
CARICOM: INVESTMENT, SAVING AND CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES 
(Annual averages) 
Domestic investment as a 
percentage of GDP (A) 
Domestic saving as a 
percentage of GDP (B)
Current account balance as a 
percentage of GDP 
(B) - (A)
1980-1989
CARICOM 28.7 14.6 -14.1 
More developed 
countries  22.8 17.9 -4.9 
Barbados 18.9 19.4 0.5 
Guyana 27.1 14.7 -12.4 
Jamaica 22.9 16.3 -6.6 
Trinidad and Tobago 22.3 21.6 -0.7 
Less developed 
countries  32.2 8.1 -24.1 
Belize 26.5 16.3 -10.2 
OECS 33.4 6.5 -26.9 
Antigua and Barbuda … … … 
Dominica 30.5 6.6 -23.9 
Grenada 37.7 6.2 -31.5 
Montserrat 39.7 -5.5 -45.2 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 37.5 10.1 -27.4 
Saint Lucia 24.3 10.8 -13.5 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 29.6 11.8 -17.8 
1990-1999
CARICOM 32.2 20.5 -11.7 
More developed 
countries  26.8 23.5 -3.3 
Barbados 15.2 16.6 1.4 
Guyana 43.5 31.2 -12.3 
Jamaica 30.8 22.1 -8.7 
Trinidad and Tobago 17.7 24.6 6.9 
Less developed 
countries  35.2 19.2 -16.0 
Belize 25.8 20.4 -5.4 
OECS 37.1 18.4 -18.7 
Antigua and Barbuda 36.3 30.8 -5.5 
Dominica 35.7 5.5 -30.2 
Grenada 36.7 15.8 -20.9 
Montserrat 44.9 18.4 -26.5 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 44.3 25.1 -19.2 
Saint Lucia 24.8 16.9 -7.9 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 31.9 19.4 -12.5 
Source: ECLAC, Subregional Headquarters for the Caribbean, Selected statistical indicators of Caribbean 
countries, vol. 2 (LC/CAR/G.544), Port of Spain, December 1998 and International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics, Washington, D.C., 2000. 
Note: In the cases of Barbados and Guyana the percentages are for the period 1990-1998, while in that of 
Montserrat they are for 1990-1996. 
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In all the Caribbean countries except Barbados and Trinidad and 
Tobago, the investment ratio continued to exceed the domestic saving 
ratio by a wide margin.8 This resulted in chronic current account deficits, 
meaning that a high percentage of domestic investment had to be 
financed with external resources. Remittances from Canada, the United 
States, the European Union and other countries, which tend to account for 
a high proportion of external saving, had a considerable impact on the 
balance of payments and on development in general in the Caribbean 
countries. In the subregion, Jamaica and the OECS members, except for 
Antigua and Barbuda, are the main recipients of remittances. Jamaica, for 
example, received US$ 306 million in remittances in 1996. In the OECS 
countries, remittances amounted to between 6% and 9% of GDP, and in 
the mid-1990s they were equivalent to 100% of merchandise exports in 
Montserrat and Anguilla, 20% in Jamaica and 9% in Guyana 
(ECLAC/CDCC, 1999). 
The more developed countries saw an improvement in their current 
account deficits, which declined from an average of 4.9% of GDP in the 
1980s to 3.3% in the 1990s. Trinidad and Tobago had an estimated current 
account surplus of 6.9% of GDP in the 1990s, but this came at the expense of 
investment. The current account deficit was generally higher in the OECS 
countries, averaging 26.9% of GDP in the 1980s and 18.7% in the 1990s. 
If economic growth rates are compared with investment ratios in the 
1980s and 1990s, it transpires that there are major differences between the 
more developed countries, on the one hand, and the OECS members, on the 
other. The greater investment effort made in the former (an increase of 
almost four percentage points of output) led to modest growth (up from an 
average of -0.2% in the 1980s to 2.2% in the 1990s), whereas in the OECS 
countries the opposite occurred: despite higher investment rates (an 
increase of almost four percentage points of output), average economic 
growth slowed from 5.5% to 2%. The OECS countries have actually 
achieved levels of gross fixed capital formation comparable to those of 
South-East Asia, and investment rates for the Caribbean countries as a 
whole are higher than those for Latin America. However, this did not lead 
to high growth rates in the 1990s, probably because investment in the 
Caribbean was not as efficient.9
8  Owing to the lack of chronological series, GDP and domestic saving have been used 
instead of gross national product (GNP) and national saving. Gross national saving is 
gross domestic saving plus net factor income from abroad. In the case of some Caribbean 
countries that receive remittances from citizens living abroad, gross national saving may 
be higher than gross domestic saving. 
9  The marginal capital-output ratio, calculated at the end of the 1980s as gross investment 
divided by the exponential growth rate of real GDP, was very high, ranging between 7.4 
and 9.4. See CARICOM (1988). 
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3. Production profile 
As table VIII.5 shows, the production profile of the Caribbean 
countries did not undergo any major changes during the decade. In 
general, the share of agriculture declined and the shares of manufacturing 
and services increased, although the trend varied considerably from 
country to country. In some cases, the contribution of agriculture to GDP 
actually rose. In Guyana, for example, agricultural output rose 
significantly as a result of economic reforms, particularly the lifting of 
price controls and currency restrictions and the liberalization of trade and 
the exchange rate, so that its contribution to total output rose from 29.9% 
in 1987 to 35.1% in 1999. Agriculture also continued to account for a high 
proportion of GDP in Belize and Dominica, while in Trinidad and Tobago 
and some of the OECS countries its share fell to less than 5%. 
The steady decline in the production of the main agricultural crops, 
a trend that began years ago, continued to gain momentum in the 1990s. 
Sugar production in Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and the 
OECS producer countries fell from 1,100,000 tons in 1970 to 427,100 tons 
in 1995 and 392,500 tons in 1999. Cacao and coffee experienced similar 
declines in Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and the producer countries of 
the OECS. Cacao production fell from 11,700 tons in 1970 to 6,250 tons in 
1995 and 2,080 tons in 1999, while coffee production dropped from 4,100 
tons in 1970 to 1,350 tons in 1995 and 890 tons in 1999.10 Although banana 
production fluctuated somewhat, it has held up over the last two decades. 
The threatened abolition of preferential treatment for bananas in the 
European market may have a negative effect on production in the very 
near future. Other factors that have contributed to the decline in 
agricultural production are falling prices, mishandling of products after 
they are harvested and soil degradation resulting from poor management 
of land and water resources. In general, the introduction of technology in 
the agricultural sector has been confined entirely to production, to the 
exclusion of processing. 
10 ECLAC, on the basis of information from the statistical database of the United Nations 
Food and Agriculture Organization (2000). 
Table VIII.5 
CARICOM: STRUCTURE OF NATIONAL ECONOMIES 
(Percentages of GDP) 
 Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services 
 1977 1987 1997 1999 1977 1987 1997 1999 1977 1987 1997 1999 1977 1987 1997 1999 
Barbados 10.3 6.9 4.0 6.1 20.4 18.7 12.7 21.5 11.6 8.9 5.2 9.3 69.3 74.4 83.3 72.4
Guyana 20.7 29.9 35.4 35.1 35.7 30.1 33.7 28.5 12.1 13.9 11.4 10.1 43.6 39.9 30.8 36.4
Jamaica 8.4 7.7 8.0 6.6 37.0 39.9 35.1 32.1 18.4 20.9 16.3 13.9 54.6 52.4 56.9 61.3
Trinidad and 
Tobago 3.5 2.6 2.2 1.9 59.1 41.5 44.6 39.7 13.8 7.8 7.8 8.0 37.3 55.9 53.2 58.3
Belize … 22.7 19.0 18.6 … 27.6 22.1 25.0 … 18.6 13.3 14.8 … 49.6 58.9 56.4
Antigua and 
Barbuda 4.1 4.5 4.1 3.9 20.1 20.3 18.2 19.2 4.3 3.6 2.2 2.2 75.8 75.2 77.7 76.8 
Dominica 37.6 29.8 20.9 18.5 14.6 14.8 21.5 22.5 5.0 6.5 7.5 8.5 47.8 55.4 57.7 59.0
Grenada 27.1 18.7 8.1 8.1 14.2 18.9 20.7 22.2 3.1 5.9 6.7 7.3 58.7 62.4 71.2 69.7
Montserrat … … … … … … … … … … … … 
…
…
Saint Kitts and 
Nevis 18.9 10.6 5.1 3.7 28.9 24.8 24.6 25.7 18.1 14.5 10.1 10.3 52.2 64.6 70.3 70.7 
Saint Lucia  … 13.2 8.6 8.4 … 17.6 19.6 20.6 … 8.5 6.6 6.0 … 69.2 71.8 71.1
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines 17.5 17.0 10.1 10.4 22.4 24.7 26.6 25.8 7.1 10.3 7.9 6.5 60.1 58.3 63.3 63.8 
Bahamas … 2.1 … … … 14.5 … … … 
- - 
… … 83.4 
…
…
Suriname 8.4 11.2 … … 42.4 25.1 … … 18.4 11.5 - … 49.2 63.7 … …
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After the recession of the late 1980s, manufacturing recovered 
slightly in the 1990s. However, this sector’s contribution to output 
continued to be less than 10% in Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and 
almost all the OECS countries. The Caribbean manufacturing sector, 
whose products go mainly to the protected  subregional  market and, in 
the case of free trade zones, to the United States, has failed to achieve the 
level of efficiency needed to compete properly in international markets. It 
continues to be dominated by assembly plants that make wearing apparel 
and electronic items for export to the United States or appliances and the 
like for local markets, and agricultural processing plants whose output 
goes mainly to the CARICOM market. 
The low productivity of this sector in the Caribbean has prompted 
the countries of the subregion to implement numerous programmes 
aimed at improving efficiency. Several of the countries have established 
special support systems for small and medium-sized industrial 
enterprises, most of which offer training and try to promote the 
entrepreneurial spirit. These initiatives include the youth training and 
employment cooperation programmes implemented in Trinidad and 
Tobago and the small business development institutions set up in certain 
OECS countries. The way these support programmes are actually applied 
tends to be unsatisfactory in certain respects, especially as regards 
financing and the provision of technical assistance. Besides this, the lack 
of basic administrative and technical skills continues to be one of the main 
obstacles to the development of enterprises of this type in the Caribbean. 
The service sector maintained its traditionally high share of output 
during the decade. Tourism continued to make a very significant 
contribution to economic growth in Barbados, Jamaica and several of the 
OECS countries. These examples encouraged other countries to develop 
their own tourist potential, Trinidad and Tobago being a case in point. 
One of the most important trends recently has been the emergence of new 
types of tourism, such as eco-tourism, that do not endanger the fragile 
ecosystem of the islands. 
Several of the Caribbean countries have also promoted other 
service subsectors, such as computer and offshore financial services, with 
varying results. Barbados and Jamaica have developed fairly dynamic 
computer and communications sectors, but the expansion of this sector in 
Jamaica appears to have halted in the last decade. Some of the factors that 
have contributed to the development of these activities are relatively 
efficient, low-cost telecommunications services, the availability of cheap 
labour and legislation that is favourable to foreign investment. The OECS 
countries, especially Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines, have small information technology sectors that have 
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been highly constrained by the shortage of qualified personnel and the 
high cost of telecommunications. Most information technology businesses 
operating in the Caribbean tend to specialize in simple data storage 
services. In Barbados and Jamaica, however, some have begun to offer 
services with greater value added, such as programming, call centres and 
Web site design and management services. As regards offshore financial 
services, small financial centres have been created in Antigua and 
Barbuda, Barbados and Saint Kitts and Nevis, and are now expanding. 
They join the ranks of older centres in the subregion such as those in the 
British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands and the Netherlands Antilles. 
The future growth of this industry will depend on the countries’ ability to 
apply strict standards of regulation and prudential oversight, in keeping 
with worldwide efforts to strengthen regulatory systems. 
In the field of science and technology, numerous policies have been 
formulated to strengthen research and development services and to boost 
technological development, but little has been achieved so far. A number 
of the Caribbean countries have created norms and standards bureaux in 
recent years, but most of them still do not have the staff and resources 
they need, and in some countries they do not even have the legislative 
support they require to function properly. There has also been a lack of 
progress with the creation of national bodies to oversee the direction and 
funding of science and technology activities, like those that do exist in 
many Latin American countries. 
4. Changes in the social structure 
The social structure of the Caribbean countries has undergone a 
profound transformation, brought on largely by population growth and 
ageing patterns, migration, urbanization and the increasingly damaging 
effects of the AIDS epidemic. The population has grown only slowly in 
the last 20 years as a result of steadily declining fertility and high levels of 
emigration. The general decline of fertility in the Caribbean —due mainly 
to higher levels of education for women and consistent implementation of 
family planning programmes— is less pronounced among adolescents 
than in other age groups. In 1994, 15% of births were to teenage mothers, 
and in some countries (Guyana and Jamaica, for example) the proportion 
exceeded 20%.11
11  ECLAC, on the basis of national figures.  
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The combination of declining birth and death rates has led to slow 
but steady population ageing. The crude birth rate fell from 2.7% in 
1975-1980 to 2.1% in 1995-2000, while the crude death rate fell from 0.9% 
in the earlier period to 0.8% in 1995-2000 (see figure VIII.1). 
Figure VIII.1 
CARICOM: CRUDE BIRTH AND DEATH RATES AND TOTAL 
FERTILITY RATE, 1950-2000 
Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision. Comprehensive Tables, vol. 1 
(POP/DB/WPP/Rev.2000/1/F1,F3,F7), New York, Population Division, Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, 2001. 
As can be seen in table VIII.6, the proportion of people aged over 60 
rose from 7.9% of the total subregional population in 1970 to 9.8% in 2000, 
chiefly owing to improved health conditions, emigration by young people 
and the return of increasing numbers of retirees. On average, women live 











1950-1955 1955-1960 1960-1965 1965-1970 1970-1975 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000
Crude birth rate
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Table VIII.6 
SELECTED CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES: POPULATION AGED 60 AND OVER, 1950-2000 
(Percentages of total population) 
Estimates 
Indicator 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Subregion 6.9 7.0 7.2 7.5 7.9 8.1 8.6 8.7 9.1 9.3 9.8 
Barbados 8.5 9.5 10.0 11.1 12.2 13.6 14.1 14.8 15.3 14.4 13.7 
Guyana 6.7 5.8 5.2 5.4 5.3 5.5 5.7 5.7 5.9 6.1 6.3 
Jamaica 5.8 6.3 6.6 8.1 8.5 8.5 9.3 9.4 10.0 9.5 9.3 
Trinidad 
and Tobago 
6.1 6.1 5.9 5.7 6.7 7.6 8.1 8.0 8.7 8.9 9.6 
Belize 6.0 6.2 6.4 6.4 6.5 6.8 6.3 6.1 6.2 6.1 6.0 
Bahamas 6.6 6.4 5.8 5.4 5.5 5.9 6.3 6.4 6.6 7.1 7.9 
Netherlands 
Antilles 
8.8 7.7 7.3 7.4 8.0 8.6 9.3 9.9 10.2 10.5 11.3 
Suriname 8.4 7.2 6.2 6.0 5.7 5.8 6.3 6.3 6.8 7.5 8.1 
Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 1998 Revision. Comprehensive Tables, vol. 1 
(ST/ESA/SER.A/180), New York, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1999. 
Migration, both within the subregion and to countries elsewhere in 
the world, has continued to influence the demographic profile of the 
Caribbean. Most of the skilled workers who emigrate go to Canada, the
United States and the United Kingdom. The number of emigrants to the 
United States exceeded 750,000 in the 1970s and 1980s. It has been 
estimated that 3.5 million emigrants from the Caribbean were living in 
that country at the beginning of the 1990s, with the number increasing to 
4.1 million by the end of the decade. Migration within the Caribbean is 
generally from countries with lower growth to those with higher growth, 
since the main objective is to find work. An extreme example of this is the 
case of Montserrat, where the migration prompted by a volcanic eruption 
reduced the population from 10,630 inhabitants in 1991 to just 4,000 in 
1998. Another factor that has affected the demographic profile of the 
Caribbean countries is the dramatic effect of the AIDS epidemic. 
According to estimates by the Caribbean Epidemiology Centre, AIDS is 
responsible for 60% to 80% of all deaths in the 25 to 34 age group, with 
high economic and social costs for the countries of the Caribbean.  
The changes in the subregion’s production profile, with the 
manufacturing and service sectors gaining ground at the expense of 
agriculture, have prompted growing numbers of workers to migrate from 
rural to urban areas in search of better job opportunities. On average, the 






























and Tobago has the highest proportion of its population living in urban 
areas (65%). The size of households has also been falling, and households 
headed by women still represent a high proportion of the total, ranging 
from 22.3% in Belize to 43.9% in Barbados.12
The 1990s saw substantial improvements in gender equity. One 
indicator of this is the change in the school enrolment rates of the two 
sexes (see figure VIII.2). In contrast to the situation that prevailed in the 
past, girls now make up at least half the student population at all levels of 
the educational system, and in fact there are currently more females than 
males at the secondary and tertiary levels. 
Figure VIII.2 
THE CARIBBEAN: MALE AND FEMALE ENROLMENT RATES 
(Percentages) 
Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Culture 
Report, 1998: Culture, Creativity and Markets, Paris, 1998. 
Thanks to better education, and to the laws against sex 
discrimination that have been enacted and enforced in most of the 
countries, women have been able to join the workforce in greater numbers 
and, in general, to improve their social and economic situation. However, 
female unemployment levels remain high and few women hold positions 
in government or the legislature. In the mid-1990s, 14.3% of all 
parliamentary positions were held by women. Although this is a 
significant increase on the percentage seen at the end of the 1980s (6.6%), 
it is still low. Nor did women’s participation in the labour force improve 
much during the decade. According to estimates by the International 
12  ECLAC, on the basis of national figures. 
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Labour Organization, in 1996 women represented 44% of the workforce 
but held only 41% of jobs (ILO, 1997). Generally speaking, women are 
most likely to hold technical, commercial and service jobs. At the same 
time, recent figures show that 25% of all own-account workers in the 
Caribbean are women. 
Although social indicators have tended to be better in the 
Caribbean countries than in most of Latin America, the severe recessions 
seen in several Caribbean economies and the restructuring and 
adjustment measures taken as a result may have narrowed the gap. The 
current growth model may also have caused poverty to worsen in some 
cases, although its incidence varies widely across countries (see table 
VIII.7). It is estimated that the proportion of the population living below 
the poverty line is 43.2% in Guyana, 34.6% in Belize and 34.2% in Jamaica, 
whereas in Barbados the figure is only 8%. Most of the countries have 
adopted poverty eradication plans, including job creation and training 
programmes. 
Table VIII.7 





Trinidad and Tobago 21.2 
Belize 34.6 




Saint Kitts and Nevis 15.0 
Saint Lucia 25.1 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 17.0 
Bahamas 5.0 
Suriname 47.0 
Source: World Bank, “Caribbean Countries: Poverty Reduction and Human Resource Development in  
the Caribbean”, Report No. 15342-LAC, Washington, D.C., 14 May 1996. 
The characteristics of social security systems vary from country to 
country, but a common feature is that they are financed by the State. 
Barbados is the only country whose system includes unemployment 
insurance. The others typically provide medical insurance, transfers to the 
indigent and retirement pensions. The coverage of older persons is still 
inadequate in several of the Caribbean countries, examples being Belize 
and Grenada, where barely 10% and 5%, respectively, of the older 
population receive social insurance benefits. Private pension plans are 
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increasingly common, but they are still at an early stage of development, 
and they usually only benefit people in the upper income brackets. 
Private medical insurance is also very limited. In 1997, only 115 people 
out of every 1,000, on average, were covered by this type of insurance. 
Public spending on health and education tends to be higher in the 
Caribbean countries than in Latin American countries. According to 
ECLAC estimates, for example, average public expenditure on health 
during the first half of the decade, expressed as a percentage of GDP, was 
4.1%, 3% and 2.6% in Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, 
respectively, whereas in Brazil and Chile it was 2.3% and 2.5%. 
Expenditure on education in Belize, Jamaica and Saint Lucia at mid-
decade was 7.2%, 7.5% and 9.8%, while in Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay 
the proportions were just 3.1%, 5.8% and 3.2% of GDP. 
5.  The environment and sustainable development 
Most of the countries in the Caribbean subregion are fragile island 
ecosystems that are highly vulnerable to environmental degradation. The 
rise of tourism —which has become a mainstay of the economy in many 
of these countries— and the concentration of hotels and tourist facilities 
along beaches have altered coastal ecosystems and led to increased 
pollution and more rapid destruction of marine ecosystems. Another 
aspect of environmental degradation is the advance of deforestation, with 
forest cover decreasing from 20.4% of the total land area in 1990 to 18.7% 
by the middle of the decade. The average annual deforestation rate was 
1.7% over the period, although there were wide variations, a figure of 
7.2% in Jamaica contrasting with very low rates in Belize, Guyana and 
Suriname (see table VIII.8). 
Table VIII.8 
CARIBBEAN ISLAND STATES: ANNUAL RATE OF DEFORESTATION,  
1990-1995
Country Annual rate 
Jamaica 7.2 
Trinidad and Tobago 1.5 
Saint Lucia 3.6 
Bahamas 2.6 
Caribbean island States 1.7 
Central America and Mexico 3.0 
Tropical countries of South America 0.6 
World 0.3 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information from the FAO “Faostat Forestry” database.
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The Caribbean countries’ heavy reliance on income from tourism, 
and the fear of losing this important source of foreign exchange, have led 
their governments to develop and implement programmes aimed at 
halting environmental degradation. Among other measures, these 
programmes include provision for sewerage systems, management of 
coastal areas and plans for protected land and sea areas. In the 1990s, 
some countries (Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, among others) also 
enhanced their environmental management capabilities by setting up 
specialized institutions. In other countries, however, responsibility 
for environmental management continues to be fragmented among 
a large number of ministries and other institutions. Environmental 
management relies essentially on regulation, and it tends to be 
undermined by the existence of various kinds of taxes and subsidies that 
have negative effects. On the other hand, increasing community 
involvement in the conservation of natural resources is a positive trend. 
Examples include measures to protect the turtle population in Trinidad 
and Tobago and the management of national parks in Jamaica and of 
marine areas in Saint Lucia. 
Adoption of the Programme of Action for the Sustainable 
Development of Small Island Developing States has made an important 
contribution to the quest for sustainable development in the Caribbean. 
This programme sets forth a series of development strategies and 
principles for protecting the fragile environment of such States within an 
overall development strategy. The damage inflicted year after year on 
economic and social infrastructure by hurricanes and tropical storms is 
another cause for concern. The subregion was hit by seven hurricanes in 
the 1990s. The small island States of the Caribbean regard the Programme 
of Action as an instrument that provides them with a general reference 
framework for the implementation of sustainable development initiatives 
with a particular focus on the environment. Since its recommendations 
are only general in nature, however, it does not give the authorities the 
specific tools that are needed if it is to become a more practical and 
effective instrument. 
The countries of the subregion believe that, when the Programme of 
Action is applied, the highest priority should be given to coastal and marine 
resources, natural and environmental disasters and tourism. A lack of 
funds, at both the national and regional levels, is the most commonly cited 
obstacle to implementing this programme. At the national level, the most 
serious obstacles are limited human resources, lack of training and the 
absence of a comprehensive approach to problems. 
One of the lasting benefits that the process of implementing the 
Programme of Action has brought is an understanding of different 
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aspects of sustainable development. As a result, region-wide 
environmental and socio-economic problems and projects have been 
clearly identified. Furthermore, governments and civil society have begun 
to respond to the needs identified in the Programme of Action by forging 
new cooperative ties of unprecedented breadth and depth. The 
contribution of civil society and the private sector to setting and attaining 
Programme objectives (for the joint management of natural resources, the 
adoption of standards and the formulation of environmental policies and 
plans of action) has been recognized and encouraged. 
Some progress has also been made in achieving greater recognition 
of the need to strengthen the institutional position by enacting 
environmental laws, building institutional capabilities, carrying out 
environmental impact assessments and adopting and implementing plans 
of action. On the international level, the governments have also made 
considerable efforts to secure ratification of international agreements such 
as the Convention on Biological Diversity and the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. By mid-1997 the former had 
already been ratified by all the small island developing States of 
the Caribbean. 
At the regional level, the most concrete expression of the Caribbean 
countries’ efforts to understand the nature of the problems involved in 
applying the Programme of Action is the model devised for coordinating 
the process and contributing to its implementation in general.13 As several 
of the governments have pointed out, many of the activities envisaged by 
the Programme had already been initiated prior to its adoption and have 
been carried out as part of national sustainable development plans. 
Nevertheless, the Programme of Action has influenced these activities by 
giving them renewed impetus, helping to bring a more comprehensive 
approach to their execution and to the formulation of new projects 
and programmes. The recent expansion of the Programme to 
include economic and social areas opens up new opportunities for 
practical action. 
13  The components of the model are a provisional joint Secretariat (formed by the ECLAC 
and CARICOM secretariats), the Presiding Officers of the small island developing States, 
the Inter-institutional Group (made up of various organizations based or represented in 
the region) and a joint programme of work, based on the chapters into which the 
Programme is divided, which was formally adopted at the same ministerial meeting. 
Within the provisional joint Secretariat, ECLAC acts as the operational or technical 
secretariat, while CARICOM is responsible for activities related to the dissemination 
of policy. 
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Chapter IX 
The restructuring of national territories 
During the 1990s, the economic, social and political geography of 
the region’s countries underwent significant changes. New areas were 
occupied and large numbers of people moved among existing urban and 
rural settlements, making for new patterns of population distribution 
within countries. Economic activity went into crisis in some areas and 
expanded vigorously in others, so that large changes took place in the 
geographical location of production processes. Public-sector decision-
making, traditionally centralized and concentrated in capital cities, 
increasingly spread to subnational political and administrative bodies. 
Innovations in transport and communications, and the associated 
infrastructure investments, made distance less of a challenge. In short, the 
human geography of the Latin American and Caribbean countries 
underwent major structural changes. 
Among the many factors that shaped this restructuring, the most 
important was globalization. As economies opened up to the outside 
world, flows of capital, goods and services were increasingly detached 
from their own territorial bases. These conditions have given rise to a new 
geography in which territories that have won a competitive position in the 
world economy (winning zones) exist, side by side, with others that have 
lost ground (losing zones). The presence of large commercial and financial 
conglomerates in the cities and of agro-industrial, mining and tourist 
complexes in the countryside whose success is linked to external 
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investment and demand are visible manifestations of the impact of 
globalization on national territories. 
Increased trade among the countries of the region was a second 
factor that contributed to territorial restructuring. The results of these 
integration efforts have included systematic improvements to transport 
and communications infrastructure in border areas, joint implementation 
of energy megaprojects, the creation of multinational eco-tourism circuits 
and the enactment of common standards for trade in goods and services. 
Continued success in resolving border disputes has stimulated trade, 
given rise to production and environmental protection projects and 
facilitated individual freedom of movement. 
A third factor was the formulation and execution, within the 
context outlined above, of public policies designed to respond to the 
strategic challenge raised by the need to establish and promote a form of 
territorial organization that served the needs of the current development 
model. At the same time, this organization had to deal with conflicts 
arising from the new territorial structure, in particular those related to the 
uncertain future of losing areas and to clashes of interest in winning areas. 
A very important endogenous force, and the fourth factor to shape 
the restructuring process, was the increasing power of action enjoyed by 
social actors operating at the subnational level, something that was closely 
linked with increasing decentralization of the State. Local leadership, local 
cultural identity and local actors’ powers of action and negotiation played 
a decisive part in increasing the benefits of restructuring in some areas 
and attenuating its negative effects in others. 
1. Population distribution and geographical mobility 
Despite continuing centrifugal trends in the region’s settlement 
dynamic, the traditional pattern of concentration still holds sway, with 
more than two thirds of the inhabitants of Latin America and the 
Caribbean living in less than one fifth of the region’s land area. More 
importantly still, urbanization continued to advance during the 1990s, 
although at a slower pace than in previous decades, when the growth rate 
of the urban population averaged more than 3% a year (see figure IX.1). 
Because of this continued growth, the region’s population remained the 
most urbanized in the developing world: the proportion of people living 
in cities, at 73.4%, was more than double the level in Africa (34.9%) or Asia 
(34.7%), and only one percentage point less than in the developed 
countries (74.5%). 
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Figure IX.1 
























Source: ECLAC-CELADE, “Latin America: Urban and Rural Population Projections, 1970-2025”, 
Demographic Bulletin, year 32, No. 63 (LC/G.2052; LC/DEM/G.183), Santiago, Chile, March 1999. 
From this picture it is clear that the economic and social 
adjustments and changes that have occurred in the region since the 1980s 
have not altered the structural factors that favour concentration in urban 
areas. On the contrary, today’s cities offer new location factors that help in 
the quest for international competitiveness, such as advanced production 
services, human capital and know-how, and a broad array of public and 
private services. 
(a) The heterogeneity of human settlements 
Although the urban population rose everywhere, there continued to 
be great disparities across countries in terms of their patterns of 
urbanization. In one group of countries in Latin America (Argentina, 
Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela) and the Caribbean (Jamaica, Puerto Rico 
and Trinidad and Tobago), urbanization continued slowly, to the point 
where cities housed more than 85% of the total population. The urban 
population grew at slow or moderate rates of between 0.9% and 2.6% a 
year, while the rural population decreased as a result of emigration flows 
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that were small in absolute terms, but significant in relation to the 
population of origin. 
In a second group of countries (Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru), which taken together 
account for the bulk of the region’s inhabitants, the urban population was 
over 60% of the total but did not exceed 80%. In this group the rate of 
urbanization declined, demographic growth in urban areas slowed to 
about 2% a year, and the rural population tended to grow very slowly, 
stagnate or even decrease. In the remaining countries, which are 
numerous but do not have large populations, urbanization was rapid. The 
urban population of this group grew more slowly during the 1990s than it 
had in the past, but annual rates still averaged 2.5% or more, while the 
rural population grew by between 0.5% and 2.4% a year as a result of 
natural growth, which offset the impact of net emigration from 
the countryside. 
As regards urban population growth, the tendency seen in the 1980s 
consolidated and intensified during the 1990s. Because of the enormous 
size difference between the urban and rural populations, the cities’ gains 
from rural-urban migration became steadily smaller compared with their 
gains from the net balance of births and deaths within the urban areas 
themselves. The case of Brazil illustrates this: whereas in the 1980s about 
42% of the country’s urban growth was the result of net transfers from the 
countryside, in the 1990s these accounted for only 33% of total urban 
growth.1 Higher degrees of urbanization tend to relegate migration from 
the countryside to an even more secondary position. In Chile, for example, 
it accounted for only 10% of urban growth between the mid-1980s and the 
mid-1990s. 
Examination of demographic changes in the 52 cities that had more 
than a million inhabitants at the end of the 1990s reveals that this group 
saw exceptionally fast growth up until 1970, when it accounted for 46% of 
the urban population (see table IX.1). The 1980s were a particularly 
difficult time for these cities’ businesses and people, and as a result their 
share of the total urban population fell from 46% to 43%, while their 
population growth slowed from an annual average of 3.6% in the 1970s to 
2.3% in the 1980s. In the 1990s, their population growth rate remained 
virtually unchanged and their share of the total urban population 
remained at 43%. By then most of these cities had reached an advanced 
1  The figures are for growth in and migration by the population aged 10 and over. They 
were calculated by applying the intercensal survival ratios methodology and they cover 
the period between the 1991 census and the 1996 survey. 
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stage in the demographic transition;2 at the same time, the factors that had 
been making them less attractive in the previous period, and had even 
resulted in net emigration, were no longer operating vigorously. 
Table IX.1 
LATIN AMERICA:  52 CITIES WITH 1,000,000 OR MORE INHABITANTS, 1950-2000 
Year 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Number of cities 52 52 52 52 52 52 
Population (in 
thousands) 28 747 47 708 74 068 105 837 133 584 166 952 
Percentage of total 
population  17.3 22.0 26.1 29.5 30.5 32.4 
Percentage of 
urban population  41.7 44.6 45.5 45.5 42.9 43.0 
Growth ratea  5.1 4.4 3.6 2.3 2.2 
Source: Calculations by the Population Division - Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre 
(CELADE); United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects: The 1996 Revision. Estimates and Projections 
of Urban and Rural Populations and of Urban Agglomerations (ST/ESA/SER.A/170), New York, 1998. 
United Nations publication, Sales No. E.98.XVIII.6. 
a
 Average annual growth rate for the decade.
As can be seen in table IX.2, larger metropolitan cities, i.e. those with a 
population of 5 million or more, are home to one in every five of the region’s 
city dwellers. In the 1980s these cities also felt the negative impact of 
deindustrialization (particularly Buenos Aires, Mexico City and São Paulo) 
and of the retreat of the public sector as an employer, but in the 1990s they 
showed signs of demographic recovery, thus demonstrating their capacity 
to adapt to the new conditions of global competition. 
Table IX.2 
LATIN AMERICA: CITIES WITH 5,000,000 OR MORE INHABITANTS, 1950-2000 
Year 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Number of cities 1 4 4 4 6 7
Population (in thousands) 5 042 12 199 32 588 45 046 62 110 77 992
Percentage of total population 3.0 5.6 11.5 12.5 14.2 15.2
Percentage of urban 
population 7.3 11.4 20.0 19.3 20.0 20.1
Source: Calculations by the Population Division - Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre 
(CELADE); United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects: The 1996 Revision. Estimates and Projections 
of Urban and Rural Populations and of Urban Agglomerations (ST/ESA/SER.A/170), New York, 1998. 
United Nations publication, Sales No. E.98.XVIII.6. 
In these large cities —some of them regarded as “global cities” 
because of their size and economic importance— two tendencies became 
2  In other words, fertility had already reached low levels, so its effect in reducing 
population growth was no longer as great. 
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firmly established. Firstly, population growth rates in their urban cores 
continued to be low, owing to their advanced stage in the demographic 
transition coupled with low or negative net migration.3 Secondly, they 
tended to extend their reach yet further, acting as the social and economic 
nuclei for urban centres with which they had no actual geographical 
connection (Rodríguez and Villa, 1997). 
This latter phenomenon was due not only to the addition of new 
territory to existing urban areas, or the expansion of road networks to 
facilitate movement, but also to the displacement of industry from city 
centres to outlying areas and the emergence of subcentres that tended to 
develop their own relatively autonomous living and working dynamic. As 
metropolitan areas were shaped by market forces and unregulated 
settlement processes, they became much more complex to manage. This 
was particularly true of areas where there were no metropolitan 
government authorities or local authority coordination mechanisms. As 
has already been indicated, this type of expansion meant that cities were 
not able to resume the dynamic growth they once enjoyed. Indeed, there 
could be no prospect of this, given low fertility rates and the steady 
decline in immigration.4
Although there is not enough information available to identify the 
dominant trend in the region, it is clear that there is cause to be concerned 
about socio-spatial segmentation in cities. Access restrictions have 
resulted in the occupation of land areas that have an important function in 
regulating torrential watercourses and stabilizing hillsides, making 
settlements more vulnerable to natural disasters,5 and in the appropriation 
of abandoned industrial sites or waste dumps for residential purposes. 
Moreover, socio-spatial segmentation perpetuates poverty and isolates 
wealth, maintains and even deepens socio-economic inequalities and 
makes it harder to exercise truly democratic citizenship. 
Medium-sized cities saw dynamic population growth although, as 
was the case with other types of cities, expansion was not as rapid as in 
3 The demographic transition, which is occurring nationwide in most of the countries, is 
examined in chapter 6. 
4  Moreover, it would appear that some metropolitan areas have still not regained their 
power to attract immigrants. For example, population flows between the metropolitan 
area of Mexico City and the four other macroregions that are identified in the country 
resulted in the former losing a net 150,000 or so people during 1992-1997 (Conapo, 
1999). Nonetheless, net outward migration was much greater in 1985-1990, which 
explains the rise in Mexico City’s growth rate from an annual average of 0.7% in the 
1980s to 1.5% in 1990-1995.  
5 This is illustrated by the devastation caused to several of the region’s cities recently by 
climatic phenomena (such as El Niño and La Niña and the hurricanes that have ravaged 
Central America and the Caribbean) and earthquakes. 
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previous decades (Jordán and Simioni, 1998). In the 1990s, a number of 
them began to experience some of the problems of large cities. Evidently, 
medium-sized cities are not guaranteed a promising future simply by 
virtue of their size; their viability depends on their economic 
underpinnings,6 including the extent to which they are integrated into the 
global economy, the types of linkages they have with the national and 
regional urban system and their ability to capitalize on comparative 
advantages.7
To sum up the situation in the region’s urban system, the large 
cities showed their ability to rebound from the socio-economic setbacks of 
the 1980s, although severe problems remained. The tendency of 
metropolises to extend their influence beyond their traditional limits and 
radii of action intensified, creating enormously expanded areas of urban 
interaction. The importance of medium-sized cities as engines of urban 
growth was confirmed. As a result, they face a number of challenges. They 
need to ensure they do not reproduce the problems already experienced 
by large cities, while striving to match their success in fomenting and 
supporting productive activity (ECLAC, 1998e). 
The rural population, meanwhile, was virtually stagnant, as figures 
IX.1 and IX.2 show. Since trade liberalization benefits the modern export 
sector but gradually excludes sectors that are poorly capitalized or located 
on marginal lands (Dirven, 1997), the future outlook for the retention of 
population in the Latin American and Caribbean countryside does not 
look as promising as the importance of agriculture and primary products 
in regional exports might suggest. Modern agriculture is not typically 
labour-intensive, and even when it is, its seasonal nature discourages 
permanent settlement in the countryside. Moreover, campesinos are often 
lacking in the skills and specialist know-how required by modern farming 
operations, which thus tend to recruit elsewhere. The fact that the rural 
population continues to be widely scattered militates against the creation 
of settlements large enough to provide access to social services, inhibits 
the creation of links with the public sector and the urban world, and 
encourages emigration. 
6 To these factors should be added the quality of management and the level of 
coordination among the most important actors. 
7 In relation to production, the supply of services, the availability of infrastructure, the 














LATIN AMERICA:  TOTAL, URBAN AND RURAL POPULATIONS, 1970-2000 
(Millions of inhabitants) 
Source: Population Division - Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE); Spatial 
distribution and urbanization in Latin America and the Caribbean (DEPUALC) project (1999).
(b) Changing migratory patterns 
The consolidation of urban predominance has gradually led to 
changes in migratory patterns. As rural-urban migration has declined in 
importance everywhere, migration among urban areas has taken on 
greater proportions. This situation has not been fully grasped by decision 
makers, who still tend to regard migration from the countryside as the 
primary cause of urban ills (Villa, 1996). 
Another form of mobility that has gained importance is inter-
metropolitan migration, i.e., people moving from one large city to another, 
a phenomenon whose characteristics and selectivity make it a factor for 
spatial, demographic and socio-economic differentiation. Although the 
evidence regarding this trend is somewhat fragmentary, figures from 
Mexico provide some illustration. In the period 1950-1960, only 9% of all 
interstate moves were between the Federal District and the state of 
Mexico, whereas during the period 1990-1995 such moves accounted for 
22% of the total (Conapo, 1998).8
Moves between rural areas were connected with economic 
restructuring processes. In many cases they were temporary and were 
8   The great majority of these moves were within the metropolis, since the state of Mexico 
includes the outlying municipalities of the metropolitan area of Mexico City. Survey-
based estimates indicate that at the beginning of the decade 19% of interstate migration 
in Mexico took place within the Mexico City metropolitan area (Conapo, 1997). 
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undertaken for the purposes of seasonal working or itinerant agriculture 
by landless campesinos in areas that were relatively unexploited and often 
ecologically vulnerable.9
The settlement of new areas within countries, however, is still a 
major tendency. This process continued in the region during the 1990s, 
especially in the Amazon and Orinoco river basins. By contrast with what 
had happened in the past, these movements were not driven by official 
land settlement programmes, but rather by the attractive prospects offered 
by opportunities for exploiting natural resources and energy sources, and 
by infrastructure projects. 
The growing importance of the trade in goods and services among 
the countries of the region has also helped consolidate a number of border 
areas. The vigorous population growth that has taken place in a vast area 
of eastern Paraguay —including, most notably, the department of Alto 
Paraná, whose share of the national population increased more than 
tenfold between 1950 and the mid-1990s (Jordán and Simioni, 1998)— 
illustrates the attraction that can be exerted by border externalities (the 
border in this case being the one with Brazil) and by opportunities to 
exploit natural and energy resources. 
The Mexican federal states of Baja California and Quintana Roo 
exemplify the convergence of forces that led to the spatial redistribution of 
population during the decade. Baja California is a special case among the 
states located along the border between Mexico and the United States10 in 
that it has a subsystem of cities adjacent to the international border11 and is 
structurally linked to the economy of the latter country. The economic 
dynamism and job growth that have been stimulated by this link and by  
9  Much of this movement is daily or temporary, as is illustrated by the fact that in 1995,
20% of the economically active population (EAP) engaged in agriculture, or some 8 
million people, lived in urban areas (Dirven, 1997). 
10   The northern border of Mexico is a striking case. For several decades, and particularly 
after 1965, the area was promoted through government measures and incentives, which 
appear to have worked largely by taking advantage of proximity to the United States 
and the fact that labour is cheaper in Mexico than in that country (González, 1999; 
Alegría and others, 1997; Gilbert, 1974). The emergence of a string of cities along this 
border has offset the traditional concentration of population and immigration flows in 
the central region of the country (Valle de México and the state of Morelos). This trend 
is confirmed by the most recent data: whereas in 1965-1970 the net migratory flow to the 
central region was four times greater than that to the northern border (and there was net 
migration from the latter to the central region), in 1992-1997 the northern border was the 
only macroregion in the country with a positive migration balance (Conapo, 1999). 
Indeed, this power to attract migration has continued despite a tendency for 
maquiladoras, which are the traditional productive backbone of the region, to be located 
increasingly in non-border states and municipalities (ECLAC, 1996a). 
11  Tijuana, Mexicali and Ensenada are the urban centres that link this subsystem together. 
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public-sector measures (Alegría and others, 1997) seem to have been the 
principal attractions for the migrants arriving from the country’s other 
states. Indeed, migrants now constitute half the resident population of 
Baja California (Conapo, 1997). Migration to Quintana Roo has been even 
greater,12 but in this case the main attraction has been the opportunity to 
exploit the state’s tourist potential. 
In the border areas between Colombia and Venezuela, by contrast, 
the growth of trade has not had a significant impact on the activities that 
have traditionally been important. There have not been any notable 
changes in these areas, even though trade between the two countries is 
one of the most dynamic axes of commerce within Latin America and 
numerous plans and work agendas have been drawn up over the last two 
decades. 
2.  The politics and financing of decentralization 
Since the 1980s, and particularly in the 1990s, decentralization has 
come to play a fundamental role in the public policies of the region. There 
are two reasons for this. The first is political: decentralization is seen as a 
means of bringing government closer to the people, and thus it is part of 
the current movement towards democratization. The opportunity to 
promote effective citizen participation at the local level is one of the 
arguments for delegating responsibilities to regional and local 
governments. The second reason is economic: as part of the State 
restructuring process, decentralization is seen as a way of increasing the 
efficiency of service delivery, especially in the case of social services, 
which do not offer much scope for economies of scale. The greater 
flexibility of local management, and better access to information about 
local preferences and needs,  further support the argument that 
decentralized service delivery is more efficient. 
In the 1990s, the growing importance of decentralization initiatives, 
enshrined both in constitutional reforms and in legal statutes, translated 
into significant changes in the structure of the public sector. 
Decentralization resulted in a State that was closer to the community and 
gave new importance to the role of local government and administration 
in solving problems and creating development opportunities. Municipal 
and regional governments and administrations became better equipped to 
take responsibility for managing and providing basic services and 
implementing or allocating public spending in their areas. 
12 In the mid-1990s it was estimated that 60% of Quintana Roo’s population came from 
other states (Conapo, 1997). 
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As a general rule, decentralization is always part of a broader 
process of State reform, one that is not confined to the sphere of public 
management alone. This entails substantial changes to government and 
administration, civil society and political parties, which are the traditional 
mechanisms for coordinating the interests of the community. As a result, it 
is difficult for the process to be carried forward and evaluated in isolation; 
it only makes sense when viewed more broadly as part of the historical 
matrix of relationships among the components referred to. 
These developments, then, require changes to political cultures 
whose characteristics are determined by the political structure in place 
and by the peculiarities specific to unitary and federal States. These 
differences in political culture determine which subnational level becomes 
the politico-administrative unit in the decentralization process: regions, 
states (provinces or departments), or municipalities (local governments). 
Furthermore, those differences also determine what particular form is 
taken by the territorial authority, either a delegated governing and 
administrative body that has jurisdiction over a territory, or a 
decentralized entity. Except in some countries that have a federal system, 
the municipality has very much tended to predominate, although interest 
has recently been shown in the intermediate spheres. Thus, the main 
political manifestation of decentralization has been the increase in the 
number of Latin American countries with directly elected mayors, from 
three in 1980 to 17 in 1997, as shown in figure IX.3. Since then, however, 
more leaders have begun to be directly elected at the intermediate levels 
(states, provinces or departments) in several of the region’s countries. 
This process has been accompanied by the development of new 
mechanisms for promoting greater citizen participation in local affairs 
through town councils and open forums. The favoured approach has been 
one that focuses on accountability, citizen control and planning of a kind 
that contributes to the building of social capital, the development of 
mutual trust among the actors involved and the construction of 
governability. The increasing assertiveness of local actors, whose role is 
far more complex than before, is closely connected with this redistribution 
of political and administrative power among territorial entities. This trend 
has empowered subnational territories, political and administrative units 
of different sizes, towns and cities and ethnic territories, which no longer 
just passively experience the changes brought about by territorial 
restructuring but have become active partners in economic and political 


































THE POLITICAL ASPECT:  DIRECTLY ELECTED MAYORS, A GOOD INDICATOR OF 
DECENTRALIZATION 
Source: Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), La ciudad en el siglo XXI. Experiencias exitosas en 
gestión del desarrollo urbano, Washington, D.C., 1998. 
From the economic standpoint, one of the effects of decentralization 
has been that territorial considerations, as well as sectoral ones, have 
become important for the delivery of services, the assumption of financial 
responsibility for and social control of spending, the formulation of public 
policies and coordination among the different territorial actors. Although 
this is very recent, the more dynamic local and regional governments have 
also been taking more and more responsibility for the local economy, 
acting as facilitators and promoters of alliances with the private sector so 
that initiatives to improve business competitiveness and the dynamism of 
the local economy can be negotiated and consolidated. 
The evidence suggests that decentralization has been taken furthest 
in the area of expenditure, reinforcing the growing importance of 
subnational governments as they take direct responsibility for local public 
spending. On the revenue side, by contrast, local tax collection and the 
modernization of subnational tax systems have progressed slowly, making 
for a political economy that is not conducive to a healthy and sustainable 
decentralization process, which has to be based on greater fiscal autonomy 
and responsibility in general at the local level.
As figure IX.4 shows, the percentages of public spending 
undertaken at subnational levels  in the region’s countries averaged 17.4% 
in 1995. However, this simple measure of the degree of decentralization 
fails to reflect significant differences between countries. The indicators of 
one group (Argentina, Brazil and Colombia) are higher than the average 
for the member States of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) (35%); a second group (Bolivia, Mexico and 
Venezuela) has levels somewhat above the average for Latin America; in a 
third group (Chile and Peru, among others), local spending is below the 
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regional average but above 10%; and lastly, there is a group of countries 
(Paraguay and most of the countries of the Central American isthmus and 
the Caribbean) where local spending is lower than 10%. As a result of the 
decentralization initiatives that have been undertaken, however, it is 
estimated that by the end of the decade the regional average was about 
20% of public spending. Although this percentage is markedly higher than 
it was in the mid-1980s (12%), it continues to be substantially lower than 
the average for the OECD countries. 
Figure IX.4 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING IN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
(Percentages) 
Source: Gabriel E. Aghón and Herbert Edling (comps.), Descentralización fiscal en América Latina: nuevos 
desafíos y agenda de trabajo (LC/L.1051), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC), 1997, and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), La ciudad en el siglo XXI. 
Experiencias exitosas en gestión del desarrollo urbano, Washington, D.C., 1998. 
Because little use is made of locally-based taxes in the 
municipalities of the region, however, the extent of municipal 











































towards their communities is less than is assumed in decentralization 
proposals, something that is reflected by the fragile situation with respect 
to local financing. The limitations stem from the difficulty of creating 
larger and better local tax bases and from legal restrictions which leave 
local governments little scope for action in this area. Thus, strengthening 
local tax systems is unquestionably one of the most urgent priorities for 
the countries of the region if decentralization is to be sustainable. Again, 
while local borrowing has opened up greater opportunities for financing 
public investment, it has also brought greater risk to local financing 
structures. For this reason, a framework is needed to regulate local 
government access to credit in order to curtail the negative effects that this 
may have on macroeconomic stability, local finances and political 
confidence in the decentralization process itself.  
The decentralization process has also come up against problems 
and limitations. First of all, in a number of cases (Argentina, Brazil and 
Colombia) it has led to increases in consolidated public spending that 
have not always been matched by revenue growth. Secondly, 
decentralization has given rise to a gradual transfer of responsibilities to 
municipalities, including the provision of basic services (health, education 
and environmental sanitation) and, on occasion, for social and 
transportation infrastructure investment. Because of differences in the 
scale of the resources available in more and less developed regions, often 
due to historical inertia in the allocation process that the new transfer 
systems have not fully corrected, and to differences in administrative 
capabilities, there has been a tendency for increased inequalities in the 
availability and quality of State services. This is the reason for all the 
government efforts and legislative initiatives that have been undertaken to 
revise transfer systems with a view to achieving greater efficiency and, 
even more importantly, greater equity in decentralized social spending. 
Thirdly, there is not always a clear division of powers among the different 
spheres of government or an adequate system for following up and 
evaluating decentralized spending. 
The evidence available confirms both the need to strengthen the 
institutions and human resources that decentralization requires and the 
desirability of establishing systems to follow up and evaluate this process. 
In response to the difficulties outlined, the countries of the region have 
been introducing a variety of innovations and best practice in the different 
areas that are critical to decentralized management.13 Changes of this kind 
have included redesign of transfer systems, some successful attempts to 
modernize local tax collection and establish borrowing rules, decentralized 
management of social services, schemes for greater citizen participation and 
13 This is discussed in greater detail in ECLAC/GTZ (2001). 
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social control of spending and alliances between the public and private 
sectors, as shown in box IX.1. If these innovations are shared and learnt 
from, decentralization may progress more vigorously and be implemented 
more thoroughly in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Box IX.1 
INNOVATION AND PROGRESS WITH DECENTRALIZATION: SOME  
SUCCESS STORIES 
The countries of the region have adopted a variety of practices for 
dealing with the difficulties involved in the transition towards more 
decentralized administration. Some of these approaches are described below: 
Improving local tax collection. Property taxes: the experience of 
cities such as Bogotá (Colombia), La Paz (Bolivia) and Quito (Ecuador) 
show that there are some interesting options, such as the use of self-
appraisal as the basis for assessment of these taxes, complemented by 
greater local autonomy, efficient tax administration and greater transparency 
in the way the revenue collected is ultimately spent. 
Redesign of transfer systems. In some of the region’s countries 
efforts are being made to overhaul these systems by introducing criteria that 
take into account such aspects as the local distribution of income and 
poverty, local tax-collecting efforts, administrative efficiency and service 
costs. This is one of the most important issues on government agendas for 
the coming years. 
New sources of financing and greater private-sector involvement. 
The increasing use of contribution payments for improvements in some 
large and medium-sized cities in Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and 
Peru, among others, has been encouraging greater fiscal responsibility on 
the part of the community by reinforcing the link between local public-sector 
investments and the costs and potential beneficiaries of these. Efforts have 
also been made to mobilize private capital for the funding of projects whose 
local impact is undeniable, through such instruments as concession 
contracts. Under current laws, there is scope for use to be made of these at 
different levels of government in most countries. 
Regulation and oversight of local borrowing. Despite restrictions on 
subnational access to capital markets, the idea of issuing bonds locally is 
beginning to arouse interest, especially in the medium-sized cities and 
metropolitan areas of the region. Again, controversy over borrowing has led 
to calls for this to be managed more responsibly with a view to minimizing 
its potential macroeconomic effects. Perhaps the most striking example of 
progress in this area is the recent law on subnational borrowing in Colombia, 
which regulates access to credit by means of a rating system based on the 
solvency of the local administrations concerned. 
(Continued)
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Box IX.1 (concluded) 
Community participation in spending decisions and oversight. There 
are successful instances of citizen involvement with local budgets in various 
Brazilian cities, especially Porto Alegre, and also some towns in Argentina, 
Chile and Colombia, where the emphasis has been on transparency and the 
political responsibility of the communities and authorities in regard to the 
prioritization of investments and the execution and follow-up of decentralized 
public spending. 
Decentralized management of social services. There have been 
some successful experiments with the provision of social education and 
health services, including mixed public-private cooperation schemes, 
measures to strengthen municipal partnerships and new forms of 
community oversight and participation, the aim in all cases being to achieve 
better local service provision at a lower cost for the town or city concerned. 
Promotion of local economic development. Alliances between the 
public and private sectors. Developments of interest in this area include joint 
local initiatives between the public and private sectors to create business 
training centres, support technological innovation and foster local economic 
potential, especially in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, but also in other 
countries. 
Source: Gabriel E. Aghón and Gerold Krause-Junk, Descentralización fiscal en América Latina. Balance y 
principales desafíos (LC/L.948), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), 1996. 
Although there is still a long way to go, the decentralization process 
embodies a quest for comprehensive, more democratic and equitable local 
development that could foster economic progress in towns and regions so 
that excessive concentration in large cities and their surrounding regions 
can be redressed. 
3. Territorial heterogeneity 
Historically, Latin American and Caribbean countries have always 
been characterized by a heavy concentration of population and wealth in 
metropolitan areas and the existence of marginal regions and areas with a 
declining economic base (coal, tin, the textile industry, coffee, etc.). 
Physically, economically, socially and politically detached from the rest of 
the national territory, marginal regions have suffered from pervasive 
deficiencies in transportation and communications infrastructure, low or 
non-existent economic growth, serious problems of land ownership and 
tenancy, inappropriate use and management of natural resources, poor 
marketing systems and serious deprivation among their campesino, settler 
or indigenous populations. Declining areas, meanwhile, have been 
characterized by an exhausted or obsolete economic base, emigration, and 
a stock of physical capital that does not provide an adequate basis for the 
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logic of economic modernization implicit in State-led industrialization 
models. Owing to the structural nature of their problems, regions of the 
latter type have received considerable attention from the public sector in 
almost all the countries of the region.  
Attempts to account for regional disparities have attributed them, 
on the one hand, to the logic of private capital accumulation, whereby 
investors have sought to maximize returns by committing their resources 
to vigorously growing areas, and, on the other hand, to the practice of 
allocating public-sector resources in such a way as to minimize the 
opportunity costs of capital by favouring regions in which the conditions 
for rapid success are in place. The most common interpretation points to a 
vicious circle in which population and economic activity become 
increasingly concentrated in metropolitan areas while marginal areas and 
regions with a decaying economic base continue to decline. 
Public policies that have sought to reverse territorial concentration 
by various means have yielded only modest results because their design 
and execution have failed to take sufficient account of the sectoral linkages 
—let alone the territorial ones— operating through the urban-regional 
system. Even when successful, these policies have tended to punish low-
income groups in well-to-do regions and to benefit upper-income sectors 
in the poorer regions. 
(a) Regional disparities 
According to the paradigm that prevailed in the 1980s, disparities in 
per capita income among different territories should tend to diminish over 
the long term. It was argued that unrestricted internal factor mobility 
would combine with market opening to bring about the integration of 
territories that had been left behind by the industrialization process. The 
empirical evidence available for some countries confirms that there was a 
tendency for disparities in per capita output among politico-
administrative regions to narrow somewhat between 1970 and the end of 
the 1980s. This trend was most evident in Brazil, Chile and Colombia and 
the least so in Mexico and Peru. In both groups of countries, however, this 
trend was cut short and even reversed (as in Colombia) over the course of 
the 1990s, as can be seen in figure IX.5.14
14 The index of regional disparities used is the so-called sigma convergence (Cuadrado 
and García, 1995). An index value of zero signifies complete equality in the per capita 
output of the different regions, while a value of 1 would indicate a situation of extreme 
disparity. The index is defined as the square root of the sum of the squares of the 
differences between the per capita output of each region and the national average, 
divided by the number of regions. 
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Figure IX.5 
INDEX OF REGIONAL DISPARITIES 
(Per capita output) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
A more detailed analysis shows that the convergence that took 
place up until 1990 was due to two main factors: firstly, a loss of 
dynamism in metropolitan hubs, whose rate of decline at times of 
recession was higher than the national average; and secondly, the 
emergence of vigorous growth in some territories which specialized in the 
production of new goods and services and thereby succeeded in 
participating successfully in the globalization process. The relationship 
between regional convergence until 1990 and the opening up and 
liberalization of the region’s economies is questionable since, other than in 
Chile, these processes did not get fully under way in the countries 
mentioned until the mid-1980s or early 1990s. 
After 1990, when these processes became more universal, economic 
growth in metropolitan areas picked up and the dominance of these areas 
in the generation of national output generally increased. These 
metropolitan hubs now coexist with territories in different parts of the 
country that have globalized by expanding their exportable output of 
natural resource-based products, with border territories that have been 
boosted by regional integration and with territories that are marginalized 
or excluded from international and even domestic markets. 
This heterogeneity means that regional disparities need to be 
examined afresh. Although little or no convergence is taking place among 
politico-administrative units at the country level, in all cases the 
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interregional differences are surpassed or amplified by intraregional 
differences, as both are just different manifestations of social inequalities 
in income distribution. This is true almost universally in the countries of 
Latin America and the Caribbean, where regions that have traditionally 
been “winners” contain areas and social groups that are “losers” and 
where, conversely, regions that have traditionally been “losers” can now 
show instances of successful areas and social groups (Caravaca, 1998). 
As regards the region’s towns and cities, two main trends can be 
distinguished. Firstly, certain medium-sized centres have consolidated 
after growing rapidly thanks to rising prices for some of their export 
products. Secondly, advanced services are becoming increasingly 
concentrated in metropolises and, to a lesser extent, in other capital cities. 
Indeed, the consolidation of global cities is a fundamental characteristic of 
the urban process in the region. The role of these cities in the movement of 
financial capital, coupled with their resources in the form of knowledge 
capital and skilled personnel, has strengthened their position as regional 
business centres and hence their ability to connect with the global 
economy.  
(b) The reorientation of territorial planning and management 
The processes that drove territorial restructuring greatly reduced 
the effectiveness of the old top-down national planning models. Instead, 
hopes began to be placed in a new type of planning that was more 
strategic and selective, that provided more long-term direction and that 
struck a better balance between the interests of the public and private 
sectors (ECLAC/ILPES, 1999). Regional and urban planning in the 1990s 
was characterized by this effort to bring public and private agents 
together so that they could improve competitiveness in the different 
territories, achieve higher levels of social equity and deal with crisis 
situations. At the same time, management at the subnational level came to 
be regarded as indispensable if resources were to be used efficiently, the 
needs of the population addressed and participation increased. 
This is a clear sign that the territorial dimension is a major 
component of social inequality, both in itself and through its strong 
association with other factors that determine primary income distribution. 
Indeed, some studies (Martin, 1986) have demonstrated a clear correlation 
between politico-administrative jurisdictions, rural or urban residence, 
education levels, occupational categories and sectors of economic activity. 
Thus, social groups in different countries have their own particular 
combinations of characteristics in each of these respects, and the policies 
applied to them thus have to have very specific components to address the 
problems of poverty and social inequality at the territorial level. 
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Special mention should be made of measures to promote 
production activities and develop local business systems with a view to 
increasing productivity, the training of human resources to carry out 
specific processes and the use of innovation systems to promote 
competitiveness, which are now planned with territorial needs in mind, as 
well as sectoral ones (ILPES, 1998). Another indication of change is the 
renewed recognition being given to the value of selective public action to 
promote better coordinated urban systems, reduce rural dispersion and 
make cities, including metropolises, more competitive, orderly, and 
pleasant to live in. 
Despite the encouraging direction of change, there are still many 
gaps where public action is required. Although there is no place for 
coercion or a return to the inflexible policies seen prior to the 1980s, most 
of the countries in the region lack an objective long-term vision for the use 
and occupation of their territory. If they are to produce a territorial 
structure consistent with a process of genuine economic modernization 
with equity that guarantees democracy and social and environmental 
sustainability, the policies implemented need to be comprehensive and 
multifaceted. Territorial planning may be seen as a sort of matrix in which 
the vectors represent specific fields of action in the form of policies 
relating to land use, decentralization, economic growth and the socio-
economic development of spatial units. Taken together, these policies 
should ensure national consistency so that territorial decentralization is 
carried out in accordance with a plan that does not lead to incoherence 
and thence the risk that it may be reversed. 
The reduced scope for central government action that has resulted 
from the change in the role of the State entailed by globalization and 
regional integration, and the increased responsibilities that 
decentralization brings for subnational governments and administrations, 
mean that it is time to develop a new concept of territory. Rather than 
being treated as a monolithic, homogeneous entity whose only function is 
to serve as a context for the agglomeration, distribution and interaction of 
the population and its activities, territory should be understood in all the 
diversity of the economic, environmental, and sociocultural situations 
which it contains and around which different actors organize themselves 
in an interplay of consensus and conflict that has to be reconciled in 
pursuit of a common development project. 
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